THE

HISTORY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the

Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL. D. F. A. S.

Εκ μεν τοιγε της ἁπαντων προς αλληλα συμπλοκης και παραθεσεως, ετι δε ὁμοιοτητος και διαφορας, μονως αν τις εφικοιτο και δυνηθειη κατοπτευσας, ἁμα και το χρησιμον και το τερπνον εκ της ἱστοριας λαβειν.
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ERRATA.

Page 3, line 25, *for* Harpalus, *read* Harpagus.
22, —— 13, Note, *for* τȣ των, *read* τȣτων.
225, —— 3, Note, *for* τις, *read* ταις.

THE

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASVATI MAHAL. THE TANJORE

CHAP. XI.

Military Glory of Greece.—Enemies to whom that Country was exposed.—Foundation and Growth of Carthage.—The flourishing Condition of Magna Græcia—Excites the Jealousy of the Carthaginians—Who enter into a League with Xerxes.—The Object of this Alliance.—Causes of the singular Prosperity of Magna Græcia.—History of Pythagoras, and of his Philosophy.—The Carthaginians invade Sicily.—Their Disasters.—Glory of Gelon.—His Treaty with the Carthaginians.—Causes of the Decay of Magna Græcia.

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State of Greece. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 480.

THE beginning of the fifth century before Christ forms the most glorious æra in the history of Greece. While the republics of Athens and Sparta humbled the pride of Asia, the flourishing settlements on the Hellespont and the

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the Hadriatic overawed the fierce Barbarians of Europe [1]; and the southern colony of Cyrené restrained, within their native limits, the savage ferocity of the Libyans [2]. The north, south, and east thus acknowledging the ascendant of the Grecian valour and genius, Rome still contended in the west, with the obstinacy of the Volsci [3], for the rude villages of Latium: yet on this side, from which the stream of conquest was destined, in a future age, to flow over the world, the Greeks had already most danger to apprehend, and most laurels to acquire; not, however, from Rome, but from the implacable [4] enemy of the Roman name.

The foundation and growth of Carthage,

The foundation and growth of Carthage, which have been so successfully adorned by poetical fiction, are very imperfectly explained in history. It is known, that at least eight hundred and ninety years [5] before the Christian æra, a Phœnician colony settled on that fertile projecture of the African coast, which boldly advances into the Mediterranean, to meet, as it were, and to defy the shores of Sicily and Italy, planted in the following century by

[1] Herodot. l. vi. Thucydid. l. i.

[2] Strabo, l. xvii.

[3] Diodor. l. xi.

[4] With what energy does Virgil express the eternal enmity between Rome and Carthage?

Littora littoribus contraria, fluctibus undas,
Imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipsique nepotes. Æneid. l. iv.

[5] B. C. 891. Petav. de Doctr. Temporum. Yet, as there is a gap in the Carthaginian history of several centuries, every man of taste will be desirous of extending the duration of this dark and unknown period, to have the pleasure of believing that Æneas and Dido were contemporaries: an opinion more probable than that of Sir Isaac Newton, who would bring down the time of Æneas and the æra of the Trojan war to the age of Dido and the foundation of Carthage.

Greeks,

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Greeks, with whom the republic of Carthage, long before the age of her great Hannibal, waged many cruel and bloody wars. For three centuries after their eſtabliſhment, the Carthaginians ſeem to have ſilently but ſucceſsfully availed themſelves of the natural fertility of their ſoil, the conveniency of their harbours, the ſkill and dexterity of their artiſans, the adventurous ſpirit of their mariners; above all, of the profound wiſdom of their government, which had been eſtabliſhed on ſuch admirable principles, that, from the foundation of their city till the age of the philoſopher Ariſtotle[6], no tyrant had oppreſſed the freedom, no ſedition had diſturbed the tranquillity of Carthage[7].

which oppoſes the naval enterpriſes of the Greeks.

From this peaceful and happy obſcurity the Carthaginians firſt emerged into notice in conſequence of their oppoſition to the naval enterpriſes of the Aſiatic Greeks, who, about the middle of the ſixth century before Chriſt, flying the oppreſſive domination of Perſia, threw themſelves on the weſtern ſhores and iſlands of the Mediterranean. As a maritime and enterpriſing nation the Greeks were naturally the rivals of the Carthaginians; and the Phocæans, who had left the coaſt of Ionia to avoid the cruel tyranny of the ſatrap Harpalus, had landed

6 Ariſtot. de Repub. l. ii. c. xi.

7 If Dido laid the foundation of ſo much proſperity and happineſs, ſhe might boaſt, with becoming dignity, of having ſecured immortal fame:

> Vixi, & quem dederat curſum fortuna peregi,
> Urbem præclaram ſtatui, mea mœnia vidi:
> Et nunc magna mei ſub terris ibit imago. VIRGIL, ibid.

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at, or perhaps founded, Aleria in the isle of Corsica, before they finally settled at Velia[8] in Italy, and Marseilles in Gaul[9]. The Carthaginians, who had already formed establishments in Corsica, regarded the whole island as a dependency of their republic, and set themselves to oppose with vigour the Grecian invaders. From a similar motive the Tuscans embraced the same design; and the most ancient naval engagement, distinctly recorded in history, was fought in the Sardinian sea, between the Phocæans with sixty sail on the one side, against the Tuscans and Carthaginians with double that number on the other[10]. The Greeks had the whole glory of the battle; they destroyed forty of the enemy's ships, and compelled the rest to fly. But the smallness of their numbers, greatly diminished by their desperate efforts in defence of the honour of their nation against a superior force, obliged them to abandon the project of settling in Corsica.

Hinders them from settling in Corsica.

Power and splendour of Carthage. Olymp. lxx. 1. A. C. 500.

Though the issue of this memorable sea-fight tends to dispel the cloud of fiction concerning the remote voyages and ancient naval power of the Carthaginians, yet it cannot be doubted, that in the beginning of the following century, and before the invasion of Xerxes, they were the most powerful commercial nation in the world. The proud centre of their empire was surrounded by a cluster of colonies and tributary cities, which extended

[8] Diodor. l. v. and Cluverius Sicil. Ant. p. 507.

[9] Thucydid. l. i.

[10] Id. ibid. & Herodot. l. vi.

above

above a thousand miles [11] along the coast of Africa. They were masters of Sardinia and the northern coast of Sicily [12]. They had established colonies not only in Corsica, but in Malta and the Balearian isles. They often visited the Casseterides. They probably first discovered the Canaries, whose equable and happy temperature entitled them to the epithet of Fortunate. They had appropriated the gold mines of Spain, the Peru and Mexico of the ancient world [13]; and all these advantages being directed by the prudent enterprise of the magistrates, consisting chiefly of merchants [14], and improved by the patient industry

[11] From the western boundary of Cyrenaica to the Straits of Gibraltar, Shaw reckons 1420 geographical miles; but this was the extent of the Carthaginian dominion in the greatest splendour of the republic. SHAW's Travels, p. 150.

[12] Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

[13] Auctor. apud Hendreich Respub. Carthag. l. i.

[14] In this respect the government of Carthage was very different from that of Crete, and particularly of Sparta, with both which Aristotle compares it. Isocrates (ad Nicoclem) says, that in civil affairs the Carthaginian government was aristocratical; in military, royal: this probably was the case in the earliest times. The chief magistrates were called Suffetes, which, in the Hebrew language, signifies judges (Bochart, Canaan), and might therefore be naturally translated by the word βασιλεις, in Greek. But it appears from Aristotle, that these judges or kings, who were two in number, were nothing more than annual magistrates, who convoked the senate, and presided in that assembly. When the senate and the suffetes were of one mind, the people had no vote in the management of public affairs; but when their opinions were different, it belonged to the people to decide. Aristotle regards this as an imperfection in their constitution; and time justified his opinion. In a commercial republic, where the people gradually become more rich and more licentious, such a regulation naturally tended to throw too much power into their hands. During the century which elapsed from Aristotle to Hannibal, the people of Carthage became more powerful than the senate; at Rome the

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duftry of the people, who knew that by gaining wealth they muft attain refpect, rendered Carthage the centre of general commerce. From Egypt they imported linen and the papyrus; the coafts of the Red Sea furnifhed them with fpices, perfumes, gold, pearls, and precious ftones [15]. The rich carpets of Perfia adorned the palaces of the Carthaginian magiftrates. From Spain they drew the precious metals neceffary to facilitate their commerce; and from Britain and other provinces of the north they derived iron, lead, tin, and copper, equally neceffary to fecond all the efforts of their induftry. The Carthaginian exports confifted partly in the produce of their fertile foil, but chiefly in the ingenious labours of their artificers; grains, fruits, honey, leather, and flax of a fuperior kind [16]; naval ftores, particularly ropes made of a fpecies of broom called fpartum; houfehold furniture, toys, and the materials of the highly valued *Punicean* colour. Their mechanic arts had attained a degree of perfection which was acknowledged and admired by their enemies [17]; but the liberal arts, and particularly poetry and eloquence [18], feem never to

the fenate were more powerful than the people: and to thefe circumftances chiefly, the moft judicious author of antiquity afcribes the very different fortune of the two nations in the ever memorable wars waged between them. POLYB. l. vi.

15 Pliny, l. xxxviii. c. vii. tells us, that carbuncles were fo common in Carthage, that they were generally known by the name of Carthaginian.

16 Xenophon, de Venatione.

17 Cato de Re Ruftica, & Valerius Maximus, l. vii.

18 The great Hannibal was a lover of Greek learning, and compofed feveral books in that language. Cornelius Nepos in Hannibal. Silenus,

to have flouriſhed or taken root in their republic; a circumſtance more fatal to the renown of Carthage than all the deſtructive ravages of the Romans, whoſe immortal hate would have found it more difficult to aboliſh the elegant inventions of genius, than to extinguiſh the moſt ſplendid monuments of wealth and grandeur.

The ambitious and jealous ſpirit of that republic.

Few individuals are able to enjoy, without abuſing, the gifts of fortune; and no nation ever poſſeſſed power, without aſpiring at conqueſt. But the commercial ambition of the Carthaginians was diſtinguiſhed by an excluſive and jealous ſpirit, which ſought to ſtifle the activity and improvements of every people that might ever become their rival. In the end of the ſixth century before Chriſt, and twenty-eight years before the invaſion of Xerxes, they concluded a treaty with Rome, recently delivered from the tyranny of its kings, which marks the utmoſt ſolicitude to prevent the new republic from ever entering into correſpondence, or ever gaining acquaintance [19] with the dependencies of Carthage.

The proſperity of Greece alarms the Carthaginians,

The Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, which, within the courſe of ſixty years, had (for reaſons that will immediately be explained) received

Silenus, another Carthaginian, wrote hiſtory in Greek. Cicer. de Divinat. Salluſt ſpeaks of *Punic books* in his hiſtory of the Jugurthine war; and we know that Mago's Treatiſe of Rural Oeconomy, in 28 books, was tranſlated by order of the Roman ſenate, although the elder Cato had previouſly handled that important ſubject. I mention not the ſpurious voyage of Hanno, ſince better proofs of the Carthaginian literature may be found in the ſecond and eighteenth books of Pliny. But two obſervations naturally preſent themſelves, which juſtify what is ſaid in the text; firſt, that the Carthaginians wrote rather on the uſeful than ornamental arts; and ſecondly, that their greateſt writers preferred the Greek to the Punic language.

19 Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

 ſuch

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such accessions of strength and splendour, as entitled those countries to the appellation of Magna Græcia [20], more justly alarmed the jealousy, and provoked the envious resentment of the Carthaginian magistrates. The Greeks were already masters of the eastern isles and shores of the Mediterranean. They were not only a warlike, but an ingenious and commercial nation. The naval force of the Phocæans alone had defied and disgraced the united fleets of the Tuscans and Carthaginians. The latter therefore beheld, with the utmost satisfaction, the continual sparks of hostility that broke out between the Greeks and Persians. They learned, with admiration and delight, the mighty preparations of Xerxes; but were still more delighted when the great king, who had been accustomed to receive the presents and the adulation of the tributary princes of Asia, condescended to demand an equal alliance with their republic; probably granted them subsidies to raise troops in Spain, Gaul, and the northern parts of Italy; and only required them to join their efforts with his own, to punish, and, if possible, to extirpate the natural enemies of both. The crafty Africans greedily accepted propositions, seemingly so favourable to their interest; and, after three years preparations, had collected an armament of two thousand ships of war, and three thousand transports, to convey an army of three hundred thousand men into Magna Græcia [21]. It was determined between the confederates, that while Xerxes poured his millions into the centre of Greece,

who enter into an alliance with Xerxes.

[20] Strabo, l. viii. p. 389. [21] Herodot. l. vii. & Diodor. l. xi.

and

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and rooted out the original ſtock of the devoted nation, the Carthaginians ſhould cut off its flouriſhing branches in Italy and Sicily. The terms of the agreement were carefully obſerved; the combined attack was made at the time appointed; and Europe is intereſted in knowing to what particular cauſes muſt be aſcribed the failure of expeditions, which, if ſucceſsful, would probably have inverted her deſtiny, and deprived her of the boaſted ſuperiority which ſhe thenceforth maintained over the other quarters of the world.

Their views in adopting this meaſure.

Whoever has obſerved the deſolate barbarity of Calabria, or reflected on the narrow extent and preſent weakneſs of Sicily, cannot hear, without a mixture of ſurpriſe and incredulity, that five centuries before Chriſt, thoſe countries contained above twenty warlike communities, ſeveral of whom could ſend into the field an hundred thouſand fighting men. The haſty glance of impatient ignorance will confidently reject, on this ſubject, the evidence of antiquity, as contrary to probability and experience; the contemplative viſionary will admit the fact, and deduce from it many gloomy reflections on the old age and decay of the world; but the more practical philoſopher will attempt to diſcover the cauſes of the ancient and actual ſtate of Magna Græcia, in the hiſtory and inſtitutions of that country during the reſpective periods of time which are the objects of his reſearch.

The flouriſhing condition of Magna Græcia.

The eſtabliſhment of Eubœan Cumæ, the mother of Parthenopé, or Naples, and the foundation of a few other Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, remounts,

Hiſtory of the colonization of that country.

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remounts, as already mentioned, to the heroic ages; but by far the greater number of Greek colonies in thoſe parts were planted during the eighth century before the Chriſtian æra [22], and chiefly, 1. by the Eubœans, whoſe principal city, Chalcis, uſually furniſhing the conductor of the colony, gave the epithet of Chalcidian to the new ſettlements; 2. by the Achæans of Peloponneſus, who were of the Eolian tongue and lineage; and, 3. by the Dorian ſtates of that peninſula, eſpecially Corinth; to which city may be applied the obſervation of ancient republicans concerning the fathers of Cato and Brutus, that as children often derived luſtre from the merit of their parents, ſo Corinth acquired renown from the ſplendour and proſperity of its children. Beſides their powerful colonies in Corcyra, Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, whoſe tranſactions form ſuch an important part of the hiſtory of ancient Greece, the Corinthians founded Syracuſe, which ſoon became, and long continued, the capital of Sicily. Seventy years after their eſtabliſhment there, the inhabitants of Syracuſe built Acras, and afterwards, at an equal diſtance of time, Camerina. Many other cities of leſs note owed their birth to the ſame metropolis; ſo that in the ſixth century before Chriſt, the Syracuſans had extended their ſettlements over all the ſouthern coaſt of the iſland [23]. We had

The Dorian colonies moſt powerful in Sicily. Olymp. xi. 2. A.C. 729.

[22] Between the 10th and 30th Olympiads, and the years 737 and 777 B. C.

[23] Scymnus, v. 293. Thucyd. l. vi. & Herodot. l. vii.

already

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already an opportunity to mention on what occasion the Lacedæmonians founded the city of Tarentum in Italy; thirty-nine years afterwards, Rhegium was built by the Messenians and Chalcidians, the former of whom (as we have related above) had already settled at Messene, on the opposite shore of Sicily. The citizens of Tarentum founded Heraclea, situated on the Tarentine gulph, and perhaps gave an accession of inhabitants to Locri, which, though originally planted by the Eolians, seems early to have used the Doric dialect. The Rhodians, who were also of the Doric race, built the city of Gela in Sicily, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse[24]; and Gela planted the flourishing colony of Agrigentum, which soon surpassed the splendour of its metropolis, and became the second city in the island.

Olymp. viii. 2. A. C. 707.

Olymp. xlix. 3. A. C. 582.

The Eolian, in Italy.

By means of these powerful establishments, the *Dorians* acquired, and always maintained, an ascendant in Sicily; but the Achæan colonies, who were of the *Eolian* blood and language[25], commanded the Italian shore. Crotona, the most considerable city of the Achæans, and of all Italy in ancient times, was built seven hundred and ten years before Christ[26]. Sybaris, its rival, was founded about the same time, and by the same nation. The former sent colonies to Tirina, Cau-

24 Thucyd. l. vi.

25 Strabo, l. viii. p. 513. assures us of the latter circumstance, which is of more importance than the uncertain genealogy of the ancient Grecian tribes.

26 Dionys. Halicarn. l. ii.

lonia,

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lonia, and Pandosia; the latter built Laus, Metapontum, and Posidonia, or Pæstum[27], whose admired ruins attest the ancient wealth and grandeur of the Greek cities of Italy.

The Ionian the weakest in both countries.

In this deduction, had we followed the order of time, we ought to have mentioned, first of all, the Ionian colonies, who came from the isle of Eubœa. The inhabitants of that island built Naxus in Sicily, a year before the foundation of Syracuse[28]; but neither that, nor their settlements at Catana, Egesta, Leontium, ever attained considerable populousness or splendour. And it deserves to be particularly remarked, that, for reasons which will appear in the sequel of this work, the Ionians, who settled chiefly near the eastern shore of Sicily, never rivalled the power and fame of their Dorian and Eolian neighbours, but fell short of those nations in Magna Græcia, as much as they surpassed them in the shores and islands of Asia.

General causes of the wealth and populousness of all these colonies.

Instead of fatiguing the memory of our readers with the names of less considerable states or cities, which had little influence on the general affairs of the whole country[29], it is of more importance to

27 Scymnus, v. 245. 28 Thucyd. l. vi.

29 The Magna Græcia, which I always use in the sense of Strabo, cited above, to denote the Greek settlements in Sicily as well as Italy, being the most accessible part of the Grecian dominions, has been more fully described by the moderns than any other. The immense collection of the Thesaurus Siculus, and particularly vols. i. iv. vii. viii. and xiii. afford useful materials, as well as Cluverii Sicil. Antiqua, and Fazellus de Rebus Siculis, and the excellent work of Gio. Balt. Caruso, Memorie istoriche di quanto e accaduto in Sicilia dal tempo dé suoi primi habitanti fino ai Normanni.

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Olymp. lxx. 1. A.C. 500.

examine the circumſtances to which the inhabitants of Magna Græcia owed their flouriſhing ſituation at the period of time of which we write, when (it may be boldly affirmed) theſe colonies equalled, and exceeded, the wealth and power of the mother-country. We ſhall not inſiſt on the well-known phyſical and moral cauſes which uſually contribute to the rapid growth of newly-eſtabliſhed colonies. It is evident, that amidſt the equality of fortune, and ſimplicity of manners, which commonly prevail in ſuch communities, men who have a wide country before them muſt naturally multiply far beyond the proportion of nations corrupted and weakened by the vices of wealth, luxury, and above all, of vanity, which perhaps is the greateſt enemy to the increaſe of the human ſpecies. It is ſufficient barely to mention the natural fertility of Magna Græcia, and particularly of Sicily, which in many places produced an hundred fold[30]. The Greeks who ſailed thither from Peloponneſus, carried with them the knowledge and practice of agriculture, which had early attained an high degree of perfection in their peninſula; and the exuberant ſoil of Sicily, improved by cultivation, ſoon exhibited a picture of that rich abundance, which, in later times, made that beautiful iſland be entitled the granary of Rome[31].

Particular cauſes. The Achæan laws.

The peculiar ſituation of the Achæans and Dorians, from whom, chiefly, the colonies in Magna Græcia derived their origin, had a conſiderable

30 Strabo, l. viii.

31 Diodorus, l. xvi.

influence

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influence in accelerating the population and grandeur of these new establishments. The Achæans, whose republic became so famous in later times, and that in consequence of circumstances which it is necessary at present to describe, originally inhabited a long, but narrow strip of ground, not more fertile than extensive, along the Corinthian gulph, whose rocky shores were destitute of good harbours [32]. But the impartial and generous spirit of the Achæan laws early compensated the natural defects of their territory. They were the first, and long the only republic of Greece, who admitted strangers into their community on equal terms with the ancient citizens [33]. In *their* truly free country, no powerful capital, like Thebes in Bœotia, or Athens in Attica, domineered over the inferior towns and villages. Twelve cities, which had common laws and institutions, and afterwards common weights and measures [34], sent deputies to Helicé, which is distinguished by Homer [35] as the most considerable town of Achaia. That place being destroyed by an earthquake [36] three hundred and seventy-three years before Christ, Ægæ became the seat of the general congress, which regulated public affairs, and appointed annual magi-

32 Plutarch, in Arato, p. 1031. 33 Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

34 Polybius, ibid. mentions this circumstance, to shew how desirous they were to have every thing common and equal among them.

35 Il. ii. in the catalogue.

36 Strabo, l. viii. p. 589. says, the earthquake happened two years before the battle of Leuctra, which was fought 371 years before Christ.

strates

ftrates and generals to execute their refolutions, who were accountable to the congrefs, or council, as the members of the council themfelves were to the cities by which they had been named and conftituted [37]. This excellent fyftem of government, which checked the ambition, while it maintained the independence of Achaia [38], defended that fortunate country againft the convulfions which fhook and overwhelmed the moft powerful republics of Greece. It was then that the Achæans, who during many ages had enjoyed their equitable laws in filence, emerged from obfcurity; and communicating their government on equal terms to the neighbouring cities of Peloponnefus, preferved the feeble fpark of liberty, every where extinguifhed around them, for one hundred and thirty-fix years, till they finally yielded to the power and policy of Rome [39]. This fhort period of war and tumult has been minutely defcribed in hiftory, while the many happy centuries that preceded it are but occafionally glanced at by ancient writers: and were it not for the defeats and calamities which the Achæans fuffered in later times, we fhould, perhaps, be ignorant that their anceftors anciently poffeffed an equitable and generous policy, which being tranfported with them into Magna Græcia, could not fail to promote the happinefs and profperity of that delightful country [40].

A.C. 281.

The

37 Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

38 Schook. Achaia, apud Gronov. Thef. t. v.

39 Polyb. Excerp. Legat. & Titus Livius, l. xxxviii. & xxxix.

40 Xenophon, in his Greek hiftory, fpeaks of the excellence of the Achæan laws, in treating a paffage of hiftory which will be related

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The ſtate of the Dorians at the time of their emigration to Magna Græcia.

The condition of the Dorians, at the time when they planted colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not leſs worthy of remark. The Dorian ſtates of Peloponneſus were then univerſally ſubject to the gentle government of limited but hereditary princes, or to magiſtrates choſen from the deſcendants of their ancient royal families [41], and who, thus adorned by birth, were ſometimes ſtill more ennobled by wiſdom and virtue [42]. It is the nature of colonies to preſerve with affectionate reſpect the inſtitutions of the mother-country, which often improve by tranſplantation, and thrive and flouriſh in foreign lands, when they have withered and periſhed in the ſoil which originally produced and propagated them. Time and accident, and the various cauſes which have been explained in the courſe of this hiſtory, tended to change the ancient conſtitution, and to diminiſh the ſtrength of the Grecian ſtates on both ſides the Corinthian Iſthmus. While fierce and frequent wars exhauſted their population, the excluſive ſpirit of republican jealouſy, which ſternly refuſed ſtrangers any participation in their government, or any

Circumſtances favourable to the new ſettlers in that country.

lated in the ſequel. Polybius was evidently engaged to enter deeper into this ſubject, by the reaſon aſſigned in the text.

41 Theſe were properly the only nobility in Greece; they were called ευπατριδαι, and long held ſway in all the Grecian ſtates. S. Petitus has collected the moſt important paſſages concerning them in his commentary on the ancient Athenian law, "Τους Ευπατριδας γινωσκειν τα θεια, και παρεχειν αρχοντας, και νομων διδασκαλους ειναι, και ὁσιων και ἱερων εξηγηται." "That the Eupatridæ, or nobility, adminiſter the rites of religion, fill the offices of magiſtracy, interpret the laws, and explain all ſacred and divine matters."

42 Thucyd. l. i.

protection

protection from their laws, naturally repressed their vigour and stunted their growth. The colonies in Magna Græcia, enjoying a wide territory before them, had not the same interference of interest, and found sufficient employment in subduing the original inhabitants of that country, without commencing hostilities against each other. Nor were they more ambitious to subdue the barbarous natives, than solicitous to incorporate them into their own communities. The kings, or nobility, of Magna Græcia, secure of their own pre-eminence, felt[43] nothing of the republican jealousies which prevailed in the mother-country. They received with pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter they might come. The Barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were associated; their children received a Grecian education; and the states of Italy and Sicily thus increasing by degrees, could soon boast, the former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuse, Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, and several other cities, which rivalled or surpassed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populousness of Thebes, Argos, or Sparta.

The oppression of the Asiatic Greeks brought

The wars, conquests, or oppressions, but above all, the civil dissensions, which in the sixth century before Christ disturbed and deformed the coast of Ionia,

43 The same policy was practised by Macedon; and, as we shall have occasion to relate, was the primary cause of the Macedonian greatness.

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new inhabitants to Italy and Sicily;

Ionia, and the other Grecian colonies in the islands and continent of Asia, brought frequent accessions of inhabitants to the shores of Magna Græcia. In that age the Asiatic Greeks had attained greater proficiency, both in the useful and in the agreeable arts, than any other portion of the Grecian name; but they had also sunk deeper in voluptuousness and luxury. Their poetry, which still remains, alike attests the refinement of their taste, and the corruption of their morals. The effeminate vices, for which the Ionians were thenceforth in all ages infamous [44], seem to have taken deep root in that century; and it is probable, that along with their poetry, music, and painting, they communicated also their dissolute and artificial appetites to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily.

who improved arts, and corrupted manners;

But whether this be admitted, or whether we suppose that, according to the ordinary course of events, the inhabitants of Magna Græcia having attained opulence by industry, dissipated it in idleness and licentiousness, it is acknowledged by all writers on this part of history, that the Greek cities of Italy, and particularly Sybaris and Crotona, had degenerated from their ancient maxims, and fallen a prey to the most dangerous errors and vices, when Pythagoras came to their relief, about five hundred and fifty years before the Christian æra.

which are reformed by Pythagoras.

The philosophy of Pythagoras forms an important object in the history of the human mind:

44 Motus doceri gaudet *Ionicos*
Matura virgo, & fingitur artibus,
Jam nunc, & incestos amores
De tenero meditatur ungue. HORACE.

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and if we admit the concurring teſtimony of ancient authors [45], the philoſophy, or rather the legiſlation, of this extraordinary man, reformed and improved the manners and policy of Magna Græcia, and contributed in an eminent degree, not only to the quiet and happineſs, but to the induſtry, power, and ſplendour, of that celebrated country. Leſt this influence ſhould appear too great, and even incredible, in a ſtranger, who is known to have ſtudiouſly declined all public offices and authority, the occaſion requires that we ſhould explain the means by which ſuch extraordinary effects were produced.

History of that philoſopher. Olymp. xlv. 1. A.C. 600.

Pythagoras was born at Samos [46], when Samos was the richeſt and moſt flouriſhing of all the Grecian iſles. His father, Mneſarchus, being a perſon of diſtinction in his country [47], the promiſing youth was carefully inſtructed in the learning known or valued in that early age. Muſic, poetry, and the gymnaſtic exerciſes, formed the principal part of his education; but the young philoſopher, if we may anticipate that name, was not indifferent [48]

His education.

45 Particularly Ariſtoxenus, the learned diſciple of Ariſtotle (apud Stobæum, Serm. xli.); various ancient authors cited by Jamblicus and Porphyry, as well as by Diogenes Laertius, l. viii.; to which add Juſtin, l. xx. and Cicero, Tuſc. Quæſt. de Amicitia, & de Oratore. "Pythagoras exornavit eam Græciam quæ Magna dicta eſt, & privatim & publice, præſtantiſſimis & inſtitutis & artibus." Cicero de Amicitia.

46 Iſocrates in Buſiri. Titus Livius, l. i. c. xviii. Lucian. Lexiphanes. To theſe authorities we may add, that Pythagoras is repreſented on ſeveral Samian coins. Fabric. Bibl. Græca, t. i. p. 455.

47 Mneſarchus was ſent from Samos to conſult the oracle of Delphi, probably on ſome public occaſion. Jamb. in Vit. Pythag.

48 Apollon. apud Jamblichum.

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to the discoveries of Thales, the first Grecian who nearly calculated an eclipse of the sun; and he early set himself to rival the Milesian sage in his favourite studies. It is recorded, that he learned eloquence from Pherecydes of Syros [49], who resided a considerable time in the isle of Samos, and who is famous in the literary history of Greece, as the first author in prose [50]. Pittacus of Lesbos, Bias of Priené, and the other sophists, or wise men (as they were emphatically styled by their contemporaries) who then flourished in Asiatic Greece, and whose abilities and virtue had raised them, in troubled times, to the head of the several communities of which they were respectively members, excited the kindred ambition of Pythagoras, who appears to have been early animated with the desire of acquiring just renown, by promoting public happiness. In his eighteenth year he visited the continent of Greece, and gained the prize of wrestling at the Olympic games [51], where his vigour, address, and beauty, were beheld with admiration by the multitude; while the opening virtues of his mind were still more admired by men of sense and discernment. In conformity with the practice of an age when the feeble rays of knowledge were scattered over a wide surface, and much pains were requisite to collect them, he withdrew himself from the applauses of his countrymen, and for a longer time than was usual with the Grecian

Travels.

49 Diogenes apud Porph.

50 Plin. N. H. l. vii. c. lvi.

51 Jambl. Porph. &c.

travellers. This circumftance gave occafion to many fables concerning the extent and variety of his voyages [52]. But it is certain that he refided

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[52] The travels of the Greek philofopher were fpoken of in vague terms, and magnified even by great writers. *Ultimas* terras luftrâffe Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem accepimus. Cicero de Finibus, l. iv. c. xix. We may well believe then, that fuch men as Hermippus (apud Jofeph. adverf. Apionem), Apollonius, Jamblichus, &c. would carry their exaggerations to the higheft degree of incredibility on this fertile fubject. The chief fource of thefe fables, and of the fuppofed learning of the Magi, Chaldæans, Indians, &c. may be found in the credulous or lying writers who accompanied Alexander in his eaftern expedition. At their return to Greece, they magnified the learning, as well as the power and wealth, of the nations conquered by their patron; they were folicitous to perfuade their countrymen, that their anceftors had learned their philofophy from people whofe names they had never before heard; and their own vanity was flattered by having vifited, and familiarly known thofe fancied inftructors of mankind. Clearchus, Onefícretus, and Callifthenes, were the moft celebrated of thefe writers, of whom Diogenes Laertius, or rather a far fuperior man whom he cites, fays, Λανθανουσι δε αυτους τα των Ελληνων κατορθωματα Βαρβαροις προσαπτοντες. "They are miftaken, when they refer the Grecian difcoveries to the Barbarians." It was natural for the Eaftern nations, when they had adopted the language and learning of the Greeks, to avail themfelves of Grecian authorities, to prove how much that celebrated nation owed to people whom they proudly denominated Barbarians. Hence the fables of Berofus the Chaldæan, of Manetho the Egyptian, of Sanchoniothon the Phœnician. We except from this clafs of fabulifts the Jew, Jofephus, the antiquity of whofe nation refts on evidence which it would be irreverent to name in fuch company. Had Pythagoras or Thales been acquainted with the Jewifh religion, they would have learned far nobler notions of the Deity, than thofe which it appears they entertained. Anaxagoras, furnamed ὁ νους, the preceptor of the great Pericles, was the firft Grecian philofopher who faw, by the light of reafon, the natural and moral attributes of God, fo fublimely defcribed in the Pfalms of David. Yet it never was faid, that Anaxagoras had feen the Pfalms, the Books of Mofes, or any part of the facred writings; and it may be remarked, that Jofephus himfelf, in his firft book (cont. Ap.), however zealous to prove, that the Greeks derived their knowledge from the Eaft, can cite no author in favour of this opinion, who lived before the age of Alexander.

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ſeveral years in the ancient kingdom of Egypt [53], which had been long familiarly known to the Grecian mariners, and where the ſon of Mneſarchus might probably enjoy the protection of many hereditary friends. In that country he probably made ſome additions to his knowledge in arithmetic and geometry; he certainly learned many traditions concerning the gods, and the human ſoul: but what particularly deſerved his attention

[53] There is a famous paſſage in Iſocrates's panegyric of Buſiris, which might ſeem to contradict what is ſaid in the preceding note, if we did not reflect, that the rules of panegyric require not always a ſtrict adherence to hiſtorical truth. In ſpeaking of the ancient wiſdom and piety of the Egyptians, and particularly of the ſacerdotal order, he ſays, that he himſelf is not the firſt who perceived and acknowledged their merit; that many philoſophers had done this before him, and particularly Pythagoras the Samian. Ὃς αφικομενος εις Αιγυπτον, και μαθητης εκεινων γενομενος, την τε αλλην φιλοσοφιαν πρωτος εις τους Ελληνας εκομισε, και τα περι τας θυσιας τε και τας αγιστειας τας εν τοις ἱεροις επιφανεστερον των αλλων εσπουδασεν. ηγουμενος, ει και μηδεν αυτω δια ταυτα πλειον γιγνοιτο παρα των θεων, αλλα παρα γε τοις ανθρωποις εκ τουτων μαλιστ᾽ αν ευδοκιμησειν. ὅπερ αυτω και συνεβη. Τοσουτον γαρ ευδοξια τους αλλους ἁπαντας υπερεβαλεν, ὡστε και τους νεωτερους ἁπαντας επιθυμειν αυτου μαθητας ειναι, και τους πρεσβυτερους ἥδιον ὁρᾷν τους παιδας τους αυτων εκεινω συγγιγνομενους η των οικειων επιμελουμενους. "Who coming to Egypt, and being inſtructed by the prieſts of that country, firſt introduced other kinds of learning into Greece, and particularly a more accurate knowledge of religious rites and ceremonies," (I have generaliſed the expreſſion θυσιας και ἁγιστειας εν τοις ἱεροις,) "of which he was a careful obſerver, thinking that although he were entitled to no peculiar favour on that account from the gods, he would thereby, at leaſt, procure eſteem among men, which alſo happened to him; for he ſo far eclipſed the glory of all other philoſophers, that all the young deſired to become his diſciples, and the old were better pleaſed to ſee their ſons in the company of Pythagoras, than engaged in the moſt lucrative or honourable purſuits." If what is ſaid in my account of the life and writings of Iſocrates be conſidered with attention, this paſſage will only ſerve to confirm the obſervations in the text.

was,

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was, the ſecret ſymbolic writing of the prieſts, and the ſingular inſtitutions and policy of the ſacerdotal order, by which that body of men had long been enabled to govern prince and people [54]. At his return from Egypt and the Eaſt, Pythagoras found his native country governed, or rather inſulted, by the artful and long fortunate Polycrates; a tyrant whoſe power ſeemed ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, that there remained no hopes to ſubvert it, and under whoſe jealous eye the ſon of Mneſarchus could neither diſplay his talents, nor enjoy perſonal ſecurity: he therefore returned to European Greece, and again aſſiſted at the Olympic games; where being ſaluted by the then honoured name of Sophiſt, he modeſtly declined that diſtinction for the humbler title of Philoſopher; and when aſked what he preciſely meant by this new appellation, he is ſaid to have replied, "That, in the ſame manner as at the Olympic aſſembly, ſome men came to contend for crowns and honours, others to ſell their merchandiſe, and a third claſs merely to ſee and examine every thing which paſſed in that celebrated convention; ſo, on the greater theatre of the world, while many ſtruggled for the glory of a name, and many for the advantages of fortune; a few, and but a few, neither covetous of money, nor ambitious of fame, were contented with beholding the wonders of ſo magnificent a ſpectacle [55]." This definition has been

Olymp. lvi. A.C. 560.

54 Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, paſſim; and Strabo, l. x. p. 482.

55 Cicero (Tuſc. Quæſt. v. 3.) has tranſlated a paſſage to this purpoſe from Heraclides Ponticus, the ſcholar of Plato; and the

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been often cited, becauſe it well agrees with the contemplative notions generally entertained of the Pythagorean ſchool; but it will appear in the ſequel, that the philoſophy of Pythagoras was of a more practical kind.

From Olympia and the republic of Elis, he travelled to the neighbouring territory of Sparta [56], and ſpent a conſiderable time in that capital, diligently ſtudying the laws and inſtitutions of Lycurgus, and obſerving the manners and genius of the beſt governed, moſt virtuous, and moſt proſperous of all the Grecian ſtates. Here he beheld a conſtitution of government (the wiſdom of which had been long approved by experience) founded on a ſyſtem of education; and combining, in his clear capacious mind, the Spartan laws and diſcipline with a mixture of the Egyptian craft and policy, he framed that ſublime plan of legiſlation, which was to be far more extenſive than the laws of Lycurgus; and which, at firſt fixing its root in a ſmall ſect at Crotona, was deſtined, in twenty or thirty years, to diffuſe its flouriſhing branches over Italy and Sicily.

Cauſes of his authority in Italy.

Pythagoras arrived at the capital of Italian Greece in his fortieth year, in the full vigour of mind and body [57]. His fame, doubtleſs, preceded him; ſince, whoever had honourably diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the general convention at Olympia, was ſpeedily

the original paſſage of Heraclitus is ſtill preſerved in Jamblichus.

56 Porphyr. Jambl. & Juſtin. l. xx.

57 Ariſtoxen. apud Jambl.

known

known and celebrated in the remoteſt provinces of Greece. His perſonal acquaintances among the Italian Greeks, whoſe eſteem, or rather reſpect, he had acquired in that auguſt aſſembly, would naturally be loud in his praiſes; and the manners of the age, in which men lived together in crowds, and enjoyed their paſtimes, or tranſacted their ſerious buſineſs with undiſguiſed freedom, in temples and gymnaſia, contributed to the rapid increaſe of his friends and admirers. Upon his arrival at Crotona, he appeared in the public places, diſplaying his dexterity in thoſe exerciſes and accompliſhments, which were the faſhionable objects of purſuit, and the principal ſources of honour. His ſkill in muſic and medicine, ſciences which were far better underſtood in his native country than in Magna Græcia, procured him particular regard; nor can we heſitate to believe, that his mathematical and natural knowledge would be highly admired by the Greeks of Italy, who, having recently received the firſt tincture of arts and ſciences from the Aſiatics, cultivated them with that ardour which novelty inſpires; and who ſeem hitherto to have gained in point of knowledge and civility, in proportion as they had loſt in purity of life and manners, by an acquaintance with their Eaſtern brethren.

His ſuperior talents.

Neither the voluptuouſneſs nor the refinement of the inhabitants of Magna Græcia, were incompatible with the hopes and fears of the moſt puerile ſuperſtition; and Pythagoras, who had ſeen and examined the rites and ceremonies employed by remote

His manner of life.

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remote nations, celebrated for their antiquity and their wiſdom, to avert the diſpleaſure, or to gain the good-will of their inviſible protectors, called forth the whole force of this powerful, yet dangerous inſtrument of policy, to excite reſpect for his perſon, and reverence for his inſtructions. He carefully frequented, at an early hour, the temples of the gods; his regular purifications and ſacrifices announced ſuperior ſanctity of character; his food was of the pureſt kind, that no corporeal ſtain might interrupt his fancied communication with his celeſtial friends; and he was clothed in the linen of Egypt, which was the dreſs[58] of the ſacerdotal order in that native land of ſuperſtition, as well as of the Athenian magiſtrates and nobles, in the early and pious times of their republic[59]. The reſpect excited by ſuch artifices (if we may degrade by that name the means uſed to deceive men into their duty and happineſs) was enhanced by the high renown, the long travels, the venerable aſpect, the harmonious voice, the animated and affecting eloquence, of the Samian philoſopher. His hearers ſometimes amounted to two thouſand of the principal citizens of Crotona; and the magiſtrates of that republic erected, ſoon after his arrival among them, an elegant and ſpacious edifice, which was appropriated to the virtuous leſſons of this admired ſtranger, who pleaſed their taſte, and gratified their fancy, while he condemned their manners, and reproached their vices. Equally rapid and aſtoniſhing, and

The happy revolution which he produced at Crotona.

58 Diodorus.

59 Thucyd. l. i.

not

not more aſtoniſhing than advantageous, if we may credit the general voice of antiquity, was the reformation produced at Crotona in perſons of every age, and of either ſex, by this ſingular man. The women laid aſide their ornaments, and reſumed their modeſty; the youth preferred their duty to their pleaſures; the old improved their underſtanding, and almoſt neglected to improve their fortunes.

His ſchool.

Yet this revolution of manners was not ſurely ſo inſtantaneous, as the concurring exaggerations of wonder and credulity were naturally inclined to repreſent it. The ſame writers, who would thus magnify the fame of Pythagoras, acknowledge, that ſoon after coming to Crotona, he choſe a ſelect number of his moſt aſſiduous diſciples, and thoſe chiefly perſons of weight in the republic, whoſe temper, character, and views, beſt ſuited his own. Theſe were formed into an aſſociation, or ſeparate order of men, into which none were admitted who poſſeſſed not qualities and endowments worthy of that honour. In order to confirm this aſſociation, as well as to obtain the purpoſes for which it had been inſtituted, Pythagoras employed the cypher, or ſymbolic writing, and other ſecrets, which he had learned from the wiſdom, or rather cunning, of the Egyptian prieſts: his ſcholars were taught certain ſigns or words, by which they might know each other; they could correſpond, when ſeparated by place, in an unknown character; and ſtrangers of all countries, Greeks and Barbarians, were promiſcuouſly admitted into the ſociety, after undergoing a due

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Its influence on affairs of ſtate. Olymp. lvii. 3. A. C. 550.

a due probation as to their diſpoſitions and underſtanding. In a few years, three hundred men, all Pythagoreans, held the ſovereignty of Crotona; the influence of the new ſect extended with rapidity over Locri, Rhegium, Catana, and other cities of Italy and Sicily; the diſciples of Pythagoras were diffuſed over ancient Greece, and the iſles of the

His great views.

Ægean ſea; and it ſeemed as if the ſage of Samos, whoſe nobler ambition declined and diſdained any particular office of power and dignity, had conceived the ſublime idea of forming a ſchool, or rather an aſſociation of men, who might govern the world, while they were themſelves governed by wiſdom and virtue.

His politics.

Pythagoras was deeply perſuaded, that the happineſs of nations depends chiefly on the government under which they live; and the experience of his own times, and of his own iſland in particular, might teach him the dangerous tendency of democratic turbulence on the one hand, and jealous tyranny on the other [60]. He preferred, therefore, to

[60] A ſtriking example of this appeared at that time in Sicily, if we credit Jamblicus, who places the reign of Phalaris, at Agrigentum, in the age of Pythagoras. The doubtful, or rather incredible, hiſtory of this tyrant, may be compriſed in few words. His reign, of about ſixteen years, was diſtinguiſhed by intolerable atrocities. He burned his enemies in a brazen bull; and, as luſt or cruelty happened to direct, ſometimes abuſed, and ſometimes eat, boys. Phalaris, together with his mother and friends, (could ſuch a monſter have friends?) were burned, by the long-injured Agrigentines, in his own bull. This is the abominable tyrant, whoſe ſpurious letters furniſhed an opportunity to Dr. Bentley to diſplay his profound erudition (ſee his Diſſert. upon Phalaris). But that very learned man ſeems not to ſuſpect, that the hiſtory of Phalaris is as ſpurious as his epiſtles. It was a common artifice among Greek poets and orators (ſee, in vol. i. p. 367.

to all governments, a moderate ariſtocracy; which ſeems, without exception, to have been the well-founded opinion of the greateſt men of antiquity, ſince, under the adminiſtration of a ſenate, the republics of Greece, of Rome, and of Carthage, attained their higheſt proſperity and ſplendour. Yet he was extremely averſe to arbitrary power,

p. 367. the ſpeech of Soſicles the Corinthian), to exaggerate the vices of bad princes. Of this we ſhall find many examples in the following parts of this work. This practice began early; for Pindar ſays,

> Τον δε ταυρω χαλκεω καυτηρα νηλεα νοον
> Εχθρα Φαλαριν κατεχει παντα φατις.
>
> Pyth. i. Επωδ. κωλ. ιε.

Ariſtotle mentions, Το περι Φαλαριν λεγομενον, the hearſay about Phalaris, which Aſpaſius explains, Ὁ δε Φαλαρις λεγεται φαγειν τον ἑαυτȣ παιδα. Phalaris is ſaid to have eat his own ſon. In the ſame chapter (c. v. l. vi. Ethic. Nicom.), ſpeaking of brutal paſſions, Ariſtotle inſtances Phalaris ſometimes devouring boys, ſometimes uſing them as the inſtruments of an abſurd venereal pleaſure: "Προς αφροδισιων ατοπον ἡδονην." The philoſopher does not ſay, that he believes theſe monſtrous fictions, any more than Cicero, "Ille nobilis taurus, quem crudeliſſimus omnium tyrannorum Phalaris *habuiſſe dicitur*;" l. iv. in Verrem, c. xxxiii. Timæus, the hiſtorian of Sicily, who was more likely than any other writer to be well informed concerning the tranſactions in his own iſland, repreſents the ſtory of Phalaris's bull as a mere fable. Polyb. Excerp. ver. 3. p. 47. Polybius, indeed, attempts to refute Timæus, but I think, as to the main point, with little ſucceſs. Nor is it ſurpriſing that this judicious writer ſhould be carried along by the torrent. The republicans of Greece and Rome delighted in blackening the characters of tyrants; Τραγωδȣντες δε την ὠμοτητα των τροπων, και την ασεβειαν των πραξεων; "exaggerating, after the manner of tragedians, the fierceneſs of their manners, and the impiety of their actions." For this reaſon, the abſurd fictions concerning Dionyſius of Syracuſe, Alexander of Pheræ, &c. are related by many reſpectable writers. For this reaſon Hieronymus was deſcribed in the blackeſt colours, vide Excerp. ex Polyb. l. vii. p. 10. And for this reaſon the enormous cruelties of Phalaris, which no nation, and far leſs the Sicilians in that age, could have tolerated, receive countenance from ſome of the higheſt authorities of antiquity.

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whatever ſhape it might aſſume; and the main aim of his inſtitution was, to prevent oppreſſion in the magiſtrates and licentiouſneſs in the people. The dead letter of the law could never, he thought, effect that ſalutary purpoſe, until men were ſo trained by education and diſcipline, as to regard the great duties of life as its moſt agreeable amuſement, and to conſider the eſteem of their fellow-citizens, and their own, as the chief ſource of their enjoyment. Magiſtrates, thus formed, would command a willing obedience, and the inhabitants of Magna Græcia muſt ſoon attain the moſt perfect ſtate of which political ſociety is ſuſceptible.

Morality.

To explain at large the ſyſtem of Pythagoras, would be to write a treatiſe of ſublime, yet practical morality, ſince his concluſions are ſtrictly founded on the nature of man. Beſides the propenſities common to us with inferior natures, and beſides the ſelfiſh and artificial paſſions of avarice and ambition, he found in the human breaſt the ſeeds of nobler faculties, fitted to yield an incomparably more durable, more perfect, and more certain gratification. The chief happineſs of the mind muſt be ſought in itſelf, in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral pleaſure. Our thoughts are ever, and intimately preſent with us; and although the buſtle of external objects, and the tumult of paſſion, may ſometimes divert their current, they can never dry up their ſource. The reflections on our own conduct will be continually occurring to our fancy, whatever pains we may take to exclude them; nor can voluptuous enjoyment, or ambitious activity, ever

ever ſo totally occupy the mind of a Perſian ſatrap, or a Grecian demagogue, but that their principal happineſs or miſery, in the whole courſe of life, muſt chiefly depend upon the nature of their reflections on the paſt, and upon their hopes and fears about futurity. To ſtrengthen this great ground-work of morality, Pythagoras employed the whole force of education and habit. Rules were laid down, to which the members of his reſpected order bound themſelves to conform, and from which none could ſwerve, without being excluded from a ſociety of which they proved themſelves unworthy. The different periods of life had each its appropriated employment. The youth were carefully inſtructed in the gymnaſtic exerciſes, in literature [61], and in ſcience, and eſpecially in the laws and conſtitution of their country. Their time was ſo diverſified by ſucceſſive ſtudy, exerciſe, and repoſe, that no leiſure remained for the premature growth of dangerous paſſions; and it was an important maxim of the Pythagorean ſchool, that many things

[61] So I have tranſlated Εν γραμμασι και τοις αλλοις μαθημασι, of Ariſtoxenus apud Stobæum, Serm. xli. The learned reader will perceive, that I comprehend under the name of youth, the two different periods of of life, or ἡλικιαι, which the Greeks denoted by the words παις and νεανισκος, boy, and young man. I have done this, becauſe it was not the intention of Ariſtoxenus to ſay, that the young men were not ſtill to be employed in literature and ſcience, or that the boys were to be kept ignorant of the laws and conſtitution. The rules of the Pythagorean ſchool, and the laws of Lycurgus, often explain each other. See vol. i. p. 129, & ſeqq. It may be worthy of remark, that Jean Jaques Rouſſeau has borrowed what is rational and practical in his ſyſtem of education, from theſe two great ſources.

were

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were beſt learned late[62], eſpecially love; from which, if poſſible, the youth ſhould be reſtrained till their twentieth year, and after that period ſhould rarely, and with many precautions, indulge a paſſion, always hurtful to the weak, and which, when injudiciouſly indulged, enfeebled the moſt vigorous. He required in thoſe who had attained the age of manhood, that they ſhould no longer live for themſelves, but for the buſineſs of the community of which they were members. They were to employ the greateſt part of the day in the duties of public ſpirit and patriotiſm; in the laborious or dangerous offices committed to their charge; and to derive their chief reward from reading, in the eyes of their admiring countrymen, the hiſtory of their generous exploits; and from beholding the happy effects of their probity, beneficence, and fortitude.

Rules for the conduct of his diſciples;

The Pythagoreans were ſtrictly enjoined, as their earlieſt and lateſt work, to review the actions of the paſt, and, if time permitted, of many preceding, days. In the morning they repaired alone to the temples, to ſolitary mountains and foreſts; and after there converſing with themſelves, joined in the converſation of their friends, with whom they aſſembled, in ſmall companies, to an early and frugal meal, diſcuſſed different ſubjects of philoſophy or politics, regulated their conduct for the enſuing day, and by the mutual ſtrength and encourage-

[62] Ariſtoxen. apud Stobæum, Serm. lxix. This is the great principle of Rouſſeau in his *Emile*. The paſſage of Ariſtoxenus concerning love, is almoſt literally tranſlated in that ingenious but fanciful work.

ment

ment acquired in this ſelect ſociety, prepared for the tumultuous buſtie of the world, and the contentions of active life. The evening was ſpent as the morning, with this difference, that they then indulged in the moderate uſe of fleſh and wine, from which they rigidly abſtained during the day; and the whole concluded with that ſelf-examination, which was the capital precept of the Pythagorean ſchool.

which coincide with the inſtitutions of Lycurgus.

To enter more fully into the principles of this aſſociation, would be repeating what has been formerly obſerved concerning the laws of Lycurgus. It is ſufficient barely to mention, that, like the legiſlator of Sparta, Pythagoras enjoined the higheſt reſpect for age; that, like him, he raiſed the weaker ſex from that ſtate of inferiority in which they were ungenerouſly kept in all other countries of Greece; that he enured his diſciples to temperance and ſobriety by the ſame means employed by Lycurgus; and that both theſe great men regarded health and vigour of body as the firſt principle of mental ſoundneſs and energy; that the probationary ſilence of the Pythagoreans, which credulity has ſo much exaggerated, was nothing more than that prudent, recollected behaviour, required by Lycurgus, who prized higher the caution of ſilence than the readineſs [63] of ſpeech; and that the intimacy of the Spartan and Pythagorean friendſhips, and almoſt the community of goods, naturally flowed from the general ſpirit and genius of their reſpective ſyſtems [64]; ſo that the rules of the Pythagorean order

63 Plut. in Lycurg. 64 See vol. i. p. 135.

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were little more than a tranfcript of the Spartan laws, as thefe laws themfelves were only a refinement on the generous and manly inftitutions of the heroic ages[65].

Origin of the fictions concerning Pythagoras.

In the hiftory of a man who entertained fuch juft notions of human life, as did the founder of the Pythagorean fchool, we may at once reject, as fabulous, the tales related by the vain, lying Greeks, who lived in and after the age of Alexander, when their nation feems to have loft their love of truth along with their liberty, as well as the ridiculous wonders of the later Platonifts, thofe contemplative vifionaries, who, during the firft centuries of the Chriftian æra, degraded ancient philofophers, by defcribing *their* active and ufeful lives, as if they had refembled their own fpeculative tranquillity. Yet, after all, fhould the leaft extraordinary account of the Pythagorean order ftill feem incredible, it need only be obferved, that modern hiftory, and even our own obfervation, may have made us acquainted with orders of another kind, of which the rules are more difficult to be obferved than thofe of the Pythagoreans: and it is equally unreafonable and ungenerous, to fuppofe, that what our own experience teaches us may be done by the illiberal fpirit of fuperftition, could not, in a happier age, be effected by the love of glory, of virtue, and of mankind.

War between Crotona and Sybaris.

The concurring teftimony of hiftorians affures us, that the fchool of Pythagoras had flourifhed above forty years, to the unfpeakable benefit of

65 Diodor. l. xii. p. 77, &c.

Magna

Magna Græcia, when a war arofe between Crotona and Sybaris, the latter of which had ever contemptuoufly rejected the Pythagorean inftitutions. The city of Sybaris was founded (as above mentioned) by the Achæans, on the confluence of the river Sybaris, from which the city derives its name, and the winding ftream of Crathis, which defcends from the Lucanian mountains. The fertility of the foil, the happy temperature of the climate, the refources of fifhing, navigation, manufactures, and commerce, confpired, with the falutary effect of the Achæan laws, wonderfully to increafe, in the courfe of two centuries, the ftrength and populoufnefs of Sybaris, which was furrounded by walls nine miles in extent, commanded twenty-five fubordinate cities, and, could we credit the evidence of writers often prone to exaggeration, brought three hundred thoufand men into the field [67]. Riches and luxury proved fatal to the Sybarites, whofe effeminacy paffed into a proverb [68], which has been tranfmitted to modern times. In a decifive battle, they were defeated by the citizens of Crotona, under the command of Milo, a favourite difciple of Pythagoras, who had already obtained univerfal renown by his Olympic victories [69].

The Sybarites conquered by Milo the Pythagorean. Olymp. lxvii. 4. A.C. 509.

Sedition in Crotona.

But the deftruction of Sybaris was almoft alike fatal to Crotona. The inferior ranks of men in that city, intoxicated with profperity, and inftigated by the artful and ambitious Cylon, whofe turbulent man-

67 Strabo, l. vi. p. 263. Diodor. ibid.
68 Athenæus, l. xii. p. 518.
69 Strabo, ibid. Paufanias, l. vi. p. 369.

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ners had excluded him from the order of Pythagoras, into which he had repeatedly attempted to enter, became clamorous for an equal partition of the conquered territory of Sybaris; which being denied, as inconſiſtent with the nature of ariſtocratical government, they ſecretly conſpired againſt their magiſtrates, attacked them by ſurpriſe in the ſenate-houſe, put many to death, and drove the reſt from their country. Pythagoras himſelf died ſoon afterwards, in extreme old age, at Metapontum in Lucania[70]. His diſciples were ſcattered over Magna Græcia, and particularly Sicily, which, at the time of the Carthaginian invaſion, was governed by men who had imbibed the ſublime ſpirit of their illuſtrious maſter.

Proves fatal to the Pythagoreans there.

The Carthaginians invade Sicily. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A.C. 480.

Gelon, who, eleven years before that event, had mounted the throne of Syracuſe, was entitled, by the unanimous ſuffrage of his ſubjects, to the glorious, though often proſtituted, appellation, of Father of his Country[71]. The mildneſs of his government reſtored the felicity of the heroic ages, whoſe equitable inſtitutions had much affinity (as above obſerved) with the political ſyſtem of Pythagoras. This virtuous prince had cemented an alliance with Theron, king of Agrigentum, by accepting his daughter in marriage; and the confederacy of the two principal ſtates of Sicily ſeemed to have diffuſed ſecurity and happineſs over the whole iſland, when the immenſe armament of Carthage was beheld off the northern coaſt. Though

70 Ariſtoxenus.

71 Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. xiii. c. xxxvii. Plut. in Timol.

not

not abſolutely deſtitute of naval ſtrength, the Sicilians had nothing by which they could oppoſe a fleet of two thouſand gallies. The enemy landed without oppoſition in the ſpacious harbour, or rather bay, of Panormus, whoſe name may be ſtill recogniſed in the modern capital Palermo, where the Carthaginians had planted one of their moſt ancient colonies. Their forces were commanded by Hamilcar, who was deemed a brave and experienced leader. The firſt care of this general was, to fortify two camps; the one deſtined for his fleet, which, according to the practice of that age, was drawn on ſhore; the other intended as a ſafe retreat for his army, which immediately prepared to form the ſiege of Himera. Theron uſed proper meaſures to defend the ſecond city in his dominions, until his kinſman, the intrepid Gelon, ſhould arrive to his aſſiſtance, at the head of an army of fifty thouſand foot and five thouſand horſe. While this numerous army advanced, by rapid marches, towards Himera, they rencountered a foraging party of the enemy, and took ten thouſand priſoners. But what appeared a ſtill more important booty to the diſcernment of Gelon, they ſeized a meſſenger from Selinus, a city in the neighbourhood of Agrigentum, which had entered into a treacherous correſpondence with the Carthaginians. The priſoner conveyed a letter to Hamilcar, acquainting him, that the Selinuntines would not fail to ſend the cavalry demanded from them at the appointed time, which was likewiſe particularly ſpecified. Upon this diſcovery, Gelon founded a ſtratagem, not more

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daring than succefsful. He commanded a chosen body of troops to advance in the night towards the Carthaginian camp, and by day-break to present themselves to Hamilcar, as his Selinuntine auxiliaries; and when admitted, by this artifice, within the rampart, to assassinate the general, and set fire to the fleet [72].

Defeated by a stratagem.

It happened on the fatal day, that Hamilcar offered a solemn sacrifice to the bloody divinity of Carthage, who delighted in human victims. While he performed this abominable rite, the soldiers surrounded him unarmed, in the gloomy silence of their detested superstition, with which their minds were totally penetrated. The Sicilian cavalry, being admitted without suspicion, thus found no difficulty to execute their audacious design. Hamilcar, while he sacrificed an innocent and noble youth to the abhorred genius of Superstition, was himself dispatched with a dagger; and next moment the Carthaginian ships were in a blaze. A chain of Sicilian sentinels, posted on the neighbouring eminences, intimated to Gelon the happy success of his stratagem; of which, in order fully to avail himself, that gallant commander immediately conducted the main body of his troops to the Carthaginian army, while it was yet agitated by surprise and terror at the sudden conflagration.

Their disasters.

The furious onset of the Sicilians made a dreadful havoc among the astonished Barbarians, who recovering, however, their faculties, began to defend

72 Diodor. l. ix. sect. 25, & seqq. Polyæn. l. i. c. xxvii.

themselves

themſelves with vigour; when the melancholy tidings, that their ſhips were all burnt, and their general ſlain, drove them to deſpair and flight. Gelon commanded his troops not to give quarter to an enemy, who, though defeated, ſtill ſeemed formidable by their numbers. It is reported, that an hundred and fifty thouſand periſhed in the battle, and the purſuit. The remainder ſeized an eminence, where they could not long maintain themſelves, for want of water and proviſions. In the language of an ancient hiſtorian, all Africa ſeemed to be taken captive in Sicily. Gelon diſtributed the priſoners among the Sicilian cities, in proportion to the contingents of troops which they had reſpectively raiſed for this memorable ſervice. The greater part falling to the ſhare of Syracuſe and Agrigentum, were employed in beautifying and enlarging thoſe capitals [73], whoſe magnificent monuments, ſtill conſpicuous in their ruins, are ſuppoſed, with great probability, to be the effect of Carthaginian labour.

Treaty of peace between Gelon and the Carthaginians.

The melancholy tidings affected Carthage with conſternation and deſpair. The inhabitants of that city, ever ſhamefully depreſſed by bad fortune, in proportion as they were immoderately elated by the deceitful gifts of proſperity, dreaded every moment to behold the victorious enemy in their harbour. To ward off this calamity their ambaſſadors were ſent to crave a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities on any terms the victorious Greeks might think

73 Cicero, Orat. iv. in Verrem.

CHAP. XI. proper to impofe. Gelon received them with fuch moderation as marked the fuperiority of his character, and told them, that he would defift from every purpofe of revenge, on condition that the Carthaginians paid two thoufand talents of filver, to be diftributed among the cities of Sicily, which had incurred trouble and expence by the war; that they thenceforth abftained from the abominable practice of infulting the gods by human victims; that they erected two temples, one in Carthage, another in Syracufe, to preferve the memory of the war, and the articles of the peace [74].

Olymp. lxxxii. A. C. 449. This honourable treaty was a prelude to that ftill more famous, concluded thirty years afterwards between the Athenians and the Perfians. It marked a nation fuperior to its enemies not only in valour but humanity, and conferred more true glory than could be acquired by the moft fplendid feries of victories. It might be expected, however, and feems much to have been defired, that a people fo advantageoufly diftinguifhed as were the Greeks during that age in arts and arms; a people A. C. 504. who had repelled, defeated, and difgraced the moft populous and powerful nations, and who were alike prompted, by ambition and revenge, to the attainment of diftant conqueft, fhould have united their efforts againft the enemies who ftill made war on them, and, advancing in a rapid career of victory, have diffufed, along with their dominion, their manners, knowledge, and civility over the

74 Diodor. Sicul. ibid.

eaſtern world. But various events and cauſes, which we ſhall have occaſion afterwards to explain, tended to detach the colonies of Magna Græcia from the affairs of the mother-country, as well as to diſunite the two moſt powerful republics of that country by inteſtine diſcord.

While the fortune of Athens raiſed her to ſuch power as threatened the liberty of Sicily and Greece, the kings of Syracuſe and Agrigentum contented themſelves with the humbler glory of embelliſhing their capitals with barbaric ſpoils, and producing thoſe wonders of art, which, in the time of Cicero and Verres, were eſteemed among the moſt precious monuments of antiquity [75]. The golden medals of Gelon, ſtill preſerved and of the higheſt beauty [76], juſtify the glowing expreſſions of the Roman orator.

Decay of Magna Græcia, and deſtruction of the Pythagoreans.

In Italy, the citizens of Crotona had too ſoon cauſe to lament their inſurrection againſt their magiſtrates, and their forſaking the diſcipline of Pythagoras. They who had hitherto defeated ſuperior numbers, who had furniſhed ſo many victors in the Olympic conteſt, and whoſe country was diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of healthy, on a ſuppoſition that the vigorous bodies of its inhabitants proceeded from an effect of the climate, were now totally routed and put to flight at the river Sagra, with an army of an hundred and thirty thouſand men, by the Locrians and Rhegians,

75 Cicero in Verrem, paſſim.

76 Mem. de Trevoux, l'ann. 1727, p. 1449.

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whose forces were far less numerous. The other Greek cities of Italy, which are said to have imitated the fatal example of Crotona, were harassed by wars against each other, or against their barbarous neighbours. In consequence of these misfortunes, the Pythagoreans again recovered their credit; and about sixty years after the death of the great founder of their order, Zaleucus and Charondas, the first in Locri, the second in Thurium, endeavoured to revive the Pythagorean institutions, which, perhaps, were too perfect for the condition of the times. In less than forty years a new persecution entirely drove the Pythagoreans from Italy, and completed, according to Polybius, the confusion and misery of that once happy country [77].

77 Polybius, i. 203.

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Glory of Athens.—Military Success of the Confederates.—Athens rebuilt and fortified —Extent of its Walls and Harbours.—The Confederates take Byzantium.—Conspiracy of Pausanias.—Banishment of Themistocles.—Virtue of Aristides.—Cimon assumes the Command.—His illustrious Merit and Success.—Revolt of Egypt.—War in Cyprus.—Peace with Persia.—Domestic Transactions of Greece.—The Athenian Greatness.—Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos.—Earthquake in Sparta.—Revolt of the Helots.—War between the Elians and Pisans.—The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter.—Dissensions in Argolis.—Revolt in Bœotia.—Truce of Thirty Years.—Character of Pericles.—Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies.—Spirit of the Athenian Government.

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The glory of Athens; A. C. 479—431.

FROM the battles of Mycalé and Platæa, to the memorable war of Peloponnesus, elapsed half a century, the most illustrious in the Grecian annals. A single republic, one of sixteen states, whose united possessions hardly equalled the extent of Scotland, and whose particular territory is scarcely visible in a map of the world, carried on an offensive war against the Persian empire, and, though surrounded by jealous allies or open enemies, prosecuted

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fecuted this extraordinary enterprife with unexampled fuccefs; at length, granting fuch conditions of peace as the pride of victory may dictate, and the weight of accumulated difafters condefcend to folicit or accept. In that narrow fpace of time the fame republic erected, on the feeble bafis of her fcanty population and diminutive territory, a mighty mafs of empire; eftablifhed and confirmed her authority over the extent of a thoufand miles of the Afiatic coaft, from Cyprus to the Thracian Bofphorus; took poffeffion of forty intermediate iflands[1], together with the important ftraits which join the Euxine and the Ægean; conquered and colonized the winding fhores of Macedon and Thrace; commanded the coaft of the Euxine from Pontus to the Cherfonefus Taurica, or Crim Tartary; and, overawing the barbarous natives by the experienced terrors of her fleet[2], protected againft *their* injuftice and violence, but at the fame time converted, to the purpofes of her own ambition and intereft, the numerous but fcattered colonies which Miletus, and other Greek cities of Afia, had at various times eftablifhed in thofe remote regions[3]. Our wonder will be juftly encreafed, if we confider that Athens obtained thofe immortal trophies, not over ignorant favages or effeminate flaves, but over men who had the fame language and laws, the fame

in arms;

[1] Several of thefe iflands had been formerly conquered by Athenian commanders, particularly Miltiades, as we have related above; but having rebelled againft the fevere government of Athens, they were finally fubdued by Pericles.

[2] Plut. in Pericle.

[3] Strabo, Geograph. paffim.

blood

blood and lineage, the ſame arts and arms, in ſhort, every thing common with the victors but their audacity and fortune.

in arts;

But it is the peculiar glory of the Athenians that, during this rapid ſeries of military and naval triumphs, they cultivated, with a generous enthuſiaſm, the arts which adorn peace as well as war, and improved theſe decorations of poliſhed life into ſuch perfection as few nations have been able to imitate, and none have found it poſſible to ſurpaſs. During the adminiſtration of a ſingle man, more works of elegance and ſplendour, more magnificent temples, theatres, and porticoes were erected within the walls of Athens, than could be raiſed during many centuries in Rome, though miſtreſs of the world, by the wealth and labour of tributary provinces [4]. In the ſame period of time ſculpture attained a ſublimity, from which that noble art could never afterwards but deſcend and degenerate; and a republic hitherto inferior in works of invention and genius to ſeveral of her neighbours, and even of her own colonies, produced, in the ſingle lifetime of Pericles, thoſe ineſtimable models of poetry, eloquence, and philoſophy [5], which, in every ſucceeding age, the enlightened portion of mankind hath invariably regarded as the beſt ſtandards, not merely of compoſition and ſtyle,

4 Plutarch. in Pericle.

5 Pericles may be conſidered as the contemporary of Socrates, Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, &c. ſince, although he died before them of the plague, theſe and other great men flouriſhed during his adminiſtration.

but

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but of taste and reason. The name of Greek seemed thenceforth to be sunk in that of Athenian; Athenian writers are our surest and almost only guides in relating the subsequent transactions of the whole nation[6]; and from them we learn what is yet the most extraordinary circumstance respecting the Athenian empire, that it had been built on such stable foundations, and reared with such art and skill, as might have long defied the hostile jealousy of Greece and Persia, confederate in arms and resentment, if various causes, which human prudence could neither foresee nor prevent, had not shaken its firmness, and precipitated its downfal[7].

Such is the subject which I have undertaken to treat in this and the two following Chapters; a subject worthy to animate the diligence, and call forth the vigour of an historian: but, if he truly deserves that respected name, he will remember that it is less his duty to amuse the fancy by general description, than to explain, with precision and perspicuity, the various transactions of this interesting and splendid theme; to give the reader a full and distinct view of the complicated matter which it involves; and to remove every adventitious circumstance that might distract or dazzle the attention, as astronomers, in viewing the sun, are careful to ward off its surrounding splendour.

[6] I mean Thucydides and Xenophon, together with the Athenian orators, philosophers, and poets.

[7] Thucydid. l. vii. & viii. passim.

The

The military succefs of the Athenians[8] (which naturally forms the firſt branch of the ſubject, becauſe it not only ſupplied the materials of future improvements, but awakened that energy requiſite to cultivate and complete them) includes three ſeparate actions which were carried on at the ſame time, and conſpired to the ſame end, yet cannot be related in one perpetual narrative, without occaſioning ſome confuſion of ideas, alike deſtructive of the pleaſure and of the uſe of hiſtory. While we endeavour to keep each ſeries of events unbroken and diſtinct, we muſt be careful to point out its influence on the ſimultaneous or ſucceeding tranſactions of the times, that our relation may be at once ſatisfactory and faithful. In ſuch a delineation the trophies of the Perſian war juſtly claim the firſt and moſt conſpicuous place; the hoſtile animoſity of rival ſtates, which continually envied and oppoſed, but, for reaſons that will be fully explained, could neither prevent nor retard the growing ſuperiority of Athens, ſhall occupy the middle of the picture; and we ſhall throw into the back ground the ſucceſſive uſurpations of that fortunate republic over her allies, colonies, and neighbours.

Military ſucceſs of that republic.

Diviſion of the ſubject.

8 The chief materials for this portion of hiſtory conſiſt in the firſt and ſecond books of Thucydides; the eleventh and twelfth of Diodorus Siculus; Plutarch's lives of Themiſtocles, Ariſtides, Cimon, Pericles; Pauſanias's Deſcription of Greece, and Pliny's Natural Hiſtory: ſcattered facts are ſupplied by other ancient writers, whoſe works will be carefully cited.

The

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The Athenians take Seſtos. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A.C. 479.

The common fears which, notwithſtanding innumerable ſources of animoſity, had formed, and hitherto upheld a partial confederacy of the Greeks, were removed by the deciſive victories of Platæa and Mycalé. After theſe memorable events, it was the firſt care of the Athenians to bring home their wives, children, and moſt valuable effects from the iſles of Ægina and Salamis. In the latter iſland they celebrated their good fortune by a national ſolemnity. The ſublime Sophocles joined in the chorus of boys which danced, in exultation, around the Barbarian ſpoils[9]; the valour of his predeceſſor, Æſchylus, had contributed to the victories by which they were obtained; and his rival, the tender Euripides, was born in the iſle of Salamis[10], on that important day which proved alike glorious to Greece, and fatal to Perſia. But an attention to domeſtic concerns prevented not the Athenians from puſhing the war with vigour, though deſerted by the Spartans and other Peloponneſians, who ſailed home before winter. The Aſiatic colonies, animated by the recent recovery of freedom, ſeconded the Athenian ardour; and the confederates, having ſucceſsfully infeſted the territories of the great king, beſieged and took the rich city of Seſtos in the Cherſoneſus of Thrace, the only place of ſtrength which adhered to the Perſian intereſt in that fertile peninſula[11].

9 Athenæus, l. i. 10 Vita Euripid.

11 Herodot. l. ix. c. cvi. Diodor. l. xi. c. xxxvii.

During

During the two following years the war languished abroad, while the symptoms of jealousy and discord, which had already appeared in the separation of the Athenian and Spartan fleets, broke out with more virulence at home. The Athenians began the laborious task of rebuilding their ruined city, which the Persian spoils might contribute to enrich with uncommon magnificence, and which the acquaintance gained in the course of the war, with the graceful forms of Ionic and Doric architecture, might enable them to adorn with more beauty and elegance than had yet been displayed in Europe. But the weighty advice of Themistocles prevailed on them to suspend this noble undertaking, and engaged them, instead of decorating their capital with temples, theatres, and gymnasia, to fortify it by walls of such strength and solidity as might thenceforth bid defiance to every enemy, whether foreign or domestic. In an age when the art of attack was so rude and imperfect, that the smallest fortress formed an object of importance, such a design could not fail of exciting jealousy in the neighbouring republics. The measure was scarcely determined when an embassy arrived from Sparta, remonstrating against a design peculiarly dangerous and alarming to those who owed their safety to the weakness of their cities. "If the Greeks," it was said, "had possessed any town of impregnable strength, they must have found it impossible to expel the Barbarians from their

Athens rebuilt and fortified. Olymp. lxxv. 3, 4. A. C. 478 & 477.

Jealousy of Sparta,

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their country. The Athenians therefore, who had hitherto so generously maintained the cause of the confederacy, ought not only to desist from raising walls and fortifications, but even to prevent a similar design in any republic beyond the isthmus; the Peloponnesus was alone sufficient to afford, in time of danger, a secure refuge to the whole Grecian name."

discovered by Themistocles;

Themistocles easily unveiled the suspicion and hatred concealed under this specious mask of public utility, and encouraged his countrymen to elude the Spartan artifice by similar address. The senate of the five hundred, who gave audience to foreign ambassadors, declared that Athens would adopt no measure inconsistent with the public interest, and promised speedily to send an embassy, in their turn, which would remove all groundless apprehensions entertained on that subject. The Lacedæmonians having returned with this temporising answer, Themistocles was immediately dispatched to Sparta, and expected, as he had previously concerted matters with his countrymen[12], to be followed, at a proper time, by Aristides, the most respected character of his age; and by Lisicles, an able orator in the senate and assembly. Meanwhile the Athenian walls arose with unexampled celerity. Not only slaves, artificers by profession, and the poorer classes of citizens, but magistrates of the

[12] Idem ibid. & in Themist. Lysias Orat. Funeb. & cont. Alcib.

first

first rank, the venerable fathers of the republic, wrought with their own hands, and with unceasing industry. The feeble efforts of women and children contributed to the useful labour. The most superstitious of men neglected their accustomed solemnities, and no longer acknowledged the distinction of days or seasons: nor did even the silent tranquillity of night abate the ardour of their diligence. The ruins of their city happily supplied them with a rich variety of material; no edifice was spared, public or private, sacred or profane; the rude sculpture of ancient temples, even the mutilated tombs of their ancestors, were confounded in the common mass; and, at the distance of near a century, the singular appearance of the wall, composed of stones rough and unpolished, of various colours and unequal size, attested the rapid exertions by which the work had been constructed [13].

and its effects eluded by his address.

Themistocles had hitherto, under various pretences, avoided declaring his commission before the Spartan senate. When urged to this measure by some of the magistrates, who began to suspect his silence, he still alleged the absence of his colleagues as a sufficient reason for delay. But a company of travellers, who had recently visited Athens, gave intelligence of the extraordinary works carrying on in that city. This information, and the resentment of the Spartans which it occasioned, must have disconcerted a man who possessed less cool

[13] Thucydid. l. i. c. lxxxix. & seqq.

 boldness

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boldness than the commander at Salamis and Artemisium. But Themistocles, with the addrefs congenial to his character, afferted, that it was unworthy the gravity of Sparta to regard the vague rumours of obfcure men; and that before lightly fufpecting the approved fidelity of their allies, fhe ought to beftow fome pains in difcovering the truth. This declaration was enforced, it is faid, by feafonable bribes to the moft popular of the Ephori; and the Spartans, deluded or corrupted, agreed to difpatch a fecond embaffy to Athens, confifting of fome of their moft refpectable citizens. Thefe men had no fooner arrived at their deftination, than they were taken into cuftody, as pledges for the fafe return of Themiftocles and his colleagues, who by this time had brought him the welcome news, that the walls were completed. The Athenian ambaffadors were now prepared to throw off the mafk. They appeared in the Lacedæmonian affembly; and Themiftocles, fpeaking for the reft, declared, that his countrymen needed not to learn from their confederates, what meafures were honourable to themfelves, and beneficial to the common caufe; that, by his advice, they had firmly defended their city againft the affaults of open enemies and jealous friends; and that if Sparta entertained any refentment of this meafure, which was evidently not lefs conducive to the public intereft, than, perhaps, difpleafing to private ambition, her anger would be equally unjuft and impotent, fince her own citizens muft remain as hoftages at Athens, till his colleagues and himfelf fhould be

reftored

reſtored in ſafety to their country[14]. Whatever ſecret indignation this ſpeech might excite, the Spartans thought proper to ſuppreſs their animoſity. They allowed the ambaſſadors to return home; but the conduct of Themiſtocles laid the foundation of that unrelenting hatred with which he was perſecuted by Sparta, whoſe intrigues engaged all Greece, not excepting Athens herſelf, in the deſtruction of this illuſtrious citizen. Yet his eminent ſervices, before they were interrupted by the ſtorm of perſecution, gave an opportunity to his unworthy country to diſplay more fully her ſignal ingratitude[15].

Themiſtocles builds the Piræus. Olymp. lxxv. 4. A.C. 477.

The ancient Athenian harbour of Phalericum was ſmall, narrow, and inconvenient. To ſupply its defects, Themiſtocles, even before the Perſian invaſion, had recommended the Piræus, a place five miles diſtant from the citadel, furniſhed with three natural baſons, which, if properly fortified, might form a far more commodious and ſecure ſtation for the Athenian navy. The foundations were laid, and the walls began to riſe, when the cruel ravages of the Barbarians interrupted the undertaking. Having in the preceding year fortified the city, Themiſtocles thought the preſent a proper time to finiſh the new harbour[16]. His addreſs, his eloquence, and his bribes, were ſeaſonably applied to divert the reſentment of Sparta, who, though thenceforth leſs jealous of the naval than military power of her rival, threatened, on this oc-

14 Plut. &c. ibid. 15 Diodor. l. xi. p. 437.
16 Thucydid. l. i. c. xciii. Plut. in Themiſt. Diodor. xi. 436.

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casion, to enter Attica with an armed force. But the artful Athenian had the skill to persuade the Spartans and their allies, that the procuring a strong and capacious harbour was a matter essentially requisite to the common interest of the Grecian confederacy. The work, meantime, was carried on at Athens with much spirit and activity, and, in less than a twelvemonth, brought to such a prosperous conclusion, as could scarcely be credited, but on the testimony of a contemporary historian of the most approved diligence and fidelity[17]. The new walls were sufficiently broad to admit two carriages abreast; the stones composing them were of an immense size, strongly united by bars of iron, which were fastened by melted lead. The Piræus soon grew into a town, containing many thousand inhabitants. It was joined to the city by walls begun by Cimon, but finished by Pericles, twenty years after the harbour itself had been erected. The new buildings of Cimon and Pericles are often mentioned in history under the name of the Long Walls. They extended forty stadia on either side; and when added to the circumference of the ancient city (about sixty stadia), give us for the whole circuit of the Athenian fortifications an extent of nearly eighteen English miles [18].

A. C. 457.

The war against Persia continued by the confederates;

The altercations and animosities excited by such undertakings among the confederates at home, prevented not their united arms from assaulting the

17 Thucydid. ubi supra.

18 Pausanias, p. 20, & seqq. Strabo, p. 391, & seqq. Plut. in Cimon.

dominions

dominions of the great king. Thirty Athenian, and fifty Peloponnesian ships, had been employed to expel the Persian garrisons from the sea-ports which they still occupied in the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Ægean isles. The European fleet, being seasonably joined by various squadrons from the Greek cities of Asia, scoured the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and delivered from oppression the long-enslaved island of Cyprus. Their next operation must have been at a considerable distance of time, since they had to return near two hundred leagues westward, and then to proceed almost as far towards the north, and the Bosphorus of Thrace. At the entrance of this celebrated canal, which joins the Euxine and Propontis, the city of Byzantium, destined in future ages to become the seat of empire, and long to remain the chief emporium of Europe and of Asia, had been first founded by a feeble colony of Megareans, which had gradually become populous, flourishing, and independent, but which was actually commanded and insulted by armed Barbarians. It is not probable that Xerxes, or his ministers, perceived the peculiar security of Byzantium, situate between the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, two straits, which it might occasionally shut to an hostile navy, or open to the fleets of commerce. But had they been sensible of this advantage, the misfortunes hitherto attending all their maritime enterprises must have rendered it impossible to encourage their seamen to resist a victorious enemy. They discovered, however, more than their usual vigour,

who take Byzantium. Olymp. lxxvi. 1. A.C. 476.

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vigour, in defending, by land, a place which they regarded as the center of very valuable poſſeſſions. The adjacent coaſt of Thrace forms a ſtriking contraſt with the inland parts of that country. Inſtead of bleak heaths, and ſnowy mountains, which deform the inhoſpitable regions of Hæmus and Rhodopé, the maritime provinces produce in abundance, vines, olives, the moſt uſeful grains, and the moſt delicious fruits. The climate vies with the delightful ſoftneſs of the Aſiatic plains; and the ſoil had been long cultivated by Greek colonies, who had widely extended themſelves on both ſides of Byzantium. The Barbarians ſtrengthened the garriſon of the place, which was well ſupplied with proviſions, and commanded by Perſians of the firſt diſtinction, among whom were ſeveral kinſmen of the great king. The ſiege was obſtinate, but the events of it are not deſcribed in hiſtory. It is only known, that the walls were ſtormed, and that an immenſe booty, together with many Perſian princes and nobles, fell into the hands of the victors[19].

The conſpiracy of Pauſanias;

Here ends the glory of Pauſanias, who ſtill commanded the forces of the confederacy; a man whoſe fame would rival the moſt illuſtrious names of antiquity, had he fallen in the ſiege of Byzantium. The rich ſpoils of Platæa, of which the tenth was allotted to him, as general, raiſed him above the equality required by the republican inſtitutions of his country. His recent conqueſt ſtill farther augmented his wealth and his ambition; a continual

19 Plut. in Ariſtid. Thucydid. l. i. 95, & ſeqq. Diodor. l. xi. 44—46.

flow

flow of prosperity, which is dangerous to the beſt regulated minds, proved fatal to the aſpiring temper of Pauſanias. As he conceived himſelf too great to remain a ſubject, he was willing to become a ſovereign, through the aſſiſtance of Xerxes, the inveterate enemy of his country. To this prince he made application, by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, a fit inſtrument for any kind of villany. To ſuch an aſſociate Pauſanias had entruſted the noble Perſians taken in Byzantium. This man eſcaped with his priſoners acroſs the Boſphorus, and conveyed a letter to the great king, in which the Spartan general, having mentioned, as an indubitable proof of his ſincerity, the reſtoring his captive kinſmen, propoſed to enter into ſtrict amity with Xerxes, to take his daughter in marriage, to ſecond his efforts in conquering Greece, and to hold that country as a dependent province of the Perſian empire. The Perſian is ſaid to have highly reliſhed theſe propoſals, the ſubjugation of Greece being the great object of his reign. It is certain that he ſpeedily ſent Artabazus, a nobleman of confidence, to confer and cooperate with the traitor.

But Pauſanias himſelf acted with the precipitancy and inconſiſtency of a man, who had either been deluded into treaſon by bad advice, or totally intoxicated by the dangerous vapours of ambition that floated in his diſtempered brain. Inſtead of diſſembling his deſigns until they were ripe for execution, he aſſumed at once the tone of a maſter and the manners of a tyrant. He became difficult of *ill conducted.*

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of access to his colleagues in command; disdained their advice in concerting measures which they were ordered to execute; he was surrounded by guards, chosen from the conquered Barbarians; and he punished the slightest offence in the allied troops with a rigour hitherto unknown to the Grecian discipline. He still managed, indeed, the fierce spirits of the Spartans, but without any degree of prudence, since the distinctions which he demanded for *them*, tended only to irritate and inflame their confederates, who were not allowed to forage, to draw water, to cut down straw for their beds, until the countrymen of Pausanias had been previously furnished with all these articles.

The allies reject his authority; Olymp. lxxvi. 1. A.C. 476.

This intolerable insolence disgusted and provoked the army in general, but especially the Ionians, who lamented that they had been no sooner delivered from the shackles of Persian despotism, than they were bent under the severer and more odious yoke of Sparta. By common consent, they repaired to the Athenian Aristides, and his colleague Cimon, the son of Miltiades, a youth of the fairest hopes, who had signalized his patriotism and valour in all the glorious scenes of the war. Their designs being approved by the Athenian admirals, Uliades and Antagoras, who respectively commanded the fleets of Samos and Chios, the bravest of all the maritime allies, seized the first opportunity to insult the galley of Pausanias; and when reproached and threatened by the Spartan, they desired him to thank Fortune, who had favoured him at Platæa, the memory of which victory alone saved him from the

the immediate punifhment of his arrogance and cruelty. Thefe words fpeedily re-echoed through the whole fleet, and ferved, as foon as they were heard, for the fignal of general revolt. The different fquadrons of Afia and the Hellefpont failed from their ftations, joined the fhips of Uliades and Antagoras, loudly declared againft the infolent ambition of Paufanias, abjured the proud tyranny of Sparta, and for ever ranged themfelves under the victorious colours of Athens, whofe generous magnanimity feemed beft fitted to command the willing obedience of freemen [20].

and fubmit to the Athenians.

This revolution had immediate and important effects, which we fhall proceed to explain, when we have punifhed and difmiffed the unworthy Paufanias. Apprifed of his malverfation and treachery, the Spartan fenate recalled him, to ftand trial for his life. But his immenfe wealth enabling him to corrupt the integrity of his judges, he efcaped without farther punifhment than degradation from his office, and paying a heavy fine. In his ftead, the Spartans fubftituted, not one admiral, but feveral captains, with divided authority, thereby to remove the odium and refentment which the infolence of unlimited command had excited among their confederates. Paufanias, though divefted of his public character, having accompanied thefe officers to the Hellefpont, in a veffel fitted out at his private expence, began to difplay more arrogance than ever. He difdained not only the manners and behaviour,

Paufanias recalled by the Spartans. Olymp. lxxvi. 2. A. C. 475.

Returns to the eaft;

[20] Nepos in Paufan. Plutarch. in Ariftid.

haviour, but the drefs and appearance of a Greek; carried on, almoft openly, his treacherous correfpondence with Artabazus; increafed the number of his Barbarian guards and attendants; trampled with contempt on the moft revered inftitutions of his country; and affumed that provoking pomp of power, and that offenfive oftentation of vice, which difgraced the profligate lives of the Perfian fatraps[21].

recalled by the fcytalé;

When the Spartan magiftrates received a full account of his pride and folly, they were apprehenfive left he might refufe to return home on an ordinary fummons, and therefore employed the form of the fcytalé, a form referved for the moft folemn occafions. The fcytalé (for opinion can give importance to any thing) was only a narrow fcroll of parchment, which had been rolled on a piece of wood, and then ftamped with the decree of the republic. Every Spartan, invefted with authority at home or abroad, poffeffed a tally exactly correfponding to the rod on which the parchment had been firft rolled. By applying his tally, the words of the fcytalé neceffarily arranged themfelves in their original form, and attefted the authentic command of the magiftrate. As tutor to the infant king of Sparta, Paufanias had been furnifhed with an inftrument of this kind; and fuch is the effect of legal formality, that a man who would probably have defpifed the injunction of a fimple letter, returned without delay to a country which he had

21 Thucydid. i. 95. & 128.

betrayed,

betrayed, when recalled by this frivolous, but respected ceremony. CHAP. XII.

The external professions, and hypocritical pedantry, of Spartan virtue, were most shamefully detected and exposed in the whole affair of Pausanias. Though convicted of the most odious tyranny, extortion, and profligacy, he was still allowed to enjoy the benefit of personal freedom; to correspond by frequent messages with his accomplice Artabazus; and, at length, to tamper with the Helots and Messenians, those oppressed slaves, who were ever ready to rebel against the unrelenting tyranny of their masters. But as it exceeded even the opulence and effrontery of Pausanias, to corrupt and influence the whole republic, those who had either escaped the general contagion of venality, or who were offended at not sharing his bribes, accused him, a third time, of treason to Greece, in consequence of an event which enabled them in the fullest manner to make good the charge. An unhappy youth, who lived with Pausanias as the infamous minister of his pleasure, was destined by that monster to become the victim of his ambition. He was charged with a letter from his master to Artabazus, in which, after explaining the actual state of his affairs, Pausanias hinted to him, as had been his usual practice, to destroy the bearer. The suspicious youth, who had observed that none of those sent on such errands ever returned to their country, broke open the letter, and read his own fate. Fired with resentment, he instantly carried the writing to the enemies of Pausanias, who prudently

and punished.

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dently advised the messenger to take refuge in the temple of Neptune, expecting that his master would soon follow him. Meanwhile they practised a concealment in the wall of the temple, and having acquainted the Ephori, and other chief magistrates, with their contrivance for convicting the traitor by his own words, they obtained a deputation to accompany them, to remain concealed with them in the temple, and to overhear the mutual reproaches of Pausanias and his messenger. Yet the superstition of the Spartans permitted them not to seize the criminal in that sacred edifice. He was allowed to retire in safety; and when the senate had at length determined to lay hold of him, he was privately admonished of his danger by some members of that venal assembly. Upon this intelligence, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva, from which it being unlawful to drag him, that asylum was surrounded by guards, all necessaries were denied the prisoner, and he thus perished by hunger[22].

Aristides entrusted with the finances of the confederates. Olymp. lxxvi. 2. A. C. 475.

The late punishment of this detestable traitor could not repair the ruinous effects of his misconduct and villany. Not only the Ionians, who had first begun the revolt, but the foreign confederates in general, loudly rejected the pretensions of Dorcis and other captains whom the Spartans appointed to command them. A few communities of Peloponnesus still followed the Lacedæmonian

[22] Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxviii. & seqq. Diodor. l. xi. c. xliv. & Nepos in Pausan.

standard;

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ftandard; but the iflanders and Afiatics unanimoufly applied to Ariftides, to whofe approved wifdom and virtue they not only entrufted the operations of the combined armament, but voluntarily fubmitted their more particular concerns; and experience foon juftified their prudent choice. Pay was not yet introduced into the Grecian fervice, becaufe the character of *foldier* was not feparated from that of *citizen*. It had been ufual, however, to raife annually a certain proportion of fupplies among the feveral confederates, in order to purchafe arms, to equip and victual the gallies, and to provide fuch engines of war as proved requifite in ftorming the fortified towns belonging to the common enemy [23]. By unanimous fuffrage, Ariftides was appointed to new-model and apply this neceffary tax, which had been impofed and exacted by the Spartans without fufficient attention to the refpective faculties of the contributaries. The honeft Athenian executed this delicate office with no lefs judgment than equity. The whole annual impofition amounted to four hundred and fixty talents, about ninety thoufand pounds fterling; which was proportioned with fuch nice accuracy, that no ftate found the fmalleft reafon to complain of partiality or injuftice. The common treafure was kept in the central and facred ifland of Delos; and, though entrufted to the perfonal difcretion of the Athenian commander, was foon conceived to lie at the difpofition of his republic [24].

Their amount.

23 Plut. in Ariftid. p. 532, & feqq.

24 Ibid. p. 534. Thucyd. l. i. c. xcvi. Diodor. p. 440.

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Merit and persecution of Themistocles.

While the merit of Ariſtides thus procured his countrymen the management of the national treaſury of Greece, Themiſtocles was equally ſucceſſful in improving the internal reſources of the ſtate. By yielding more protection to ſtrangers than they enjoyed in neighbouring cities, he augmented not only the populouſneſs, but the wealth of Athens, as that deſcription of men paid an annual contribution in return for their ſecurity[25]. This, together with other branches of the revenue, he employed in building annually about ſixty gallies, the addition of which to the Athenian navy abundantly compenſated ſuch loſſes as were ſuſtained by the accidents of the ſea in foreign parts. Notwithſtanding the envy and malice of worthleſs demagogues, who infeſted the Athenian aſſembly and courts of juſtice, Themiſtocles was faſt advancing to the attainment of the ſame authority at home, which Ariſtides enjoyed abroad, when complaints arrived from Sparta, that he had conſpired with Pauſanias to betray the public liberty. The known reſentment of the Spartans againſt this extraordinary man, ſufficiently explains the reaſon why they, who were ſo dilatory in their proceedings againſt Pauſanias himſelf, ſhould be ſo eager to bring to puniſhment his ſuppoſed accomplice. But it is not eaſy to conceive, how the Athenians could admit ſuch an accuſation againſt a citizen, whoſe ſingular valour and conduct had gained the deciſive victory at Salamis; whoſe counſels and addreſs

[25] Lyſias adv. Philon.

had

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had fortified their city with impregnable ſtrength; whoſe foreſight and activity had procured them a fleet which no nation in the world could reſiſt; and whoſe abilities and patriotiſm had not only ſaved his country from the moſt formidable invaſion recorded in hiſtory, and which was principally directed againſt Athens, but amidſt the terrors of this invaſion, the treachery of falſe friends, and the violence of open enemies, had ſo eminently contributed to raiſe his republic to the firſt rank in the Grecian confederacy. Yet ſuch, on the one hand, was the effect of that envy which, in republics, always accompanies excellence; and ſuch, on the other, the influence of Spartan bribery and intrigues, that Themiſtocles was baniſhed by the oſtraciſm, a puniſhment inflicted on men whoſe aſpiring ambition ſeemed dangerous to freedom, which required not the proof of any particular delinquency, and which had effect only during a term of years [26].

His death and character. Olymp. lxxvi. 4. A. C. 473.

It is probable, that the illuſtrious exile would have been recalled before the expiration of the appointed time; but the perſecution of Sparta allowed not his countrymen leiſure to repent of their ſeverity. Having puniſhed Pauſanias, they acquainted the Athenians, "That from the papers of that notorious traitor, complete evidence appeared of the guilt of Themiſtocles; that it was not ſufficient, therefore, to have expelled him for a few years from Athens, by an indulgent decree, which the aſſembly

[26] Diodor. p. 445, & ſeqq. Plut. ibid.

CHAP. XII. might revoke at pleaſure; that crimes againſt the general confederacy of Greece ought to be judged by the Amphictyonic council, and puniſhed by death, or perpetual baniſhment." The Athenians ſhamefully complied with this demand. It appeared, indeed, that Themiſtocles had correſponded with Pauſanias, and been privy to his deſigns; but he perſiſted in affirming that he never had approved them. The rivalſhip and enmity ſubſiſting between Sparta and Argos, had induced him to chooſe the latter as the place of his retreat. There he received the news of his condemnation; after which, not thinking himſelf ſecure in any city of Peloponneſus, he ſailed to Corcyra. But his enemies ſtill continuing to purſue him, he fled to the oppoſite coaſt of Epirus, and ſought refuge among the barbarous Moloſſians. Soon afterwards he eſcaped into Perſia, where his wonderful verſatility of genius, in acquiring the language and manners of that country, recommended him to the new king Artaxerxes, who had lately ſucceeded the unfortunate invader of Greece. The ſuſpicion of treaſon throws a dark ſhade on the eminent luſtre of his abilities; nor does the diſintereſtedneſs of his private character tend to remove the imputation. Though he carried with him to Perſia his moſt valuable effects, yet the eſtimate of the property which he left behind in Athens, amounted to an hundred talents (above twenty thouſand pounds ſterling), an immenſe ſum, when eſtimated by the value of money in that age. The whole was confiſcated to the exchequer; and the eagerneſs of the

Olymp. lxxvii. 1. A.C. 472.

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the populace to ſeize this rich booty, ſerves to explain the alacrity with which all parties agreed to his deſtruction. A report prevailed in Greece, that Themiſtocles could never forgive the ingratitude of the Athenians, which he had determined to revenge at the head of a powerful army, raiſed by Artaxerxes. But perceiving the unexampled ſucceſs of Cimon on the Aſiatic coaſt, he deſpaired of being able to accompliſh his deſign; and, in a melancholy hour, ended his life by poiſon at the age of ſixty-five, in Magneſia, a town of Lydia, which had been beſtowed on him by the liberality of the Perſian monarch [27].

Death of Ariſtides. Olymp. lxxvii. 2. A. C. 471.

It is worthy of obſervation, that the three great commanders who had reſiſted and diſgraced the arms of Xerxes, quitted the ſcene almoſt at the ſame time. While Pauſanias and Themiſtocles ſuffered the puniſhment of their real or pretended crimes, Ariſtides died of old age, univerſally regretted by the affectionate admiration of his country.

His character.

He, who had long managed the common treaſury of Greece, left not a ſufficient ſum to defray the expence of his funeral. His ſon Lyſimachus received a preſent of three hundred pounds from the public, to enable him to purſue and finiſh his education. His daughters were maintained and portioned at the expence of the treaſury. This honourable poverty well correſponded with the manly elevation of his character, whoſe pure and unſullied

27 Plut. & Nepos in Themiſt. Diodor. l. xi. c. liv—lix. Thucyd. i. 135, & ſeqq.

 ſplendour,

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ſplendour, in the opinion of a good judge of merit [28], far eclipſes the doubtful fame of his daring, but unfortunate rival.

Elevation of Cimon to the command.

By the death of Ariſtides, the conduct of the Perſian war devolved on his colleague Cimon, who united the integrity of that great man to the valour of Miltiades and the deciſive boldneſs of Themiſtocles. But as he felt an ambition for eminence which diſdains bare imitation, he not only reflected the moſt diſtinguiſhed excellencies of his predeceſſors, but improved and adorned them by an elegant liberality of manners, an indulgent humanity, and candid condeſcenſion; virtues which long ſecured him the affections of his fellow-citizens, while his military talents and authority, always directed by moderation and juſtice, maintained an abſolute aſcendant over the allies of the republic.

He reduces the coaſt of Thrace. Olymp. lxxvii. 2. A.C. 471.

His firſt operations were employed againſt the coaſt of Thrace, which the taking of Byzantium ſeemed to render an eaſy conqueſt. The only places in that country fitted to make an obſtinate reſiſtance, were the towns of Eion and Amphipolis, both ſituate on the river Strymon; the former near its junction with the Strymonic gulph, the latter more remote from the ſhore, but entirely ſurrounded by an arm of the gulph, and the principal branches of that copious river. Amphipolis, however, was taken, and planted by a numerous colony of Athenians. But Eion ſtill oppoſed a vigorous reſiſtance; Boges, the Perſian governor, having deter-

[28] Plato apud Plutarch. in Ariſtid.

mined

mined rather to perifh than furrender. After long baffling the efforts of the befiegers, by fuch perfe-vering courage and activity as none of his country-men had difplayed in the courfe of the war, this fierce Barbarian was at length not tamed, but exaf-perated by hunger. His companions and attend-ants, equally defperate with their leader, followed his intrepid example; and mounting the ramparts with one accord, threw into the middle ftream of the Strymon their gold, filver, and other precious effects. After thus attefting their implacable ha-tred to the affailants, they calmly defcended, lighted a funeral pile, butchered their wives and children, and again mounting the walls, precipitated them-felves with fury into the thickeft of the flames [29].

Purfues the enemy into Afia. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A.C. 470.

With this fignal act of defpair ended the Perfian dominion over the coaft of Europe, which finally fubmitted to the victorious arms of Cimon; a ge-neral, who knew alike how to conquer, and how to ufe the victory. The Athenians were eager to prolong the authority of a man, who feemed ambi-tious to acquire wealth by valour, only that by wealth he might purchafe the public efteem; and whofe affable condefcenfion, and generous libera-lity, continually increafed his fame and his influence both at home and abroad. The reinforcements with which he was fpeedily furnifhed by the re-public, enabled him to purfue the enemy into Afia, without allowing them time to breathe, or recover ftrength, after their repeated defeats. The inter-

[29] Plut. in Cimon. Diodor. l. xi.

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mediate iſlands ambitiouſly courted his protection and friendſhip; and *their* feeble aid, together with the more powerful aſſiſtance of the Ionian coaſt, ſpeedily increaſed his fleet to the number of three hundred ſail.

His rapid ſucceſs in Caria and Lycia.

With this formidable armament he ſtretched towards the coaſt of Caria, where his approach ſerved for the ſignal of liberty to the numerous Greek cities in that valuable province. Seconded by the ardour of the natives, he ſucceſſively beſieged and reduced the walled towns and fortreſſes, ſeveral of which were filled with powerful garriſons; and, in the courſe of a few months, totally expelled the Perſians from all their ſtrong holds in Caria. The victorious armament then proceeded eaſtward to Lycia, and received the ſubmiſſion of that extenſive coaſt. The citizens of Phaſelis alone, defended by ſtrong walls, and a numerous garriſon, refuſed to admit the Grecian fleet, or to betray their Perſian maſter. Their reſiſtance was the more formidable, becauſe their ancient connection with the Chians, who actually ſerved under the colours of Cimon, enabled them to enter into a treacherous correſpondence with the enemy. After other means of intercourſe had been cut off, the Chians ſtill ſhot arrows over the walls, and thus conveyed intelligence into the place of all the meaſures adopted by the aſſailants. Wherever the attack was made, the townſmen and garriſon were prepared to reſiſt: the beſiegers were long baffled in all their attempts; but the perſeverance of Cimon finally overcame the obſtinacy of his enemies. Their vigorous re-

He takes Phaſelis.

ſiſtance

ſiſtance was not diſtinguiſhed by any memorable puniſhment; the mediation of the Chians, who were juſtly eſteemed among the beſt ſailors in the Athenian fleet, eaſily prevailing on the lenity of Cimon to grant them a capitulation, on condition that they immediately paid ten talents, and augmented the Grecian armament by their whole naval ſtrength [30].

The Perſians prepare for defence:

The diſtracted ſtate of Perſia, the intrigues of the court, the diſcord of the palace, and the civil wars which raiſed to the throne of Xerxes his third ſon Artaxerxes, diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of Longimanus, prevented that vaſt but unwieldy empire from making any vigorous effort to reſiſt the European invaſion. But after Artaxerxes had at length cruſhed the unfortunate ambition of his competitors, and acquired firm poſſeſſion of the reins of government, which he continued to hold for half a century [31], he naturally concerted proper meaſures to defend his remaining dominions in Aſia Minor. Having re-eſtabliſhed the Perſian authority in the iſle of Cyprus, he conſidered that Pamphylia, being the next province to Lycia, would probably receive a ſpeedy viſit from the victorious Greeks. That he might meet them there with becoming vigour, he aſſembled a powerful army on the fertile banks of the Eurymedon. A fleet likewiſe, of four hundred ſail, was collected,

A. C. 473 —425.

30 Plut. & Diodor. ibid.

31 Compare Thucydid. l. i. c. cxxxvii. and Uſher Chronol. See alſo Petav. de Doctrin. Temp. l. x. c. xxv. who endeavours to reconcile the chronological differences between Thucydides and Plutarch in Themiſt.

 chiefly

CHAP. XII. chiefly from Cilicia and Phœnicia, and was commanded to rendezvous near the mouth of that river.

Are defeated at ſea. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A.C. 470.

The Greeks, conducted by the activity of Cimon, delayed not to undertake the enterpriſe which the prudence of Artaxerxes had foreſeen. Their fleet, amounting to two hundred and fifty gallies, fell in with the Perſian ſquadrons off the coaſt of Cyprus. The Barbarians, vainly confident in their ſuperior numbers, did not decline the engagement, which was obſtinate, fierce, and bloody. Many of their ſhips were ſunk; an hundred were taken; the reſt fled in diſorder towards the ſhore of Cyprus; but, being ſpeedily purſued by a powerful detachment of the Grecian fleet, were abandoned by the terror of their crews, to the victors; and thus the mighty preparations, which the great king had raiſed with ſuch flattering hopes, ſtrengthened in one day, with about three hundred ſail, the hoſtile navy of Greece [32].

Cimon's valour and conduct.

The vigorous mind of Cimon, inſtead of being intoxicated with this flow of proſperity, was leſs elevated with good fortune, than ſolicitous to improve it. The captured veſſels contained above twenty thouſand Perſians. The ſoldiers encamped on the Eurymedon were ſtill ignorant of the battle. Theſe circumſtances inſtantly ſuggeſted to the quick diſcernment of Cimon a ſtratagem for ſurpriſing the Perſian camp, which was executed on the evening of the ſame glorious day with unexam-

[32] Thucydid. Plut. Diod. ibid.

pled

pled ſucceſs. The priſoners were ſtripped of their eaſtern attire; the braveſt of the Greeks condeſcended to aſſume the tiara and ſcymitar, and thus diſguiſed, embarked in the Perſian ſhips, and ſailed up the river Eurymedon with a favourable gale. The unſuſpecting Barbarians received them with open arms into their camp, as their long-expected companions. But the Greeks had no ſooner been admitted within the gates, than on a given ſignal, at once drawing their ſwords, they attacked, with the concert of diſciplined valour, the defenceleſs ſecurity of their now aſtoniſhed and trembling adverſaries. Before the Perſians recovered from their ſurpriſe, Cimon had advanced to the tent of their general. Conſternation and deſpair ſeized this numerous but unwarlike hoſt. The few who were leaſt overcome by the impreſſions of fear and amazement, betook themſelves to flight; a panic terror ſuſpended the powers of the reſt; they remained, and fell, unarmed and unreſiſting, by the hands of an unknown enemy.

Gains the deciſive victory of Eurymedon.

The rich ſpoil of the Barbarian camp rewarded the enterpriſe and celerity of the Greeks, who, loaded with wealth and glory, returned home during winter, and piouſly dedicated to Apollo a tenth of the plunder acquired by theſe ever memorable atchievements. A conſiderable portion of the remainder was employed (as mentioned above) in ſtrengthening the fortifications of Athens. Agreeably to the Grecian cuſtom, the general was entitled to a valuable ſhare. Cimon received it as a teſtimony of the public eſteem, and expended it for the

The ſpoil how employed.

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the public use; embellishing his beloved native city with shady walks, gardens, porticoes, schools of exercise, and other works of general pleasure and utility [33].

The Athenians prosecute the war; Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A.C. 469.

After these decisive victories, the Greeks, headed by the Athenians, carried on the war during twenty-one years, rather for plunder than glory. The manifest superiority which they enjoyed on all the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, might have rendered their maritime allies sufficiently secure. But the people of Athens, whose councils began about this time to be governed by the magnanimous ambition and profound policy of Pericles, had the address to persuade their confederates that naval preparations and enterprises were still as necessary as ever. At length, however, most of those scattered islands and sea-ports, which followed the colours of Athens, grew weary of perpetual hostilities, of which *they* shared the toil and the danger, while their ambitious leaders alone reaped the advantage and the glory, and became continually more anxious to enjoy the benefits of public peace, and the undisturbed comforts of domestic tranquillity. The Athenians availed themselves of this disposition, to engage such states as appeared most backward in raising their contingents for the common armament, to compound for personal service on shipboard, by an annual supply of money, which might enable Athens continually to keep in readiness a fleet of observation, to watch and check

take money instead of ships from the allies;

[33] Idem, ibid. & Nepos in Cimon. & Thucydid. l. i.

the

the motions of the common enemy. This, at firſt voluntary, contribution ſoon amounted to about an hundred thouſand pounds. It was gradually augmented; and, at length, raiſed by Pericles to three times the original ſum [34]; an immenſe income, conſidering that the proportional value of money to labour was then ten times higher than at preſent; and conſidering alſo the very limited revenues of the greateſt monarchs of antiquity; ſince, from all the various provinces of the Perſian empire, ſcarcely four millions ſterling entered the royal treaſury [35].

prepare to undertake an expedition againſt Cyprus. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 466.

In their eaſtern expeditions, the Greeks had an opportunity of viſiting the large and beautiful iſland of Cyprus, which, though delivered by their valour from *ſome* Perſian garriſons, either ſtill continued, or again became, ſubject to that empire. The ſtriking advantages [36] of a delightful territory, four hundred miles in circumference, producing in great abundance wine, oil, with the moſt delicious fruits, and deemed invaluable in ancient times on account of its rich mines of braſs, naturally tempted the ambition of an enterpriſing nation. The conqueſt of Cyprus was ſtill farther recommended to the Athenians, as the ſea-coaſt had been peopled by a Grecian colony under the heroic Teucer, who built there a city called Salamis from the name of

34 Thucydid. ibid. & Plut. in Pericl.

35 Herodot. iii. 95. In modern times the precious metals have ſo much encreaſed in quantity and diminiſhed in value, that in 1660 the revenue of Hiſdooſtan amounted to thirty-two millions ſterling.

36 Strabo, p. 648.

his

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his native country[37], which, from the earlieſt antiquity, had been regarded as a dependence of Attica. The Grecian inhabitants of Cyprus had hitherto attained neither power nor ſplendour; their ſettlements had been ſucceſſively reduced by the Phœnicians and the great king; and they actually languiſhed in a condition of the greateſt debility[38]. Honour prompted the Athenians to relieve their diſtreſſed brethren; intereſt incited them to acquire poſſeſſion of a valuable iſland. With two hundred ſhips of war they prepared to undertake this important enterpriſe, when an object ſtill more dazzling gave a new direction to their arms.

Diverted from that meaſure by the revolt of Egypt. Olymp. lxxviii. 4. A. C. 465.

Amidſt the troubles which attended the eſtabliſhment of Artaxerxes on the Perſian throne, the Egyptians ſought an opportunity to withdraw themſelves from the yoke of a nation whoſe tyranny they had long felt and lamented. A leader only was wanting to head the rebellion. This alſo was at length diſcovered in Inarus, a bold Libyan chief, to whoſe ſtandard the malcontents aſſembling from all quarters, gradually grew into an army, which attacked and defeated the Perſian mercenaries, expelled the garriſons, baniſhed or put to death the governors and officers of the revenue, and traverſing the kingdom without controul or reſiſtance, every where proclaimed the Egyptians a free and independent nation. Nor was this the capricious revolt of ſhort-ſighted Barbarians. Inarus maintained his conqueſt with valour and policy; and in

[37] Iſocrat. in Evagor. [38] Iſocrat. ibid.

order

order to ſtrengthen his intereſt by foreign alliance, diſpatched an embaſſy to Athens, craving the aſſiſtance of that victorious republic againſt its moſt odious and inveterate enemy [39]. CHAP. XII.

The negociation was ſucceſsful; the Athenians burned with deſire to ſhare the ſpoils of Perſia, and commanded the ſhips, deſtined for Cyprus, to ſail to Egypt. They had ſcarcely arrived in that kingdom, when a Perſian army of three hundred thouſand men, commanded by Achæmenes, encamped on the banks of the Nile. A battle ſpeedily enſued, in which the inſurgents obtained a complete victory, chiefly through the valour and diſcipline of their Grecian auxiliaries. The vanquiſhed ſought refuge within the walls of Memphis; that capital was inveſted; and after becoming maſter of two diviſions of the city, the Athenians puſhed with vigour the ſiege of the third, called, from the colour of its fortifications, the White Wall. Artaxerxes, meanwhile, neglected no poſſible effort, for breaking, or eluding, a tempeſt, that threatened to diſmember his dominions. While Perſian nobles of diſtinction conveyed immenſe ſums of gold and ſilver into Greece, to rouſe, by ſeaſonable bribes, the hoſtility of rival ſtates againſt the audacity of Athens, a new army was collected, ſtill more numerous than the former, and entruſted to Megabazus, the braveſt general in the Eaſt. Such, at leaſt, he was deemed by his countrymen; yet we cannot perceive any very illuſtrious merit in forcing the Greeks to raiſe

The Athenian armament ſails thither; Olymp. lxxix. 2. A.C. 463.

is victorious;

beſieges Memphis.

39 Thucydid. l. i. & Diodor. l. xi. p. 279.

the

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the ſiege of Memphis, the ſoldiers being already worn out with the fatigues of hard ſervice, and probably enfeebled by diſeaſes in a far diſtant climate, extremely different from their own.

Misfortunes of the Athenians in Egypt. Olymp. lxxx. 4. A. C. 457.

Megabazus, however, had the glory of firſt turning againſt the Greeks that current of ſucceſs which had run for many years ſo ſtrongly in their favour. They and the revolted Egyptians were now beſieged, in their turn, in a ſmall iſland of the Nile called Proſopis, along the coaſt of which the Athenians had anchored their ſhips. By diverting the courſe of the river, Megabazus left them on dry land. This operation ſo much confounded the Egyptians, that they immediately laid down their arms: but their wonted magnanimity did not forſake the Greeks: with their own hands they ſet fire to their fleet, and exhorting each other to ſuffer nothing unworthy of their former fame, determined, with one accord, to reſiſt the aſſailants, and, although they could not expect victory, to purchaſe an honourable tomb. Megabazus, intimidated by their countenance and reſolution, and unwilling to expoſe his men to the efforts of a dangerous deſpair, granted them a capitulation, and, what ſeems more extraordinary in a Perſian commander, allowed them to retire in ſafety. They endeavoured to penetrate through Libya to the Grecian colonies in Cyrenaica, from which they hoped to be tranſported by ſea to their native country. But the greater part periſhed through fatigue or diſeaſe in the inhoſpitable deſarts of Africa, and only a miſerable remnant of men, whoſe bravery deſerved a better

fate,

fate, revisited the shores of Greece. To complete the disaster, a reinforcement of sixty ships, which the Athenians had sent to Egypt, was attacked, surrounded, and totally destroyed by the Phœnicians, near the same scene which had already proved so fatal, but so honourable, to their countrymen [40]. CHAP. XII.

These repeated misfortunes, together with the growing troubles in Greece, which we shall speedily have occasion to describe, prevented the Athenians, during seven years, from reviving their design against Cyprus. A fleet of two hundred sail was at length entrusted to Cimon, who enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the Cyprian coast. The towns of Malos and Citium opposed a feeble resistance, and the singular humanity with which Cimon treated his prisoners, would have facilitated more important conquests: but the Phœnician and Cilician fleets had again put to sea, and Cimon wisely determined to attack them as they approached the island, rather than wait their arrival, his countrymen being superior to their enemies, still more in naval than in military prowess. In the battle which soon followed, he took above an hundred gallies; the number of those sunk or destroyed is unknown; the remainder fled to the coast of Cilicia, in hopes of protection from the army of Megabazus, encamped in that province; but that slow unwieldy body was unable to afford them any seasonable or effectual relief. The Greeks, having pursued them on shore, totally destroyed *them*, as well as the

The Athenians renew their designs against Cyprus. Olymp. lxxxii. 3. A. C. 450.

Their success in that island.

40 Isocrat. de Pace & Panegyr. & Thucydid. & Diodor. ibid.

Persian

Perſian detachments who came to their ſuccour, and returned loaded with ſpoil to Cyprus. The Athenian general then prepared to form the ſiege of Salamis, which, though defended by a numerous Perſian garriſon, and well provided with all the neceſſaries of defence, muſt have ſoon yielded to his ſkill and valour, had not ſickneſs, in conſequence of a wound received before the walls of Citium, prevented him from exerting his uſual activity.

The Perſian monarch ſolicits peace. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 449.

Meanwhile Artaxerxes, who perceived that the acquiſition of Salamis would naturally draw after it the conqueſt of the whole iſland, and who had been continually diſappointed in expecting to prepare fleets and armies capable to contend with the Athenians, eagerly ſolicited peace from that people, almoſt on their own terms. His ambaſſadors were favourably heard in the Athenian aſſembly by thoſe who were more ſolicitous about confirming their uſurpations over their allies and colonies, than ambitious of extending their Aſiatic conqueſts. Cimon, who invariably maintained the contrary ſyſtem, was now no more. A peace, therefore, was concluded on the following conditions [41]: That all the Greek colonies in Lower Aſia ſhould be declared independent of the Perſian empire; that the armies of the great king ſhould not approach within three days journey of the weſtern coaſt; and that no Perſian veſſel ſhould appear between the Cyanean rocks and the Chelidonian iſles, that is, in the wide extent of the Ægean and Mediterranean ſeas, between the northern extremity of the Thracian

Motives which determined the Athenians to compliance.

[41] Thucydid. Plutarch. Diodor. Iſocrat. &c.

Boſpho-

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Bofphorus and the fouthern promontory of Lycia. On fuch terms the Athenians and their allies ftipulated to withdraw their armament from Cyprus, and to abftain thenceforward from molefting the territories of the king of Perfia [42]. Such was the conclufion of this memorable war, which, fince the burning of Sardis, the firft decifive act of hoftility, had been carried on, with little intermiffion, during fifty-one years. The fame magnanimous republic, which firft ventured to oppofe the pretenfions of Perfia, dictated to that haughty empire the moft humiliating conditions of peace; an important and illuftrious æra in Grecian hiftory, which was often celebrated with pompous panegyric during the declining ages of Athenian glory.

Obftacles to a general or lafting confederacy in Greece.

Although, for reafons which will be explained hereafter, peace was alike neceffary to both parties, yet the reader, who feels a warm intereft in the caufe of civilization and humanity, cannot but regret that, after difgracing the arms of Perfia, and breaking the power of Carthage, the Greeks had not combined in one powerful exertion, and extended their victories and their improvements over the ancient world. But the internal defects in her political conftitution, which ftunted the growth of Greece, and prevented her manhood and maturity from correfponding to the blooming vigour of her youth, rendered impoffible this moft defirable union, which, could it have taken place, would probably have left little room for the tranfient conquefts of Alexander, or the more permanent glory

[42] Ifocrat. Panegyr.

 of

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of the Roman arms. Inſtead of theſe imagined trophies, the ſubſequent hiſtory of Greece preſents us with the melancholy picture of inteſtine diſcord.

Its ſubſequent hiſtory peculiarly intereſting.

During an hundred and eleven years, which elapſed between the glorious peace with Perſia, in which the Athenians, at the head of their allies, ſeemed for ever to have repreſſed the ambition of that aſpiring power, and the fatal defeat at Cheronæa, in which the ſame people, with their unfortunate auxiliaries, ſubmitted to the valour and activity of Philip, Greece, with ſhort variations of domeſtic quiet and foreign hoſtility, carried on bloody wars, and obtained deſtructive victories, in which her own citizens, not the enemies of the confederacy, were the unhappy objects of her inglorious triumph. Yet the tranſactions of this diſtracted and miſerable period, however immaterial in the hiſtory of empire, are peculiarly intereſting in the ſtill more inſtructive hiſtory of human nature. A confederacy of ſoldiers and freemen, extending their dominion over ignorant ſavages, or effeminate ſlaves, muſt continually exhibit the unequal combat of power, courage, and conduct on the one ſide, againſt weakneſs, ignorance, and timidity on the other. But amidſt the domeſtic diſſenſions of Greece, the advantages of the contending parties were nicely balanced and accurately adjuſted. Force was reſiſted by force, valour oppoſed by valour, and art encountered or eluded by ſimilar addreſs. The active powers of man, excited by emulation, inflamed by oppoſition, nouriſhed by intereſt, and at once ſtrengthened and elevated by

a ſenſe

a ſenſe of perſonal honour and the hope of immortal fame, operated in every direction with awakened energy, and were diſplayed in the boldeſt exertions of the voice and arm. In every field where glory might be won, men recogniſed the proper objects of their ambition, and aſpired to the higheſt honours of their kind; and although the prizes were often ſmall, and the victory always indeciſive, yet the pertinacious efforts of the combatants (great beyond example, and almoſt beyond belief) furniſh the moſt intereſting ſpectacle that hiſtory can preſent to the rational wonder of poſterity.

Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, hoſtile to Athens.

The powerful cities of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, which had long rivalled Athens and each other, could not behold, without much diſſatisfaction and anxiety, the rapid growth of a republic which already eclipſed their ſplendour, and might ſome time endanger their ſafety. The Spartans had particular cauſes of diſguſt. The immortal victories of Cimon made them deeply regret that *they*, who had ſhared the firſt and ſevereſt toils of the war, had too haſtily withdrawn from a field of action that afforded ſo many laurels. They were provoked at being denied the command of the maritime allies, and not leſs offended at being overreached by Themiſtocles. All theſe reaſons had determined them, above twenty years before the peace with Perſia, to make war on the Athenians, expecting to be ſeconded in this deſign by the fears of the weak, and the jealouſy of the more powerful, ſtates, on both ſides the Corinthian iſthmus.

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Earthquake in Sparta; Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A. C. 469.

But their animosity, before it broke out into action, was diverted by a calamity equally sudden and unforeseen. In the year four hundred and sixty-nine before Christ, Sparta was overwhelmed by an earthquake [43]. Taygetus and the neighbouring mountains were shaken to the foundation, and twenty thousand Lacedæmonian citizens or subjects perished in this dreadful disaster. But, amidst the ruins of Sparta, one description of men beheld the public misfortunes not only without horror, but with a secret satisfaction.

followed by the revolt of the Helots and Messenians;

The oppressed Spartan slaves, known by the appellations of Helots and Messenians, assembled in crowds from the villages in which they were cantoned, and took measures for delivering themselves, during the cruelty of the elements, from the not less inexorable cruelty of their unfeeling tyrants. The prudent dispositions of king Archidamus, who, foreseeing the revolt, had summoned the citizens to arms, prevented them from getting immediate possession of the capital; but they rendered themselves masters of the ancient and strong fortress Ithomé, from which they continued many years to infest the Lacedæmonian territories. The Spartans in vain exerted their utmost endeavours to expel this dangerous intestine enemy; and in the third year of the war (for this revolt is dignified in history by the name of the Third Messenian War), they had recourse to the Athenians, who, of all the Greeks, were deemed the most skilful in sieges. The Athenians, either not sufficiently acquainted with the

[43] Thucydid. lib. i. cap. c. & seqq. Diodor. lib. xi. cap. lxiii.

ſecret hoſtility of Sparta, or willing to diſſemble their knowledge of it, as they were then totally bent on other projects and enterpriſes, ſent them the required aſſiſtance. The beſiegers, however, met with ſo little ſucceſs, that the Spartans diſmiſſed their Athenian auxiliaries, on pretence indeed that their help was no longer neceſſary; but, in reality, from a ſuſpicion that they favoured the intereſt of the rebels; and, as they retained the troops of all the other allies, the Athenians were juſtly provoked by this inſtance of diſtruſt[44]. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Piſa, who, for a reaſon that will be immediately explained, were highly incenſed againſt Sparta, gave vigorous aſſiſtance to the beſieged.

part of whom are ſettled in Naupactus by the Athenians. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A.C. 459.

The place thus held out ten years: many ſallies were made, ſeveral battles were fought with the fury that might be expected from the cruelty of tyrants chaſtiſing the inſolence of ſlaves. Both parties muſt have been reduced to extremity, ſince the Helots and Meſſenians, though obliged to ſurrender the place, obtained from the weakneſs, a condition which they would have vainly ſolicited from the mercy, of Sparta, "that they ſhould be allowed, with their wives, children, and effects, to depart, unmoleſted, from the Peloponneſus." The Athenians, deeply reſenting the affront of ſuſpected fidelity, determined to mortify the Spartans by kindly receiving thoſe needy fugitives, whom they finally eſtabliſhed in Naupactus, a ſea-port on the Criſſean gulph, which their arms had juſtly wreſted

44 Thucydid. l. i. cap. ci.

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Their signal gratitude.

from the Locri Ozolæ; a cruel and barbarous people, whose savage manners and rapacity disgraced their Grecian extraction. The Helots and Messenians repaid, by signal gratitude, the humane protection of Athens. During the long course of the Peloponnesian war, while their neighbours on every side espoused the opposite interest, the inhabitants of Naupactus alone invariably exerted themselves, with zeal and vigour, in defence of the declining power of their magnanimous confederate and ancient benefactor.

The war between the Elians and Pisans.

The cause above alluded to, which had incensed the Pisans against Sparta, dated beyond a century[45]. That people had long contended with Elis, the capital of their province, for the right of superintending the Olympic games. The Spartans enabled the Elians to prevail in the contest, who continued, without opposition, to direct that august solemnity, until the earthquake and subsequent calamities of Sparta emboldened the insolent and wealthy Pisans to renew their pretensions[46]. Their attempts, however, to maintain this bold claim, especially after the removal of the Helots and Messenians, appear to have been alike feeble and unfortunate.

Sack of Pisa. Olymp. lxxi. i. A. C. 456.

Pisa was taken, plundered, and so thoroughly demolished, that not a vestige, and scarce the name, remained.

The temple of Olympian Jupiter.

With the valuable booty acquired in this warfare, the Elians executed a memorable undertaking; having, in the course of ten years[47], enlarged and

45 Pausanias, l. vi. c. xxii. 46 Strabo, l. viii. p. 545.
47 Between the years 456 and 446, A. C.

adorned

adorned the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and erected the celebrated ſtatue of that divinity; a work which no ſubſequent age could ever rival, and whoſe ſublimity is ſaid to have increaſed and fortified the popular ſuperſtition [48]. This famous temple was of the Doric order, encircled with a colonnade, and built of the ſtone of the country reſembling Parian marble. From the area, or ground, to the decoration over the gate, it reached ſixty-eight feet in height; it was ninety-five feet broad, and two hundred and thirty long: thus falling ſhort of the greateſt modern temples in magnitude, as much as it excelled them in beauty and the richneſs of material. It was covered with Pentelican marble, cut in the form of brick tiles. At each extremity of the roof ſtood a gilded vaſe; in the middle a golden victory; below which was a ſhield emboſſed with Meduſa's head, likewiſe of gold. Pelops and Oenomaus were repreſented, on the pediment, ready to begin the chariot-race before very illuſtrious ſpectators, ſince Jupiter himſelf was of the number. The vault was adorned with the battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ. The labours of Hercules diſtinguiſhed the principal entrance [49].

Phidias's ſtatue of that divinity.

After paſſing the braſs gates, you diſcovered Iphitus crowned by his ſpouſe Echecheiria; from thence you proceeded, through a noble portico, to the majeſtic creation of Phidias the Athenian, which formed the principal ornament of the tem-

[48] Aliquid receptæ religioni adjeciſſe fertur. PLIN.

[49] Pauſan. in Eliac. p. 303, & ſeqq.

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ple, and of Greece. The god was ſitting on a throne, and being ſixty feet high, touched the roof with his head; and threatened, if he moved himſelf, to ſhake in pieces that noble edifice, which, lofty and ſpacious as it was, ſtill appeared unworthy to contain him. This vaſt coloſſus was compoſed of gold, taken in the ſack of Piſa, and of ivory, then almoſt as precious as gold, which was brought from the Eaſt by Athenian merchantmen. The god had an enamelled crown of olive on his head, an image of victory in his right hand, a burniſhed ſceptre in his left. His robes and ſandals were variegated with golden flowers and animals. The throne was made of ivory and ebony, inlaid with precious ſtones. The feet which ſupported it, as well as the fillets which joined them, were adorned with innumerable figures; among which you perceived the Theban children torn by ſphynxes, together with Apollo and Diana ſhooting the beautiful and once flouriſhing family of Niobé. Upon the moſt conſpicuous part of the throne which met the eye in entering, you beheld eight ſtatues, repreſenting the gymnaſtic exerciſes; and the beautiful figure, whoſe head was encirled with a wreath, reſembled young Pantarces, the favourite ſcholar of Phidias, who, in the conteſt of the boys, had recently gained the Olympic prize. Beſides the four feet, mentioned above, the throne was ſupported by four pillars, placed between them, and painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias. There that admirable artiſt had delineated the Heſperides guarding the golden apples; Atlas painfully ſuſtaining the

the heavens, with Hercules ready to aſſiſt him; Salamine with naval ornaments in her hand; and Achilles ſupporting the beautiful expiring Penthe-ſilea.

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It would be tedious to deſcribe the remaining ornaments of this celebrated ſtatue, and ſtill more of the ſacred edifice itſelf: yet the temple of Olympia was much inferior in ſize to that of Ceres and Proſerpine, at Eleuſis, in Attica. The latter was built by Ictinus, the contemporary and rival of Phidias; and ſufficiently capacious (could we believe the exaggerations of travellers) to contain thirty thouſand perſons [50]. This edifice was alſo of the Doric order; that of Diana at Epheſus, and of Apollo at Miletus, were both of the Ionic; and the celebrated temple of Jupiter at Athens, begun by Piſiſtratus, and enlarged by Pericles, was finiſhed in the Corinthian ſtyle, by Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria. Theſe four temples were the richeſt and moſt beautiful in the world, and long regarded as models of the three Grecian orders of architecture [51].

The Olympic temple compared with other ſacred edifices in Greece.

While the earthquake and the ſervile war confined within a domeſtic ſphere the activity of Sparta, Argos, the ſecond republic of the Peloponneſus, and long the moſt conſiderable principality in that peninſula, underwent ſuch revolutions and misfortunes, as left her neither inclination nor power to oppoſe the Athenian greatneſs. Ever rivals and enemies of Sparta, the Argives had jealouſly de-

Inteſtine diſſenſions in Argolis. Olymp. lxxviii. 1. A. C. 468.

[50] Strabo, l. ix. p. 395.

[51] Vitruvius, l. vii.

clined

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clined the danger and glory of the Persian war, to the success of which their adversaries had so eminently contributed. This ungenerous dereliction passed not unpunished. As deserters of the common cause, the Argives incurred the hatred and contempt of their public-spirited neighbours. Mycenæ, once the proud residence of royal Agamemnon, Epidaurus, and Træzené, which formed respectively the greatest strength and ornament of the Argive territory, threw off the yoke of a capital, whose folly or baseness rendered her unworthy to govern them. Sicyon, Nauplia, Heliæa, and other towns of less note, which were scattered at small distances over the face of that delightful province, obeyed the summons to liberty, and assumed independence. The rebels (for as such they were treated by the indignant magistrates of Argos) strengthened themselves by foreign alliance, and continued thenceforth to disdain the authority of their ancient metropolis and sovereign. At the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, they formed a respectable portion of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while Argos alone, of all the cities in the Peloponnesus, openly espoused the cause of the Athenians.

Destruction of Mycenæ.

The ancient city of Mycenæ, which had first sounded the trumpet of sedition, was the only victim of Argive resentment. The Argives seized a favourable opportunity, while the allies and adherents of Mycenæ were occupied with their domestic concerns, to lead their whole forces against the place; and having taken it by storm, they decimated

mated the inhabitants, and demoliſhed not only the walls, but the town [52] itſelf, which was never afterwards rebuilt.

The inferior cities in Bœotia reject the authority of Thebes.

The deſultory tranſactions of ſo many ſtates and cities as compoſed the name and nation of Greece, muſt appear a continual maze of perplexity and confuſion, unleſs we carefully follow the threads which ſhould direct us in this intricate, yet not inextricable, labyrinth. But if we ſeriouſly apply ourſelves to inveſtigate the hidden cauſes of events, and to trace revolutions to their ſource, we ſhall be ſurpriſed by the agreeable diſcovery, that the hiſtory of this celebrated people is not entirely that maſs of diſorder which it appears on a ſuperficial ſurvey. The ſame cauſes which repreſſed the activity, and humbled the pride of Argos, operated alike fatally on Thebes, the ſecond republic beyond the iſthmus, and the only one that ever aſpired to rival the power of Athens. The Thebans, for ſimilar, or more odious reaſons, than thoſe which had reſtrained the Argives, had alſo with-held their aſſiſtance in the Perſian war; and by this mean ſelfiſhneſs or treachery had juſtly provoked the indignation of the ſubordinate cities of Bœotia. Not only Theſpiæ and Platæa, which had ever borne with impatience the Theban yoke, but the ſea-ports of Aulis, Anthemon, and Larymna; Aſchra, the beloved habitation of old Heſiod; Coronea, overſhadowed by mount Helicon, a favourite ſeat of the Muſes; Labadea, famous for its oracle of Tro-

[52] Diodor. l. xi. p. 276.

phonius;

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phonius; Delium and Alalkomené, respectively sacred to Apollo and Minerva, together with Leuctra and Chæronæa, the destined scenes of immortal victories; all these cities successively rejected the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Thebes, which, during the invasion of Xerxes, had so shamefully betrayed the common interest and glory of the nation [53].

The Thebans obtain assistance from Sparta. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A.C. 459.

During several years, the Thebans patiently yielded to a storm, which they found it impossible to resist. But when the Spartans began to breathe after the recovery of Ithomé, and had made a successful expedition against the Phocians, in defence of their kinsmen in Doris, the Thebans warmly solicited them to take part in their domestic quarrels, and to enable them to regain their ascendant in Bœotia; with assurance that they would employ the first moments of returning vigour to oppose the growing pretensions of the Athenians. This proposal was accepted, not only by the resentment, but by the policy, of the Spartan senate, who perceived, that it equally concerned their interest, that the neighbouring city of Argos should lose her jurisdiction over Argolis; and that Thebes, the neighbour and rival of Athens, should recover her authority in Bœotia.

Wise policy of that state.

Athens enables the Bœotians to maintain their independence.

They were applying themselves with vigour and success to effect this salutary purpose, when the active vigilance of Athens dispatched an army, fifteen thousand strong, to maintain the independ-

[53] Diodor. l. xi. p. 283, & seqq. & Thucydid. l. i. p. 273.

ence

ence of Bœotia. The valour and conduct of Myronides, the Athenian general, obtained a decisive victory near the walls of Tanagra, one of the few places in the province which had preserved its fidelity to the capital. This memorable battle, which no ancient writer has thought proper to describe, although it is compared to the glorious trophies of Marathon and Platæa [54], confirmed the liberty of Bœotia; nor could the Thebans, notwithstanding their partial success against several of the revolted cities, recover their authority in that province, until, about fourscore years afterwards, they emerged into sudden splendour under the conduct of their heroic Epaminondas. CHAP. XII. A. C. 458—456.

Ambitious measures of Athens.

The ambitious policy of Pericles, which will be fully explained in the sequel, was eager to profit by every favourable turn of fortune. He took care to place Athenian garrisons in several Bœotian fortresses; he made the neighbouring republics of Corinth and Megara feel and acknowledge the superiority of Athens; and after sending Tolmidas, (A. C. 455.) a commander endued rather with an impetuous than well regulated courage, to ravage the coast of the Peloponnesus, he sailed thither next year in person, (A. C. 454.) and made the Lacedæmonians and their allies deeply regret, that they had too soon discovered their animosity against a republic, alike capable to protect its friends and take vengeance on its enemies. The measures of this daring leader were actually uncontrouled by any opposition, since his eloquence

54 Diodor. l. xi. p. 284.

had

CHAP. XII. had prevailed over the innocence and merit of Cimon, and procured the banifhment of that illuftrious commander. But Cimon was recalled in two years; and his return was fignalifed by a fufpenfion of arms in Greece, which that real patriot had been as zealous to promote, as he was ambitious to purfue his Afiatic triumphs. This treaty, how-

A.C. 447. ever, was foon broke; but an ill-concerted and unfortunate enterprife againft Thebes (difapproved by Pericles himfelf), in which the rafh Tolmidas loft his army and his life, made the Athenians again liften to terms of accommodation. They

A.C. 445. agreed to withdraw their garrifons from Bœotia; to difavow all pretenfions againft Corinth and Megara, pretenfions which had no other effect than to exafperate thofe little republics againft their ufurping neighbour; and, on complying with thefe conditions, the Athenians recovered their citizens made captive in Bœotia, through the mifconduct of Tolmidas [55].

The truce of thirty years. Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. A.C. 445.

This was the famous truce of thirty years, concluded in the fourteenth year preceding the Peloponnefian war. The former treaty had been limited to a much fhorter period; for it is worthy of obfervation, that even in their agreements of peace, the Greeks difcovered that perpetual propenfity to war, which was the unhappy effect of their political inftitutions [56].

Motives of the Athenians for granting it.

The terms of this accommodation, feemingly little favourable to the intereft of Athens, were

[55] Diodor. l. xii. p. 293. Thucydid. l. i. p. 71, & feqq.
[56] Idem, p. 74.

dictated,

dictated, however, rather by the ambition than the equity of that republic; a conclusion that evidently results from examining the third series of events, which (as observed above) completes the history of this memorable period. Amidst the foreign expeditions of Cimon, and the domestic dissensions of Greece, the Athenian arms and policy had been gradually, during thirty years, establishing the sovereignty of the republic over her distant colonies and confederates. This bold undertaking was finally accomplished by Pericles, whose character contributed, more than that of any one man, to the glory and greatness, as well as to the calamities and ruin of his country.

Between the years 470 and 440, A. C.

His father Xanthippus, who gained the illustrious victory at Mycalé, rejoiced in a son endued with the happiest natural talents, and an innate love of glory. His youth was entrusted to the learned and virtuous Damon, who concealed, under the uninvidious title of master of rhetoric, the art of animating his pupil with an ambition to deserve the first rank in the republic, as well as of adorning him with the accomplishments most necessary to attain it. From Aristagoras of Clazomené, denominated the philosopher of mind, on account of his continual solicitude to confirm the most important and most pleasing of all doctrines, that a benevolent intelligence presides over the operations of nature, and the events of human life, Pericles early learned to controul the tempest of youthful passions, which so often blast the promising hopes of manhood; to preserve an unshaken constancy in all

Character of Pericles;

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all the viciſſitudes of fortune, ſince all are the varied diſpenſations of the ſame wiſe providence; and to trample, with generous contempt, on the groveling ſuperſtition of the vulgar. Thus qualified by nature and education, he ſoon diſplayed, in the Athenian aſſembly, an eloquence, nouriſhed by the copious ſpring of philoſophy, and ennobled by the manly elevation of his character. His ſpeeches conſiſted not in the unpremeditated effuſions of a temporary enthuſiaſm; he was the firſt of his countrymen who, before pronouncing his diſcourſes, committed them to writing [57]: they were ſtudied and compoſed with the moſt laborious and patient care; and being poliſhed by repeated touches of correcting art, they roſe in admiration, in proportion as they were more cloſely examined by the piercing eye of criticiſm; and acquired the epithet of Olympian, to expreſs that permanent and ſteady luſtre which they reflected [58].

he is ſuſpected of uſurpation;

But the ſuperior talents of Pericles, which, in a well-regulated government, would have increaſed his influence, had well nigh occaſioned his ruin in a turbulent and ſuſpicious democracy. The memory of the oldeſt citizens faithfully recollected, and the envy or fears of the younger readily believed, that the figure, the countenance, and the voice, of the young orator, ſtrongly reſembled thoſe of the ambitious and artful Piſiſtratus, whoſe ſpecious virtues had ſubverted the liberty of his country. The alarmed jealouſy of freedom, which often

57 Suidas.

58 Plut. in Pericl.

deſtroyed,

destroyed, in an hour, the authority established slowly, and with much labour, during many meritorious years, might be tempted to punish the imagined tyranny of Pericles; who, to escape the disgrace of the ostracism, shunned the dangerous admiration of the assembly.

he courts and corrupts the Athenian populace;

The active vigour of his mind, thus withdrawn from politics, was totally directed to war; and his abilities, alike fitted to excel in every honourable pursuit, and gradually opening with every occasion to display them, carried off the palm of military renown from the most illustrious captains of the age. Cimon alone surpassed him in the object of his victories gained over Barbarians; but Pericles equalled Cimon in valour and conduct. A rivality in warlike fame was followed by a competition for civil honours. Cimon, who had been introduced on the theatre of public life by the virtuous Aristides, regarded, like that great man, a moderate aristocracy, as the government most conducive to public happiness. The contrary opinion was warmly maintained by Pericles, who found an ostentatious admiration of democracy the best expedient for removing the prejudice excited against him, by his resemblance to Pisistratus, of aspiring, or at least of being capable to aspire, at royal power. On every occasion he defended the privileges of the people against the pretensions of the rich and noble; he embraced not only the interests, but adopted the capricious passions, of the multitude; cherishing their presumption, flattering their vanity, indulging their rapacity, gratify-

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ing their taste for pleasure without expence, and fomenting their natural antipathy to the Spartans, who, as the patrons of rigid aristocracy, were peculiarly obnoxious to their resentment.

encourages their ambitious pretensions.

The condition of the times powerfully conspired with the views and measures of Pericles, since the glory and wealth acquired in the Persian war, procured not only allies and power to the state, but industry and independence to the populace. The son of Xanthippus impelled this natural current, which ran so strongly in favour of both, when he maintained, that the citizens of Athens were entitled to enjoy equal advantages at home, to challenge a just pre-eminence in Greece, and to assume a legal dominion over their distant colonies and confederates.

Means by which he subdued the Athenian colonies and allies. A. C. 470—440.

These unfortunate communities had unwarily forged their own chains, when they consented to raise an annual subsidy to maintain the guardian navy of Athens. They perceived not, that this temporary benevolence would be soon converted into a perpetual tribute, since, in proportion as they became unaccustomed to war, they laid themselves at the mercy of that republic, to which they had tamely entrusted the care of their defence. When the rigorous exactions of Athens speedily warned them of their error, the wide intervals at which they were separated from each other, rendered it impossible for them to afford mutual assistance, and to act with united vigour. Naxos, Thasos, Ægina, Eubœa, Samos, and other islands or cities of less importance, boldly struggled to repel

repel usurpation; but fighting singly, were successively subdued; while new, and more grievous, burdens were cruelly imposed on them. The least patient again murmured, petitioned, rebelled, and taking arms to resist oppression, were treated with the severity due to unprovoked sedition. The punishment inflicted on them was uniformly rigorous. They were compelled to deliver up the authors of the revolt, to surrender their shipping, to demolish their walls, or receive an Athenian garrison, to pay the expences of the war, and give hostages for their future obedience [59]. It is not the business of general history to describe more minutely the events of this social war, which was carried on chiefly by Pericles, and finished in the course of thirty years, with every success the most presumptuous ambition of Athens could either expect or desire. Samos, the capital of the island of that name, made the most vigorous resistance; but at length surrendered to Pericles, after a siege of nine months, in the ninth year before the war of Peloponnesus [60].

Spirit of the Athenian government;

Historians, partial or credulous, have handed down some atrocious cruelties committed after the taking of Samos, which may be confidently rejected as fictions, injurious to the fame of Pericles, who, though he approved and animated the aspiring genius of his country, and vainly flattered himself that he could justify, by reasons of state, its most ambitious usurpations, uniformly shewed himself inca-

59 Thucydid. & Diodor. loc. citat.

60 Thucydid. l. i. p. 75.

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pable of any deliberate wickedneſs. It may be obſerved, however, that as the moderate peace with Sparta had been concluded chiefly with a view to allow the Athenians to apply their undivided attention to the affairs of their tributaries, the ſeverities exerciſed over theſe unfortunate ſtates were, in conſequence of that event, rather increaſed than mitigated. Athenian magiſtrates and garriſons were ſent to govern and command them. They were burdened with new impoſitions, and diſhonoured by new badges of ſervitude. The lands, which the labour of their anceſtors had cultivated, were ſeized and appropriated by ſtrangers, who claimed the diſtinction of Athenian colonies; and all theſe once independent and flouriſhing republics were thenceforth compelled to ſubmit their mutual conteſts, their domeſtic differences, and even their private litigations, to the cogniſance and deciſion of Athenian aſſemblies and tribunals [61]. By drawing thus cloſely the reins of government, Pericles, in the courſe of ten years, brought into the treaſury of Athens the ſum of near two millions ſterling [62]. His vigilance ſeaſonably diſplayed the terrors of the Athenian navy before the moſt diſtant enemies or allies of the republic; by alternate pliancy and firmneſs, by ſucceſſive promiſes, bribes, and threats, he repreſſed the jealous hoſtility of neighbouring powers; and while his ambition and magnificence fortified and adorned the capital with

Its exceſſive ſeverity towards its dependencies.

61 Iſocrat. de Pace; & Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

62 Thucyd. Diodor. Iſocrat. Plut. &c.

external ftrength and fplendour, they alfo laid the foundations of thofe internal diforders, which rendered his long adminiftration glorious for his contemporaries, fatal to the fucceeding generation, and ever memorable with pofterity. CHAP. XII.

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Tranſition to the internal State of Athens.—Laws of Draco—Solon—Piſiſtratus—Cliſthenes—Ariſtides—Pericles.—Final Settlement of the Athenian Government.—View of the Athenian Empire.—The combined Effect of external Proſperity and democratic Government on Manners—Arts—Luxury.—Hiſtory of Grecian Literature and Philoſophy.—Singular Contraſt and Balance of Virtues and Vices.—The ſublime Philoſophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates.—The unprincipled Captiouſneſs of the Sophiſts.—The moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides.—The licentious Buffoonery of Ariſtophanes.—The imitative Arts employed to the nobleſt Purpoſes—and abuſed to the moſt infamous.—Magnificence of public Feſtivals.—Simplicity in private Life.—Modeſt Reſerve of Athenian Women.—Voluptuouſneſs, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aſpaſia.

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Tranſition to the internal ſtate of Athens.

THE taking of Samos cloſed the long ſeries of Athenian conqueſts. During the nine ſubſequent years, that once fortunate people enjoyed and abuſed the bleſſings of peace and proſperity. Their oſtentatious diſplay of power increaſed the envy and terror of Greeks and Barbarians, and excited the obſtinate and bloody war of twenty-ſeven years, during which the force of the whole

whole Grecian nation was exerted to demoliſh or uphold the ſtately edifice of empire that had been reared by the ambitious patriotiſm of Pericles. Aſſiſted by feeble or reluctant allies, Athens long ſtruggled againſt the combined ſtrength of Peloponneſus, Bœotia, Macedon, Sicily, and Perſia; and our curioſity muſt deſervedly be attracted towards the internal reſources and moral condition of a people, who, with few natural advantages, could make ſuch memorable and pertinacious efforts, and who, amidſt the din of arms, ſtill cultivating and improving their favourite arts, produced thoſe immortal monuments of taſte and genius, which, ſurviving the deſtruction of their walls, navy, and harbours, have ever atteſted the glory of Athens, and the impotent vengeance of her enemies. In an inquiry of this kind, the ſcience of government and laws, which gives ſecurity to all other ſciences, merits the firſt place in our attention; nor, at this diſtance of time, will the enlightened reader contemplate with indifference the laws of Athens, which having been incorporated [1] into the Roman juriſ-

[1] The Romans ſent deputies to Athens, to obtain a copy of Solon's laws, four hundred and fifty-four years before Chriſt. The benefits derived from theſe ſalutary inſtitutions were gratefully acknowledged by the liberal candour of a people, who knew how to appretiate the merit of enemies and ſubjects. Hear the language of Pliny (l. viii. ep. 24.) to Maximus, who in the reign of Trajan was appointed governor of the province of Achaia, or Greece: "Remember that you go to a country, where letters, politeneſs, and agriculture itſelf (if we believe common report), were invented . . . . Revere the gods and heroes, the ancient virtue and glory of the nation. Reſpect even its fables and its vanity; remembering that from Greece we derived our laws. The right of conqueſt, indeed, hath enabled

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jurisprudence about the middle of the fifth century before Christ, served, after an interval of above sixteen hundred years, to abolish the barbarous practices of the Gothic nations, and to introduce justice, security, and refinement, among the modern inhabitants of Europe [2].

Laws and government.

The admirable institutions of the heroic ages were built on religion; which, as we have fully

enabled us to impose our laws on the Greeks; but that people had first given us their laws, at our solicitation, and when they had nothing to fear from the power of our arms. It would be inhuman and barbarous to deprive them of the small remnant of liberty which they still possess."

[2] Justinian's Pandects, it is well known, were discovered at Amalfi, in Italy, A. D. 1130. In less than half a century afterwards, the civil law was studied and understood in all the great provinces of Europe; and this study (as Mr. Hume observes, Reign of Richard the Third) tended to sharpen the wits of men, to give solidity to their judgment, to improve their taste, and to abolish the barbarous jurisprudence which universally prevailed among the Gothic nations. To this law we owe the abolition of the mode of proof by the ordeal, the corsnet, the duel, and other methods equally ridiculous and absurd. Pecuniary commutations ceased to be admitted for crimes; private revenge was no longer authorised by the magistrate; and the community was made to feel its interest in maintaining the rights, and avenging the wrongs, of all its members. See more in the admirable discourse annexed to the Reign of Richard the Third. I shall add but one observation, in Mr. Hume's own words: "The sensible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private interest, recommended the study of it, at a time when the more exalted and speculative sciences carried no charms with them; and thus the last branch of ancient literature which remained uncorrupted, was happily the first transmitted to the modern world: for it is remarkable, that in the decline of Roman learning, when the philosophers were universally infected with superstition and sophistry, and the poets and historians with barbarism, the lawyers, who, in other countries, are seldom models of science or politeness, were yet able, by the constant study and close imitation of their predecessors, to maintain the same good sense in their decisions and reasonings, and the same purity in their language and expression." Hume's Hist. 3d vol. 8vo, p. 300.

explained

explained above, ascertained and enforced the rights and obligations of public and private life. But the abused authority of priests and oracles, and the natural depravity of man, ever solicitous to obtain the partial favour of his heavenly protectors on easier terms than the faithful discharge of his duty, gradually severed, by fraud or violence, the natural and most salutary union between religion and morality; in consequence of which separation, the former degenerated into an illiberal superstition, and the latter relaxed into licentiousness, or stiffened into pedantry. The striking comparison, or rather contrast, between the genius and character, the virtues and vices, of the Greeks, as variously described by Homer and by Solon, and which is so much to the advantage of the earlier period, must, in the progress of this discourse, naturally present itself to the reflection of the attentive reader, and will set in the clearest point of view the unhappy revolution of manners, which time and accident had produced in the wide interval between the poet and the legislator.

Legislation of Draco; Olymp. xxxix. 1. A.C. 624.

The very imperfect legislation of Draco[3], who flourished thirty years before Solon[4], proved that the Athenians felt the want of a science, which they knew not how to acquire or cultivate. The austere gravity of that magistrate seems to have imposed on the easy credulity of the multitude; for his ignorance or severity were alike unworthy of the important office with which he was entrusted.

[3] Suidas in voce Draco. Pollux, l. viii. c. vi.
[4] Meursius, Solon.

He

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He gave laws, which, according to the lively expreſſion of an orator, ſeemed to be written [5], not with ink, but with blood; ſince death or baniſhment were his ordinary penalties for the moſt trivial offences, as well as for the moſt dangerous crimes: and he juſtified this rigour, by abſurdly obſerving, that the ſmalleſt diſorders deſerved death, and no ſeverer puniſhment could be inflicted on the greateſt. The laws of Draco, therefore, tended only to increaſe the evils which they were deſigned to remedy [6]; and no people ever preſented a ſcene of greater confuſion and miſery, than did the unhappy Athenians, when the abilities and virtues of Solon were ſeaſonably called to their relief.

of Solon. Olymp. xlvi. 3. A.C. 594.

In relating the general revolutions of Greece, we had occaſion to deſcribe the important ſervices, and illuſtrious merit, of this extraordinary man, whoſe diſintereſtedneſs, patriotiſm, and humanity, equalled his military conduct and ſucceſs. His royal extraction (for he ſprang from the race of the Codridæ), his experienced abilities, above all, his approved wiſdom and equity, pointed him out for the nobleſt and moſt ſublime employment of humanity, that of regulating the laws and government of a free people. Such, at leaſt, the Athenians may be conſidered, when their unanimous ſuffrage rendered Solon the abſolute umpire of their whole conſtitution and policy; although, prior

State of Athens in the time of Solon.

5 The orator Demades, of whom more hereafter. The obſervation has been always repeated in ſpeaking of Draco, though his laws were certainly written neither with blood nor ink. Even thoſe of Solon were only engraved on tables kept in the citadel.

6 Ariſtot. de Civ. l. ii. & Plut. in Solon.

to

to this period, they ſuffered the combined evils of anarchy and oppreſſion[7]. The magiſtrates plundered the treaſury and the temples; and often betrayed, for bribes, the intereſts of their country. The rich tyranniſed over the poor, the poor continually alarmed the ſafety of the rich. The rapacity of creditors knew no bounds. They compelled the inſolvent debtors to cultivate their lands, like cattle; to perform the ſervice of beaſts of burden; and to transfer to them their ſons and daughters, whom they exported as ſlaves to foreign countries. Solon, with a laudable vanity, boaſts of having recovered and reſtored to their native rights many of thoſe unhappy men, whoſe ſentiments had been debaſed, and language corrupted, by the infamy of Barbarian ſervitude[8]. The wretched populace, deriving courage from deſpair, had determined no longer to ſubmit to ſuch multiplied rigours; and before the wiſdom of the lawgiver interpoſed, they had taken the reſolution to elect and follow ſome warlike leader, to attack and butcher their oppreſſors, to eſtabliſh an equal partition of lands, and to inſtitute a new form of government[9]. But the numerous clients and retainers, who, in a country little acquainted with arts and manufactures, depended on the wealthy proprietors of the lands and mines of Attica, muſt have rendered this undertaking alike dangerous to both parties; ſo that both became willing rather to ſubmit their differences to law, than to decide them by the ſword.

7 Fragm. Solonis apud Demoſth. p. 234. edit. Wol.

8 Idem, ibid. 9 Plut. in Solon.

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His regulations concerning property.

The impartiality of Solon merited the unlimited confidence of his country. He maintained the ancient division of property, but abolished debts. He established the rate of interest at 12 per cent. at which it afterwards remained; but forbade, that the insolvent debtor should become the slave of his creditor, or be compelled to sell his children into servitude. After these preliminary regulations, which seemed immediately necessary to the public peace, Solon proceeded, with an impartial and steady hand, to new-model the government[10]; on this generous, but equitable principle, that the few ought not, as hitherto, to command, and the many to obey; but that the collective body of the people, legally convened in a national assembly, were entitled to decide, by a plurality of voices, the alternatives of peace and war; to contract or dissolve alliances with foreign states; to enjoy

New-models the government.

[10] The most correct information concerning the ancient republic of Athens, and the laws of Solon, is contained in Aristot. Fragm. de Civit. Athen. and in various parts of his second, fourth, and sixth books of Politics. 2. In Isocrat. Areopagit. Panathen. & Panegyr. And 3. In Plut. in Vit. Solon. Xenophon's Treatise concerning the Athenian republic relates to later times, when many corruptions had crept in, as will be afterwards explained. It is remarkable, that Polybius, l. vi. has confounded the moderate institutions of Solon with the democratical licentiousness and tyranny introduced by Pericles and his successors in the administration. The palpable errors of so judicious an author prove how little accurate knowledge the Greeks possessed on the subject of their own history; and how impossible it is for a modern writer, who blindly follows such guides, not to fall into innumerable errors and contradictions. The treatise of Aristotle (de Civitate) above mentioned, deserves particular attention from those who write or study the history of republics. In it we see the germ, and often more than the germ, of the political works of Machiavel, which Montesquieu has so often copied, without once acknowledging his obligation.

all

all the branches of legiſlative or *ſovereign* power[11]; and to elect, approve, and judge the magiſtrates or miniſters entruſted, for a limited time, with the *executive* authority.

His inſtitutions ſuited the condition of the times.

In the actual ſtate of moſt countries of Europe, ſuch a form of government, as only takes place in ſome ſmall cantons of Switzerland, would be attended with the inconvenience of withdrawing the citizens too much from their private affairs. But in ancient Greece, and particularly in Attica, the ſlaves were four times more numerous than the freemen[12]; and of the latter we may compute that little more than one-half were entitled to any ſhare in the ſovereignty. Strangers, and all thoſe who could not aſcertain their Athenian deſcent, both in the male and female line, were totally excluded from the aſſembly and courts of juſtice. The regulations of Solon marked the utmoſt attention to preſerve the pure blood of Athens unmixed and uncorrupted; nor could any foreigner, whatever merit he might claim with the public, be admitted to the rank of citizen, unleſs he abandoned for ever his native country, profeſſed the knowledge of ſome highly uſeful or ingenious art, and, in both caſes,

[11] The election contained a mixture of chance, ſince thoſe who were named by the people caſt lots to decide on whom the office ſhould be conferred. The ſame practice prevails in chuſing the ſenators of the republic of Berne. But Solon enacted, that the fortunate candidate ſhould undergo what is called a probation; his character and merits were thus expoſed to a ſecond examination; and it ſeemed ſcarcely poſſible, after this ſevere ſcrutiny, that any man ſhould attain power, who was altogether unworthy of public confidence.

[12] See my Introductory Diſcourſe to the Orations of Lyſias and Iſocrates, p. 5, & ſeqq.

had

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had been chosen by ballot, in a full assembly of six thousand Athenians. These circumstances (especially as the Athenian people were usually convened only four times in thirty-five days) prevented their assemblies from being either so inconvenient and burdensome, or so numerous and tumultuary, as might at first sight be supposed. Yet their numbers, and still more their impetuosity and ignorance, must have proved inconsistent with good government, if Solon had not secured the vessel of the republic from the waves of popular frenzy, by the two firm anchors of the Senate and the Areopagus; tribunals originally of great dignity and of very extensive power, into which men of a certain description only could be received as members.

His division of the citizens.

Solon divided the Athenians into four classes, according to the produce of their estates. The first class consisted of those whose lands annually yielded five hundred measures of liquid, as well as dry commodities; and the minimum of whose yearly income may be calculated at sixty pounds sterling; which is equivalent, if we estimate the relative value of money by the price of labour, and of the things most necessary to life, to about six hundred pounds sterling in the present age[13]. The second class consisted of those whose estates produced three hundred measures; the third, of those whose estates produced two hundred; the fourth, and by far the most numerous class of Athenians, either possessed no landed property, or at least enjoyed not a revenue in land equal to twenty-four

[13] See Introduction to Lysias, &c. p. 14.

pounds

pounds ſterling, or, agreeably to the above proportion, two hundred and forty pounds of our preſent currency.

Prerogatives of the firſt claſſes.

All ranks of citizens were alike admitted to vote in the public aſſembly, and to judge in the courts of juſtice, whether civil or criminal, which were properly ſo many committees of the aſſembly [14]. But the three firſt claſſes were excluſively entitled to ſit in the ſenate, to decide in the Areopagus, or to hold any other office of magiſtracy. To theſe dignities they were elected by the free ſuffrages of the people, to whom they were accountable for their adminiſtration, and by whom they might be puniſhed for malverſation or negligence, although they derived no emolument from the diligent diſcharge of their duty.

Of the ſenate of the 500.

The ſenate of four hundred, which, eighty-ſix years after its inſtitution, was augmented to five hundred by Cliſthenes, enjoyed the important prerogatives of convoking the popular aſſembly; of previouſly examining all matters before they came to be decided by the people, which gave them a negative before debate in all public reſolutions; and of making laws which had force during a year, without requiring the conſent of the populace. Beſides this general ſuperintendence and authority,

14 In my Introductory Diſcourſes to the Orations of Lyſias, &c. I had occaſion to explain the nature of the Athenian tribunals. Since the publication of that work, the ſame ſubject, and particularly the form of civil proceſs, has been accurately explained by Sir William Jones, in his Diſſertations annexed to the tranſlation of Iſæus. Mr. Pettingal's learned work upon the uſe and practice of *juries* among the ancients, lately fell into my hands. Wherein my ideas and his differ, will eaſily appear from the text, and needs not be pointed out.

the

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the ſenate was excluſively inveſted with many particular branches of the executive power. The preſident of that council had the cuſtody of the public archives and treaſury. The ſenate alone built ſhips; equipped fleets and armies; ſeized and confined ſtate-criminals; examined and puniſhed ſeveral offences, which were not expreſsly forbidden by any poſitive law. The weight of ſuch a council, which aſſembled every day, except feſtivals, infuſed a large mixture of ariſtocracy into the Athenian conſtitution. This, as we ſhall immediately explain, was ſtill farther increaſed by the authority of the Areopagus, a court ſo named from the place where it was held; a hill ſacred to Mars, adjoining to the citadel.

The nine archons.

The principal magiſtrates in Athens were the nine archons, the firſt of whom gave his name to the year, and preſided in the civil courts of juſtice, where a committee of the people, choſen promiſcuouſly from all claſſes by lot [15], ſat as judges and jury; but where it belonged to the archon and his aſſeſſors, men appointed by ſuffrage, and acquainted with forms, to take what in Scotland is called a precognition, to preſcribe the form of action, to give the ballot [16], and to receive and declare the

[15] The eſſential difference between the Roman and Athenian government, conſiſted in the different placing of the judicial power; which at Rome remained 300 years in the hands of the ſenate. The ſeditions of the Gracchi, and moſt of the civil diſſenſions which happened before the time of Auguſtus, had for their object or pretence, the altering of this order of things, and bringing the Roman conſtitution nearer the Athenian.

[16] Ὁι τιθεντες τον αγωνα και την ψηφον διδοντες, are the words of Lyſias. The ſame writer mentions the παρεδροι, συνδικαι, aſſeſſors, ſyndics.

verdict

verdict and sentence of the court. The archon next in dignity, who had the appellation of king, presided in causes respecting religion and things sacred, which formed the object of an important and dangerous branch of Athenian jurisprudence. The archon third in dignity, with his assessors the generals [17], presided in military matters; and the six remaining, who were known by the general appellation of thesmothetæ, heard criminal pleas of various kinds, or rather directed the proceedings of the six courts where criminal causes were examined and determined. These nine archons, or presidents of the several courts of justice, like all other Athenian magistrates, were, at the expiration of their annual office, accountable to the people; and when their conduct, after a severe scrutiny, appeared to merit public approbation and gratitude, they were received, and remained for life, members of the Areopagus, a senate invested with a general inspection over the laws and religion, as well as over the lives and manners of the citizens; and which, in dangerous emergencies, was even entitled to assume a sort of dictatorial power [18].

The Areopagus.

Such is the great outline of the constitution established by Solon, according to which every Athenian citizen enjoyed the inestimable privilege of being judged by his peers, and tried by laws to

Happy tendency of Solon's plan of government.

17 Lysias, in the second oration against Alcibiades (a military cause), not only mentions the στρατηγοί, or generals, but addresses them separately from the ανδρες δικασται, or judges.

18 Isocrat. Oratio Areopagit.

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which he himſelf had conſented. Although the legiſlative and judicial powers were thus lodged with the people, men of property and ability were alone entruſted with the adminiſtration of government; and as power in ſome meaſure followed property, the ſame expedient which ſerved to maintain a due diſtinction of ranks in ſociety, tended alſo to promote the induſtry and frugality of the multitude, that they might thereby become entitled to ſhare thoſe honours and offices, to which perſons of a certain eſtate only could aſpire.

Extenſive nature of his laws.

The laws of Solon were of the moſt extenſive nature, comprehending not only rules of right, but maxims of morality, regulations of commerce, and precepts of agriculture. To deſcribe his inſtitutions reſpecting ſuch matters as are properly the objects of law, would be explaining thoſe great, but familiar principles, concerning marriage, ſucceſſion, teſtaments, the rights of *perſons* and of *things*, which, through the medium of the civil law, have been conveyed into the juriſprudence of all the civiliſed nations of Europe. His laws concerning education and manners prove that drunkenneſs and unnatural love were the predominant vices of that early age. It was a particular duty of the archons, to prevent or puniſh offences committed in conſequence of intoxication; and the regulations concerning ſchools [19], which were not to be opened till ſun-riſe, which were ordered to be ſhut before night, and into which none but ſuch relations of

[19] Æſchin. in Timarchum.

the

the mafter, as were particularly fpecified by law, could on any pretence be admitted, marked the utmoft folicitude to root out an evil which already infected and difgraced the manners of Greece.

His fyftem of educa-tion.

The education recommended by Solon nearly refembled that above defcribed, which generally prevailed in Greece[20]. The children of Athenian citizens, when taken from the hands of the women, were delivered to two mafters, of whom the one formed the body, and the other the mind. Swimming, and the eafier exercifes, prepared them for the harder toils of the gymnaftic. Reading, and learning by heart the leffons and examples of the poets, made way for the feverer ftudies of eloquence and philofophy. In procefs of time, mufic, geometry, and drawing, feem to have entered into the plan of a liberal education[21].

Duties and employ-ments of the youth.

At the age of twenty, the youth of all ranks took an oath in the temple of Agraulos (an appellation of Minerva), to obey and to maintain the laws of their country; to ufe their beft endeavours to promote its profperity; to follow the ftandard of whatever commanders might be appointed to conduct them; to fail to every part of the world, when fummoned by the public fervice; to fight to death for their native land; and to regard wheat, barley, vines, and olives, as the only boundaries of Attica[22]: a prepofterous arrogance in that little republic, which already betrayed an ambition to conquer and appropriate all

[20] See Chapters V. and VI. [21] Arift. Polit. l. vii. c. iii.
[22] See Introduction to Lyfias, &c. p. 16.

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the cultivated parts of the world. When the Athenian youth were not, in consequence of this oath, engaged in military service, they were obliged by law to follow such employments as suited their respective fortunes. Agriculture, commerce, and mechanic arts, fell to the share of the poor; the rich still continued their application to gymnastic and philosophy, carefully studied the laws of the republic, examined the ancient and actual condition of their own and neighbouring states; and, at the age of thirty, appeared as candidates in the assembly for such offices of trust and honour as their regular manners, inoffensive and dutiful behaviour in all the relations of private life, temperance, œconomy, public spirit, and abilities [23], might obtain from the voluntary suffrage of the people.

Usurpation of Pisistratus. A.C. 578.

The usurpation of Pisistratus, though it destroyed for a time the political liberty of Athens, gave stability to most of the laws and forms introduced by Solon. That extraordinary *tyrant*, for so the Greeks styled him, was not more distinguished by the loftiness of his genius than the humanity of his disposition; and had not the violence of contending factions, and the fury of his enemies, inflamed his natural love of power, the name of Pisistratus would stand the foremost in the list of Grecian patriots and heroes. His valour and conduct were signalized in the conquest of Nisæa, Salamis, Naxos, Delos, and Sigæum; and if he displayed boldness and address in acquiring sovereignty, he displayed

23 Lysias, passim.

still

ftill more moderation and virtue in adminiftering it. He affumed, indeed, the royal dignities of prieft and general, and took care that the chief offices of magiftracy fhould be filled by his partifans. But he maintained the regular courfe of law and juftice, not only by his authority, but by his example; having appeared in perfon to anfwer an accufation in the Areopagus. He not only enforced the laws of Solon againft idlenefs, but endeavoured to give them more efficacy by introducing new arts and manufactories into Attica. He was the firft who brought into that country the complete collection of Homer's poems, which he commanded to be fung at the Panathenæan feftival; nor can we fuppofe that he fhould have been zealous to diffufe the liberal and manly fentiments of that divine poet, if his government had not refembled the moderation and equity of the heroic ages, rather than the defpotifm of tyrants.

His moderate and wife adminiftration;

His fon Hipparchus imitated and furpaffed the mild virtues of his father; and, amidft the turbulence of the later democracy, it was acknowledged with a figh by the Athenians, that their anceftors were indeed happy under Solon and Pififtratus, but that the reign of the tyrant Hipparchus brought back on earth the golden days of Saturn. The father had required a tenth part of the produce of Attica, to fupport his guards, and the other appendages of royalty: his more generous fon remitted one-half of this impofition. While he alleviated the burdens, yet encouraged the induftry of his fubjects, by building the temple of Olympian

furpaffed by that of his fon Hipparchus.

Jupiter,

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Jupiter, he was ſolicitous to diſpel their ignorance and barbarity by erecting pillars in every part of the city, engraved with elegiac verſes, containing leſſons of wiſdom and precepts of morality. He collected the firſt library in Athens; and his liberal rewards, and ſtill more his agreeable manners and winning affability, attracted to that city the moſt diſtinguiſhed poets of the age.

His murder exaſperates Hippias.

The murder of Hipparchus exaſperated the temper of his brother and ſucceſſor Hippias; but notwithſtanding the calamities which the latter inflicted and ſuffered, it muſt be allowed that the government of Piſiſtratus and his family, which, with various interruptions, laſted ſixty-eight years[24], increaſed the ſtrength, and promoted the refinement of Athens[25].

The government changed by Cliſthenes. Olymp. lxvii. 3. A.C. 510.

Yet in nothing was that uſurpation more advantageous than in the animating ſenſe of liberty which the memory of paſt ſervitude, under Hippias, excited and kept alive in Athens, after the popular government had been reſtored by Cliſthenes and Alcibiades. We have already had occaſion to relate the foreign victories of the republic, which immediately followed that event; but at the ſame time the conſtitution of government underwent a conſiderable change. By admitting to the rank of citizens a promiſcuous crowd of ſtrangers, fugitives, Athenians of half blood, and perhaps ſlaves, the tribes were augmented from four to ten; and

24 Between 578 and 510, B. C.

25 See the treatiſe of Meurſius, entitled Piſiſtratus, one of the few ſatisfactory performances in the immenſe collection of Gronovius.

the

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the senators from four to five hundred. The ostracism was likewise established; a law by which any citizen whose influence or abilities seemed dangerous to liberty, might be banished ten years, without the proof or allegation of any positive crime.

Important alteration made by Aristides. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A.C. 479.

In this condition the republic continued thirty years, until the glorious victories of Salamis, Platæa, and Mycalé, encouraged the lowest but most numerous class of citizens, by whose valour those memorable exploits had been atchieved, to make further invasions on the prerogatives of their superiors. The sudden wealth, which the rich spoils of the Barbarians had diffused among all ranks of men, increased the *census* of individuals, and destroyed the balance of the constitution. Aristides, who perceived it to be impossible to resist the natural progress of democracy, seasonably yielded to men who had arms in their hands, and firmness in their hearts; and proposed, with apparent satisfaction, but much secret reluctance [26], a law by which the Athenian magistrates should be thenceforth promiscuously elected from the four classes of citizens. This innovation paved the way for the still greater changes begun twenty years afterwards, and gradually completed by Pericles; a revolution of which the consequences were not immediately felt, but which continually became more sensible, and finally terminated in the ruin of Athens and of Greece.

The democracy completed

The general reasons which prevailed on the equity and discernment of Pericles to espouse, with

[26] Ἑκων αεκοντι δε θυμω, cited on this occasion by Plutarch, well expresses the forced generosity of Aristides to the populace.

 undue

CHAP. XIII. by Pericles. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A.C. 449.

undue warmth, the cause of the populace, have in the preceding chapter been sufficiently explained. Yet whatever partial motives of interest and ambition [27] might warp the views of this illustrious statesman, it must be acknowledged, that the foreign transactions and success of the republic, and particularly the new situation in which the Athenians found themselves placed with regard to their distant allies and colonies, might naturally suggest and occasion very important alterations in the Athenian constitution.

Introduction of pay to the troops;

The ancient and sacred law, which obliged every citizen, without fee or reward, to take arms in defence of his country, could not easily be extended to the obligation of protecting, without a proper recompence, the interest of foreign communities. The scanty population of Attica sufficed not to answer the demands of so many distant expeditions. It became necessary to hire troops wherever they might be found; and, as this necessity introduced pay into the Athenian armies, a similar, though not equally cogent, reason established fees and salaries for all the different orders of judges and magistrates.

of fees and salaries to the magistrates.

The same principle of duty and public spirit, which obliged every freeman to fight without pay, likewise obliged him gratuitously to judge, consult, and deliberate, for

27 Plutarch (in Pericle) mentions a particular reason which engaged Pericles to counteract the aristocracy, and to abridge the power of the Areopagus. Although he had been often *named* for the office of archon, the *lot* had never fallen on him; so that he could not be received as a member of that respected court. If this observation be well founded, it shews how little real weight the annual magistracies had at Athens; since Pericles, though he never attained the dignity of archon, governed the republic many years with unrivalled authority.

the benefit of his country. But when the contefted interefts of foreign, though dependent communities, were agitated and adjufted in the tribunals of Athens, it feemed reafonable for thofe who fpent their time in an employment, to which no natural obligation called them, to demand a proper reward for their ufeful fervices. At firft, therefore, a *fmall* fum, but which gradually increafed with the power of the people, was regularly diftributed among the citizens, for every deliberation which they held, and for every caufe which they determined.

These circumftances totally unhinge the government eftablifhed by Solon.

The defire of reaping this profit made the populace anxious to draw all caufes and deliberations before their own tribunals and affemblies. This defign was fuccefsfully accomplifhed by Ephialtes[28], an artful and daring demagogue, whom Pericles employed as a proper inftrument to effect fuch invidious meafures as were moft obnoxious to the rich and noble. While his patron extended the renown of Athens by his foreign victories, and gradually reduced into fubjection the colonies and allies of the republic, the obfequious Ephialtes zealoufly promoted his domeftic meafures; and by undermining the authority of the fenate and of the Areopagus[29], the firmeft bulwarks of the ariftocracy,

28 Plut. in Pericle.

29 Authors have not defcribed in what particular refpects, or by what particular means, Ephialtes effected his purpofe: yet we may collect, from obfcure hints on this fubject, that he not only brought before the inferior tribunals caufes hitherto confined to the Areopagus, but took from that court its general infpection and fuperintendence over the religion and laws; which offices he beftowed on the popular court of the ἡλιαια and the νομοφυλακες, who were appointed, and

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cracy, obtained a signal victory over the laws of Solon. The assassination of Ephialtes proved only the weakness of his enemies; and we shall find, in the subsequent history of Athens, that most matters of deliberation came, thenceforth, in the first instance, before the popular assembly; that the wise institutions of Solon were reduced to an empty form; and that the magnanimity of Pericles, the extravagance of his immediate successors, the patriotism of Thrasybulus and Conon, the integrity of Phocion, the artifices of Æschines, and the eloquence of Demosthenes, successively swayed, at will, a wild and capricious democracy.

External and domestic prosperity of the republic. Olymp. lxxxv. 1. A.C. 440.

The revolution which immediately followed, in the manners, character, and conduct of the Athenians, was the natural consequence of the change of government, combined with other circumstances inseparably connected with their domestic and external prosperity. In the course of a few years, the success of Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, had tripled the revenues, and increased, in a far greater proportion, the dominions of the republic. The Athenian gallies commanded the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean; their merchantmen had engrossed the traffic of the adjacent countries; the

and dismissed, at the will of the people. He likewise rendered the *probation* for becoming an *Areopagite* less severe than formerly. Persons crept into this order, whose characters disgraced it. The Areopagites became equally accessible to presents and to beauty; and their decisions fell into contempt. See the discourse of Isocrates upon reforming the government of Athens, and Athenæus, l. ix. That Ephialtes, or Pericles himself, likewise weakened the authority of the senate (although it is not remarked by any ancient author), appears from all the subsequent history of Athens.

maga-

magazines of Athens abounded with wood, metal, ebony, ivory, and all the materials of the uſeful as well as of the agreeable arts; they imported the luxuries of Italy, Sicily, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, and Peloponneſus; experience had improved their ſkill in working the ſilver mines of mount Laurium; they had lately opened the valuable marble veins in mount Pentelicus; the honey of Hymettus was more eſteemed, in proportion as it became better known to their neighbours; the culture of their olives (oil being long their ſtaple commodity, and the only production of Attica, which Solon allowed them to export) muſt have improved with the general improvement of the country in arts and agriculture, eſpecially under the active adminiſtration of Pericles, who liberally let looſe the public treaſure to encourage every ſpecies of induſtry [30].

Effect of this, combined with the change of government, on manners and arts.

But if that miniſter promoted the love of action, he found it neceſſary at leaſt to comply with, if not to excite, the extreme paſſion for pleaſure, which then began to diſtinguiſh his countrymen. The people of Athens, ſucceſsful in every enterpriſe againſt their foreign as well as domeſtic enemies, ſeemed entitled to reap the fruits of their dangers and victories. For the ſpace of at leaſt twelve years preceding the war of Peloponneſus, their city afforded a perpetual ſcene of triumph and feſtivity. Dramatic entertainments, to which they were paſſionately addicted, were no longer performed in ſlight

30 Iſocrat. Areop. de Pace, & Panegyr. Xenoph. & Ariſtot. de Repub. Athen.

unadorn-

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unadorned edifices, but in ſtone or marble theatres, erected at great expence, and embelliſhed with the moſt precious productions of nature and of art. The treaſury was opened, not only to ſupply the decorations of this favourite amuſement, but to enable the poorer citizens to enjoy it, without incurring any private expence; and thus, at the coſt of the ſtate, or rather of its tributary allies and colonies, to feaſt and delight their ears and fancy with the combined charms of muſic and poetry. The pleaſure of the eye was peculiarly conſulted and gratified in the architecture of the theatres and other ornamental buildings; for as Themiſtocles had ſtrengthened, Pericles adorned his native city; and unleſs we had the concurring teſtimony of antiquity, as well as the immortal remains of the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva, which ſtill excite the admiration of travellers, it would be difficult to believe that in the ſpace of a few years, there could have been created thoſe ineſtimable wonders of art, thoſe innumerable temples, theatres, ſtatues, altars, baths, gymnaſia, and porticoes, which, in the language of ancient panegyric, rendered Athens the eye and light of Greece[31].

Luxury and vices of Athens.

Pericles was blamed for thus decking one favourite city, like a vain, voluptuous harlot, at the expence of plundered provinces[32]; but it would have been fortunate for the Athenians if their extorted wealth had not been employed in more periſhing, as well as more criminal, luxury. The

[31] Iſocrat. & Ariſtid. in Panegyr.

[32] Plutarch in Pericle.

pomp

pomp of religious ſolemnities, which were twice as numerous and as coſtly in Athens as in any other city of Greece; the extravagance of entertainments and banquets, which on ſuch occaſions always followed the ſacrifices; the increaſe of private luxury, which naturally accompanied this public profuſion, exhauſted the reſources, without augmenting the glory, of the republic. Inſtead of the bread, herbs, and ſimple fare recommended by the laws of Solon, the Athenians, ſoon after the eightieth Olympiad, availed themſelves of their extenſive commerce to import the delicacies of diſtant countries, which were prepared with all the refinements of cookery [33]. The wines of Cyprus were cooled with ſnow in ſummer; in winter [34] the moſt delightful flowers adorned the tables and perſons of the wealthy Athenians. Nor was it ſufficient to be crowned with roſes, unleſs they were likewiſe anointed with the moſt precious perfumes [35]. Paraſites, dancers, and buffoons, were an uſual appendage of every entertainment [36]. Among the weaker ſex, the paſſion for delicate birds, diſtinguiſhed by their voice or plumage, was carried to ſuch exceſs as merited the name of madneſs [37]. The bodies of ſuch youths as were not peculiarly addicted to hunting and horſes, which began to be a prevailing taſte [38], were corrupted

33 Ariſtoph. Nubes, ver. 50. & Lyſiſtrat. paſſim.

34 Athen. l. xi. 3. & Xenoph. Memorabilia, l. ii.

35 Xenoph. ibid.

36 Athenæus, l. i. & Xenoph. Symp.

37 Ορνιθομανια, Athen. l. xi. 3.

38 Ariſtoph. Nubes, paſſim.

by

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by the commerce of harlots, who had reduced their profession into syſtem[39]; while their minds were ſtill more polluted by the licentious philoſophy of the ſophiſts. It is unneceſſary to crowd the picture, ſince it may be obſerved, in one word, that the vices and extravagancies, which are ſuppoſed to characteriſe the declining ages of Greece and Rome, took root in Athens during the adminiſtration of Pericles, the moſt ſplendid and moſt proſperous in the Grecian annals.

Contraſt and balance of virtues and vices, advantages and diſadvantages.

This paradox, for ſuch it muſt appear, may be explained by conſidering the ſingular combination of circumſtances, which, in the time of that ſtateſman, gave every poiſon its antidote, and rendered the partial evils, already deſcribed, only the thorn that ever accompanies the roſe. The Grecian hiſtory of thoſe times affords a more ſtriking contraſt than ever appeared in any other age or country, of wiſdom and folly, of magnanimity and meanneſs, of liberty and tyranny, of ſimplicity and refinement, of auſterity and voluptuouſneſs. The ſublime philoſophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates was accompanied, as with a ſhadow, by the dark unprincipled captiouſneſs of the ſophiſts; the pathetic and moral ſtrains of Sophocles and Euripides were parodied by the licentious buffoonery of Ariſtophanes; painting and ſculpture, which, under geniuſes of the firſt order like Phidias, ſerved as handmaids to religion and virtue, degenerated under inferior artiſts into mean hirelings of vice and diſorder;

39 Alexis apud Athenæum, l. xiii.

diſorder; the modeſty of Athenian matrons was ſet off as by a foil, when compared with the diſſoluteneſs of the ſchool of Aſpaſia; and the ſimple frugality of manners, which commonly prevailed in private families, even of the firſt diſtinction, was contraſted with the extravagant diſſipation of public entertainments and feſtivals. To examine the parallel links of this complicated chain will illuſtrate the character of a people whoſe ſubſequent tranſactions form one principal object of Grecian hiſtory.

Parallel links of this chain examined.

Philoſophy, which in Greece alone deſerves the peculiar attention of the hiſtorian, aroſe about the beginning of the ſixth century before Chriſt, and in an hundred and fifty years attained the higheſt degree of perfection, and ſunk into the loweſt degeneracy and corruption, to which the uſe or abuſe of the human intellect could raiſe or plunge it.

Hiſtory of Greek philoſophy.

Leſſer Aſia, to which Europe and America owe the ineſtimable benefits of their religion and letters, produced and nouriſhed the tender plant of philoſophy; and the flouriſhing Greek colonies on that delightful coaſt, communicated to their mother country this precious offspring of their ſoil.

The ſeven Sages.

Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Cleobulus of Lindus in the iſle of Rhodes, and the other wiſe men, as they were emphatically ſtyled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and aſſiſtance to their countrymen in particular emergencies, but reſtrained their vices by wholeſome laws, improved their manners by uſeful leſſons of morality, and extended their knowledge by im-

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portant and difficult discoveries[40]. 'But the first attempt towards moral philosophy, as independent on, and unconnected with religion, seems to have been the fables of Æsop, which, to men in an early period of society, must have appeared a very serious and important species of composition. The sphere of history was narrow; the examples of the gods, amidst the continual corruptions of superstition, had become too flagitious for imitation; and men, whose rustic simplicity of life afforded them continual opportunities to observe the instinctive sagacity of certain animals, might derive many useful lessons from those humble instructors. In the early ages of Greece and Rome, and of all other nations whose history is recorded, fables were told, and in some degree believed, in the assembly and senate-house, on the most important occasions; for in the infancy of society men are children; and the delusion, which the belief of a fable supposes, is not more gross and improbable than many of those errors into which (as we have already proved[41]) their lively fancy had often hurried them. The same romantic cast of imagination which had animated woods and winds, mountains and rivers, which had changed heroes into gods, and gods into frail men, might endow animals with reason, and even speech.

Æsop the fabulist.

The gnomonic poets.

The next step towards moral science was of a more refined and abstract kind, consisting of the

40 Plutarch. Sympos. & de Placit. Philosoph. Plato in Protagor. Diogen. Laert. passim.

41 See above, Chapter II.

sentences

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ſentences of the gnomonic poets [42], and in thoſe detached precepts or proverbs which, in all countries, have preceded any ſyſtematic account of morality. Each of the ſeven ſages, as they were called, had his favourite maxims [43], which he engraved in temples and other places of public reſort; but at this diſtance of time it is impoſſible, amidſt the differences of authors, to diſcover what belongs to each; nor is the ſearch important, ſince all their maxims or proverbs, whatever efforts of generalization they might coſt their inventors, now appear extremely ſimple and familiar.

Theſe reſpectable fathers of Grecian philoſophy, who ſilently diffuſed light through the gloom of a barbarous age, are ſaid to have maintained a correſpondence [44] with each other, as well as with Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, and Periander of Corinth; men who, in imitation of their eaſtern brethren, chiefly cultivated ſuch practical knowledge as qualified them to be the legiſlators, magiſtrates, and generals of their reſpective countries.

The diſcoveries of Thales the Mileſian.

Thales the Mileſian, alone, quitted the ordinary purſuits of civil and military renown; and although he compoſed verſes, promulgated moral ſentences, and, on ſome particular emergencies, gave ſeaſonable advice to his countrymen, yet he eſtabliſhed his fame on a baſis more broad and perma-

42 See the Sentences of Theognis, which are evidently a collection, not the work of one man.

43 Ariſtot. Rhet. ii. 21. Stobæus, Serm. p. 44, &c.

44 Plut. Symp.

CHAP. XIII. permanent than the fluctuating interefts of perifhing communities. Many of the elementary propofitions of geometry, afterwards collected by Euclid, were firft difcovered [45] by Thales, who directed the acutenefs of his mind with equal fuccefs to aftronomy. He divided the heavens into five zones; difcovered the equinoxes and folftices; remarked the Urfa Minor; obferved, and nearly predicted, eclipfes. The divifion of the year into three hundred and fixty-five days was already known to the Egyptians; but although Thales might borrow this, and perhaps other difcoveries, from that ancient people, among whom he fometime refided, it appears, even from thofe authors who are ever prone to exaggerate the wifdom of Egypt, that he owed much lefs to that country, than to the native fagacity and penetration of his clear comprehenfive mind [46].

His fchool and fucceffors,

Thales founded the Ionic fchool, in which he was fucceeded by Anaximander and Anaximenes, who were followed by Anaxagoras, the inftructor of Pericles, and Archelaus, who is called by ancient writers the mafter of Socrates. About fifty years after Thales, the fame fpeculations which he had introduced were purfued by Xenophanes of Colophon, Leucippus and Parmenides of Elea, and Heraclitus of Ephefus. Thefe ingenious men difcovered many ufeful truths; yet all of them, not

45 Proclus in Euclid.

46 Hieronym. apud Laert. l. i. c. xxvii. Plin. l. xxxviii. c. xvii.

excepting

excepting Thales himſelf, likewiſe buſied themſelves with ſubjects that will for ever excite and elude human curioſity. Their doctrines were equally liable to objection, whichever of the elements they aſſumed as the firſt principle of nature; they univerſally agreed in aſſerting the fallacy of the ſenſes, and the unworthineſs of the vulgar ſuperſtition; but their various opinions concerning the origin and deſtruction of worlds, the magnitudes and diſtances of heavenly bodies, the eſſence of matter and ſpirit[47], deſerve only to be conſidered as the dreams of inquiſitive men, whoſe ambition of knowledge carried them beyond the ſphere of experience, and the clear deductions of reaſon. The ſyſtem of Leucippus, the moſt famous of them all, was improved by Democritus of Abdera[48], and afterwards adopted by Epicurus, whoſe philoſophy is ſufficiently explained in the extraordinary work of Lucretius, the boldeſt monument which the world is ever likely to behold, of learning, genius, and impiety.

degenerate into atheiſm.

But it is particularly worthy of obſervation, that at the ſame time Democritus aſſailed the celeſtial manſions, and unveiled, with a daring hand, the feeble majeſty of Grecian ſuperſtition, Anaxagoras of Clazomené revealed a new and infinitely more auguſt ſpectacle, by firſt announcing to the heathen world, a ſelf-exiſtent, all-perfect mind, as the great cauſe

The ſublime philoſophy of Anaxagoras.

47 See Diogen. Laert. l. i. Ariſtot. Metaph. paſſim. & Plut. de Placit. Philoſoph.

48 Laert. l. ix. Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. viii.

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cause and author of the material world. Thales and Pythagoras, with such of their disciples as faithfully adhered to their tenets, had indeed admitted spirit as a constituent principle of the universe; but they had so intimately blended mind and matter, that these dissimilar substances seemed to make an indissoluble compound, as the soul and body constitute but one man. According to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, the creating and sovereign intelligence was to be carefully distinguished from the soul of the world, which he seems to have regarded merely as a poetical expression for the laws which the Deity had impressed on his works. The great Ruler of the universe did not animate, but impel matter; he could not be included within its limited and perishing terms; his nature was pure and spiritual, and totally incapable of pollution by any corporeal admixture [49].

The discovery and diffusion of this luminous and sublime principle, which was naturally followed by an investigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and the deducing from thence the great duties of morality, might have produced a general and happy revolution in Greece, under the zealous and persevering labours of Socrates and his followers, if the tendency of this divine philosophy had not been counteracted, not only by the gross prejudices of the vulgar, but by the more dangerous refinements of incredulous Sophists.

49 Aristot. Metaphys. l. i. c. iii. Plato in Cratylo, & Plut. in Pericle.

The

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Its tendency counteracted by the Sophists.

The ſame ſpirit of inquiry, which leads to the diſcovery of truth, will ever promote the propagation of error; and unfortunately for Greece, in the middle of the fifth century before Chriſt, errors were propagated, ſo congenial to the condition of the times, that they could not fail to take deep root, and flouriſh in a ſoil which was peculiarly well prepared to receive them. The glorious victories over the Carthaginians and Perſians had increaſed the wealth and ſecurity, called forth the invention and induſtry, but, at the ſame time, multiplied the wants, and inflamed the paſſions, of the Greeks. The more powerful cities, and particularly Athens and Syracuſe, had attained a pitch of proſperity which exceeded their moſt ſanguine hopes; elated by the bloom of health and the pride of riches, they continually ſighed for new and unknown enjoyments, while both individuals and communities were ever ready to liſten to ſuch inſtructors as juſtified their vices, and taught them to abuſe the gifts of fortune.

Hiſtory of the Sophiſts. Olymp. lxxxv. 1. A. C. 440.

In this ſituation of affairs appeared the Sophiſts [50], whoſe name, ſtill familiar in the languages of Europe, pretty faithfully expreſſes their character. Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontium, with many inferior names, preſerved in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Iſocrates, ſtarted up about the ſame time, and exhibited a new phænomenon in Greece. The Olympic, and other public aſſem-

50 Vid. Philoſtrat. de Vit. Sophiſt.

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blies, furnished them with an opportunity to display their specious accomplishments to the admiring spectators. They frequented the great cities, particularly Athens, and acquired the friendship of the rich, and the applause of the multitude. They professed the knowledge of every science, and of every art, which they taught publicly, for a stipulated price; and, as they really possessed the art of persuasion, their disciples continually increased among the rich and the voluptuous, the idle and the vain.

Their character and views.

Their language was glowing and harmonious, their manners elegant, their life splendid. When it served their interest, and pleased the taste of their hearers, they could paint virtue in the warmest and most alluring colours; but the capricious will of their scholars, whose passions they were ever careful to gratify, served as the only standard of their principles; and engaged them, for the most part, to deck out the barren doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus with the meretricious arts of the rhetorician. Their morality supplied the springs with which Epicurus watered his gardens; and their captious logic furnished the arguments by which Pyrrho attempted to justify his scepticism [51]. It would be easy to trace up to the Sophists that quibbling metaphysic, which being embodied in the Greek language, thenceforth adhered too closely to the philosophical writings of that people, and

Their influence on philosophy and manners.

[51] See the note on the Sophists, in my Translation of Isocrates's Panegyric of Athens, p. 1, & seqq.

which

which totally disfigures many otherwise valuable compositions of antiquity. But our present business is only to remark the destructive effects immediately resulting from their tenets, which, while they undermined, without openly opposing, the ancient and popular superstition, boldly set at defiance all those useful maxims of conduct, and all those salutary discoveries of reason, which, amidst the insolence of the Greek democracies, fomented by prosperity, appeared essentially requisite to restrain the intemperance, injustice, and violence, of individuals and communities.

Opposed by Socrates.

In several republics of Greece, the Sophists enjoyed a free career to display their talents, practise their artifices, and to promote their fame and fortune. But in Athens their frauds were detected, and their characters unmasked by Socrates [52], whose philosophy forms an important æra in the history of the human mind. The son of Sophroniscus was born at Athens, forty years before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The smallness of his patrimony, amounting only to three hundred pounds, and his original profession of a statuary [53], have encouraged an opinion of the obscurity of his birth, among writers who did not reflect on the narrowness of Athenian fortunes, and who forgot to consider, that as hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded in the Grecian republics,

[52] To avoid prolixity in the account of Socrates and his philosophy, I cite not particular passages, but give the general result of my reading in Plato and Xenophon.

[53] Laert. l. ii. art. Socrat.

 a solid

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a ſolid and permanent luſtre was naturally derived from the practice of ingenious arts, which could not be cultivated, as in ancient Rome, and ſometimes in modern Europe, by ſervile or mercenary hands, but only by the firſt claſs of freemen and citizens. Whatever reputation or advantage Socrates might have acquired by the exerciſe of a profeſſion, which was peculiarly encouraged by the taſte of the times, and the magnificent ſpirit of Pericles, he readily ſacrificed to the natural bent of his mind, which concealed, under an external form worthy to repreſent the voluptuous Silenus [54], the fruitful ſeeds of every amiable and manly ſentiment, and determined him, by an irreſiſtible impulſe, to the ſtudy of wiſdom and virtue.

His education and character.

In his early youth he heard the phyſics of Archelaus, and learned the geometry of Theodorus [55]; and from theſe, and other teachers, acquired ſuch an acquaintance with the faſhionable theories concerning the formation of the univerſe, the original principles of things, the hidden powers of matter, as enabled him to regard with juſt contempt, and occaſionally to deride with inimitable humour, the vanity of thoſe uſeleſs and ſhadowy ſpeculations. He acknowledged with the pious Anaxagoras, the ſuperintending mind, whoſe providence regulated the operations of nature, as well as the affairs of human life. He denied not the exiſtence of thoſe inferior intelligences, which formed the only ob-

54 Plato & Xenoph. in Symp.

55 Plato in Theætet. & in Menon.

jects of popular adoration; he allowed the divine origin of dreams and omens; he was exemplary in all the religious duties of his country; and were we to judge the Athenian sage by the standard of ordinary men, we should be inclined to believe that he had not entirely escaped the contagion of superstition; since he professed to be accompanied by a dæmon, or invisible conductor, who often restrained his passions, and influenced his behaviour [56]. If this assertion was not an effect of that refined *irony* familiar to Socrates, we must allow his temper to have been tinged with credulity: yet, whoever seriously reflects on a life of seventy years, spent in the service of mankind, uniformly blameless, and terminated by a voluntary death, in obedience to the unjust laws of his country; whoever considers attentively the habitual temperance, the unshaken probity, the active usefulness, the diffusive benevolence, the constant equanimity and cheerfulness of this singular man, will admit a degree of enthusiasm, rather as the ornament, than defect, of such an extraordinary character. Men of learning and genius, who, examining the matter still more deeply, have observed the important revolution produced by the life and death of Socrates, on the principles and sentiments of his contemporaries, and of posterity, are disposed to believe that such an extraordinary phænomenon could not have appeared in the moral world, without the particular interposition of heaven. The cheerful serenity of his last

[56] Plut. de Genio Socratis.

moments,

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moments[57], and ſtill more, the undeviating tenor of his active virtue, juſtified the hardeſt maxims of Lycurgus and Pythagoras; while the main aim of his ſpeculations was to eſtabliſh the ſublime morality of thoſe ſages on the cleareſt deductions of reaſon and experience.

His philoſophy.

From the perfections of the ſupreme intelligence he deduced his juſt government of the univerſe, which implied the immortality of the human ſoul. But the great object of his reſearch was to diſcover the general laws by which, even in this life, the ſuperintending providence had variouſly diſpenſed to men good and evil, happineſs and miſery. Theſe laws he regarded as the promulgated will of the God, with which, when clearly aſcertained, it became our duty invariably to comply; ſince nothing but the moſt ſhort-ſighted folly could riſk incurring the divine diſpleaſure, in order to avoid pain or poverty, ſickneſs or death; far leſs to acquire periſhing gratifications, which leave a ſting behind them. Reaſoning on ſuch principles, and taking experience only for his guide, he deduced, with admirable perſpicuity, the intereſts and duties of nations and individuals, in all the complicated relations of ſociety. The actions of men furniſhed the materials, their inſtruction formed the object, their happineſs was the end of his diſcourſe. Wherever his leſſons might be moſt generally uſeful, there he was always to be found; frequenting, at an early hour, the Academy, Lyceum, and other

[57] This ſubject will be treated hereafter.

public

public *Gymnasia*; punctually attending the forum at mid-day, the hour of full assembly; and in the evening joining, without the affectation of austerity, in the convivial entertainments of his friends, or accompanying them in the delightful walks which adorned the banks of the Ilyssus. As a husband, a father, a citizen, and a soldier, the steady practice of his duty continually illustrated his doctrines. The conversation and example of this truly practical philosopher (and this is his highest panegyric) persuaded many of his fellow-citizens sincerely to embrace a virtuous course of life; and even those who, like Critias and Alcibiades, allowed the current of their passions to prevail over the conviction of their sober hours, were still charmed with the wonderful extent, as well as the singular accuracy, of his various knowledge; with the acuteness and penetration of his arguments; the beauty, vivacity, and persuasiveness of his style; which, whether he assumed the tone of reason or of ridicule, surpassed whatever had been deemed most eloquent [58].

Its influence.

Yet, how great soever might be the personal influence of Socrates, the triumph of his philosophy became more illustrious and complete, after his principles were embraced by those who cultivated the imitative arts, and directed the public amusements, which in all countries, but particularly in Greece, have ever produced immediate and powerful effects on the national opinions and character. In Greece alone, the theatre was regarded as an

Assisted by the tragic poets;

[58] Xenoph. Memor. l. iv. c. xv. Laert. l. ii. c. xix. & seqq. & Cicero de Orat. iii. 16.

object

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object of the first importance and magnitude; it formed an essential, and by far the most splendid, part of religious worship; the expence of supporting it exceeded that of the army and navy together; and this celebrated entertainment, which united the tragedy and opera of the moderns, was carried to perfection by a favourite disciple of Socrates, whose works were so universally admired in Greece, that (as we shall have occasion to relate in the Sicilian war) the Syracusans released from captivity those Athenians, and those only, who had learned to repeat the verses of Euripides. This admired poet rendered the Grecian tragedy complete, by perfecting the chorus [59], the principal distinction between the ancient and the modern drama, and which, when properly conducted, rendered the former more regular, yet more varied; more magnificent, and at the same time more affecting; above all, more interesting and more instructive.

particularly Euripides;

who perfected the chorus.

From the prevailing manners of the times, when the principal citizens lived together in crowds, and daily frequented the public halls, the *gymnasia*, the forums,

59 In this part of the drama, the philosophy of Euripides excels the loftiness of Æschylus, and the richness of Sophocles. It is sufficient to compare the works of the three rivals, to perceive that the chorus in Euripides most faithfully answers the description of Horace:

Ille bonis faveatque, & consilietur amicis,
Et regat iratos, & amet peccare timentes.
Ille dapes laudet mensæ brevis, ille salubrem
Justitiam, legesque, & apertis otia portis;
Ille tegat commissa; deosque precetur & oret,
Ut redeat miseris, abeat fortuna superbis.

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forums, and temples, it was natural to expect that the action of a Grecian tragedy ſhould conſiſt in ſome great public event, which intereſted the whole body of the people. The ſcene was uſually the portico of a temple, the gate of a palace, the wide expanſe of a forum, or market-place. In ſuch places many ſpectators muſt be ſuppoſed preſent, who would naturally take part in an action which concerned the public intereſt and happineſs[60]. On this principle was introduced the ancient chorus, conſiſting of ſuch perſons as moſt properly ſuited the occaſion, and who, though not immediately or principally concerned in the cataſtrophe, had ſuch general and indirect intereſt, as kept them continually on the ſcene, and made them approve or condemn, promote or oppoſe, the ſentiments and meaſures of the actors. The chorus, never quitting the ſtage, neceſſarily introduced the unity of place; and as their ſongs and dances between the acts expreſſed the feelings excited by the repreſentation, they connected the preceding act with that which immediately followed it, and rendered the whole ſpectacle uninterrupted and continuous.

60 In the Oedipus Tyrannus, the chorus is compoſed of prieſts, ſenators, Theban youths, &c. Creon ſays to Oedipus,

> Ει τωνδε χρηζεις πλησιαζοντων κλυειν
> Ετοιμος ειπειν, ειτε και στειχειν εσω.

The anſwer is,

> Ες παντας αυδα̃ τωνδε γαρ πλεον φερω
> Πενθος η και της εμης ψυχης περι.

CREON. Shall I ſpeak in preſence of this numerous aſſembly? or ſhall we retire?

OEDIPUS. Speak before all preſent; for the public diſtreſs afflicts me more than my own danger.

The

CHAP. XIII. The music of the chorus was more rich and various, and the poetry more elevated and glowing, than what could be admitted into the acts, or ordinary dialogue, which was confined to the iambic measure; circumstances which, together with the numbers, the dresses, the dances, and gestures, of these fancied spectators, equally increased the magnificence and variety of the entertainment. They likewise rendered it more affecting; since nothing is more proper to interest us in any scene, than the beholding a great number of persons deeply engaged by it, and expressing their feelings by natural tones and movements. But the principal advantage of the chorus was to furnish the poet with an opportunity (without loading the dialogue, and rendering it too sententious) of enforcing, by all the power of fancy and of numbers, that moral instruction, which was occasionally attempted by Æschylus and Sophocles, but which forms the continual end and aim of Euripides, who had a soul to feel, and a genius to express, whatever is most lovely and most excellent in sentiment and character. It is unnecessary to mention the affecting delicacy of Admetus and his attendants towards his guest Hercules; the lively emotions of gratitude in that hero; the friendship of Pylades and Orestes; the amiable picture of conjugal affection in the character of Alcestis; since the whole remains of that inestimable writer prove his unceasing labours to warm his countrymen with all the virtues and charities that adorn private life, as well as to keep alive an ardent love of the republic, and a generous passion for its glory

and liberty; while, in ſeveral paſſages, he deſcribes and refutes the philoſophy of Epicurus[61] (which, as we have already obſerved, was chiefly borrowed from the licentious maxims of the Sophiſts) with ſuch fulneſs and accuracy as entitled him to the appellation of the Philoſophic Tragedian.

His views counter-acted by the authors of the old comedy.

That Euripides, though ten years older than Socrates, owed the characteriſtic excellencies of his works to the converſation and friendſhip of that unrivalled moraliſt, is univerſally acknowledged by antiquity[62]; though the character and intentions

61 See particularly Alceſt. ver. 782, &c. and ver. 960, &c. Euripides flouriſhed near an hundred years before Epicurus and Zeno, the reſpective founders of the Epicurean and Stoical philoſophy. Yet we find the tenets of both ſects in the tragedian; which may be eaſily explained, by conſidering that thoſe oppoſite kinds of philoſophy aroſe from different aſpects of nature, which muſt often preſent themſelves to an obſerving eye; and as the doctrines of the Sophiſts laid the foundation for the moral ſyſtem of Epicurus, ſo the moderate doubt of Socrates, and the old academy, was corrupted into different degrees of ſcepticiſm, according to the fancy of their ſucceſſors; and his rational preference of virtue to all other objects, degenerated into a pretended contempt for theſe objects, as things totally indifferent, the inſenſibility and pedantry of the Stoics.

62 Εδοκει συμποιειν Ευριπιδῃ. Diogen. Laert. in Vit. Socrat. The comic poets, who envied and hated Euripides, as the darling of the public, pretended that Socrates had even compoſed all the fineſt paſſages in his tragedies. Soon after the repreſentation of the Troes, Mneſilochus parodied it in a farce, which he called Φρυγες, Phrygians, probably to have an opportunity of playing on the word φρυγανον, fuel.

Φρυγεις εςι καινον δραμα τȣτ' Ευριπιδȣ
Ὡ και Σωκρατες τα φρυγανα υποτιθησι.

"The Phrygians is a new play of Euripides, to whom Socrates furniſhes the fuel." But the pun cannot be tranſlated. The ſame Mneſilochus calls Euripides a ſort of hammerman to Socrates,

Ευριπιδης Σωκρατογομφευς.

both

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both of the poet and the philoſopher were groſsly miſrepreſented by ſome of their contemporaries. Before the commencement, and during the continuance of the Peloponneſian war, there flouriſhed at Athens a claſs of men who were the declared enemies, not only of Socrates and his diſciples, but of all order and decency. The reader will eaſily perceive, that I allude to Ariſtophanes, and the other writers of the old licentious comedy; an entertainment which was never carried to the ſame vicious exceſs in any other age or country. Yet this hideous ſpectre was the ſiſter of Tragedy, whoſe angelic ſweetneſs and dignity were long accompanied by this odious and diſguſting form; but to underſtand the natural connection between objects ſeemingly ſo different, it is neceſſary to remount to their ſource.

History of that licentious entertainment.

Tragedy, the ſong of the goat[63], and Comedy, the ſong of the village, ſufficiently indicate, by the meanneſs of their ancient names, the humility of their firſt original. They aroſe amidſt the ſacrifices and joyous feſtivity of the vintage, in a country which ſeldom adopted the amuſements, any more than the arts and inſtitutions, of others, but which was deſtined to communicate her own to all

[63] A goat, as the particular enemy of the vine, was very properly ſacrificed to Bacchus, whoſe praiſes compoſed the ſong. In the Antegoné of Sophocles, v. 1127,

Πολυωνυμε Καδμειας
Νυμφας αγαλμα, και Διος
Βαρυβρεμετα γενος, &c.

we have a ſpecimen of what formed the firſt buſineſs of tragedy.

the

the civilized portion of mankind. During the en-tertainments of a ſeaſon peculiarly dedicated to re-creation and pleaſure, the ſuſceptible minds of the Greeks naturally yielded to two propenſities congenial to men in ſuch circumſtances, a diſpo-ſition to exerciſe their ſenſibility, and a deſire to amuſe their fancy. Availing himſelf of the former, the ſublime genius of Æſchylus[64] improved the ſong of the goat into a regular dramatic poem, agreeing with the Iliad and Odyſſey in thoſe unal-terable rules of deſign and execution which are eſſential to the perfection of every literary perform-ance, yet differing from thoſe immortal archetypes of art, in a circumſtance naturally ſuggeſted by the occaſion for which tragedies were compoſed. It had been uſual with the Athenians, when they celebrated in the ſpring and autumn the great feſti-vals of Bacchus, to perſonate the exploits and fa-bles handed down by immemorial tradition con-cerning that bountiful divinity; this imitation was conſidered as a mark of gratitude due to the bene-ficence of the god, to whoſe honours they aſſociated the kindred worſhip of Pan, Silenus, and their at-tendant fawns and ſatyrs. When Æſchylus repre-

64 Æſchylus is ſaid by Ariſtotle (de Arte Poetica) to have in-troduced interlocutors, dialogue, &c. which is acknowledging him the father of tragedy. We know little of Theſpis, but from Ho-race:

> Ignotum tragicæ genus inveniſſe camænæ
> Dicitur, & plauſtris vexiſſe poëmata Theſpis.

The plauſtrum, however, has a more direct reference to comedy; ſince λαλειν ὡς εξ ἁμαξης, to ſpeak as from a cart, was a common Greek expreſſion for reviling with groſs indecent inſolence.

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ferred, therefore, instead of simply reciting, the real history, or agreeable fictions, of antiquity, he only adopted a mode of imitation already practised in the religious ceremonies of his country; a mode of imitation more powerful than the epic, since, instead of barely describing the deeds of gods and heroes, it shews those distinguished personages on the scene, makes them speak and act for themselves, and thus approaching nearer to reality, is still more forcible and affecting.

Its characteristics, as distinguished from tragedy;

As tragedy was introduced in imitation of the more serious spectacles of the Dionysian festival, so comedy, which soon followed it, was owing to the more light and ludicrous parts of that solemnity [65]. Tragedy is the imitation of an important and serious action, adapted to affect the sensibility of the spectators, and to gratify their natural propensity to fear, to weep, and to wonder. Comedy is the imitation of a light and ludicrous action, adapted to amuse the fancy, and to gratify the natural disposition of men to laughter and merriment. Terror and pity have in all ages been regarded as the main springs of tragedy, because the laws of sen-

[65] Horace is authentic, and the most agreeable authority:

Agricolæ prisci, fortes, parvoque beati
Condita post frumenta, levantes tempore festo
Corpus, & ipsum animum spe finis dura ferentem,
Cum sociis operum, pueris, & conjuge fidâ,
Tellurem porco, Silvanum lacte piabant,
Floribus & vino Genium, memorem brevis ævi.
Fescennina per hunc invecta licentia morem
Versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit, &c. &c.

and still more directly, Ars Poetic. v. 220, &c.

sibility,

ſibility, founded ſolely in nature, are always the ſame. Comedy has been infinitely varied by the innumerable modes of wit, humour, and ridicule, which prevail in different ages and countries, and which agree ſcarcely in any one particular, unleſs it may be reckoned an agreement, that men have ſeldom indulged them, except at the expence of their good-nature, and often of their virtue. The Grecian comedy was uncommonly licentious; the profligate characters of Ariſtophanes and his contemporaries, Mneſilochus, Callias, Eupolis, and Cratinus, contributed, doubtleſs, to this deformity; yet theſe poets could not eaſily have rendered their new entertainment agreeable to the taſte [66] and prejudices of the public, without incorporating in them the ſubſtance of the *phallic* ſongs [67], which conſtituted an ancient and eſſential part of the amuſements of the vintage. The fond admirers of antiquity have defended the abominable ſtrains of theſe licentious poets, by pretending, that their intention was to reform vice, not to recommend it; an apology which, if admitted, might tend to exculpate the writers, but could never juſtify their performances, ſince it is known by experience, that

66 Horace has expreſſed, with his uſual felicity, the ſituation of the ſpectators, and the fatal neceſſity of humouring it:

——Aſper
Incolumi gravitate jocum tentavit; eo quod
Illecebris erat & grata novitate morandus.
Spectator, functuſque ſacris, & potus & exlex.

67 Φαλλος. Priapus ξυλον επιμηκες εχων εν τω ακρω σκυτινον αιδοιον. Suidas. This was carried in proceſſion, accompanied with the φαλλικα ασματα.

 lewd

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lewd descriptions prove a poiſon rather than a remedy; and inſtead of correcting manners, tend only to corrupt them.

and from modern comedy.

Beſides the general licentiouſneſs of the ancient comedy, its more particular characteriſtics reſulted from the peculiar circumſtances of the Athenians, during the time of its introduction and continuance. The people of all ranks at Athens were then too deeply engaged in the military and political tranſactions of their country, to enjoy any amuſement which did not either directly flatter their paſſions, or bear an immediate relation to the great and important intereſts of the republic. It was during the confuſion and calamities of the Peloponneſian war, that all the comic pieces which remain were originally repreſented; a period too diſorderly and tumultuous to reliſh comedies, ſuch as are now written, or ſuch as were compoſed in Greece by Menander, in an age of greater moderation and tranquillity. The elegant and ingenious, the moral and inſtructive ſtrains of Moliere or Menander, may amuſe the idleneſs of wealth, and the ſecurity of peace. But amidſt the fermentation of war and danger, amidſt civil diſſenſions and foreign invaſions, the minds of men are too little at eaſe to enjoy ſuch refined and delicate beauties, which then appear lifeleſs and inſipid. In ſuch turbulent circumſtances, the reluctant attention muſt be excited by real, inſtead of imaginary characters; by a true, inſtead of a fictitious event; by direct and particular advice concerning the actual ſtate of their affairs, inſtead of vague or abſtract leſſons of wiſdom

dom and virtue. Coarſe buffoonery may often force them to laugh; delicate ridicule will ſeldom engage them to ſmile; they may be affected by the ſharpneſs of perſonal invective, but will remain impenetrable to the ſhafts of general ſatire.

General notion of the pieces of Ariſtophanes.

By combining the different parts of this deſcription, we may form a tolerably exact notion of the writings of Ariſtophanes, which commonly conceal, under a thin allegorical veil, the recent hiſtory of ſome public tranſaction, or the principal features of ſome diſtinguiſhed character, repreſented in ſuch a ludicrous light, as reflects on thoſe concerned, unexpected, and often unmerited, but not therefore the leſs ſtriking, flaſhes of inſolent ridicule. Such was the nature, and ſuch the materials of the ancient comedy, which, in its form, agreed entirely with tragedy, having borrowed from this entertainment (which was already in poſſeſſion of the theatre) the diſtribution of the whole, as well as the arrangement of the ſeveral parts; the muſic, the chorus, the dreſſes, decorations, and machinery; all of which were ſo modified and burleſqued as ſuited the purpoſes of the comic writer, and often rendered his pieces little elſe than parodies of the more faſhionable tragedies of the times.

He and his aſſociates encouraged at Athens by Pericles.

This ſingular ſpecies of drama, which, in its leſs perfect ſtate, had long ſtrolled the villages of Attica, was ſimply tolerated at Athens, until the profuſion of Pericles, and his complaiſance for the populace, firſt ſupplied from the exchequer the neceſſary expences for the repreſentation of comedies, and propoſed prizes for the comic, as well as for

 the

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the tragic, poets and actors. But, by this injudicious encouragement, he unwarily cherished a serpent in his bosom. Aristophanes and his licentious contemporaries having previously ridiculed virtue and genius, in the persons of Socrates and Euripides, boldly proceeded to avail themselves of the natural malignity of the vulgar, and their envy against whatever is elevated and illustrious, to traduce and calumniate Pericles himself; and though his successors in the administration justly merited (as we shall have occasion to relate) the severest lashes of their invective, yet, had their characters been more pure, they would have been equally exposed to the unprovoked satire of those insolent buffoons, who gratified the gross appetites of the vulgar, by an undistinguished mass of ridicule, involving vice and virtue, things profane and sacred, men and gods.

The Grecian festivals;

Dramatic entertainments formed an essential part of the festivals consecrated to the bountiful author of the vine. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was deemed far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Jupiter enjoyed his appropriated honours; but more commonly, as is attested by Athenian medals, the worship of the father of the gods was associated with that of his wife and warlike daughter. We shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the festival and mysteries of Ceres, who taught the Athenians the important knowledge of agriculture, which they were supposed to have diffused over the

ancient

ancient world. It would be endlefs to mention the inftitutions in honour of the crowd of inferio, or lefs propitious divinities, which rendered the feftivals at Athens twice more numerous than in any other Grecian city. Nor did their frequency abate any thing of the expenfive fplendour which accompanied them. The fhops and courts of juftice were fhut; the mechanic quitted his tools, the hufbandman ceafed from his labours, the mourner intermitted his forrow. The whole city was diffolved in feafting and jollity; the intervals of which were filled up by pompous fhows and proceffions, by concerts of mufic, by exhibitions of painting; and at feveral feftivals, particularly the Panathenæan, by hearing and judging the nobleft productions of eloquence and poetry [68]. We fhall have occafion to mention fome particular ceremonies of a more melancholy caft; but the general character of the Grecian religion was as cheerful and attractive, as the fuperftition of the Egyptians, from whom they are ignorantly fuppofed to have borrowed it, was gloomy and forbidding. Even the Egyptian hymns confifted in difmal complaints and lamentations [69]; the Grecian folemnities concluded with fongs of joy and exultation. The feafts which followed the facrifices were enriched by all the delicacies and luxuries of the ancient world; and, to ufe the words of Ariftotle, many perfons thought it their duty, at thofe religious entertainments, to get drunk in honour of the gods [70].

the fplendour with which they were celebrated.

68 Ifocrat. Panegyr. & Panathen.

69 Apuleius de Genio Socratis.

70 Ariftot. Ethic. ad Nichom. l. viii. c. iii.

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Manners of the Athenians in private life.

It seems extraordinary, that the revenues of Athens, notwithstanding their improvement by Pericles, should have sufficed for this multitude of expences. But we must consider, that the general simplicity of manners in private life, formed a striking contrast with the extravagance of public festivals and amusements. The houses and tables of the most wealthy Athenians were little distinguished above those of their poorest neighbours. Pericles himself, though never suspected of avarice, lived with the exactest œconomy; and the superabundance of private wealth, which would have created envy and danger to the owner, if he had employed it for his particular convenience and pleasure, procured him public gratitude and esteem, when expended for the satisfaction of the multitude.

Condition of the female sex.

For reasons which will immediately appear, we have not hitherto found it necessary to describe the manners and influence of the Grecian women; but the character and condition of the fair sex will throw light on the preceding observations in this chapter, and present the most striking contrast of any to be met with in history. If we knew not the consideration in which women were anciently held in Greece, and the advantages which they enjoyed at Sparta, after the laws of Lycurgus had revived the institutions of the heroic ages[71], we should be apt to suspect that the ungenerous treatment of the feebler sex, which afterwards so universally prevailed, had been derived from the

[71] Aristot. Politic. l. ii. p. 105.

Egyp-

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Egyptian and Aſiatic colonies, which early ſettled in that part of Europe. Excluded from ſocial intercourſe, which nature had fitted them to adorn, the Grecian women were rigorouſly confined to the moſt retired apartments of the family, and employed in the meaneſt offices of domeſtic œconomy. It was thought indecent for them to venture abroad, unleſs to attend a proceſſion, to accompany a funeral [72], or to aſſiſt at certain other religious ſolemnities. Even on theſe occaſions, their behaviour was attentively watched, and often malignantly interpreted. The moſt innocent freedom was conſtrued into a breach of decorum; and their reputation, once ſullied by the ſlighteſt imprudence, could never afterwards be retrieved. If ſuch unreaſonable ſeverities had proceeded from that abſurd jealouſy which ſometimes accompanies a violent love, and of which a certain degree is nearly connected with the delicacy of paſſion between the ſexes, the condition of the Grecian women, though little leſs miſerable, would have been far leſs contemptible. But the Greeks were utter ſtrangers to that refinement of ſentiment [73], which, in the ages of chivalry, and which ſtill, in ſome ſouthern countries of Europe, renders women the objects of a ſuſpicious, but reſpectful paſſion, and leads men to gratify their vanity at the expence of their freedom. Married or unmarried, the Grecian females were kept in equal reſtraint; no pains were taken to render them, at any one period of their lives, agreeable members of ſociety; and their education was

72 Lyſias, p. 420.

73 Idem, p. 435.

either

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either entirely neglected, or confined at leaſt to ſuch humble objects, as, inſtead of elevating and enlarging the mind, tended only to narrow and to debaſe it. Though neither qualified for holding an honourable rank in ſociety, nor permitted to enjoy the company of their neareſt friends and relations, they were thought capable of ſuperintending or performing the drudgery of domeſtic labour, of acting as ſtewards for their huſbands, and thus relieving them from a multiplicity of little cares, which ſeemed unworthy their attention, and unſuitable to their dignity. The whole burden of ſuch mercenary cares being impoſed on the women, their firſt inſtructions and treatment were adapted to that lowly rank, beyond which they could never afterwards aſpire [74]. Nothing was allowed to divert their minds from thoſe ſervile occupations in which it was intended that their whole lives ſhould be ſpent; no liberal idea was preſented to their imagination, that might raiſe them above the ignoble arts in which they were ever deſtined to labour; the ſmalleſt familiarity with ſtrangers was deemed a dangerous offence; and any intimacy or connection beyond the walls of their own family, a heinous crime; ſince it might engage them to embezzle the houſehold furniture and effects committed to their care and cuſtody. Even the laws of Athens confirmed this miſerable degradation of women, holding the ſecurity of the huſband's property a matter of greater importance

74 Xenoph. Memorab. l. v. paſſim, particularly Socrates's Diſcourſe with Iſchomachus.

than

than defending the wife's perſon from outrage, and protecting her character from infamy[75]. By ſuch illiberal inſtitutions were the moſt amiable part of the human ſpecies inſulted, among a people in other reſpects the moſt improved of all antiquity. They were totally debarred from thoſe refined arts and entertainments, to which their agreeable qualities might have added a new charm. Inſtead of directing the taſte, and enlivening the pleaſures of ſociety, their value was eſtimated, like that of the ignobleſt objects, merely by profit or utility. Their chief virtue was reſerve, and their point of honour, œconomy.

Grecian courtezans;

The extreme depreſſion of women levelled the natural inequalities of their temper and diſpoſition; the prude, the coquette, with the various intermediate ſhades of female character, diſappeared; and all the modeſt and virtuous part of the ſex (if virtue and modeſty can ever be the effects of reſtraint) were reduced to humble imitation and inſipid uniformity. But, in the time of Pericles, there appeared and flouriſhed at Athens a bolder claſs of females, who diveſted themſelves of the natural modeſty, diſdained the artificial virtues, and avenged the violated privileges of their ſex. Aſia, the mother of voluptuouſneſs, produced this dangerous brood, whoſe meretricious arts and occupations met with no check or reſtraint from the laxity of Ionian morals, and were even promoted and encouraged by the corruptions of Pagan ſuperſtition.

75 See the laws quoted by Lyſias, explained in my Introductory Diſcourſe to that orator, p. 100.

In

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In most of the Greek colonies of Asia, temples were erected to the *earthly* Venus; where courtezans were not merely tolerated, but honoured, as priestesses of that condescending divinity[76]. The wealthy and commercial city of Corinth first imported this innovation from the East; and such is the extravagance of the human mind, that after the repulse of Xerxes, the magistrates of that republic ascribed the safety of their country to the powerful intercession of the votaries of Venus, whose portraits they caused to be painted at the public expence, as the Athenians had done those of the warriors who gained the battle of Marathon[77]. The fame of all those accomplished, but mercenary beauties, though highly celebrated by the poets and historians of the times, was eclipsed by the splendour of Aspasia of Miletus, who settled at Athens under the administration of Pericles, and is said to have embarked in the fleet with which that fortunate commander subdued the powerful and wealthy island of Samos. The personal character of Aspasia gave temporary lustre to a profession, which, though exalted by the casual caprices of superstition, must naturally have fallen into contempt; since later writers among the Greeks[78] acknowledge, that though she carried on a very dishonourable commerce in female virtue, yet her wit and eloquence, still more than her beauty, gained her extraordinary consideration among all ranks in the republic. The susceptible

Their artifices and influence.

76 Athenæus, l. xiii. & Plutarch, p. 637.

77 Simonides apud Athen. l. xiii.

78 Plutarch. in Pericle.

minds

minds of the Athenians were delighted with what their abſurd inſtitutions rendered a novelty, the beholding the native graces of the ſex, embelliſhed by education. Aſpaſia is ſaid to have acquired a powerful aſcendant over Pericles himſelf; ſhe certainly acquired his protection and friendſhip; which is leſs extraordinary than that her converſation and company ſhould have pleaſed the diſcernment of the ſage Socrates. She is accuſed (as we ſhall afterwards have an opportunity to mention) of having excited, from motives of perſonal reſentment, the war of Peloponneſus; yet, calamitous as that long and obſtinate conflict proved to Greece, and particularly to Athens, it may be ſuſpected that Aſpaſia occaſioned ſtill more incurable evils to both. Her example, and ſtill more her inſtructions, formed a ſchool at Athens, by which her dangerous profeſſion was reduced into ſyſtem. The companions of Aſpaſia ſerved as models for painting and ſtatuary, and themes for poetry and panegyric. Nor were they merely the objects, but the authors of many literary works, in which they eſtabliſhed rules for the behaviour of their lovers, particularly at table; and explained the art of gaining the heart, and captivating the affections[79]; which would have been an imprudence, had they not conſidered, that the myſteries of *their* calling alone loſe little by being diſcloſed, ſince men may often perceive the ſnare, without having courage to avoid it. The dreſs, behaviour, and artifices of this claſs of women, became continually more ſe-

79 Athenæus, ibid.

ductive

CHAP. XIII. ductive and dangerous; and Athens thenceforth remained the chief ſchool of vice and pleaſure, as well as of literature and philoſophy.

It has been already hinted, that the fine arts, and particularly painting, were proſtituted to the honour of harlots, and the purpoſes of voluptuouſneſs. Licentious pictures are mentioned by ancient writers as a general ſource of corruption, and conſidered as the firſt ambuſh that beſet the ſafety of youth and innocence[80]. Yet this unhappy effect of the arts was only the vapour that accompanies the ſun; ſince painting, architecture, and above all, ſtatuary, attained their meridian ſplendour in the age of Pericles; and ſhed peculiar glory on this period of Athenian hiſtory, not only by the powers of genius which they diſplayed, but by the noble purpoſes to which they were directed. But the arts of deſign form ſo important a ſubject, that they merit to be examined apart, in the following chapter.

[80] Euripid. in Hippolyt.

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Hiſtory of the Arts of Deſign.—Superiority of the Greeks in thoſe Arts.—Cauſes of that Superiority—Among the Aſiatic Greeks—Who communicated their Inventions to Europe.—Bathycles the Magneſian—Dipenus and Scillis—Imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily.—The Athenians ſurpaſs their Maſters.—Sublime Style of Art.—Works of Phidias, Polygnotus, &c.—Characteriſtic Excellence of Grecian Art.—Different Impreſſions made by Painters and Poets—Depended on the Nature of their reſpective Arts.

CHAP. XIV. History of the arts of deſign.

THAT the hiſtory of arts has been leſs cultivated than that of arms and politics, is a general and juſt complaint, to which writers will ſeldom be inclined to pay regard, becauſe they will always find it an eaſier taſk to relate wars and negociations, debates and battles, than to deſcribe the gradual and almoſt imperceptible progreſs of genius and taſte, in works of elegance and beauty.

The origin of the imitative [1] arts (ſo congenial is imitation to man) reaches beyond the limits of

[1] Concerning the arts of the Greeks, the moſt copious materials are furniſhed by Pauſanias throughout; and by the 34th and 35th books of Pliny. The beſt modern guides are Winckelman and Leſſing in German, and Caylus in French. Many important errors of Winckelman are detected by the learned profeſſor Heine, in his Antiquariſhe Abhandlungen.

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profane hiſtory; and to diſpute who were their inventors, is only to examine what nation is the moſt ancient. In this reſpect, the Egyptians and Phœnicians merit, doubtleſs, the pre-eminence. From the earlieſt ages of Heathen antiquity, both theſe nations ſeem to have cultivated the arts of deſign. In the remoteſt periods of their hiſtory, the Egyptians engraved on precious ſtones, and ſtrove to render their public tranſactions immortal, by recording them in hieroglyphics, on the hardeſt bazaltes; nor can we ſufficiently admire the perfection to which the patience of that laborious people had carried the mechanical part of ſculpture, before the Perſian conqueſt, and the reign of Cambyſes. But beauty, the eſſence and the end of art, was never ſtudied by the natives of either Phœnicia or Egypt, who faithfully copied their national features, without attempting to improve them; until the traces of Grecian conqueſt and colonization appeared in the medals of the Ptolemies, particularly thoſe with the head of Jupiter Ammon.

Superiority of the Greeks in thoſe arts.

Allowance, doubtleſs, muſt be made for the prejudices of national vanity, when Euripides, Ariſtotle, and Epicurus, endeavour to perſuade us, that the clear ſkies and happy temperature of Greece engendered a peculiar aptitude for arts, letters, and philoſophy. The teſtimony, however, of modern travellers confirms the evidence of antiquity, that the ſhores and iſlands of the Archipelago produce more elegant and liberal forms, and features more animated and expreſſive, with fewer individual imperfections, and more of general

nature,

nature, than can be found in any other divisions of the world[2]. Yet whatever the Greeks owed to their skies and climate, they were probably not less indebted to their active laborious education and way of life, and to the manly spirit of their religious, civil, and military institutions. Long before the invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian sculpture was distinguished by an air of majesty peculiar to itself[3]; and the awful images of the gods, as yet rudely finished, displayed a grandeur and sublimity of expression, that delighted and astonished the best judges, in the most refined ages of art[4].

Causes of that superiority,

This singularity might be expected from the description already given of the religion and manners of Greece, and from the inimitable excellence of its poets. The divinities of Greece being imagined of the human form, though incomparably more noble and perfect, artists would naturally begin, at a very early period[5], to exalt and generalise their conceptions. The bold enthusiasm of poetry served to elevate and support their flight, and the native country of Homer was the first scene of their success, the happy climate of Ionia rendering frequent and *natural*, in that delightful region,

2 Belon. Observat. l. ii. 34.

3 Pausan. Corinth. l. ii. 34.

4 Plato & Aristot. passim.

5 We omit the fabulous accounts of Dedalus the Athenian, who is said to have flourished in the time of Hercules and Theseus, and forty years before the Trojan war. It has been already proved that, during the heroic ages, the Greeks paid no adoration to statues. Athenian writers, who lived a thousand years after that period, might easily confound the supposed works of the ancient Dedalus with those of Dedalus of Sicyon, especially since the error was extremely flattering to their national vanity.

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those beautiful and lovely forms which are elsewhere merely *ideal*, while other circumstances concurred to accelerate the progress of invention and genius in that highly-favoured country.

among the Asiatic Greeks;

In the eighth century before the Christian æra, the Asiatic colonies, as we already had occasion to explain, far surpassed their mother-country in splendour and prosperity. For this pre-eminence, they were indebted to the superior fertility of their soil, the number and convenience of their harbours, the advantages of their situation and climate, the vicinity of the most wealthy and refined nations in Asia; above all, to their persevering diligence and ingenuity, by which they not only improved and ennobled the arts derived from the Lydians and Phrygians, but invented others long peculiar to themselves, particularly painting, sculpture in marble, together with the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture.

who communicated their inventions to Europe.

In the seventh century before Christ, the magnificent presents which the far-famed oracle of Apollo received from the superstition or vanity of the Lydian kings, were the productions, not of Egyptian or Phœnician, but of Ionian artists; and, during both that and the following century, the Ionians diffused the elegant inventions of their country through the dominions of their ancestors in Europe. Alarmed by the inroads of the Cimmerians, and disturbed by the continual hostility of Lydia, many Eastern artists sought refuge in the commercial cities of Ægina, Sicyon, and Corinth, where the peaceful spirit of the inhabitants, com-

paratively

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paratively wealthy and luxurious, afforded the Ionian artiſts both encouragement and ſecurity.

Bathycles, the Magneſian.

The Aſiatic fugitives, however, did not confine themſelves to theſe ſecondary republics. Bathycles, a native of Ionian Magneſia, a place early celebrated for painting [6], fixed his abode in Sparta, the moſt conſiderable community in Greece. By order of the magiſtrates of that illuſtrious republic, he made the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, the ſtatue of Diana Leucophryné, the figures of the Graces and Horæ, and all the other gifts and ornaments incloſed within the conſecrated ground ſurrounding the temple of Amyclæ. The ſtatue of Apollo, thirty cubits high, ſeemed to be the work of an ignorant ſculptor, and probably was the production of a far earlier age than that of Bathycles. But whoever conſiders the coloſſean bulk of the principal figure, the baſe of which was formed into an altar, containing the tomb of Hyacinth, muſt admire the proportional magnitude of his throne, both ſides of which were adorned with ſculpture [7]. Among theſe ornaments, many ſubjects of hiſtory

The throne of Amyclæan Apollo.

6 Plin. l. xxxv. I call it Ionian Magneſia, to diſtinguiſh it from other places of the ſame name. Vid. Plin. edit. Berolin. tom. i. p. 167. & tom. iii. p. 136. 139. & 255.

7 Winkelmann, who ſcarcely mentions the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, though undoubtedly the greateſt ancient monument in Greece, confounds Bathycles the Magneſian, with a later artiſt of the ſame name, who made the celebrated cup which the ſeven ſages modeſtly ſent one to the other, as moſt worthy of ſuch a preſent, and which was finally conſecrated to Delphian Apollo. Diogenes Laertius, ſpeaking on this ſubject, ſays, Βαθυκλεα τινα Αρκαδα; and that he was an Arcadian appears alſo from Plut. in Solon. & Caſaubon, ad Athenæum, l. xi. 4.

 or

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or fable are mentioned by Paufanias, which bear no known relation to Apollo or Hyacinth, to Bathycles or the Spartans; but the top of the throne contained a chorus of Magnefians, fuppofed to reprefent the artifts who affifted in the execution of this ftupendous work. The altar reprefented a celeftial group, Minerva, Venus, Diana, and feveral other divinities, conveying Hyacinth to the fkies. Its fides were adorned with the combat of Tyndareus and Eurytus; the exploits of Caftor and Pollux; and the extraordinary fcene between Menelaus and the Egyptian Proteus, as defcribed in the Odyffey[8]. Nor was this the only fubject copied from the divine bard. It was eafy to diftinguifh his favourite Demodocus finging among a chorus of Phæatians; a circumftance confirming our obfervations in a former part of this work, that the poems of Homer were generally known in Sparta long before they had been collected by the Athenian tyrant Pififtratus.

Dipenus and Scillis.

Almoft fix centuries before the Chriftian æra, the Cretans, Dipenus and Scillis, adorned many Grecian cities in Europe as well as in Afia; and about fifty years afterward, the Chians, Bupalus and Anthermus, diffufed over Greece thofe precious works in Parian marble, which were highly admired in the age of Auguftus[9]. About the fame time, Polydorus of Samos, who feems to have been much employed by Crœfus, the laft king of Lydia, made the famous ring for the

[8] Paufan. Lacon. p. 196, & feqq.
[9] Vid. Plin. l. xxxvi. § 4.

Samian

Samian tyrant Polycrates, which is extolled by Pliny[10] as a master-piece of art.

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Their works imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily.

The productions of those Eastern artists were imitated with successful emulation by their disciples in ancient Greece, and likewise by the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; as sufficiently appears from the medals of those last-mentioned countries. These more durable monuments, however, can afford but an imperfect idea of the innumerable statues which were formed of tuf or gravel stone[11], and of various kinds of wood. The most esteemed were made of ivory, which, like the teeth of other animals, calcines under ground; an unfortunate circumstance for the arts, since, before the invasion of Xerxes, Greece could boast an hundred ivory statues of the gods, all of a colossean magnitude, and many of them covered with gold[12]. The white marbles of Paros, together with those of Cyprus and Ægina, furnished the chief materials for sculpture, before the Athenians opened the hard sparkling veins of mount Pentelicus. Ebony, cypress, and other materials, were gradually brought into use, in consequence of the more general diffusion of the art, which was destined not only to represent gods and heroes, but to commemorate the useful merit of illustrious citizens[13]. At the four sacred festivals common to the Grecian name, the victors in the gymnastic exercises, as well as in the musical and poetical entertainments, were frequently distinguished by the honour of a statue. The scenes of

[10] L. xxxvii. § 4.
[11] Plut. in Vit. Andoc.
[12] Pausanias.
[13] Lucian. Imagin.

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those admired solemnities thus became the principal repositories of sculpture; and the cities of Delphi and Olympia, in particular, long surpassed the rest of Greece in the number and value of their statues, as well as in the splendour and magnificence of all their other ornaments [14].

The Athenians surpass their masters.

But the time approached when those cities themselves were to be eclipsed by the lustre of Athens, which, in the course of forty years, became the seat not only of opulence, power, and politics, but of literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, and thenceforth continued to be regarded as the sovereign of Greece, rather than as the capital of the narrow and unfruitful territory of Attica. During that memorable period, the Athenians, whose circumstances had hitherto proved little favourable to the progress of taste and elegance, acquired unrivalled power and renown. Having disgraced the arms, they plundered the wealth of Persia. Their valour gave them possession of those maritime provinces of Lower Asia, which were justly regarded as the cradle of the arts. Their magnanimity and firmness commanded respect abroad, and ensured pre-eminence in Greece; while, by a rare felicity, their republic, amidst this uninterrupted flow of external prosperity, produced men capable to improve the gifts of valour or fortune to the solid and permanent glory of their country.

Athenian artists,

It is difficult to determine whether the discerning encouragement of Pericles was more useful in

14 Pausanias Phocic. and Eliac.

ani-

animating the induſtry of Phidias, or the genius of Phidias in ſeconding the views of his illuſtrious protector. Their congenial minds ſeemed as happily formed for each other, as both were admirably adapted to the flouriſhing circumſtances of their country. In the language of Plutarch[15], this great *miniſter*, whoſe virtues gradually rendered him the *maſter* of the republic, found Athens well furniſhed with marble, braſs, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypreſs, together with all the other materials fitted to adorn a city, which, having raiſed to the glory of empire, he wiſhed likewiſe to render the model of elegance. According to the popular principles which he profeſſed, he deemed it the duty of a ſtateſman to provide not merely for the army, the navy, the judges, and others immediately employed in the public ſervice; the great body of the people he regarded as the conſtant and moſt important object of his miniſterial care. The immenſe revenues of the ſtate, which had hitherto been chiefly ſquandered in ſhows and feſtivals, in gaudy oſtentation and periſhing luxury, he directed to objects more ſolid and durable, which, while they embelliſhed the city, might exerciſe the induſtry and diſplay the talents of the citizens. Guided by ſuch motives, he boldly opened the treaſury, and expended about four thouſand talents; a ſum which then might command as much labour as ſix or ſeven millions ſterling in the preſent age. By this liberal encouragement, he animated every art, excited every hand,

conſpire with the views of Pericles.

15 Plut. in Pericle.

CHAP. XIV. enlivened every exertion, and called forth into the public ſervice the whole dexterity, ſkill, and genius of his countrymen; while the motives of gain or glory which he propoſed, allured from all quarters the moſt ingenious ſtrangers, who readily tranſported their talents to Athens, as to the beſt market, and moſt conſpicuous theatre.

Sublime ſtyle of art,

But it was the peculiar felicity of Pericles, to find Athens provided not only in all the materials of art, but in artiſts capable of employing them to the beſt advantage. In the inaccurate, but often expreſſive, language of Pliny, ſculpture and painting then firſt aroſe, under the plaſtic hands of Phidias and his brother Panænus. Both arts, however, are known to have flouriſhed at an earlier period; but in the age of Pericles, they aſſumed more elevation and majeſty. The inventive genius of man tried a new and nobler flight. The ſuperiority of Phidias and his contemporaries obſcured, and almoſt obliterated, the memory of their predeceſſors, and produced that ſublime ſtyle of art, which, having flouriſhed about an hundred and fifty years, decayed with the glory of Greece, and diſappeared ſoon after the reign of Alexander.

compared with that preceding it.

It appears from the gems and medals, and the few remains in marble, preceding the age of Pericles, that the mechanical part of engraving and ſculpture had already attained a high degree of perfection. In many of thoſe works, the minuteſt ornaments are finiſhed with care, the muſcles are boldly pronounced, the outline is faithful; but the deſign has more hardneſs than energy, the attitudes are

are too conſtrained to be graceful, and the ſtrength of the expreſſion diſtorts, and for the moſt part deſtroys, beauty. The ſculptors Phidias, Polycletus, Scopas, Alcamenes, and Myron, together with the contemporary painters, Panænus, Zeuxis, and Parrhaſius, ſoftened the aſperities of their predeceſſors [16], rendered their contours more natural and flowing, and by employing greater addreſs to conceal the mechaniſm of their art, diſplayed ſuperior ſkill to the judgment, and afforded higher delight to the fancy, in proportion as leſs care and labour appeared viſible to the eye. In the works of thoſe admired artiſts, the expreſſion was ſkilfully diffuſed through every part, without diſturbing the harmony of the whole. Pain and ſorrow were rather concentrated in the ſoul than diſplayed on the countenance; and even the more turbulent paſſions of indignation, anger, and reſentment, were ſo tempered and ennobled, that the indications of them became conſiſtent with the ſublimeſt grace and beauty. But the triumph of art conſiſted in repreſenting and recommending the ſocial affections; for, ſetting aſide the unwarranted aſſertions of Pliny, in his pretended epochs of painting, it appears from much higher authority, that as early as the age of Socrates, painters had diſcerned and attained that admired excellence of ſtyle, which has been called in modern times the manner of Raphael; and had learned to expreſs, by the outward air, attitude, and features, whatever (in the words of

16 Plut. in Pericl. & Quintilian, l. xii. c. x. p. 578.

Xeno-

CHAP. XIV. Xenophon[17]) is moſt engaging, affectionate, ſweet, attractive, and amiable, in the inward ſentiments and character. Of theſe Grecian paintings, indeed, which were chiefly on wood, and other periſhing materials, no veſtige remains; but the ſtatuary of that celebrated age, while it diſplays its own excellence, is ſufficient to redeem from oblivion (as far at leaſt as invention, expreſſion, and ideal beauty, are concerned) the obliterated charms of the ſiſter art.

The works of Phidias. Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. A.C. 445.

In ſtatuary, the ſuperior merit of Phidias was acknowledged by the unanimous admiration of independent and rival communities. Intruſted by Pericles with the ſuperintendence of the public works, his own hands added to them their laſt and moſt valuable ornaments. Before he was called to this honourable employment, his ſtatues had adorned the moſt celebrated temples of Greece. His Olympian Jupiter we had already occaſion to deſcribe. In the awful temple of Delphi, ſtrangers admired his bronze ſtatues of Apollo and Diana. He likewiſe made for the Delphians a groupe of twelve Grecian heroes, ſurrounding a figure of braſs, that repreſented the Trojan horſe. His admired ſtatue of the goddeſs Nemeſis, or Vengeance, was formed from a block of marble, which the vain confidence of the Perſians tranſported to Marathon for a trophy of victory, but which their diſgraceful and precipitate flight left for a monument of their cowardice on the Marathonian ſhore. The grateful piety of Greece adored his Venus Urania, and Parthenopean Apollo. His three Minervas were reſpec-

17 See the converſation of Socrates with the painter Parrhaſius, in Memorab. l. iii.

respectively made for the Pallenians, Platæans, and Lemnians, and all three presented by those tributary states to their Athenian protectors and sovereigns. These inimitable works silenced the voice of envy. The most distinguished artists of Greece, sculptors, painters, and architects, were ambitious to receive the directions, and to second the labours, of Phidias, which were uninterruptedly employed, during fifteen years, in the embellishment of his native city.

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A. C. 455 —430.

The Odeum, Parthenon, and Propylæa.

During that short period he completed the Odeum, or theatre of music; the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva; the Propylæa or vestibule, and porticoes belonging to the citadel, together with the sculptured and picturesque ornaments of these and other immortal works; which, when new (as Plutarch finely observes), expressed the mellowed beauties of time and maturity, and when old, still preserved the fresh charms and alluring graces of novelty. The Parthenon, which still remains, attests the justice of this panegyric. It is two hundred and seventeen feet nine inches long, composed of beautiful white marble, and acknowledged by modern travellers[18] to be the noblest piece of antiquity existing in the world. It appears at first sight extraordinary, that the expence of two thousand talents should have been bestowed on the Propylæa[19]. But we must consider, that this extensive name comprehended the temple of Minerva, the treasury, and other public edifices.

18 Sir George Wheeler's Travels, &c.

19 Plutarch. in Pericle, & Demosth. p. 71.

The

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Works of Panænus, Polygnotus, and Micon.

The Pœcile, or diverſified portico, which was painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias, aſſiſted by Polygnotus and Micon, muſt have been a work of great time and expence. Its front and ceilings were of marble, like thoſe of all the other porticoes leading to the citadel, which ſtill remained in the time of Pauſanias, and were regarded, both on account of the workmanſhip and materials, as ſuperior to any thing extant. In the Pœcile, thoſe great painters, whoſe merit Pliny [20] forgets in his inaccurate epochs of art, had repreſented the moſt illuſtrious events of Grecian hiſtory; the victory of Theſeus over the Amazons, the ſacking of Troy, and particularly the recent exploits againſt the Perſians. In the battle of Marathon, the Athenian and Platæan heroes were drawn from the life, or more probably from the innumerable ſtatues which preſerved the faithful lineaments of thoſe illuſtrious patriots. The whole extent of the Acropolis, above ſix miles in circumference, was ſo diverſified by works of painting and ſtatuary, that it became one continued ſcene of elegance and beauty.

The Minerva in the Acropolis.

But all theſe ornaments were ſurpaſſed by one production of Phidias, which probably was the laſt of that great maſter: his admired ſtatue of Minerva, the erecting of which ſerved to conſecrate the Parthenon, was compoſed of gold and ivory, twenty-ſix cubits high, being of inferior dimenſions

[20] He places the firſt epoch of great painters in the 90th Olymp. A. C. 420.

to

to his Minerva Poliades of bronze, the ſpear and creſt of which was ſeen from the promontory of Sunium[21], at twenty-five miles diſtance. Parrhaſius had painted the ornaments of the latter[22], Phidias himſelf adorned every part of the former; and the compliment which, in this favourite work, he took an opportunity of paying to the merit of Pericles, occaſioned (as we ſhall have occaſion to explain[23]) his own baniſhment, a diſgrace which he ſeems not to have long ſurvived. Cicero, Plutarch, Pliny, and Pauſanias, had ſeen and admired this invaluable monument of piety, as well as genius, ſince the Minerva of Phidias increaſed the devotion of Athens towards her protecting divinity. It belongs only to thoſe who have ſeen and ſtudied, to deſcribe ſuch maſter-pieces of art; and as they exiſt no more, it will better ſuit the deſign of this hiſtory, to confine ourſelves to ſuch works as we ourſelves have ſeen, and which are generally acknowledged to bear the impreſſion of the Socratic age, when philoſophy gave law to painting and ſculpture, as well as to poetry and eloquence.

Characteriſtic excellence of Grecian art.

Were it allowed to make the melancholy ſuppoſition, that all the monuments of Grecian literature had periſhed in the general wreck of their nation and liberty, and that poſterity could collect nothing farther concerning that celebrated people, but what appeared from the Apollo Belvidere, the groupes of the Laocoon and Niobé, and other ſtatues, gems, or medals, now ſcattered over Italy and Europe,

21 Pauſanias Attic.
22 Idem, ibid.
23 Plutarch. in Pericl. & Thucydid. l. ii.

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Europe, what opinion would mankind form of the genius and character of the Greeks? would it correſpond with the impreſſions made by their poets, orators, and hiſtorians? which impreſſion would be moſt favourable? and what would be the preciſe difference between them? The ſolution of theſe queſtions will throw much light on the preſent ſubject.

Circumſtances in which it agreed with poetry and eloquence.

The firſt obſervation that occurs on the moſt ſuperficial, and that is ſtrongly confirmed by a more attentive, ſurvey of the ancient marbles, is, that their authors perfectly underſtood proportion, anatomy, the art of clothing, without concealing the naked figure, and whatever contributes to the juſtneſs and truth of deſign. The exact knowledge of form is as neceſſary to the painter or ſtatuary, whoſe buſineſs it is to repreſent *bodies*, as that of language to the poet or hiſtorian, who undertakes to deſcribe *actions*. In this particular, it would be unneceſſary to inſtitute a compariſon between Grecian writers and artiſts, ſince they are both allowed as perfect in their reſpective kinds as the condition of humanity renders poſſible.

The expreſſion of paſſions, ſentiments and character, in the works of poets and orators;

But when we advance a ſtep farther, and conſider the expreſſion of paſſions, ſentiments, and character, we find an extraordinary difference, or rather contrariety. Homer, Sophocles, and Demoſthenes, are not only the moſt original, but the moſt animated and glowing, of all writers. Every ſentence is energetic; all the parts are in motion; the paſſions are deſcribed in their utmoſt fury, and expreſſed by the boldeſt words and geſtures. To

keep

keep to the tragic poet, whoſe art approaches the nearest to painting and ſculpture, the heroes, and even the gods of Sophocles, frequently diſplay the impetuoſity of the moſt ungoverned natures; and, what is ſtill more extraordinary, ſometimes betray a momentary weakneſs, extremely inconſiſtent with their general character. The rocks of Lemnos reſound with the cries of Philoctetes; Oedipus, yielding to deſpair, plucks out his eyes; even Hercules, the model of fortitude, ſinks under the impreſſions of pain or ſorrow.

Nothing can be more oppoſite to the conduct of Grecian artiſts. *They* likewiſe have repreſented Philoctetes; but, inſtead of effeminate tears and lamentations, have given him the patient concentrated woe of a ſuffering hero. The furious Ajax of Timomachus was painted, not in the moment when he deſtroyed the harmleſs ſheep inſtead of the hoſtile Greeks, but after he had committed this mad deed, and when his rage having ſubſided, he remained, like the ſea after a ſtorm, ſurrounded with the ſcattered fragments of mangled carcaſes, and reflecting with the ſilent anguiſh of deſpair on his uſeleſs and frantic brutality. The revenge of Medea againſt her huſband was not repreſented, as in Euripides, butchering her innocent children, but while ſhe was ſtill wavering and irreſolute, agitated between reſentment and pity. Even Clytemneſtra, whoſe unnatural, intrepid cruelty, poets and hiſtorians had ſo indignantly deſcribed and arraigned, was not deemed a proper ſubject for the pencil, when embruing her hands in the blood of

in thoſe of painters and ſtatuaries.

Aga-

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Agamemnon. And although this may be referred to a rule of Ariſtotle, "that the characters of women ſhould not be repreſented as too daring or deciſive;" yet we ſhall find on examination that it reſults from principles of nature, whoſe authority is ſtill more univerſal and indiſpenſable. The conſideration of the Apollo, Niobé, and Laocoon, whoſe copies have been infinitely multiplied, and are familiarly known, will ſet this matter in the cleareſt point of view.

illuſtrated by the Apollo Belvidere;

The Apollo Belvidere is univerſally felt and acknowledged to be the ſublimeſt figure that either ſkill can execute, or imagination conceive. That favourite divinity, whom ancient poets ſeem peculiarly fond of deſcribing in the warmeſt colours [24], is repreſented in the attitude of darting the fatal arrow againſt the ſerpent Pytho, or the giant Tityus. Animated by the nobleſt conception of heavenly powers, the artiſt has far outſtepped the perfections of humanity, and (if we may ſpeak without irreverence) made the corrupt put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality. His ſtature is above the human, his attitude majeſtic; the Elyſian ſpring of youth ſoftens the manly graces of his perſon, and the bold ſtructure of his limbs. Diſdain ſits on his lips, and indignation ſwells his noſtrils; but an unalterable ſerenity inveſts his front, and the ſublime elevation of his aſpect aſpires at deeds of renown ſtill ſurpaſſing the preſent object of his victory.

24 Horace, b. iii. ode 4. ver. 60.

The

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The irascible passions are not represented with more dignity in the Apollo, than are those of fear, terror, and consternation, in the Niobé. This group contained Niobé and her husband Amphion, with seven sons, and as many daughters. Their melancholy story, which is too well known[25] to be related here, required the deepest expression; and the genius of the artist has chosen the only moment when this expression could be rendered consistent with the highest beauty; a beauty not flattering the senses by images of pleasure, but transporting the fancy into regions of purity and virtue. The excess and suddenness of their disaster, occasioned a degree of amazement and horror, which, suspending the faculties, involved them in that silence and insensibility, which neither breaks out in lamentable shrieks, nor distorts the countenance, but which leaves full play to the artist's skill to represent motion without disorder, or, in other words, to render expression graceful.

by the group of Niobé;

The Laocoon may be regarded as the triumph of Grecian sculpture; since bodily pain, the grossest and most ungovernable of all our passions, and that pain united with anguish and torture of mind, are yet expressed with such propriety and dignity, as afford lessons of fortitude superior to any taught in the schools of philosophy. The horrible shriek which Virgil's Laocoon[26] emits, is a proper circumstance for poetry, which speaks to the fancy

and by that of the Laocoon.

25 Ovid. Metamorph. l. vi. ver. 146, & seqq.

26 Æneid, l. ii. ver. 222.

by

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by images and ideas borrowed from all the ſenſes, and has a thouſand ways of ennobling its object; but the expreſſion of this ſhriek would have totally degraded the ſtatue. It is ſoftened, therefore, into a patient ſigh, with eyes turned to heaven in ſearch of relief. The intolerable agony of ſuffering nature is repreſented in the lower part, and particularly in the extremities, of the body; but the manly breaſt ſtruggles againſt calamity. The contention is ſtill more plainly perceived in his furrowed forehead; and his languiſhing paternal eye demands aſſiſtance, leſs for himſelf, than for his miſerable children, who look up to him for help.

Different impreſſion made by the ſame objects, as exhibited by poets and painters,

If ſubjects of this nature are expreſſed without appearing hideous, ſhocking, or diſguſtful, we may well ſuppoſe that more temperate paſſions are repreſented with the greateſt moderation and dignity. The remark is juſtified by examining the remains or imitations of Grecian art; and were we to deduce from theſe alone the character of the nation, it would ſeem at firſt ſight, that the contemporaries of Pericles muſt have been a very ſuperior people in point of fortitude, ſelf-command, and every branch of practical philoſophy, to the Athenians who are deſcribed by poets and hiſtorians.

founded in the different nature of their reſpective arts.

But when we conſider the matter more deeply, we ſhall find that it is the buſineſs of hiſtory to deſcribe men as they are; of poetry and painting, to repreſent them as may afford moſt pleaſure and inſtruction to the reader or ſpectator. The aim of theſe imitative arts is the ſame, but they differ widely in the mode, the object, and extent, of

their

their imitation. The poet who defcribes *actions* in *time*, may carry the reader through all the gradations of paffion, and difplay his genius moft powerfully in its moft furious excefs. But the painter or ftatuary, who reprefents *bodies* in *space*, is confined to one moment, and muft choofe that which leaves the freeft play to the imagination. This can feldom be the higheft pitch of paffion, which leaves nothing beyond it; and in contemplating which, the fympathy of the fpectator, after his firft furprife fubfides, can only defcend into indifference. Every violent fituation, moreover, is felt not to be lafting; and all extreme perturbation is inconfiftent with beauty, without which no vifible object can long attract or pleafe [27]. CHAP. XIV.

27 This fubject is admirably treated in Lefling's Laocoon, in which he traces the *bounds* of painting and poetry; a work which, it is much to be regretted, that great genius did not finifh.

CHAP. XV.

Causes of the Peloponnesian War.—Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra.—Sea Fights.—Insolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans.—They provoke the Resentment of the Peloponnesians—Obtain the Protection of Athens—Are defeated by the Corinthians—Who dread the Resentment of Athens.—Their Scheme for rendering it impotent.—Description of the Macedonian Coast.—It revolts from Athens.—Siege of Potidæa.—General Confederacy against Athens.—Peloponnesian Embassy.—Its Demands firmly answered by Pericles.—His Speech to the Athenians.—The Thebans surprise Platæa.—Preparations for War on both Sides.—Invasion of Attica.—Operations of the Athenian Fleet.—Plague in Athens.—Calamitous Situation of that Republic.—Magnanimity of Pericles.—Firmness of his last Advice.—His Death and Character.

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Pericles summons to Athens deputies from all the Grecian republics.

BY the lustre of the elegant arts, the magnificence of Pericles had displayed and ennobled the military glory of his country; and the pre-eminence of Athens seemed immoveably established on the solid foundation of internal strength, adorned by external splendour. But this abundant measure of prosperity satisfied neither the active ambition of the republic, nor the enterprising genius of its

its minister. The Greeks beheld and admired, but had not yet formally acknowledged, the full extent of Athenian greatness. In order to extort this reluctant confession, than which nothing could more firmly secure to him the affectionate gratitude of his fellow-citizens, Pericles dispatched ambassadors to the republics and colonies in Europe and in Asia, requiring the presence of their deputies in Athens, to concert measures for rebuilding their ruined temples, and for performing the solemn vows and sacrifices promised, with devout thankfulness, to the immortal gods, who had wonderfully protected the Grecian arms, during their long and dangerous conflict with the Persian empire. This proposal, which tended to render Athens the common centre of deliberation and of union, was readily accepted in such foreign parts as had already submitted to the authority of that republic. But in neighbouring states, the ambassadors of Pericles were received coldly, and treated disrespectfully; in most assemblies of the Peloponnesus they were heard with secret disgust, and the pride of the Spartan senate openly derided the insolence of their demands. When, at their return home, they explained the behaviour of the Spartans, Pericles exclaimed, in his bold style of eloquence, that he "beheld war advancing with wide and rapid steps from the Peloponnesus[1]."

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Such was the preparation of materials which the smallest spark might throw into combustion. But

Introduction to the history of

[1] Plut. in Pericle.

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the Peloponnesian war.

before we relate the events which immediately occasioned the memorable war of twenty-seven years, it is impossible (if the calamities of our own times have taught us to compassionate the miserable) not to drop a tear over the continual disasters which so long and so cruelly afflicted the most valuable and enlightened portion of mankind, and whose immortal genius was destined to enlighten the remotest ages of the world. When rude, illiterate peasants are summoned to mutual hostility, and, unaffected by personal motives of interest or honour, expend their strength and blood to gratify the sordid ambition of their respective tyrants, we may lament the general stupidity and wretchedness of human nature; but we cannot heartily sympathise with men who have so little sensibility, nor very deeply and feelingly regret, that those should suffer pain, who seem both unwilling and incapable to relish pleasure. Their heavy unmeaning aspect, their barbarous language, and more barbarous manners, together with their total indifference to the objects and pursuits which form the dignity and glory of man; these circumstances, interrupting the ordinary course of our sentiments, divert or repel the natural current of sympathy. Their victories or defeats are contemplated without emotion, coldly related, and read without interest or concern. But the war of Peloponnesus presents a different spectacle. The adverse parties took arms, not to support the unjust pretensions of a tyrant, whom they had reason to hate or to despise, but to vindicate their civil rights, and to maintain their political

cal independence. The meanest Grecian soldier knew the duties of the citizen, the magistrate, and the general [2]. His life had been equally divided between the most agreeable amusements of leisure, and the most honourable employments of activity. Trained to those exercises and accomplishments which give strength and agility to the limbs, beauty to the shape, and grace to the motions, the dignity of his external appearance announced the liberal greatness of his mind; and his language, the most harmonious and expressive ever spoken by man, comprehended all that variety of conception, and all those shades of sentiment, that characterise the most exalted perfection of human manners.

Magnitude and importance of the subject.

Ennobled by such actors, the scene itself was highly important, involving not only the states of Greece, but the greatest of the neighbouring kingdoms; and, together with the extent of a foreign war, exhibiting the intenseness of domestic sedition. As it exceeded the ordinary duration of human power or resentment, it was accompanied with unusual circumstances of terror, which, to the pious credulity of an unfortunate age, naturally announced the wrath of heaven, justly provoked by human cruelty. While pestilence and famine multiplied the actual sufferings, eclipses and earthquakes increased the consternation and horror of

[2] Such is the testimony uniformly given of them in the panegyric of Athens by Isocrates, and confirmed by the more impartial authority of Xenophon, in the expedition of Cyrus. Their exploits in that wonderful enterprise justify the highest praise; and yet the national character had rather degenerated than improved, in the long interval between the periods alluded to.

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that lamentable period[3]. Several warlike communities were expelled from their hereditary possessions; others were not only driven from Greece, but utterly extirpated from the earth; some fell a prey to party-rage, others to the vengeance of foreign enemies; some were slowly exhausted by the contagion of a malignant atmosphere, others overwhelmed at once by sudden violence; while the combined weight of calamity assailed the power of Athens, and precipitated the downfal of that republic from the pride of prosperous dominion, to the dejection of dependence and misery[4].

Rupture between Corinth and its colony Corcyra. Olymp. lxxxv. 2. A.C. 439.

The general, but latent hostility of the Greeks, of which we have already explained the cause, was first called into action by a rupture between the ancient republic of Corinth, and its flourishing colony Corcyra. The haughty disdain of Corcyra, elated with the pride of wealth and naval greatness, had long denied and scorned those marks of defer-

3 Thucydid. l. i. p. 16, & seqq.

4 For the Peloponnesian war we have not, indeed, a full stream of history, but a regular series of annals in Thucydides and Xenophon; authors, of whom each might say,

Quæque ipse miserrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui:——

Many material circumstances may likewise be learned from the Greek orators, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, the comedies of Aristophanes, the twelfth and two following books of Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch's Lives of Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lysander, and Agesilaus. It is remarkable, that the heavy compiler, as well as the lively biographer, have both followed the long lost works of Ephorus and Theopompus, in preference to those of Thucydides and Xenophon; a circumstance which strongly marks their want of judgment, but which renders their information more interesting to posterity.

ence and reſpect which the uniform practice of Greece exacted from colonies towards their mother-country. At the Olympic and other ſolemn feſtivals, they yielded not the place of honour to the Corinthians; they appointed not a Corinthian high-prieſt to preſide over their religion; and when they eſtabliſhed new ſettlements on diſtant coaſts, they requeſted not, as uſual with the Greeks, the auſpicious guidance of a Corinthian conductor[5].

The Corinthians protect Epidamnus.

While the ancient metropolis, incenſed by thoſe inſtances of contempt, longed for an opportunity to puniſh them, the citizens of Epidamnus, the moſt conſiderable ſea-port on the coaſt of the Hadriatic, craved aſſiſtance at Corinth againſt the barbarous incurſions of the Taulantii, an Illyrian tribe, who, having united with a powerful band of Epidamnian exiles, greatly infeſted that territory, and threatened to ſtorm the city. As Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra, its diſtreſſed inhabitants had firſt ſought protection there; but although their petition was preferred with reſpectful deference, and urged with the moſt affecting demonſtrations of abaſement and calamity, by ambaſſadors who long remained under the melancholy garb of ſupplicants in the temple of Corcyrean Juno, the proud inſenſibility of theſe intractable iſlanders ſhewed not the ſmalleſt inclination to relieve them; partly reſtrained, it is probable, by the ſecret practices of the Epidamnian exiles, conſiſting of ſome

[5] Schol. in Thucydid. ad locum. He mentions the other circumſtances which I have melted into the text, and which will afterwards be confirmed by more claſſic authority.

of

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of the principal and richest families of that maritime republic. The Corinthians readily embraced the cause of a people abandoned by *their* natural protectors, and *their own* inveterate enemies; and immediately supplied Epidamnus with a considerable body of troops, less with a view to defend its walls against the assaults of the Taulantii, than in order irrecoverably to detach and alienate its inhabitants from the interest of Corcyra.

Are defeated at sea by the Corcyreans. Olymp. lxxxvi. 2. A.C. 435.

The indignation of the Corcyreans was inflamed into fury, when they understood that those whom they had long affected to consider as aliens and as rivals, had interfered in the affairs of their colony. They instantly launched a fleet of forty sail, proceeded in hostile array to the harbour of Epidamnus, summoned the inhabitants to re-admit their exiles, and to expel the foreign troops. With such unconditional and arbitrary demands, the weakest and most pusillanimous garrison could scarcely be supposed to comply. The Epidamnians rejected them with scorn; in consequence of which their city was invested and attacked with vigour, by land and sea. The Corinthians were now doubly solicitous, both to defend the place, and to protect the troops already thrown into it, consisting partly of their Leucadian and Ambracian allies, but chiefly of Corinthian citizens. A proclamation, first published at Corinth, was industriously disseminated through Greece, inviting all who were unhappy at home, or who courted glory abroad, to undertake an expedition to Epidamnus, with assurance of enjoying the immunities and honours

honours of a republic whose safety they had ventured to defend. Many exiles and military adventurers, at all times profusely scattered over Greece, obeyed the welcome summons. Public assistance, likewise, was obtained, not only from Thebes and Megara, but from several states of the Peloponnesus. In this manner the Corinthians were speedily enabled to fit out an armament of seventy-five sail; which, directing its course towards Epidamnus, anchored in the Ambracian gulph, near the friendly harbour of Actium, where, in a future age, Augustus and Antony decided the empire of the Roman world. Near this celebrated scene of action, the impetuous Corcyreans hastened to meet the enemy. Forty ships were employed in the siege of Epidamnus. Twice that number sailed towards the Ambracian gulph. The hostile armaments fought with equal animosity; but the Corcyreans far surpassed in bravery and skill. Fifteen Corinthian vessels were destroyed; the rest escaped in disorder, and the decisive battle was soon followed by the surrender of Epidamnus. By a clemency little expected from the victors, the ancient inhabitants of the place were allowed their lives and liberties; but the Corinthians were made prisoners of war, and their allies condemned to death.

Epidamnus surrenders to the conquerors.

The Corcyreans thanked their gods, and erected a conspicuous trophy of victory on the promontory Leucimné, whose lofty ridges overlooked the distant scene of the engagement. During the two following years they reigned undisturbed masters of the neighbouring seas; and though a prin-

Their insolence and cruelty, A. C. 434—433.

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principle of fear, or perhaps a faint remnant of respect towards their ancient metropolis, prevented them from invading the territory of Corinth, they determined to make the confederates of that republic feel the full weight of their vengeance. For this purpose they ravaged the coast of Apollonia; plundered the city Ambracia; almost desolated the peninsula, now the island of Leucas; and, emboldened by success, ventured to land in the Peloponnesus, and set fire to the harbour of Cyllene, because in the late sea-fight the Elians, to whom that place belonged, had supplied Corinth with a few gallies[6].

which provoke the Peloponnesians.

The southern states of Greece, highly provoked by this outrage to the peaceable Elians, whose religious character had long commanded general respect, were still farther incensed by the active resentment of the Corinthians, who, exasperated at the disgrace of being vanquished by one of their own colonies, had, ever since their defeat, bent their whole attention, and employed the greatest part even of their private fortunes, to hire mercenaries, to gain allies, and especially to equip a new fleet, that they might be enabled to chastise the impious audacity (as they called it) of their rebellious children[7].

The Corcyreans and Corinthians send ambassadors to Athens.

The magistrates of Corcyra saw and dreaded the tempest that threatened to burst on them, and which the unassisted strength of their island was totally unable to resist. They had not taken part

6 Thucydid. l. i. p. 22, & seqq. 7 Idem, ibid.

in

in the late wars; they had not acceded to the laſt treaty of peace; they could not ſummon the aid of a ſingle confederate. In this difficulty they ſent ambaſſadors to Athens, well knowing the ſecret animoſity between that republic and the enemies by whom their own ſafety was endangered. The Corinthians likewiſe ſent ambaſſadors to defeat their purpoſe. Both were allowed a hearing in the Athenian aſſembly; but firſt the Corcyreans, who, in a ſtudied oration, acknowledged, "that having no previous claim of merit to urge, they expected not ſucceſs in their negociation, unleſs an alliance between Athens and Corcyra ſhould appear alike advantageous to thoſe who propoſed, and to thoſe who accepted it. Of this the Athenians would immediately become ſenſible, if they reflected that the people of Peloponneſus being equally hoſtile to both (the open enemies of Corcyra, the ſecret and more dangerous enemies of Athens), their country muſt derive a vaſt acceſſion of ſtrength by receiving, without trouble or expence, a rich and warlike iſland, which, unaſſiſted and alone, had defeated a numerous confederacy; and whoſe naval force, augmenting the fleet of Athens, would for ever render that republic ſovereign of the ſeas. If the Corinthians complained of the injuſtice of receiving their colony, let them remember, that colonies are preſerved by moderation, and alienated by oppreſſion; that men ſettle in foreign parts to better their ſituation, not to ſubmit their liberties; to continue the equals, not to become the ſlaves of their leſs adventurous fellow-citizens. If they pretended,

Speech of the Corcyreans.

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pretended, that the demand of Corcyra was inconſiſtent with the laſt general treaty of peace, let the words of that treaty confound them, which expreſſly declare every Grecian city, not previouſly bound to follow the ſtandard of Athens or of Sparta, at full liberty to accede to the alliance of either of thoſe powers[8]. But it became the dignity of Athens to expect honour and ſafety, not from the punctilious obſervance of a ſlippery convention, but from the manly and prompt vigour of her councils. It ſuited the renowned wiſdom of a republic, which had ever anticipated her enemies, to prevent the fleet of Corcyra from falling a prey to that confederacy, with whoſe inveterate envy ſhe herſelf muſt be ſoon called to contend; and to merit the uſeful gratitude of an iſland poſſeſſing other valuable advantages, and moſt conveniently ſituate for intercepting the Sicilian and Italian ſupplies, which, in the approaching and inevitable war, would otherwiſe ſo powerfully aſſiſt their Doric anceſtors of Peloponneſus."

Speech of the Corinthians.

The Corinthians indirectly anſwered this diſcourſe by inveighing, with great bitterneſs, againſt the unexampled inſolence and unnatural cruelty of Corcyra: " That infamous iſland had hitherto declined connection with every Grecian ſtate, that ſhe might carry on her piratical depredations unobſerved, and alone enjoy the ſpoil of the unwary mariners who approached her inhoſpitable ſhores.

[8] Ειρηται γαρ εν αυταις, των Ελληνιδων πολιων ἡτις μηδαμε ξυμμαχει, εξειναι παρ᾽ ὁποτεροις αν αρεσκηται ελθειν. The ὁποτεροις juſtifies the paraphraſe in the text.

Rendered

Rendered at once wealthy and wicked by this inhuman practice, the Corcyreans had diveſted themſelves of all piety and gratitude towards their mother-country, and embrued their parricidal hands in their parent's blood. Their audacity having provoked a late vengeance, which they were unable to repel, they unſeaſonably ſought protection from Athens, deſiring thoſe who were not accomplices of their injuſtice to participate their danger, and deluding them through the vain terror of contingent evil, into certain and immediate calamity; for ſuch muſt every war be regarded, its event being always deſtructive, often fatal. The Corcyreans vainly chicaned as to *words*; Athens, it was clear, muſt violate the *ſenſe* and *ſpirit* of the laſt treaty of peace, if ſhe aſſiſted the enemies of any contracting power. Theſe fierce iſlanders acknowledged themſelves a colony of Corinth, but pretended that ſettlements abroad owe nothing to thoſe who eſtabliſhed them, to thoſe whoſe foſtering care reared their infancy, from whoſe blood they ſprung, by whoſe arms they have been defended. We affirm, on the contrary (and appeal to you, Athenians! who have planted ſo many colonies), that the mother-country is entitled to that authority which the Corcyreans have long ſpurned, to that reſpect which their inſolence now refuſes and diſdains: that it belongs to us, their metropolis, to be their leaders in war, their magiſtrates in peace; nor can you, Athenians! oppoſe our juſt pretenſions, and protect our rebellious colony, without ſetting an example moſt dangerous to yourſelves."

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The Athenians enter into a treaty of defence with the Corcyreans.

These sensible observations made a deep impression on the moderate portion of the assembly; but the speech of the Corcyreans was more congenial to the ambitious views of the republic, and the daring spirit of Pericles. He wished, however, to avoid the dishonour of manifestly violating the peace, and therefore advised his countrymen to conclude with Corcyra, not a general or complete alliance, but only a treaty of defence, which, in case of invasion, obliged the two states reciprocally to assist each other.

Second sea-fight between the Corinthians and Corcyreans. Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. A.C. 432.

This agreement was no sooner ratified than ten Athenian ships reinforced the fleet of Corcyra, stationed on the *eastern* coast of the island; because the Corinthians, with their numerous allies, already rendezvoused on the opposite shore of Epirus. The hostile armaments met in line of battle, near the small islands Sibota, which seem anciently to have been separated from the continent by the impetuosity of the deep and narrow sea between Epirus and Corcyra. The bold islanders, with an hundred and ten sail, furiously attacked the superior fleet of the Corinthians, which was divided into three squadrons; the Megareans and Ambracians on the right, the Elians and other allies in the centre, their own ships on the left, which composed the principal strength of their line. The narrowness of the strait, and the immense number of ships (far greater than had ever assembled in former battles between the Greeks), soon rendered it impossible, on either side, to display any superiority in sailing, or any address in manœuvre.

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nœuvre. The action was irregular and tumultuous, and maintained with more firmneſs and vigour than naval ſkill. The numerous troops, both heavy and light-armed, who were placed on the decks, advanced, engaged, grappled and fought with obſtinate valour; while the ſhips, continuing motionleſs and inactive, made the ſea-fight reſemble a pitched battle. At length, twenty Corcyrean gallies, having broke the left wing of the enemy, and purſued them to the coaſt of Epirus, injudiciouſly landed there to burn or plunder the Corinthian camp.

The Corcyreans defeated.

This ineſſential ſervice too much weakened the ſmaller fleet, and rendered the inequality deciſive. The Corcyreans were defeated with great ſlaughter, their incenſed adverſaries diſregarding plunder and priſoners, and only thirſting for blood and revenge. In the blindneſs of their rage they deſtroyed many of their fellow-citizens, who had been captured by the enemy in the beginning of the engagement. Nor was their loſs of ſhips inconſiderable; thirty were ſunk, and the reſt ſo much ſhattered, that when they endeavoured to purſue the feeble remains of the Corcyrean fleet, which had loſt ſeventy gallies, they were effectually prevented from executing this deſign by the ſmall Athenian ſquadron, which, according to its inſtructions from the republic, had taken no ſhare in the battle, but, agreeably to the recent treaty between Athens and Corcyra, hindered the total deſtruction of their allies, firſt by hoſtile threats, at length by actual reſiſtance.

 The

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Arrival of an Athenian ſquadron.

The Corinthians having dragged up their wreck, and recovered the bodies of their ſlain, refitted on the coaſt of Epirus, and haſtened to Corcyra; conſiderably off which they beheld the enemy reinforced, and drawn up in line of battle, in order to defend their coaſt. They advanced, however, with intrepidity, till, to their ſurpriſe and terror, they perceived an unknown fleet preſſing towards them. This new appearance ſhook their reſolution, and made them change their courſe. The Corcyreans, whoſe ſituation at firſt prevented them from ſeeing the advancing ſquadron, were aſtoniſhed at the ſudden retreat of the enemy; but when they diſcovered its cauſe, their uncertainty and fears, increaſed by their late afflicting calamity, made them prefer the ſafeſt meaſure. *They* alſo turned their prows; and, while the Corinthians retired to Epirus, preſſed in an oppoſite direction to Corcyra. There, to their inexpreſſible joy, not unmixed with ſhame, they were joined by the unknown fleet, conſiſting of twenty Athenian gallies; a reinforcement which enabled them, next morning, to brave the late victorious armament off the coaſt of Sibota, a deſerted harbour of Epirus, oppoſite to the ſmall iſlands of the ſame name.

The Corinthians remonſtrate againſt the proceedings of the Athenians.

The Corinthians, unwilling to contend with the unbroken vigour of their new opponents, diſpatched a brigantine with the following remonſtrance: "You act moſt unjuſtly, men of Athens! in breaking the peace, and commencing unprovoked hoſtilities. On what pretence do you hinder the Corinthians from taking vengeance on an inſolent foe?

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foe? If you are determined to persist in iniquity and cruelty, seize us who address you, and treat us as enemies." The words were scarcely ended when the Corcyreans exclaimed, with a loud and unanimous voice, "Seize, and kill them." But the Athenians answered with moderation: "Men of Corinth, we neither break the peace, nor act unjustly. We come to defend our allies of Corcyra: sail unmolested by us to whatever friendly port you deem most convenient; but if you purpose making a descent on Corcyra, or on any of the dependencies of that island, we will exert our utmost power to frustrate your attempt[9]."

Their answer.

This menace, which prevented immediate hostility, did not deter the Corinthians from surprising, as they sailed homeward, the town of Anactorium, on the Ambracian gulph, which, in the time of harmony between the colony and parent state, had been built at the joint expence of Corinth and Corcyra. From this sea-port they carried off two hundred and fifty Corcyrean citizens, and eight hundred slaves. The former, added to the captives saved during the fury of the sea-fight, by the clemency or the avarice of a few Corinthian captains, made the whole prisoners of war amount to twelve hundred and fifty; a capture which, as we shall have occasion to relate, produced most important and lamentable consequences on the future fortune of Corcyra.

The Corinthians surprise Anactorium, and take many Corcyrean prisoners.

The Corinthians, having chastised the insolence of their revolted colony, had reason to dread the ven-

Their scheme for defeating

9 Thucydid. p. 37.

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the vengeance of Athens. Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. A.C. 432.

vengeance of its powerful ally. Impreſſed with this terror, they laboured with great activity and with unuſual ſecrecy and addreſs, to find for the Athenian arms an employment ſtill more intereſting than the Corcyrean war. The domeſtic ſtrength of Athens defied aſſault; but a people who, on the baſis of a diminutive territory and ſcanty population, had reared ſuch an extenſive fabric of empire, might eaſily be wounded in their foreign dependencies, which, for obvious cauſes, were ever prone to novelty and rebellion.

Deſcription of the Macedonian coaſt.

The northern ſhores of the Ægean ſea, afterwards comprehended under the name of Macedon, and forming the moſt valuable portion of that kingdom, reluctantly acknowledged the ſtern authority of a ſovereign whom they obeyed and deteſted. This extenſive coaſt, of which the ſubſequent hiſtory will deſerve our attention, compoſed, next to the Ægean iſlands and colonies of Aſia, the principal foreign dominions of the Athenian republic. The whole country (naturally divided by the Thermaic and Strymonic gulphs into the provinces of Pieria, Chalcis, and Pangæus) ſtretched in a direct line only an hundred and fifty miles; but the winding intricacies of the coaſt, indented by two great, and by two ſmaller bays, extended three times that length; and almoſt every convenient ſituation was occupied by a Grecian ſea-port. But neither the extent of above four hundred miles, nor the extreme populouſneſs of the maritime parts, formed the chief importance of this valuable poſſeſſion. The middle diviſion, called the region of Chalcis, becauſe originally peopled

peopled by a city of that name in Eubœa, was equally fertile and delightful. The inland country, continually diverſified by lakes, rivers, and arms of the ſea, afforded an extreme facility of water carriage; Amphipolis, Acanthus, Potidæa, and many other towns, furniſhed conſiderable marts of commerce for the republics of Greece, as well as for the neighbouring kingdoms of Thrace and Macedon; and the conſtant demands of the merchant excited the patient induſtry of the huſbandman. This beautiful diſtrict had, on one ſide, the black mountains of Pangæus, and on the other, the green vales of Pieria. The former, extending ninety miles towards the eaſt and the river Neſſus, abounded neither in corn nor paſture, but produced variety of timber proper for building ſhips; and the ſouthern branches of the mountain contained rich veins of gold and ſilver, which were ſucceſſively wrought by the Thaſians and the Athenians, but of which the full value was firſt diſcovered by Philip of Macedon, who annually extracted from them the value of two hundred thouſand pounds ſterling[10]. The laſt and ſmalleſt diviſion, Pieria, extended fifty miles along the Thermaic gulph to the confines of Theſſaly and Mount Pindus. The towns of Pydna and Methoné enriched the ſhore with the benefits of arts and commerce. Nature had been peculiarly kind to the inland country, whoſe ſhady hills, ſequeſtered walks and fountains, lovely verdure, and tranquil ſolitude, rendered it, in the fanciful belief of antiquity, the favourite

[10] Diodorus, l xvi. p. 514.

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haunt of the Muſes; who borrowed from this diſtrict their favourite appellation of *Pierides*. According to the ſame poetical creed, theſe goddeſſes might well *envy* the mortal inhabitants, who led a paſtoral life, enjoyed happineſs, and are ſcarcely mentioned in hiſtory.

That country revolts from Athens.

Such was the nature and ſuch the diviſions of a territory, which the policy and reſentment of Corinth encouraged to ſucceſsful rebellion againſt the ſovereignty of Athens. Several maritime communities of the Chalcidicé[11] took refuge within the walls of Olynthus, a town which they had built and fortified, at the diſtance of five miles from the ſea, in a fertile and ſecure ſituation, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnius, which flow into the lake Bolyce, the inmoſt receſs of the Toronaic gulph. The neighbouring city of Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, and governed by annual magiſtrates ſent from the mother-country, yet like moſt eſtabliſhments in the Chalcidicé, a tributary confederate[12] of Athens, likewiſe ſtrengthened its walls, and prepared to revolt. But the Athenians anticipated this deſign, by ſending a fleet of thirty ſail, which having entered the harbour of Potidæa, com-

[11] In uſing the name of Chalcidicé I have followed the analogy of the Greek language rather than complied with cuſtom; yet that part of the Macedonian coaſt, uſually called the region of Chalcis, gave name to the province of Chalcidicé in Syria, as Strabo mentions in his ſixteenth book; wherein he explains how the principal diviſions of Syria, as well as Meſopotamia, came to be diſtinguiſhed, after the conqueſts of Alexander, by Grecian appellations, borrowed from the geography deſcribed in the text.

[12] Συμμαχος ὑποτελης. Thucydid.

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manded the citizens to demolifh their fortifications, to give hoftages as fecurity for their good behaviour, and to difmifs the Corinthian magiftrates. The Potidæans artfully requefted that the execution of thefe fevere commands might be fufpended until they had time to fend ambaffadors to Athens, and to remove the unjuft fufpicions of their fidelity.

The Athenians befiege Potidæa. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 432.

The weaknefs or avarice of Ancheftratus, the Athenian admiral, liftened to this deceitful requeft, and, leaving the coaft of Potidæa, directed the operations of his fquadron againft places of lefs importance, not fparing the dependencies of Macedon. Meanwhile the Potidæans fent a public but illufive embaffy to Athens, while one more effectual was fecretly difpatched to Corinth, and other cities of the Peloponnefus, from which they were fupplied with two thoufand men, commanded by the Corinthian Arifteus, a brave and enterprifing general. Thefe troops were thrown into the place during the abfence of the Athenian fleet; and the Potidæans, thus reinforced, fet their enemies at defiance. Alarmed by this intelligence, the Athenians fitted out a new fleet of forty fail, with a large body of troops, under the command of Callias; who, arriving on the coaft of Macedon, found the fquadron of Ancheftratus employed in the fiege of Pydna. Callias judicioufly exhorted him to defift from that enterprife, comparatively of little importance, that the united fquadrons might attack Potidæa by fea, while an Athenian army of three thoufand citizens, with a due proportion of allies, affaulted it by land. This meafure was adopted;

 but

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but the ſpirit of the garriſon ſoon offered them battle, almoſt on equal terms, though with unequal ſucceſs. Callias however was ſlain, and ſucceeded by Phormio; who, conducting a freſh ſupply of troops, deſolated the hoſtile territory of Chalcis and Pieria; took ſeveral towns by ſtorm; and, having ravaged the adjoining diſtrict, beſieged the city of Potidæa.

The Corinthians endeavour to exaſperate the Lacedæmonians againſt Athens.

While thoſe tranſactions were carrying on in the north, the centre of Greece was ſhaken by the murmurs and complaints of the Corinthians and their Peloponneſian confederates, who loſt all patience when their citizens were blocked up by an Athenian army. Accompanied by the deputies of ſeveral republics beyond the iſthmus, who had recently experienced the arrogance of their imperious neighbour, they had recourſe to Sparta, whoſe actual power and ancient renown juſtly merited the firſt rank in the confederacy, but whoſe meaſures[13] were rendered ſlow and cautious by the foreſight and peaceful counſels of the prudent Archidamus. When introduced into the Spartan aſſembly, the repreſentatives of all the ſtates inveighed, with equal bitterneſs, againſt the injuſtice and cruelty of Athens, while each deſcribed and exaggerated the weight of its peculiar grievances. The Megareans

[13] Plutarch (in Pericl.) aſcribes the backwardneſs of the Spartans to engage in war to the advice of their principal magiſtrates, bribed by Pericles, who wiſhed to gain time for his military preparations; a report as improbable as another calumny, that they were bribed by their allies to take arms againſt Athens (Ariſtoph. in Pace). The cauſe of their irreſolution, aſſigned in the text, is confirmed by the ſubſequent behaviour of Archidamus.

com-

complained that, by a recent decree of that ſtern unfeeling republic, they had been excluded from the ports and markets of Attica [14]; an excluſion which, conſidering the narrowneſs and poverty of their own rocky diſtrict, was equivalent to depriving them of the firſt neceſſaries of life. The inhabitants of Ægina explained and lamented that, in defiance of recent and ſolemn treaties, and diſregarding the liberal ſpirit of Grecian policy, the Athenians had reduced their unfortunate iſland into the moſt deplorable condition of ſervitude.

Speech of the Corinthians;

When other ſtates had deſcribed their particular ſufferings, the Corinthians laſt aroſe, and their ſpeaker thus addreſſed the Lacedæmonian aſſembly: "Had we come hither, men of Lacedæmon! to urge our private wrongs, it might be ſufficient barely to relate the tranſactions of the preceding, and preſent, years. The revolt of Corcyra, the ſiege of Potidæa, are facts which ſpeak for themſelves;

[14] The Megareans were accuſed of ploughing ſome conſecrated lands: they were accuſed of harbouring the Athenian ſlaves, fugitives, and exiles; other cauſes of complaint might eaſily have been diſcovered or invented by their powerful neighbours, who were provoked that ſuch a ſmall community on their frontier ſhould uniformly ſpurn their authority. But the malignity of the comic writers of the times aſcribed the ſevere decree againſt Megara to an event equally diſgraceful to the morals of their country, and injurious to the honour of Pericles. The following verſes are tranſlated from the Acharnenſes of Ariſtophanes:

Juvenes profecti Megaram ebrij auferunt
Simætham ex ſcortatione nobilem:
Megarenſis hinc populus dolore perictus
Furatur Aſpaſiæ duo ſcorta haud impiger:
Hinc initium belli prorupit
Univerſis Græcis ob tres meritriculas.

CHAP. XV. ſelves; but the thoughts of this aſſembly ſhould be directed to objects more important than particular injuries, however flagrant and enormous. The *general* oppreſſive ſyſtem of Athenian policy,—it is this which demands your moſt ſerious concern; a ſyſtem aiming at nothing leſs than the deſtruction of Grecian freedom, which is ready to periſh through your ſupine neglect. That moderation and probity, men of Sparta! for which your domeſtic counſels are juſtly famous, render you the dupes of foreign artifice, and expoſe you to become the victims of foreign ambition; which, inſtead of oppoſing with prompt alacrity, you have nouriſhed by unſeaſonable delay; and, in conſequence of this fatal error, are now called to contend, not with the infant weakneſs, but with the matured vigour of your enemies, thoſe enemies, who, ever unſatisfied with their preſent meaſure of proſperity, are continually intent on ſome new project of aggrandizement. How different from *your* ſlow procraſtination is the ardent character of the Athenians! Fond of novelty, and fertile in reſources, alike active and vigilant, the accompliſhment of one deſign leads them to another more daring. Deſire, hope, enterpriſe, ſucceſs, follow in rapid ſucceſſion. Already have they ſubdued half of Greece; their ambition graſps the whole. Rouſe, then, from your lethargy, defend your allies, invade Attica, maintain the glory of Peloponneſus, that ſacred depoſit, with which being entruſted by your anceſtors, you are bound to tranſmit unimpaired to poſterity."

Several

Several Athenians, then refiding on other business at Sparta, defired to be heard in defence of their country. Equity could not deny the requeft of thefe voluntary advocates, who fpoke in a ftyle well becoming the loftinefs of their republic [15]. With the pride of fuperiority, rather than the indignation of innocence, they affected to defpife the falfe afperfions of their adverfaries; and, inftead of anfwering directly the numerous accufations againft their prefumptuous abufe of power, defcribed, with fwelling encomiums, "the illuftrious and memorable exploits of their countrymen; exploits which had juftly raifed them to a pre-eminence, acknowledged by their allies, uncontefted by Sparta, and felt by Perfia. When it became the dignity of Greece to chaftife the repeated infults of that ambitious empire, the Spartans had declined the conduct of a diftant war; Athens had affumed the abandoned helm, and, after demolifhing the cruel dominion of Barbarians, had acquired a juft and lawful fway over the coafts of Europe and of Afia. The new fubjects of the republic were long treated rather as fellow-citizens, than as tributaries and flaves. But it was the nature of man to revolt againft the *fuppofed* injuftice of his equals, rather than againft the *real* tyranny of his mafters. This circumftance, fo honourable to Athenian lenity, had occafioned feveral unprovoked rebellions, which the republic had been compelled to punifh with an exemplary feverity. The apprehenfion of future com-

answered by the Athenians.

15 Thucydid. l. xliii. & feqq.

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commotions had lately obliged her to hold, with a firmer hand, the reins of government, and to maintain with armed power, an authority justly earned, and strictly founded in nature, of which it is an unalterable law, that the strong should govern the weak. If the Spartans, in violation of the right of treaties, thought proper to oppose this immovable purpose, Athens well knew how to redress her wrongs, and would, doubtless, uphold her empire with the same valour and activity by which it had been established."

Pacific advice of king Archidamus;

Having heard both parties, the assembly adjourned, without forming any resolution. But next day, it appeared to be the prevailing opinion, that the arrogance and usurpation of Athens had already violated the peace, and that it became the prudence as well as the dignity of Sparta, no longer to defer hostilities. This popular current was vainly opposed by the experienced wisdom of king Archidamus, who still counselled peace and moderation, though his courage had been conspicuously distinguished in every season of danger. He exhorted his countrymen "not to rush blindly on war, without examining the resources of the enemy and their own. The Athenians were powerful in ships, in money, in cavalry, and in arms; of all which the Lacedæmonians were destitute, or, at least, but feebly provided. Whatever provocation, therefore, they had received, they ought in prudence to dissemble their resentment, until they could effectually exert their vengeance. The present crisis required negociation; if that failed, the silent preparation of a few

a few years would enable them to take the field with well-founded hopes of redreſſing the grievances of their confederates." Had this moderate language made any impreſſion on ſuch an aſſembly, it would have been ſpeedily obliterated by the blunt boldneſs of Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori, who cloſed the debate. "Men of Sparta! Of the long ſpeeches of the Athenians I underſtand not the drift. While they dwell with ſtudied eloquence on their own praiſes, they deny not their having injured our allies. If they behaved *well* in the Perſian war, and now *otherwiſe*, their degeneracy is only the more apparent. But then, and now, we are ſtill the ſame; and if we would ſupport our character, we muſt not overlook their injuſtice. They have ſhips, money, and horſes; but we have good allies, whoſe intereſts we muſt not abandon. Why do we deliberate, while our enemies are in arms? Let us take the field with ſpeed, and fight with all our might." The acclamations of the people followed, and war was reſolved.

opposed by Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori.

This reſolution was taken in the fourteenth year after the concluſion of the general peace; but near a twelvemonth elapſed before the propereſt meaſures for invading Attica could be finally adjuſted among the diſcordant members of ſo numerous a confederacy. It conſiſted of all the ſeven republics of the Peloponneſus, except Argos and Achaia, the firſt of which from ambition, and the ſecond perhaps from moderation [16], preſerved, in the begin-

War determined. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A.C. 431.

General confederacy againſt Athens;

[16] The ambition of Argos is confirmed by the ſubſequent meaſures of that republic; the moderation of Achaia is ſuſpected, from the nature of the Achæan laws, which will afterwards be deſcribed.

CHAP. XV. ning of the war, a ſuſpicious neutrality. Of the nine northern republics, Acarnania alone declined joining the allies, its coaſt being particularly expoſed to the ravages of the Corcyrean fleets. The cities of Naupactus and Platæa, for reaſons that will ſoon appear, were totally devoted to their Athenian protectors; whoſe cauſe was likewiſe embraced by ſeveral petty princes of Theſſaly. But all the other ſtates beyond the iſthmus longed to follow the ſtandard of Sparta, and to humble the aſpiring ambition of their too powerful neighbour.

ſends a menacing embaſſy to that republic;

The repreſentatives of theſe various communities having, according to the received practice of Greece, aſſembled in the principal city of the confederacy, were ſtrongly encouraged by the Corinthians, who, as their colony of Potidæa was ſtill cloſely beſieged, laboured to accelerate repriſals on Attica, by exhibiting the moſt advantageous proſpect of the approaching war. They obſerved, "That the army of the confederacy, exceeding ſixty thouſand men, far out-numbered the enemy, whom they excelled ſtill more in merit, than they ſurpaſſed in number. The one was compoſed of national troops, fighting for the independence of thoſe countries in whoſe government they had a ſhare; the other chiefly conſiſted in vile mercenaries, whoſe pay was their government and their country. If ſupplies of money were requiſite, the allied ſtates would doubtleſs be more liberal and forward to defend their intereſt and honour, than the reluctant tributaries of Athens to rivet their ſervitude and chains: and if ſtill more money ſhould

ſhould be wanted, the Delphic and Olympic treaſures afforded an inexhauſtible reſource, which could not be better expended than in defending the ſacred cauſe of juſtice and of Grecian freedom." In order to gain full time, however, for ſettling all matters among themſelves, the confederates diſpatched to Athens various overtures of accommodation, which they well knew would be indignantly rejected. In each embaſſy they roſe in their demands, ſucceſſively requiring the Athenians to raiſe the ſiege of Potidæa; to repeal their prohibitory decree againſt Megara; to withdraw their garriſon from Ægina; in fine, to declare the independence of their colonies [17].

which alarms the Athenians.

Theſe laſt demands were heard at Athens with a mixture of rage and terror. The capricious multitude, who had hitherto approved and admired the aſpiring views of Pericles, now trembled on the brink of the precipice to which he had conducted them. They had hitherto puſhed the ſiege of Potidæa with great vigour, but without any near

17 Beſides complying with the demands mentioned in the text, the Athenians were required "to expel the deſcendants of thoſe impious men who had profaned the temple of Minerva." This alluded to an event which happened the firſt year of the 45th Olympiad, or 598 years before Chriſt. Cylon, a powerful Athenian, having ſeized the citadel, and aſpiring at royalty, was defeated in his purpoſe by Megacles, a maternal anceſtor of Pericles, who having decoyed the aſſociates of Cylon from the temple of Minerva, butchered them without mercy, and with too little reſpect for the privileges of that venerable ſanctuary. The whole tranſaction is particularly related by Plutarch in his life of Solon. The renewal of ſuch an antiquated complaint, at this juncture, pointed particularly at Pericles, and ſhewed the opinion which the Spartans entertained of his unrivalled influence and authority.

CHAP. X. prospect of success. They must now contend with a numerous confederacy, expose their boasted grandeur to the doubtful chance of war, and exchange the amusements and pleasures of the city for the toils and hardships of a camp. Of these discontented murmurs the rivals and enemies of Pericles greedily availed themselves, to traduce the character and administration of that illustrious statesman. It was insinuated, that, sacrificing to private passion the interest of his country, he had enacted the imperious decree, of which the allies so justly complained, to resent the personal injury of his beloved Aspasia, whose family had been insulted by some licentious youths of Megara[18]. Diopeithes, Dracontides, and other demagogues, derided the folly of taking arms on such a frivolous pretence, and as preparatory to the impeachment of Pericles himself, the courts of justice were fatigued with prosecutions of his valuable friends.

Clamour excited against Pericles.

Persecution of his friends.

The philosopher Anaxagoras, and Phidias the statuary, reflected more lustre than they could derive from the protection of any patron. The mixed character of Aspasia was of a more doubtful kind. To the natural and sprightly graces of Ionia, her native country, she added extraordinary accomplishments of mind and body; and having acquired in high perfection the talents and excellencies of the other sex, was accused of being too indifferent to the honour of her own. Scarcely superior in modesty to Phryné, Thais, or Erigoné[19], her wit, her knowledge, and her eloquence,

[18] See above, p. 201.

[19] See above, p. 155.

excited

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excited universal admiration or envy[20], while the beauty of her fancy and of her person inspired more tender sentiments into the susceptible breast of Pericles. She was reproached, not with entertaining free votaries of pleasure in her family (which in that age was regarded as a very allowable commerce), but of seducing the virtue of Athenian matrons; a crime severely punished by the laws of every Grecian republic. But we have reason to conclude her innocent, since the arguments and tears of her lover saved her from the fury of an enraged populace, at a crisis when his most strenuous exertions could not prevent the banishment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

Banishment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

The former was accused of propagating doctrines inconsistent with the established religion; the latter, of having indulged the very pardonable vanity (as it should seem) of representing himself, and his patron, on the shield of his admired statue of Minerva. There, with inimitable art, Phidias had engraved the renowned victory of the Athenians over the warlike daughters of the Thermodon[21]; he had delineated himself in the figure of a bald old man raising a heavy stone (an allusion to his skill in architecture), while the features of Pericles were distinguished in the countenance of an Athenian chief, bravely combating the queen of the Amazons, though his elevated arm hid part of the face, and in some measure concealed the resemblance[22]. For this fictitious crime, Phidias was

20 Plato in Menex. 21 Lysias Orat. Funeb.
22 Plut. in Pericl. & Aristot. de Mund.

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driven from a city which had been adorned by the unwearied labours of his long life, and debarred beholding thoſe wonders of art which his ſublime genius had created.

Accuſation of Pericles.

The accuſation of the principal friends of Pericles paved the way for his own. He was reproached with embezzling the public treaſure; but, on this occaſion, plain facts confounded the artifices of his enemies. It was proved, that his private expences were juſtly proportioned to the meaſure of his patrimony; many inſtances were brought of his generous contempt of wealth in the ſervice of his country; and it appeared, after the ſtricteſt examination, that his fortune had not increaſed ſince he was intruſted with the exchequer. This honourable diſplay of unſhaken probity, which had ever formed the baſis of the authority[23] of Pericles, again reconciled to him the unſteady affections of his countrymen, and gave irreſiſtible force to that famous and fatal ſpeech, which unalterably decided the war of Peloponneſus.

23 This teſtimony, which is given by the impartiality of Thucydides, deſtroys at once the numerous aſperſions of the comic poets of the times, which have been copied by Plutarch, and from him tranſcribed by modern compilers. Pericles, it is ſaid, raiſed the war of Peloponneſus, merely for his own convenience and ſafety; and was encouraged to this meaſure by the advice of his kinſman Alcibiades, then a boy; who, calling one day at his houſe, was refuſed admittance, "becauſe Pericles was occupied in conſidering how he might beſt ſtate his accounts." "Let him rather conſider," ſaid the ſagacious ſtripling, "how to give no account at all." Pericles took the hint, and involved his country in a war, which allowed no time for examining the public expenditure. Such anecdotes may amuſe thoſe who can believe them.

"Often

He justifies his measures, and maintains the necessity of the war;

"Often have I declared, Athenians! that we must not obey the unjust commands of our enemies. I am still firmly of that mind, convinced as I am of the dangerous vicissitudes of war and fortune; and that human hopes, designs, and pursuits, are all fleeting and fallacious. Yet, in the present crisis, necessity and glory should alike fix us to this immovable resolution. The decree against Megara, which the first embassy required us to repeal, is not the cause of that hostile jealousy which has long secretly envied our greatness, and which has now more openly conspired our destruction. Yet that decree, of which some men have spoken so lightly, involved the honour of our councils and the stability of our empire. By pusillanimously repealing it, we should have emboldened that malignant enmity, which, notwithstanding our proper firmness in the first instance, has yet successively risen to higher and more arbitrary demands; demands which merit to be answered, not by embassies, but by arms.

explains the strength and resources of the republic;

"The flourishing resources, and actual strength, of the republic, afford us the most flattering prospect of military success. Impregnably fortified by land, our shores are defended by three hundred gallies; besides a body of cavalry, to the number of twelve hundred, together with two thousand archers, we can immediately take the field with thirteen thousand pikemen, without draining our foreign garrisons, or diminishing the complete number of sixteen thousand men who defend the walls and fortresses in Attica. The wealthy seaports

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ports of Thrace and Macedon; the flourishing colonies of Ionia, Eolia, and Doria; in a word, the whole extensive coast of the Asiatic peninsula, acknowledge, by annual contributions, the sovereignty of our guardian navy, whose strength is increased by the ships of Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, while the smaller islands furnish us, according to their ability, with money and troops. Athens thus reigns queen of a thousand [24] tributary republics, and notwithstanding the expences incurred by the siege of Potidæa, and the architectural ornaments of the city, she possesses six thousand talents in her treasury.

which he contrasts with the weakness of the enemy.

"The situation of our enemies is totally the reverse. Animated by rage, and emboldened by numbers, they may be roused to a transient, desultory assault; but destitute of resources, and divided in interests, they are totally incapable of any steady, persevering exertion. With sixty thousand men they may enter Attica; and if our unseasonable courage gives them an opportunity, may win a battle; but unless our rash imprudence assists and enables them, they cannot possibly prosecute a successful war. Indeed, Athenians! I dread less the power of the enemy, than your own ungovernable spirit. Instead of being seduced from your security, by a vain desire to defend, against superior numbers, your plantations and villas in the

[24] Aristoph. Vesp. He says, that twenty thousand Athenians might live as in the Elysian fields, if each tributary city undertook to provide for twenty citizens. V. 705, &c.

open

open country, you ought to deſtroy theſe ſuperfluous poſſeſſions with your own hands. To you who receive the conveniences of life from ſo many diſtant dependencies, the devaſtation of Attica is a matter of ſmall moment; but how can your enemies repair, how can they ſurvive, the devaſtation of the Peloponneſus? How can they prevent, or remedy, this fatal, this intolerable calamity, while the ſquadrons of Athens command the ſurrounding ſeas? If theſe conſiderations be allowed their full weight; if reaſon, not paſſion, conducts the war, it ſeems ſcarcely in the power of fortune to rob you of victory. Yet let us anſwer the Peloponneſians with moderation, "that we will not forbid the Megareans our ports and markets, if the Spartans, and other ſtates of Greece, aboliſh their excluſive and inhoſpitable laws: that we will reſtore independent governments to ſuch cities as were free at the laſt treaty of peace, provided the Spartans engage to follow our example: that we are ready to ſubmit all differences to the impartial deciſion of any equitable tribunal; and that, although theſe condeſcending overtures be rejected, we will not commence hoſtilities, but are prepared to repel them with our uſual vigour[25]." The aſſembly murmured applauſe; a decree was propoſed and

Dictates a reply to the Peloponneſians,

which is taken for a declaration of war.

[25] In examining the ſpeech aſcribed to Pericles, on this occaſion, by Thucydides, the attentive reader will perceive that it ſuppoſes the knowledge of ſeveral events omitted in the preceding narrative of that hiſtorian, but which are carefully related in the text. The Engliſh ſpeech is ſhorter than the Greek, but contains more information, collected from Plutarch, Diodorus, Ariſtophanes, and the 2d book of Thucydides himſelf.

 rati-

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ratified; the ambaſſadors returned home with the reply dictated by Pericles; which, moderate as it ſeemed to the Athenian ſtateſman, ſounded like an immediate declaration of war to the Spartans and their allies.

The Thebans ſurpriſe Platæa. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A.C. 431. May the 7th.

Six months after the battle of Potidæa, the Thebans, who were the moſt powerful and the moſt daring of theſe allies, undertook a military enterpriſe againſt the ſmall but magnanimous republic of Platæa. Though ſituate in the heart of Bœotia, amidſt numerous and warlike enemies, the Platæans ſtill preſerved an unſhaken fidelity to Athens, whoſe toils and triumphs they had ſhared in the Perſian war. Yet even this feeble community, ſurrounded on every ſide by hoſtile Bœotians, was not exempted from domeſtic diſcord. Nauclides, the perfidious and bloody leader of an ariſtocratical faction, engaged to betray the Platæan gates to a body of foreign troops, provided they enabled him to overturn the democracy, and to take vengeance on his political adverſaries, whom he regarded as his perſonal foes. Eurymachus, a noble and wealthy Theban, with whom, in the name of his aſſociates, this ſanguinary agreement had been contracted, entered Platæa with three hundred of his countrymen, at the firſt watch of the night; but, regardleſs of their promiſe to Nauclides, who expected that they would break tumultuouſly into the houſes, and butcher his enemies, the Thebans formed regularly in arms, and remained quietly in the market-place, having iſſued a proclamation to invite all the citizens indiſcri-

7 minately

minately to become allies to Thebes. The Platæans readily accepted a propoſal, which delivered them from the terror of immediate death. But while they ſucceſſively ratified the agreement, they obſerved, with mixed ſhame and joy, that darkneſs and ſurpriſe had greatly augmented the number of the conſpirators. Encouraged by this diſcovery, they ſecretly diſpatched a meſſenger to Athens; and, while they expected the aſſiſtance of their diſtant protector, determined to leave nothing untried for their own deliverance.

Daring enterpriſe of the Platæans.

The night was ſpent in an operation not leſs daring than extraordinary. As they could not aſſemble in the ſtreets without alarming ſuſpicion, they dug through the interior walls of their houſes, and fortified the outward in the beſt manner the time would allow, with their ploughs, carts, and other inſtruments of huſbandry. Before day-break the work was complete; when, with one conſent, they ruſhed furiouſly againſt the enemy, the women and children animating with horrid ſhrieks and geſtures the efforts of their rage. It was night, and a ſtorm of rain and thunder augmented the gloomy terrors of the battle. The Thebans were unacquainted with the ground; above an hundred fell; near two hundred fled in trepidation to a lofty and ſpacious tower adjoining the walls, which they miſtook for one of the gates of the city. In the firſt movements of reſentment, the Platæans prepared to burn them alive; but a moment's reflection deterred them from this dangerous cruelty. Meanwhile, a conſiderable body of Thebans

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bans advanced towards Platæa, to co-operate with their countrymen. Their progreſs would have been haſtened by a fugitive who met them, and related the miſcarriage of the enterpriſe, had not the heavy rain ſo much ſwelled the Aſopus, that an unuſual time was ſpent in croſſing that river. They had ſcarcely entered the Platæan territory, when a ſecond meſſenger informed them, that their unfortunate companions were all killed or taken priſoners. Upon this intelligence they pauſed to conſider, whether, inſtead of proceeding to the Platæan walls, where they could not perform any immediate ſervice, they ought not, as an eaſier enterpriſe, to ſeize the citizens of that place, who were diſperſed over their villages in the open country.

Their ſtratagem for deſtroying the Thebans, without danger to themſelves.

But while they deliberated on this meaſure, a Platæan herald arrived, complaining of the unjuſt and moſt unexpected infraction of the peace, by a daring and atrocious conſpiracy; commanding the Thebans immediately to leave the territory of Platæa, if they hoped to deliver their fellow-citizens from captivity; and denouncing, if they refuſed compliance, that their countrymen would inevitably be puniſhed with a cruel death. This ſtratagem, not leſs audacious than artful, prevailed on the enemy to repaſs the Aſopus, while the Platæans loſt not a moment to aſſemble within their walls the ſcattered inhabitants of their fields and villas; and braving the Theban reſentment, the immediate effects of which they had rendered impotent, maſſacred the unhappy priſoners, to the number of an

hundred

hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the chief promoter of the expedition. After this signal act of vengeance, they strengthened the works of the place; transported their wives and children to the tributary islands of Athens; and, that they might more securely sustain the expected siege, required and received from that republic a plentiful supply of provisions, and a considerable reinforcement of troops.

Preparations for war on both sides. A. C. 431.

The sword was now drawn, and both parties seemed eager to exert their utmost strength. The Spartans summoned their confederates to the Isthmus; demanded money and ships from their Italian and Sicilian colonies; and solicited assistance from the Persian monarch Artaxerxes, and from Perdiccas king of Macedon; both of whom naturally regarded the Athenians as dangerous neighbours, and ambitious invaders of their coasts. The people of Athens also condescended to crave the aid of Barbarians, and actually contracted an alliance with Sitalces, the warlike chief of the Odrysians, who formed the most powerful tribe in Upper Thrace. They required at the same time an immediate supply of cavalry from their Thessalian allies, while their fleet already cruised along the coast of Peloponnesus, to confirm the fidelity of the surrounding islands; an object deemed essential to the successful invasion of that territory. The unexperienced youth, extremely numerous in most republics of Greece, rejoiced at the prospect of war. The aged saw and dreaded the general commotion, darkly foretold, as they thought, by ancient

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ancient oracles and prophesies, but clearly and recently announced, by an earthquake in the sacred, and hitherto immovable island of Delos. Such was the ardour of preparation, that only a few weeks after the surprise of Platæa, the Lacedæmonian confederates, to the number of sixty thousand, assembled from the north and south, at the Corinthian Isthmus. The several communities were respectively commanded by leaders of their own appointment; but the general conduct of the war was intrusted to Archidamus, the Spartan king.

Archidamus addresses the confederates.

In a council of the chiefs, that prince warmly approved their alacrity in taking the field, and extolled the greatness and bravery of an army, the most numerous and best provided that had ever followed the standard of any Grecian general. Yet their preparations, however extraordinary, were not greater than their enterprise required. They had waged war with a people not less powerful, than active and daring; who had discernment to perceive, and ability to improve, every opportunity of advantage; and whose resentment would be as much inflamed, as their pride would be wounded, by the approach of invasion and hostility. It seemed probable, that the Athenians would not allow their lands to be wasted, without attempting to defend them. The confederates, therefore, must be always on their guard; their discipline must be strict, regular, and uniform; to elude the skill, and to oppose the strength of Athens, demanded their utmost vigilance and activity.

Archi-

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Leads them to Attica.

Archidamus, after leading his army into Attica, ſeems blamable in allowing their martial ardour to evaporate in the fruitleſs ſiege of Oenoé, the ſtrongeſt Athenian town towards the ſouthern frontier of Bœotia. This tedious and unſucceſsful operation enabled the Athenians to complete, without interruption, the ſingular plan of defence ſo ably traced by the bold genius of Pericles. They haſtened the deſolation of their own fields; demoliſhed their delightful gardens and villas, which it had been their pride to adorn; and tranſported, either to Athens or the iſles, their valuable effects, their cattle, furniture, and even the frames of their houſes. The numerous inhabitants of the country towns, and villages, where the more opulent Athenians commonly ſpent the greater part of their time, flocked to the capital, which was well furniſhed with the means of ſubſiſtence, though not of accommodation, for ſuch a promiſcuous crowd of ſtrangers, with their families, ſlaves, or ſervants. Many people of lower rank, deſtitute of private dwellings, were obliged to occupy the public halls, the groves and temples, the walls and battlements. Even perſons of diſtinction were narrowly and meanly lodged; an inconvenience ſeverely felt by men accuſtomed to live at large in the country, in rural eaſe and elegance. But reſentment againſt the public enemy blunted the ſenſe of perſonal hardſhip, and ſilenced the voice of private complaint.

The confederates ravage Attica.

Meanwhile, the confederate army, having raiſed the ſiege of Oenoé, advanced along the eaſtern frontier

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Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A.C. 431.

frontier of Attica; and, within eighty days after the ſurpriſe of Platæa, invaded the Thriaſian plain, the richeſt ornament of the Athenian territory. Having waſted that valuable diſtrict with fire and ſword, they proceeded to Eleuſis, and from thence to Acharnæ, the largeſt borough in the province, and only eight miles diſtant from the capital. There they continued an unuſual length of time, gradually demoliſhing the houſes and plantations, and daily exerciſing every act of rapacious cruelty, with a view either to draw the enemy to a battle, or to diſcover whether they were unalterably determined to keep within their walls; a reſolution, which, if clearly aſcertained, would enable the invaders to proceed with more boldneſs and effect, and to carry on their ravages with ſecurity, even to the gates of Athens.

The Athenians retort their injuries.

The Athenians, hitherto intent on their naval preparations, had exerted an uncommon degree of patience and ſelf-command. But their unruly paſſions could no longer be reſtrained, when they learned the proceedings in Acharnæ. The proprietors of that rich and extenſive diſtrict boaſted that they alone could ſend three thouſand brave ſpearmen into the field, and lamented, that they ſhould remain cooped up in diſhonourable confinement, while their poſſeſſions fell a prey to an hoſtile invader. Their animated complaints inflamed the kindred ardour of the Athenian youth. It appeared unworthy of thoſe, who had ſo often ravaged with impunity the territories of their neighbours, patiently to behold the deſolation of their own. In-

tereſted

terested priests announced approaching calamity; seditious orators clamoured against the timid councils of Pericles; the impetuous youth required their general to lead them to battle. Amidst this popular commotion, the accomplished general and statesman remained unmoved, bravely resisting the storm, or dexterously eluding its force. Though determined not to risk an engagement with the confederates, he seasonably employed the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry to beat up their quarters, to intercept their convoys, to harass, surprise, or cut off their advanced parties. While these enterprises tended to divert or appease the tumult, a fleet of an hundred and fifty sail ravaged the defenceless coast of Peloponnesus. A squadron, less numerous, made a descent on Locris. The rebellious inhabitants of Ægina were driven from their possessions, and an Athenian colony was settled in that island. The wretched fugitives, whose country had long rivalled Athens itself in wealth, commerce, and naval power, received the maritime district of Thyrea[26] from the bounty of their Spartan protectors.

The confederates evacuate Attica.

Intelligence of these proceedings, and still more the scarcity of provisions, engaged the confederates to return to their respective republics. Having advanced by the eastern, they retired along the western, frontier of Attica; every place in their line

[26] This district lay on the frontier of the Argive and Lacedæmonian territory, and was long an object of contention between those republics. See vol. i. p. 322, 323.

of

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of march experiencing the fatal effects of their resentment or rapacity. Soon after their retreat, Pericles, towards the beginning of autumn, led out the Athenians to ravage the neighbouring and hostile province of Megara. The invading army was accidentally observed by the fleet, while it returned from the coast of Peloponnesus. The sailors hastened to share the danger and plunder. The whole Athenian force thus amounted to near twenty thousand men; a number far more than sufficient to deprive the industrious Megareans of the hope of a scanty harvest, earned with infinite toil and care, in their narrow unfruitful territory.

Pericles invades Megara.

The winter was not distinguished by any important expedition on either side. The Corinthians, long inured to the sea in all seasons, carried on indecisive hostilities against the Athenian allies in Acarnania. During this inactive portion of the year, the Athenians, as well as their enemies, were employed in celebrating the memory of the dead, with much funeral pomp, and high encomiums on their valour[27]; in distributing the prizes

27 This mournful solemnity, as practised by the Athenians, is described by Thucydides, l. ii. p. 120, & seqq. The bones of the deceased were brought to a tabernacle previously erected for receiving them. On the day appointed for the funeral, they were conveyed from thence in cypress coffins, drawn on carriages, one for each tribe, to the public sepulchre in the Ceramicus, the most beautiful suburb of the city. The relations of the dead decked out the remains of their friends, as they judged most proper (See Lysias against Agoratus). One empty bier was drawn along in honour of those whose bodies had not been recovered. Persons of every age, and of either sex, citizens and strangers, attended this solemnity. When the bones were deposited in the earth, some citizen of dignity and merit,

prizes of merit among the ſurviving warriors; in confirming their reſpective alliances; and in fortifying ſuch places on their frontier as ſeemed moſt expoſed to military excurſions, or naval deſcents. CHAP. XV.

The return of ſummer brought back into Attica the Peloponneſian invaders; but it likewiſe introduced a far more dreadful calamity. A deſtructive peſtilence, engendered in Æthiopia, infected Egypt, and ſpread over great part of the dominions of the king of Perſia. Hiſtory does not explain by what means this fatal diſorder was communicated to Greece. The year had been in other reſpects remarkably healthful. As the diſeaſe firſt appeared in the Piræus, the principal Athenian harbour, we may be allowed to conjecture, that it was imported from the eaſt, either by the Athenian merchantmen, or by the ſhips of war, which annually ſailed to that quarter, in order to levy money on the tributary cities. When its miſerable ſymptoms broke out in the Piræus, the inhabitants ſuſpected that the enemy had poiſoned their wells. But it ſoon extended over the adjoining diſtricts, and raged

The plague breaks out in Athens. A.C. 330.

merit, named by the ſtate, mounted a lofty pulpit, and pronounced the panegyric of the deceaſed, of their anceſtors, and the Athenian republic. On this occaſion, Pericles himſelf had been appointed to that ſolemn office. He performed it with great dignity. His ſpeech, containing almoſt as many ideas as words, is incapable of abridgment; nor does its nature admit the inſertion of it intire in the preſent hiſtory, in which eloquence is merely conſidered as an inſtrument of government, and ſuch ſpeeches only introduced as influenced public reſolutions and meaſures. It is, however, worthy of obſervation, that his magnificent diſplay of the advantages, the ſecurity, and the glory of Athens, forms a ſtriking contraſt with the unexpected calamities which ſoon overwhelmed his unhappy country.

with

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with peculiar violence in the populous ſtreets which ſurrounded the citadel.

Deſcription of that malady.

The malady appeared under various forms, in different conſtitutions; but its ſpecific ſymptoms were invariably the ſame. It began with a burning heat in the head; the eyes were red and inflamed; the tongue and mouth had the colour of blood. The pain and inflammation deſcended to the breaſt with inexpreſſible anguiſh; the ſkin was covered with ulcers; the body of a livid red; the external heat not ſenſible to the touch, but the internal ſo violent, that the ſlighteſt covering could not be endured. An inſatiable thirſt was an univerſal ſymptom; and, when indulged, increaſed the diſorder. When the bowels were attacked, the patient ſoon periſhed through debility. Some lived ſeven or nine days, and died of a fever, with apparent remains of ſtrength. The life was ſaved, when the internal vigour diverted the courſe of the diſeaſe towards the extremities. Thoſe who once recovered were never dangerouſly attacked a ſecond time, from which they conceived a vain hope of proving thenceforth ſuperior to every bodily infirmity. The diſorder, which was always accompanied with an extreme dejection of ſpirits, often impaired the judgment, as well as the memory. All remedies, human and divine, were employed in vain to ſtop the progreſs of this fatal contagion. The miſerable crowds expired in the temples, preferring unavailing prayers to the gods. A ſhocking ſpectacle was ſeen round the ſacred fountains, where multitudes lay dead, or periſhed in agoniſing

Its effects on the mind.

on morals.

nifing torture. At length all medical affiftance was defpifed[28], and all religious ceremonies neglected. Continually fuffering or apprehending the moft dreadful calamities, the Athenians became equally regardlefs of laws human and divine. The fleeting moment only was theirs. About the future they felt no concern, nor did they believe it of concern to the gods, fince all alike perifhed, guilty or innocent. Decency no longer impofing refpect, the only purfuit was that of prefent pleafure. To beings of an hour, the dread of punifhment formed no reftraint; to victims of mifery, confcience prefented no terrors. Athens thus exhibited at once whatever is moft afflicting in wretchednefs, and moft miferable in vice, uniting to the rage of difeafe the more deftructive fury of unbridled paffions.

Devaftation of Attica. Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. A. C. 430.

While the city fell a prey to thefe accumulated evils, the country was laid wafte by an implacable enemy. On the prefent occafion, the confederates advanced beyond Athens; they deftroyed the works of the miners on Mount Laurium; and, having

28 The fuppofed decree of the Athenians in favour of Hippocrates, fays, that his fcholars fhewed the means both of preventing and curing the plague. Τις χρη θεραπειαις ασφαλως διαφευξασθαι τον λοιμον; and again, Ὁπως τε ιατρικη δοθεισα ασφαλως σωζει τους καμνοντας. Hippocrates, p. 1290. This decree therefore, as well as the letters of Hippocrates, mentioning the plague at Athens, are unqueftionably fpurious. The malady is minutely defcribed by Thucydides, l. ii. c. xlvii. by Lucretius, l. vi. ver. 1136, & feqq. Diodorus, l. xii. differs widely from them both, probably having copied from Ephorus and Theopompus. Hippocrates has feveral cafes of the plague from Thafos, Abdera, &c. but not one from Athens. See Hippocrat. de Morbis Epidem.

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ravaged all that southern district, as well as the coast opposite to Eubœa and Naxos, they traced a line of devastation along the Marathonian shore, the glorious scene of an immortal victory, obtained by the valour of Athens, in defence of those very states by which her own territories were now so cruelly desolated.

Magnanimity of Pericles.

If conscious wisdom and rectitude were not superior to every assault of fortune, the manly soul of Pericles must have sunk under the weight of such multiplied calamities. But his fortitude still supported him amidst the flood of public and domestic woe. With decent and magnanimous composure, he beheld the unhappy fate of his numerous and flourishing family, successively snatched away by the rapacious pestilence. At the funeral of the last of his sons, he dropped, indeed, a few reluctant tears of paternal tenderness. But, ashamed of this momentary weakness, he bent his undejected mind to the defence of the republic. Having collected an hundred Athenian, together with fifty Chian or Lesbian vessels, he sailed through the Saronic gulph, and ravaged the unprotected coasts of Elis, Argos, and Laconia. While this armament weighed anchor in the Piræus, there happened an eclipse of the sun[29], which terrified the superstitious mariners, whose minds were already clouded by calamity. The pilot of the admiral galley betrayed the most unmanly cowardice, when

[29] Plutarch. in Pericle. But as Thucydides mentions no such eclipse that summer, although extremely attentive in recording such phænomena, I would not warrant the chronology of Plutarch.

Pericles,

Pericles, throwing a cloak before his eyes, aſked, "whether the obſcurity ſurpriſed him?" the pilot anſwering him in the negative, "Neither," rejoined Pericles, "ought an eclipſe of the ſun, occaſioned by the intervention of a revolving planet, which intercepts its light."

Having arrived on the Argolic coaſt, the Athenians laid ſiege to the ſacred city Epidaurus, whoſe inhabitants gloried in the peculiar favour of Æſculapius. The plague again breaking out in the fleet, was naturally aſcribed to the vengeance of that offended divinity. They raiſed the ſiege of Epidaurus; nor were their operations more ſucceſsful againſt Troezené, Hermioné, and other Peloponneſian cities. They took only the ſmall fortreſs of Praſiæ, a ſea-port of Laconia; after which they returned to the Piræus, afflicted with the peſtilence, and without having performed any thing that correſponded to the greatneſs of the armament, or the public expectation.

His unfortunate expedition to the Peloponneſus. Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. A.C. 430.

The Athenian expedition into Thrace was ſtill more unfortunate. Into that country Agnon conducted a body of four thouſand men, to co-operate with Phormio in the ſiege of Potidæa. But in the ſpace of forty days, he loſt one thouſand and fifty men in the plague; and the only conſequence of his expedition was, to infect the northern army with that melancholy diſorder.

Athenians equally unfortunate in Thrace.

Theſe multiplied diſaſters reduced the Athenians to deſpair. Their ſufferings exceeded example and belief, while they were deprived of the only expected conſolation, the pleaſure of revenge. The

Pericles traduced.

 bulk

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bulk of the people desired peace on any terms. Ambassadors were sent to Sparta, but not admitted to an audience. The orators clamoured, and traduced Pericles. The undiscerning populace ascribed their misfortunes to the unhappy effect of his councils; but his magnanimity did not yet forsake him, and, for the last time, he addressed the assembly:

The magnanimous firmness of his last advice to the Athenians.

"Your anger, Athenians! occasions no surprise, because it comes not unexpected. Your complaints excite no resentment, because to complain is the right of the miserable. Yet as you mistake both the cause and the measure of your present calamity, I will venture to expose such dangerous, and, if not speedily corrected, such fatal errors. The justice and necessity of the war I have often had occasion to explain: it is just that you, who have protected and saved, should govern Greece; it is necessary, if you would assert your pre-eminence, that you should now resist the Peloponnesians. On maintaining this resolution, not your honour only, but your safety, depends. The sovereignty of Greece cannot, like an empty pageant of grandeur, be taken up with indifference, or without danger laid down. That well-earned dominion, which you have sometimes exercised tyrannically, must be upheld and defended, otherwise you must submit, without resource, to the resentment of your injured allies, and the animosity of your inveterate enemies. The hardships, to which you were exposed from the latter, I foresaw and foretold; the pestilence, that sudden and improbable disaster, it was impossible for human prudence to conjecture; yet great and

and unexpected as our calamities have been, and continue, they are ſtill accidental and tranſitory, while the advantages of this neceſſary war are permanent, and its glory will be immortal. The greatneſs of that empire which we ſtrive to uphold, extends beyond the territories of our moſt diſtant allies. Of the two elements, deſtined for the uſe of men, the ſea and the land, we abſolutely command the one, nor is there any kingdom, or republic, or confederacy, that pretends to diſpute our dominion. Let this conſideration elevate our hopes; and perſonal afflictions will diſappear at the view of public proſperity. Let us bear, with reſignation, the ſtrokes of providence; and we ſhall repel, with vigour, the aſſaults of your enemies. It is the hereditary and glorious diſtinction of our republic, never to yield to adverſity. We have defied danger, expended treaſure and blood; and, amidſt obſtinate and formidable wars, augmented the power, and extended the fame, of a city unrivalled in wealth, populouſneſs, and ſplendour, and governed by laws and inſtitutions worthy its magnificence and renown. If Athens muſt periſh, (as what human grandeur is not ſubject to decay?) let her never fall, at leaſt, through *our* puſillanimity; a fall that would cancel the merit of our former virtue, and deſtroy at once that edifice of glory which it has been the work of ages to rear. When our walls and harbours are no more; when the terror of our navy ſhall have ceaſed, and our external magnificence fallen to decay, the glory of Athens ſhall remain. This is the prize which

I have

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I have hitherto exhorted, and ftill exhort you to defend, regardlefs of the clamours of floth, the fufpicions of cowardice, or the perfecution of envy."

Death and character of Pericles. Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A. C. 429.

Such were the fentiments of Pericles, who, on this occafion, declared to his affembled countrymen, with the freedom of confcious merit, that he felt himfelf inferior to none in wifdom to difcover, and abilities to explain and promote, the meafures moft honourable and ufeful; that he was a fincere and ardent lover of the republic, unbiaffed by the dictates of felfifhnefs, unfeduced by the allurements of partiality, and fuperior to the temptations of avarice. The anger of the Athenians evaporated in impofing on him a fmall fine, and foon after they re-elected him general. The integrity and manly firmnefs of his mind reftored the fainting courage of the republic. They refcued the dignity of Pericles from the rage of popular frenzy; but they could not defend his life againft the infectious malignity of the peftilence. He died two years and fix months after the commencement of the war. The character which he draws of himfelf is confirmed by the impartial voice of hiftory, which adds a few circumftances fitted to confirm the texture of a virtuous and lafting fame. During the firft invafion of the Peloponnefians, he declared that he would convey his extenfive and valuable eftate to the public, if it fhould be excepted from the general devaftation, by the policy or the gratitude of Archidamus, his hereditary gueft and friend[30]. Yet this generous patriot lived

[30] Thucydid. p. 108.

with

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with the moſt exemplary œconomy in his perſonal and domeſtic expence. His death-bed was ſurrounded by his numerous admirers, who dwelt with complacence on the illuſtrious exploits of his glorious life. While they recounted the wiſdom of his government, and enumerated the long ſeries of his victories by ſea and land, "You forget," ſaid the dying ſtateſman and ſage, "you forget the only valuable part of my character: none of my fellow-citizens was ever compelled, through any action of mine, to aſſume a mourning robe[31]." He expired, teaching an invaluable leſſon to human kind, that in the laſt important hour, when all other objects diſappear, or loſe their value, the recollection of an innocent life is ſtill preſent to the mind, and ſtill affords conſolation more valuable than Pericles could derive from his nine trophies erected over the enemies of his country, from his long and proſperous adminiſtration of forty years, the depth of his political wiſdom, the perfection of his military and naval ſkill, and the immortal fame of his unrivalled eloquence.

[31] Plut. in Pericl.

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Subsequent Events of the War.—Platæa taken.—Revolt of Lesbos.—Description and History of that Island.—Nature of its political Connection with Athens.—Address of Lesbos.—Its Capital besieged by the Athenians.—Measures of the Peloponnesians for relieving it.—Mitylené surrenders.—Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Prisoners.—Resettlement of the Affairs of Lesbos.—The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra.—Sedition in that Island.—The contending Factions respectively supported by the Athenians and Peloponnesians.—Progress, Termination, and Consequences of the Sedition.

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Events of the four following years of the war. Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A. C. 429—425.

THE dignity and vigour of the republic seemed to perish with Pericles, and several years elapsed scarcely distinguished by any event that tended to vary the uniformity, much less to decide the fortune of the war. While the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, the Athenian fleet annually ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. In vain the inhabitants of that country, little accustomed to the sea, collected ships, and used their utmost endeavours to contend with the experienced skill of the Athenian mariners. They were always defeated, and often by an inferior force; one proof among many, that naval superiority is slowly acquired and

and ſlowly loſt. Neither the Athenians nor the Peloponneſians derived any effectual aſſiſtance from their reſpective alliances with Sitalces and Perdiccas. The former, reinforced by many independent tribes of Thrace, who were allured to his ſtandard by the hopes of plunder, poured down an hundred and fifty thouſand men on the Macedonian coaſt. But a haſty agreement between the two kings diſſipated that numerous and deſultory band with the ſame rapidity with which it had been collected [1].

One benefit, indeed, the Athenians received from Sitalces, if that can be reckoned a benefit, which enabled them to commit an action of atrocious cruelty: he put into their hands Ariſtæus, the Corinthian, a bold and determined enemy of their republic; and actually travelling through Thrace into Perſia, to ſolicit money from Artaxerxes to ſupport the war againſt them. Both Ariſtæus and his colleagues in the embaſſy ſuffered a painful and ignominious death.

Taking of Potidæa: Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A.C. 429.

The ſucceſs of the adverſe parties was equally balanced in the ſieges of Potidæa and Platæa. The former, having ſurrendered on capitulation, was occupied by new inhabitants. The expelled citizens retired to Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, where they ſtrengthened and exaſperated the foes of Athens. Platæa alſo capitulated, after a long and ſpirited reſiſtance during five years. Notwithſtanding the warm and affecting remon-

Of Platæa. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A.C. 427.

[1] Thucydid. p. 167—170.

ſtrances

CHAP. XVI. ſtrances of the citizens who had acted ſuch an illuſtrious part in the Perſian war, when the Thebans behaved moſt diſgracefully, the capitulation was ſhamefully violated by the Spartans, who ſacrificed to the reſentment of Thebes, the eternal enemy of Platæa, two hundred brave men, whoſe courage and fidelity merited a better fate. But the youth of Platæa ſtill flouriſhed in the boſom of Athens, and were deſtined, in a future age, to reaſſume the dignity of independent government, which always formed the higheſt ambition of their ſmall but magnanimous community.

Revolt of Leſbos.

Among the tranſactions of this otherwiſe unimportant period, happened the revolt of Leſbos, and the ſedition of Corcyra. Both events deeply affected the intereſt of Athens; and the former is diſtinguiſhed by ſuch circumſtances as ſerve to explain the political condition of the times, while the latter exhibits a ſtriking but gloomy picture of Grecian manners.

Deſcription and hiſtory of that iſland.

The iſland of Leſbos, extending above an hundred and fifty miles in circumference, is the largeſt, except Eubœa, in the Ægean ſea. Originally planted by Eolians, Leſbos was the mother of many Eolic colonies. They were eſtabliſhed on the oppoſite continent, and ſeparated from their metropolis by a ſtrait of ſeven miles, which expands itſelf into the gulf of Thebe, and is beautifully diverſified by the Hecatonneſian and Arginuſſian iſles, of old ſacred to Apollo. The happy temperature of the climate of Leſbos conſpired with the rich fertility of the ſoil to produce thoſe

delicious

delicious fruits, and thoſe exquiſite wines, which are ſtill acknowledged by modern travellers to deſerve the encomiums ſo liberally beſtowed on them by ancient writers [2]. The convenience of its harbours furniſhed another ſource of wealth and advantage to this delightful iſland, which, as early as the age of Homer, was reckoned populous and powerful, and, like the reſt of Greece at that time, governed by the moderate juriſdiction of hereditary princes. The abuſe of royal power occaſioned the diſſolution of monarchy in Leſbos, as well as in the neighbouring iſles. The rival cities of Mitylené and Methymna contended for republican pre-eminence. The former prevailed; and having reduced Methymna, as well as ſix cities of inferior note, began to extend its dominion beyond the narrow bounds of the iſland, and conquered a conſiderable part of Troas. Meanwhile the internal government of Mitylené was often diſturbed by ſedition, and ſometimes uſurped by tyrants. The wiſe Pittacus, contemporary and rival of Solon, endeavoured to remedy theſe evils by giving his countrymen a body of laws, compriſed in ſix hundred verſes, which adjuſted their political rights, and regulated their behaviour and manners. The Leſbians afterwards underwent thoſe general revolutions, to which both the iſlands and the continent of Aſia Minor were expoſed from the Lydian and Perſian power. Delivered from the yoke of Per-

[2] Monſ. de Guys, Tournefort, &c. agree with Horace (paſſim) and Strabo, l. xiii. p. 584—657. from which the following particulars, in the text, concerning Leſbos, are extracted.

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ſia by the ſucceſsful valour of Athens and Sparta, the Leſbians, as well as all the Greek ſettlements around them, ſpurned the tyrannical authority of Sparta and Pauſanias, and ranged themſelves under the honourable colours of Athens, which they thenceforth continued to reſpect in peace, and to follow in war.

Nature of its political connection with Athens.

In the exerciſe of power the Athenians diſplayed principles totally different from thoſe by which they had attained it. The confederacy between Athens and Leſbos was ſtill ſupported, however, by mutual fear rather than by reciprocal affection. During peace, the Leſbians dreaded the navy of Athens; the Athenians feared to loſe the aſſiſtance of Leſbos in war. Beſides this, the Athenians were of the Ionic, the Leſbians of the Eolic, race; and the latter juſtly regretted that the allies of Athens ſhould be ſucceſſively reduced to the condition of ſubjects. They perceived the artful policy of that republic in allowing the Chians and Leſbians alone to retain the ſemblance of liberty. While the Chians and Leſbians, ſtill free in appearance, aſſiſted in ſubduing the other confederates of Athens, that ambitious republic was always furniſhed with a plauſible juſtification of her general oppreſſion and tyranny; ſince it was natural to imagine that men, left to the unreſtrained liberty of choice, ſhould, in matters indifferent to themſelves, prefer the cauſe of juſtice to that of uſurpation. But even the apparent freedom which the Leſbians enjoyed had become extremely precarious. They felt themſelves under the diſagreeable neceſſity to

ſooth,

ſooth, to bribe, and to flatter the Athenian demagogues, and in all their tranſactions with that imperious people, to teſtify the moſt mortifying deference and ſubmiſſion. Notwithſtanding their watchful attention never deſignedly to offend, they were continually endangered by the quarrelſome humour of a capricious multitude, and had reaſon to dread, leſt, in conſequence of ſome unexpected guſt of paſſion, they ſhould be compelled to demoliſh their walls, and to ſurrender their ſhipping, the puniſhments already inflicted on ſuch of the neighbouring iſlands as had incurred the diſpleaſure of Athens.

Meaſures of the Leſbians previous to their revolt.

This uneaſy ſituation naturally diſpoſed the Leſbians, amidſt the calamities of the ſecond Peloponneſian invaſion, heightened by the plague at Athens, to watch an opportunity to revolt. The following year was employed in aſſembling the ſcattered inhabitants of the iſland within the walls of Mitylené, in ſtrengthening theſe walls, in fortifying their harbours, in augmenting their fleet, and in collecting troops and proviſions from the fertile ſhores of the Euxine ſea. But in the fourth year of the war, their deſign, yet unripe for execution, was made known to the Athenians by the inhabitants of Tenedos, the neighbours and enemies of Leſbos, as well as by the citizens of Methymna, the ancient rival of Mitylené, and by ſeveral malcontents in the Leſbian capital. Notwithſtanding the concurrence of ſuch powerful teſtimonies, the Athenian magiſtrates affected to diſbelieve intelligence which their diſtreſſed circumſtances rendered pecu-

Olymp. lxxxviii. 1. A. C. 428.

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peculiarly alarming. The Lesbians, it was said, could never think of forsaking the alliance of a country, which had always treated them with such distinguished favour, how powerfully soever they might be urged to that measure by the Thebans, their Eolian brethren, and the Spartans, their ancient confederates. Ambassadors, however, were sent to Lesbos, desiring an explanation of rumours so dishonourable to the fidelity and gratitude of the island.

Activity of Athens.

The ambassadors having confirmed the report, Athens equipped a fleet of forty sail, intending to attack the enemy by surprise, while they celebrated, with universal consent, the anniversary festival of Apollo, on the promontory of Malea. But this design was rendered abortive by the diligence of a Mitylenian traveller, who, passing from Athens to Eubœa, proceeded southward to Geraistos, and, embarking in a merchant-vessel, reached Lesbos in less than three days from the time that he undertook this important service. His seasonable advice not only prevented the Mitylenians from leaving their city, but prepared them to appear, at the arrival of the enemy, in a tolerable posture of defence. This state of preparation enabled them to obtain from Cleippidas, the Athenian admiral, a suspension of hostilities, until they dispatched an embassy to Athens, to remove, as they pretended, the groundless resentment of the people, and to give ample satisfaction to the magistrates.

Address of Lesbos.

On the part of the Lesbians, this transaction was nothing more than a contrivance to gain time. They

Olymp. lxxxviii. 1. A.C. 428.

They expected no favour or forgiveness from the Athenian assembly; and while this illusive negociation was carrying on at Athens, other ambassadors went secretly to Sparta, requesting that the Lesbians might be admitted into the Peloponnesian confederacy, and thus entitled to the protection of that powerful league. The Spartans referred them to the general assembly, which was to be soon held at Olympia, to solemnize the most splendid of all the Grecian festivals. After the games were ended, and the Athenians, who little expected that such matters were in agitation, had returned home, the Lesbian ambassadors were favourably heard in a general convention of the Peloponnesian representatives or deputies, from whom they received assurance of immediate and effectual assistance.

Mitylené besieged.

This promise, however, was not punctually performed. The eyes of the Athenians were at length opened; and while the Peloponnesians prepared or deliberated, their more active enemies had already taken the field. Various skirmishes, in which the islanders shewed little vigour in their own defence, engaged the neighbouring states of Lemnos and Imbros to send, on the first summons, considerable supplies of troops to their Athenian confederates; but as the combined forces were still insufficient completely to invest Mitylené, a powerful reinforcement was sent from Athens; and before the beginning of winter, the place was blocked up by land, while an Athenian fleet occupied the harbour.

Measures of the Pelopon-

The unfavourable season, and still more, that dilatoriness which so often obstructed the measures of

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nesians for relieving it.

of the confederates, prevented timely aid from arriving at Mitylené. But in order to make a diversion in favour of their new allies, the Peloponnesians assembled a considerable armament at the isthmus, intending to convey their ships over land from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they might thus infest the Athenian shores with their fleet, while the army carried on its usual ravages in the central parts of Attica. The activity of the Athenians defeated this design. Notwithstanding their numerous squadrons on the coasts of Peloponnesus, Thrace, and Lesbos, they immediately fitted out an hundred sail to defend their own shores. The Peloponnesian sailors, who had been hastily collected from the maritime towns, soon became disgusted with an expedition, attended with unforeseen difficulties; and, as autumn advanced, the militia from the inland country grew impatient to return to their fields and vineyards. During winter, the Mitylenians were still disappointed in their hope of relief. They were encouraged, however, to persevere in resistance, by the arrival of Salæthus, a Spartan general of considerable merit, who having landed in an obscure harbour of the island, travelled by land towards Mitylené; and, during the obscurity of night, passed the Athenian wall of circumvallation, by favour of a breach made by a torrent. Salæthus gave the besieged fresh assurances that a powerful fleet would be sent to their assistance early in the spring; and that, at the same time, the Athenians should be harassed

by

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by an invaſion more terrible and deſtructive than any which they had yet experienced.

Imprudent conduct of Alcidas. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

The latter part of the promiſe was indeed performed. The Peloponneſians invaded Attica. Whatever had been ſpared in former incurſions, now fell a prey to their fury. But after the ſpring was conſiderably advanced, the long-expected fleet was looked for in vain. The ſame procraſtination and difficulties ſtill retarded the preparations of the confederates; and when at length forty ſail were collected, the command was beſtowed on the Spartan Alcidas, a man totally devoid of that ſpirit and judgment eſſential to the character of a naval commander. Inſtead of ſailing directly to the relief of Mitylené, he waſted much precious time in purſuing the Athenian merchantmen, in haraſſing the unfortified iſlands, and in alarming the defenceleſs and unwarlike inhabitants of Ionia, who could ſcarcely recover from their aſtoniſhment, at ſeeing a Peloponneſian fleet in thoſe ſeas. Many trading veſſels, that ſailed between the numerous iſlands and harbours on that extenſive coaſt, fell into the hands of Alcidas; for when they deſcried his ſquadron, they attempted not to avoid it; many fearleſsly approached it, as certainly Athenian. In conſequence of this imprudence, Alcidas took a great number of priſoners, whom he butchered in cold blood at Myoneſus.

Mitylené ſurrenders. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

This barbarity only diſgraced himſelf, and injured the Spartan cauſe in Aſia, many cities of which were previouſly ripe for revolt. Before he attempted to accompliſh the main object

 of

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of his expedition, the opportunity was for ever loſt by the ſurrender of Mitylené. Deſpair of aſſiſtance, and ſcarcity of proviſions, had obliged Salæthus, who began himſelf by this time to ſuſpect that the Peloponneſians had laid aſide all thoughts of ſuccouring the place, to arm[3] the populace, in order to make a vigorous aſſault on the Athenian lines. But the lower ranks of men, who in Leſbos, as well as in all the Grecian iſles, naturally favoured the cauſe of Athens, the avowed patron of democracy, no ſooner received their armour, than they refuſed obeying their ſuperiors, and threatened, that unleſs the corn were ſpeedily brought to the market-place, and equally divided among all the citizens, they would inſtantly ſubmit to the beſiegers. The ariſtocratical party prudently yielded to the torrent of popular fury, which they had not ſtrength to reſiſt; and juſtly apprehenſive, leſt a more obſtinate defence might totally exclude them from the benefit of capitulation, they ſurrendered to Paches, the Athenian commander, on condition that none of the priſoners ſhould be enſlaved or put to death, until their agents, who were immediately ſent to implore the clemency of Athens, ſhould return with the ſentence of that republic.

Terror of the Leſbian captives.

The terms were accepted and ratified; but ſuch were the furious reſentments which prevailed in that age, ſuch the dark ſuſpicions, and ſuch the

[3] He gave the populace, who were before light armed, heavy armour. Thucydid. p. 188. English cannot imitate his expreſſion: ὁπλίζει τὸν δῆμον πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα.

total

total diſregard to all laws of juſtice and humanity, that the Athenian army had no ſooner taken poſſeſſion of the place, than the chief authors and abettors of the revolt, judging it imprudent to truſt their ſafety to the faith of treaties, and the ſanctity of oaths, flew for protection to their temples and altars. This unſeaſonable diffidence (for Paches appears to have united uncommon humanity with a daring ſpirit, and great military abilities) diſcovered conſcious guilt, and enabled the Athenians to diſtinguiſh between their friends and enemies. The latter were protected by Paches, and prevailed on to withdraw from their ſanctuaries. He afterwards ſent them to the iſle of Tenedos, until their fate, as well as that of their fellow-citizens, ſhould be finally determined by the Athenian republic.

They are doomed to death by an Athenian decree.

Immediately after the arrival of the Mitylenian ambaſſadors, the people of Athens had aſſembled to deliberate on this important ſubject. Agitated by the giddy tranſports of triumph over the rebellious ingratitude and perfidy of a people, who, though diſtinguiſhed by peculiar favours, had abandoned and betrayed their protectors in the ſeaſon of danger, the Athenians doomed to death all the Mitylenian citizens, and condemned the women and children to perpetual ſervitude. In one day the bill was propoſed, the decree paſſed, and the ſame evening a galley was diſpatched to Paches, conveying this cruel and bloody reſolution. But the night left room for reflection; and the feelings of humanity were awakened by the ſtings of remorſe. In the morning, having aſſem-

 bled,

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bled, as usual, in the public square, men were surprised and pleased to find the sentiments of their neighbours exactly corresponding with their own. Their dejected countenances met each other; they lamented, with one accord, the rashness and ferocity of their passion, and bewailed the unhappy fate of Mitylené, the destined object of their misguided frenzy. The Mitylenian ambassadors availed themselves of this sudden change of sentiment; a new assembly was convened, and the question submitted to a second deliberation.

Character of Cleon.

A turbulent impetuous eloquence had raised the audacious profligacy of Cleon, from the lowest rank of life, to a high degree of authority in the Athenian assembly. The multitude were deceived by his artifices, and pleased with his frontless impudence, which they called boldness, and manly openness of character. His manners they approved in proportion as they resembled their own; and the worst of his vices found advocates among the dupes of his pretended patriotism. This violent demagogue, whose arrogant [4] presumption so unworthily succeeded the enlightened magnanimity of Pericles, had, in the former assembly, proposed and carried the sanguinary decree against Mitylené. He still persevered in supporting that atrocious measure, and upbraided the weak and wavering

[4] The character of Cleon, sketched in miniature by Thucydides, pp. 193 and 266. is painted at full length by Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Ιππεις, "The Horsemen." Yet we could not safely trust the description of the angry satirist, who bore a personal grudge to Cleon, unless the principal strokes were justified by the impartial narrative of Thucydides.

counsels

counſels of his countrymen, liable to be ſhaken by every guſt of paſſion, and totally incapable of that ſtability eſſential in the management of great affairs, and particularly indiſpenſable in the government of diſtant dependencies.

Cleon enforces that decree.

" Such a temper of mind (he had often ventured to declare, and would repeat the ſame diſagreeable truth as often as their folly obliged him) was alike unworthy, and incapable, of command. That a democracy was unfit for ſovereign rule, paſt experience convinced him, and the preſent inſtance now confirmed his opinion. The empire of Athens could not be maintained without an undivided attachment, an unalterable adherence, to the intereſt and honour of the republic. But the maſters of Greece were the ſlaves of their own capricious paſſions; excited at will by the perfidious voice of venal ſpeakers, bribed to betray them. Lulled to a fatal repoſe by the ſoftneſs of melodious words, they forgot the dignity of the ſtate, and reſtrained their perſonal reſentment againſt multiplied and unprovoked injuries. What was ſtill more dangerous, they invited, by an ill-judged lenity, the imitation and continuance of ſuch crimes as muſt terminate in public diſgrace and inevitable ruin. What elſe can be expected from pardoning the aggravated guilt of Mitylené? Encouraged by this weakneſs, muſt not the neighbouring cities and iſlands, whoſe reſources form the principal vigour of the republic, greedily ſeize the firſt opportunity of ſhaking off the yoke, which they have long reluctantly borne; and follow the example of a revolt, which, without

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presenting them with the fear of danger, promised them the hope of deliverance?"

Deodatus opposes it with equal address and spirit.

This sanguinary speech was answered by Deodatus, a man endowed with an amiable moderation of character, joined to a profound knowledge of government, and a deep insight into human nature. In the former assembly, this respectable orator had ventured, almost single and alone, to plead the cause of the Mitylenians, and to assert the rights of humanity. He observed, "that assemblies were liable to be misled by the fury of resentment, as well as by the weakness of compassion; and that errors of the former kind were often attended by consequences not less destructive, and always followed by a far more bitter repentance. Against vague slanders and calumny no man is secure; but a true patriot must learn to despise such unmanly reproaches. Undaunted by opposition, he will offer good counsel, to which there are no greater enemies than haste and anger. For my part, I stand up neither to defend the Mitylenians, nor to waste time in fruitless accusations. They have injured us most outrageously, yet I would not advise you to butcher them, unless *that* can be proved expedient; neither, were they objects of forgiveness, would I advise you to pardon them[5], unless that were conducive to the public interest, the only point on which our present deliberation turns. Guided by vulgar prejudices, Cleon has

[5] This is speaking like an orator. It will appear in the sequel, that Deodatus by no means considered the innocence or guilt of the Mitylenians as things indifferent.

loudly

loudly aſſerted, that the deſtruction of the Mitylenians is neceſſary to deter neighbouring cities from rebellion. But diſtant ſubjects muſt be kept in obedience by the mildneſs of diſcretionary caution, not by the rigour of ſanguinary examples. What people were ever ſo mad as to revolt, without expecting, either through their domeſtic ſtrength, or the aſſiſtance of foreign powers, to make good their pretenſions? Men who have known liberty, how ſweet it is, ought not to be puniſhed too ſeverely for aſpiring at that ineſtimable enjoyment. But their growing diſaffection muſt be watched with care, and anticipated by diligence; they muſt be prevented from taking the firſt ſteps towards emancipation; and taught, if poſſible, to regard it as a thing altogether unattainable.

"Yet ſuch is the nature of man, conſidered either individually or collectively, that a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Of all crimes that any reaſonable creature can commit, Deſire is the forerunner, and Hope the attendant. Theſe inviſible principles within, are too powerful for all external terrors; nor has the increaſing ſeverity of laws rendered crimes leſs frequent in latter times, than during the mildneſs of the heroic ages, when few puniſhments were capital. While human nature remains the ſame, weakneſs will be diſtruſtful, neceſſity will be daring, poverty will excite injuſtice, power will urge to rapacity, miſery will ſink into meanneſs, and proſperity ſwell into preſumption. There are other

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contingencies, which ſtir up the mutiny of paſſions, too ſtubborn for controul. The authority of government can neither change the combination of events, nor interrupt the occaſions of fortune. Impelled by ſuch cauſes, the ſelfiſh deſires of men will hurry them into wickedneſs and vice, whatever penalties await them. The imagination becomes familiar with one degree of puniſhment, as well as with another; and, in every degree, hope renders it alike ineffectual and impotent; ſince neither individuals nor communities would be guilty of injuſtice, if they believed that it muſt infallibly ſubject them to puniſhment, ſmall or great. When individuals commit crimes, they always expect to elude the vengeance of law. When communities rebel, they expect to render their revolt not the occaſion of triumph to their enemies, but the means of their own deliverance and ſecurity.

"The ſevere puniſhment of Mitylené cannot, therefore, produce the good conſequences with which Cleon has flattered you. But this cruel meaſure will be attended with irreparable prejudice to your intereſt. It will eſtrange the affections of your allies; provoke the reſentment of Greece; excite the indignation of mankind; and, inſtead of preventing rebellion, render it more frequent and more dangerous. When all hopes of ſucceſs have vaniſhed, your rebellious ſubjects will never be perſuaded to return to their duty. They will ſeek death in the field rather than await it from the hand of the executioner. Though reduced

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to the laſt extremity, they will ſpurn ſubmiſſion, and gathering courage from deſpair, either repel your aſſaults, or fall an uſeleſs prey, weak and exhauſted, incapable of indemnifying you for the expence of the war, or of raiſing thoſe ſubſidies and contributions, which rendered their ſubjugation a reaſonable object either of intereſt or ambition. CHAP. XVI.

"The revolt of Mitylené was the work of an ariſtocratical faction, fomented by the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. The great body of the people were no ſooner provided with arms, than they diſcovered their affection for Athens. It would be moſt cruel and moſt ungrateful, to confound the innocent with the guilty, to involve friends and foes in undiſtinguiſhed ruin. Yet this odious meaſure would ſhew more weakneſs than cruelty, more folly than injuſtice. What advantage could the enemies of Athens more earneſtly deſire? What boon could the ariſtocratical factions, ſo profuſely ſcattered over Greece, more anxiouſly requeſt from Heaven? Furniſhed with your ſanguinary decree againſt Mitylené, they might for ever alienate from the republic the affections of her ſubjects and confederates; for having once ſeduced them to revolt, they might unanſwerably convince them, that ſafety could only be purchaſed by perſevering in rebellion, and that to return to duty was to ſubmit to death."

His opinion prevails.

The moderation and good ſenſe of Deodatus (ſuch was the influence of Cleon) were approved only by a ſmall majority of voices. Yet it remained uncertain, whether this late and reluctant repent-

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repentance would avail the Mitylenians, who, before any advice of it arrived, might be condemned and executed in conſequence of the former decree. A galley was inſtantly furniſhed with every thing that might promote expedition. The Mitylenian deputies promiſed invaluable rewards to the rowers. But the fate of a numerous, and lately flouriſhing community, ſtill depended on the uncertainty of winds and currents. The firſt advice-boat had ſailed, as the meſſenger of bad news, with a ſlow and melancholy progreſs. The ſecond advanced with the rapid movement of joy. Not an adverſe blaſt oppoſed her courſe. The neceſſity of food and ſleep never reſtrained a moment the labour of the oar: and her diligence was rewarded by reaching Leſbos in time to check the cruel hand of the executioner.

Narrow eſcape of the Mitylenians.

The bloody ſentence had been juſt read, even the orders had been iſſued for its execution, when the critical arrival of the Athenian galley converted the lamentable outcries, or gloomy deſpair of a whole republic, into expreſſions of admiration and gratitude.

Reſettlement of affairs in Leſbos. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A.C. 427.

The puniſhment, however, of Mitylené was ſtill ſufficiently ſevere, even according to the rigorous maxims of Grecian policy. The priſoners, who had been ſent to Tenedos, were tranſported to Athens. They exceeded a thouſand in number, and were indiſcriminately condemned to death. Salæthus, the Spartan general, ſhared the ſame fate, after deſcending to many mean contrivances to ſave his life. The walls of Mitylené were

were demolished, its shipping was sent to Athens, and its territory divided into three thousand portions, of which three hundred were consecrated to the gods, and the rest distributed by lot among the people of Athens. The Lesbians were still allowed to cultivate, as tenants, their own fields, paying for each share an annual-rent of about six pounds nine shillings sterling[6].

Merit and persecution of Paches.

The activity and judgment of Paches thus effected an important conquest to his country. Though the affairs of Lesbos might have required his undivided attention, he no sooner was apprised of the appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet, than he immediately put to sea, protected the allies of Athens, and chased the enemy from those shores. During the whole time of his command, he behaved with firmness tempered by humanity. But, at his return to Athens, he met with the usual reward of superior merit. He was accused of misconduct; and finding sentence ready to be pronounced against him, his indignation rose so high, that he slew himself in court[7].

Operations of the Spartan fleet.

The Spartan admiral, Alcidas, met, on the other hand, with a reception (such is the blindness of popular prejudice!) far better than his behaviour deserved. The Peloponnesian fleet of forty sail, imprudently intrusted to his command, retired ingloriously, after a most expensive and fruitless expedition, to the protection of their friendly harbours. A northerly wind, however, drove them

6 Thucydid. p. 173—206.

7 Plutarch. in Nicia, & in Aristid.

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on the ſhores of Crete; from whence they dropped in ſucceſſively to the port of Cyllené, which had recovered the diſaſter inflicted on it by the Corcyreans at the beginning of the war, and become the ordinary rendezvous of the Peloponneſian fleet. In this place, Alcidas found thirteen gallies, commanded by Braſidas, a Spartan of diſtinguiſhed valour and abilities, purpoſely choſen to aſſiſt the admiral with his counſels. This ſmall ſquadron had orders to join the principal armament; with which the confederates, as their deſign had miſcarried at Leſbos, purpoſed to undertake an expedition to Corcyra, then agitated by the tumult of a moſt dangerous ſedition.

Intrigues of the Corinthians with the Corcyrean priſoners,

Among the hoſtilities already related between the republics of Corinth and Corcyra, we deſcribed the enterpriſes by which the Corinthians took above twelve hundred Corcyrean priſoners. Many of theſe perſons were deſcended from the firſt families in the iſland; a circumſtance on which the policy of Corinth founded an extenſive plan of artifice and ambition. The Corcyreans, inſtead of feeling the rigours of captivity, or experiencing the ſtern ſeverity of republican reſentment, were treated with the liberal and endearing kindneſs of Grecian hoſpitality. Having acquired their confidence by good offices, the Corinthians inſinuated to them, in the unguarded hours of convivial merriment, the danger as well as the diſgrace of their connection with Athens, the univerſal tyrant of her allies; and repreſented their ſhameful ingratitude in deſerting Corinth, to which the colony of Corcyra owed

owed not only its early happineſs and proſperity, but its original eſtabliſhment and exiſtence. Theſe arguments, ſeaſonably repeated, and urged with much addreſs, at length proved effectual. The Corcyreans recovered their freedom, and returned to their native country; and while they pretended to be collecting the ſum of eight hundred talents (about an hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling) to pay their ranſom, they left nothing untried to detach Corcyra from the Athenian intereſt.

excite dangerous factions in Corcyra.

Their firſt expedient for accompliſhing this purpoſe was, to traduce the popular leaders, who were the moſt ſtedfaſt partizans of that republic. Accuſations, impeachments, all the artifices and chicane of legal perſecution, were directed and played off againſt them. The demagogues, who were not of a temper to brook ſuch injuries, retorted on their antagoniſts with equal ingenuity, and far ſuperior ſucceſs. Peithias, the moſt diſtinguiſhed advocate of the Athenian or democratic party, accuſed five ringleaders of the oppoſite faction of having deſtroyed the fence which incloſed the grove of Jupiter; a treſpaſs eſtimated by the Corcyrean law at a ſevere pecuniary puniſhment[8]. In vain the perſons accuſed denied the charge; in vain, after conviction before the ſenate, they fled as ſupplicants to the altars. They could obtain no mitigation of the amercement. The

[8] The fine was, for every pale a ſtater (one pound and nine pence ſterling). Such cauſes were frequent in other parts of Greece, as we learn from the oration of Lyſias in defence of a citizen accuſed of cutting down a conſecrated olive. See the tranſlation of Lyſias and Iſocrates, p. 377.

dema-

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demagogue was inflexible; and his influence with his colleagues in the ſenate, of which he happened that year to be a member, determined them to execute the law in its utmoſt rigour.

Aſſaſſination of the demagogues.

Exaſperated by this ſeverity, and not doubting that during the adminiſtration of the preſent ſenate, many ſimilar proſecutions would be raiſed againſt them, the ariſtocratical party entered into a conſpiracy for defending themſelves and their country againſt the oppreſſive injuſtice of Athens and Athenian partizans. On this emergency they acted like men who knew the danger of delay. Having fortified their cauſe with a ſufficient number of adherents, they armed themſelves with concealed daggers, ſuddenly ruſhed into the ſenate-houſe, and aſſaſſinated Peithias, with ſixty of his friends. This boldneſs ſtruck their opponents with terror. Such perſons as felt themſelves moſt obnoxious to the conſpirators, immediately fled to the harbour, embarked, and ſailed to Athens.

Sedition in Corcyra. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A.C. 427.

The people of Corcyra, thus deprived of their leaders by an event equally unexpected and atrocious, were ſeized with ſuch aſtoniſhment as ſuſpended their power of action. Before they had ſufficiently recovered themſelves to take the proper meaſures for revenge, or even for defence, the arrival of a Corinthian veſſel, and a Lacedæmonian embaſſy, encouraged their opponents to attempt their deſtruction. The attack was made at the hour of full aſſembly; the forum, or public ſquare, preſented a ſcene of horror; the ſtreets of Corcyra ſtreamed with blood. The unguarded citizens were

were incapable of making reſiſtance againſt ſuch ſudden and unforeſeen fury. They fled in trepidation from the forum, and the more ſpacious ſtreets. Some took poſſeſſion of the citadel; others of the Hillæan harbour; and in general occupied, before evening, the higher and more remote parts of the town. Their adverſaries kept poſſeſſion of the market-place, around which moſt of their houſes ſtood, or aſſembled in the principal harbour, that points towards Epirus, from which they expected ſuccour. The day following was ſpent in doubtful ſkirmiſhes, and in ſummoning from the country the aſſiſtance of the peaſants, or rather ſlaves, by whom chiefly the lands of the iſland were cultivated. Theſe naturally ranged themſelves on the ſide of the people: the Corcyrean women zealouſly embraced the ſame party, and ſuſtained the tumult with more than female courage. One inactive day intervened. The partizans of ariſtocracy were reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent of Epirus. But in the ſucceeding engagement, the numbers and fury of the ſlaves, who ſeized the preſent opportunity to reſent the barbarous cruelty of their reſpective maſters, and the generous ardour of the women, rendered the friends of liberty completely victorious. The vanquiſhed fled towards the forum and the great harbour. Even theſe poſts they ſoon deſpaired of being able to maintain; and, to eſcape immediate death, ſet fire to the ſurrounding houſes, which being ſoon thrown into a blaze, preſented an impervious obſtacle to the rage of the aſſailants.

The

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The moſt beautiful part of Corcyra was thus deſtroyed in one night; the houſes, ſhops, magazines, and much valuable merchandiſe, were totally conſumed; and had an eaſterly wind aided the conflagration, the whole city muſt in a ſhort time have been reduced to aſhes. Amidſt this ſcene of confuſion and horror, the Corinthian galley, together with the auxiliaries from Epirus, retired in conſternation from a place that ſeemed doomed to inevitable deſtruction.

An Athenian ſquadron arrives at Corcyra.

Next day twelve Athenian gallies arrived from Naupactus, containing, beſides their ordinary complement of men, five hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians. Nicoſtratus, who commanded this armament, had, upon the firſt intelligence of the ſedition, haſtened with the utmoſt celerity to ſupport the cauſe of Athens and democracy. He had the good fortune not only to anticipate the Peloponneſian ſquadron, which was ſo anxiouſly expected by the enemy, but to find his friends triumphant. They had obtained, however, a melancholy triumph over the ſplendour of their country, which, if its factions were not ſpeedily reconciled, was threatened with total ruin. Nicoſtratus omitted nothing that ſeemed proper to heal the wounds of that afflicted commonwealth. By authority, entreaties, and commands, he perſuaded the contending parties to accommodate matters between themſelves, and to renew their alliance with Athens. Having happily terminated this buſineſs, he was intent on immediate departure; but the managers for the people propoſed, that he ſhould leave five

of

of his ſhips with them, to deter the enemy from any freſh commotion, and take in exchange five of theirs, which ſhould be inſtantly manned to attend him on his ſtation. With this propoſal he complied; and the Corcyreans ſelected the mariners deſtined to ſail with Nicoſtratus. Thoſe named for this ſervice were, to a man, partizans of the oligarchy and Lacedæmon: a circumſtance which created in them juſt alarm, leſt they ſhould be tranſported to Athens, and, notwithſtanding the faith of treaties, condemned to death. They took refuge in the temple of Caſtor and Pollux: the aſſurances of Nicoſtratus could ſcarcely remove them from this ſanctuary; and all his declarations and oaths were incapable to prevail on them to embark. The oppoſite party aſſerted, that this want of confidence betrayed not only the conſciouſneſs of paſt, but the fixed purpoſe of future, guilt; and would have immediately diſpatched them with their daggers, had not Nicoſtratus interpoſed. Terrified at theſe proceedings, the unhappy victims of popular malice and ſuſpicion aſſembled, to the number of four hundred, and retired with one accord, as ſupplicants, to the temple of Juno. From this ſanctuary they were perſuaded to ariſe, and tranſported to a neighbouring iſland, or rather rock, ſmall, barren, and uninhabited. There they remained four days, ſupplied barely with the means of ſubſiſtence, and impatiently waiting their fate.

The Peloponneſian fleet appears off the coaſt.

In this poſture of affairs a numerous fleet was ſeen approaching from the ſouth. This was the long-expected ſquadron of fifty-three ſhips commanded

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manded by Alcidas and Brasidas. With the unfortunate slowness inherent in all the measures of the confederacy, this armament arrived too late to support the ruined cause of their friends. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, might still expect to take an useless but agreeable vengeance on their enemies. To accomplish this design they prepared to attack the harbour of Corcyra, while all was hurry and confusion. The islanders had sixty vessels fit for sea, in which they embarked with the utmost expedition, and successively sailed forth as each happened to be ready. Their ardour and impatience disdained the judicious advice of Nicostratus, who alone, calm and unmoved amidst a scene of unexpected danger, exhorted them to keep the harbour until they were all prepared to advance in line of battle, generously offering, with his twelve Athenian gallies, to sustain the first assaults of the enemy.

A seafight, in which the Peloponnesians prevail.

The Peloponnesians, observing the hostile armament scattered and unsupported, divided their own fleet into two squadrons. The one, consisting of twenty gallies, attacked the Corcyreans; the other, amounting to thirty-three, endeavoured to surround the Athenians. But the address of the Athenian mariners frustrated this attempt. Their front was extended with equal order and celerity. They assaulted, at once, the opposite wings of the Peloponnesian fleet, intercepted their motion, and skilfully encircled them around, hoping to drive their ships against each other, and to throw them into universal disorder. Perceiving these manœuvres, the

the ſhips which followed the Corcyreans left off the purſuit, and ſteered to ſupport the main ſquadron: and now, with their whole embodied ſtrength, they prepared to pour on the Athenians. Theſe prudently declined the ſhock of ſuperior force: but the glory of their retreat was equal to a victory. They ſeaſonably ſhifted their helms, ſlowly and regularly gave way, and thus covered the retreat of their Corcyrean allies, who, having already loſt thirteen veſſels, were totally unable to renew the engagement.

The miſconduct of Alcidas ſaves Corcyra.

Having reached the harbour, the Corcyreans ſtill feared leſt the enemy, in purſuance of their victory, ſhould make a deſcent on the coaſt, and even aſſault the city. But the manly counſels of Braſidas, who ſtrongly recommended the latter meaſure, were defeated by the timidity and incapacity of Alcidas. The Corcyreans ſeized, therefore, the preſent opportunity to remove the ſupplicants from the uninhabited iſland to the temple of Juno, as leſs expoſed there, to be diſcovered and taken up by the Peloponneſian fleet. Next day they entered into accommodation with theſe unhappy men, and even admitted ſeveral of them to embark in thirty veſſels, which they haſtily equipped, as the laſt defence of the iſland. The Peloponneſians, meanwhile, ſtill prevented, by the daſtardly counſels of Alcidas, from attacking the capital, wrecked their reſentment on the adjacent territory. But before the dawn of the ſucceeding day, they were alarmed by lights on the northern ſhore of Leucadia, which, by their number and diſpo-

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dispofition, fignified the approach of an Athenian fleet of fixty fail.

The Athenians reinforced.

The fituation of the invaders was now extremely dangerous. If they ftretched out to fea, they might be obliged to encounter the unbroken vigour of the Athenians: if they cruifed off the coaft, they would be compelled to contend, not only with the power of Athens, but with the refentment of Corcyra. One meafure alone promifed the hope of fafety: it was immediately adopted. Having crept along the fhore to Leucadia, they carried their veffels acrofs the ifthmus[9], afterwards buried in the fea, but which then joined the peninfula, now the ifland of Leucas, to the adjacent coaft of Acarnania. From thence failing through the narrow feas, which feparate the neighbouring ifles from the continent, they efcaped without difcovery, and fafely arrived in the harbour of Cyllené.

The Peloponnefians retire from Corcyra.

Maffacre of the Lacedæmonian partizans.

The democratical party in Corcyra foon perceived the flight of the enemy, and defcried the approach of the Athenian fleet, commanded by Eurymedon. Thefe fortunate events, which ought in generous minds to have effaced the dark impreffions of enmity and revenge, only enabled the Corcyreans to difplay the deep malignity of their character. They commanded the thirty gallies, recently manned, to pafs in review, and in proportion as they difcovered their enemies, punifhed them with immediate death. Fifty of the principal citizens, who ftill clung to the altars in the temple

9 D'Anville confiders the ancient Leucadia as an ifland; Ptolemy fpeaks of it as a peninfula.

of Juno, they ſeduced from their aſylum, and inſtantly butchered.

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Malignant paſſions of the Corcyreans.

Politics and party formed the pretence for violence, while individuals gratified their private paſſions, and wrecked vengeance on their perſonal foes. The ſedition became every hour more fierce: the confuſion thickened; the whole city was filled with conſternation and horror. The altars and images of the gods were ſurrounded by votaries, whom even the terrors of a ſuperſtitious age could no longer protect. The miſerable victims were dragged from the moſt revered temples, whoſe walls and pavement were now firſt ſtained with civil blood. Many withdrew themſelves by a voluntary death from the fury of their enemies. In every houſe, and in every family, ſcenes were tranſacted too horrid for deſcription. Parents, children, brothers, and pretended friends, ſeized the deſired moment for gratifying their latent malignity, and perpetrating crimes without a name. The unfeeling Eurymedon (whoſe character, as will ſhortly appear, was a diſgrace to human nature) ſhewed neither ability or inclination to ſtop the carnage. During the ſpace of ſix days that his fleet continued in the Corcyrean harbour, the actors in this lamentable tragedy continually aggravated the enormity of their guilt, and improved in the refinement of their cruelty. A dreadful calm ſucceeded this violent agitation. Five hundred partizans of ariſtocracy eſcaped to the coaſt of Epirus; and the Athenian fleet retired.

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The ariſtocratical party receive aſſiſtance from Epirus.

The fugitives, inſtead of rejoicing in their ſafety, thought only of revenge. They ſent agents to Lacedæmon and Corinth. By deſcribing their ſufferings to the aſtoniſhed Epirots, they excited their compaſſion, and acquired their aſſiſtance. The ſeverity of the prevailing party in Corcyra increaſed the number of outlaws; who, at length, finding themſelves ſufficiently powerful to attack and conquer the iſland, which, from the moment of their baniſhment, they had infeſted by naval deſcents, ſailed with their whole ſtrength for that purpoſe in boats provided by the Barbarians. In landing at Corcyra, the rowers drove with ſuch violence againſt the ſhore, as broke many of their veſſels in pieces; the reſt they immediately burned, diſdaining ſafety unleſs purchaſed by victory. This deſperate meaſure deterred oppoſition: they advanced, ſeized, and fortified, Mount Iſtoné; a ſtrong poſt in the neighbourhood of the city, from which they ravaged the territory, and ſubjected their enemies to the multiplied evils of war and famine.

The Athenians again arrive in the iſland. Olymp. lxxxviii.4. A.C.425.

An epidemical diſorder increaſed the meaſure of their calamities. The flames of civil diſcord, which had never been thoroughly extinguiſhed, again broke out within the walls. The miſery of the Corcyreans was verging to deſpair, when an Athenian fleet of forty ſail appeared off the coaſt. This armament was commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was principally deſtined againſt Sicily, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, but ordered in its voyage thither to touch at Corcyra, and regulate the affairs of that iſland. This unex-

pected

pected assistance enabled the besieged to become the besiegers. The outworks and defences of Mount Istoné were successively taken, the parties who defended them gradually retiring to the more elevated branches, and, at length, to the very summit, of the mountain. They were on the point of being driven from thence, and of falling into the hands of enemies exasperated by innumerable injuries suffered and inflicted. Alarmed by this reflection, they called out to the Athenians for quarter, and surrendered to Eurymedon and Sophocles, on condition that their fate should be decided by the people of Athens. They were sent prisoners to the small island of Ptychia, till it should be found convenient to transport them to Athens, and commanded not to make any attempt to stir from thence under pain of annulling the capitulation which had been granted them.

Perfidious cruelty of the Corcyreans;

If the malignity of the Corcyrean populace had not exceeded the ordinary standard of human pravity, their resentment must have been softened by the sudden transition wrought by accident in their favour. But their first concern was to intercept the precarious clemency of Athens, and to assure the destruction of their adversaries. This atrocious design was executed by a stratagem equally detestable, uniting, by a singular combination, whatever is savage in ferocity, and base in perfidy. By means of proper agents dispatched secretly to Ptychia, the leaders of the popular faction acquainted those of the prisoners, with whom, in peaceable times, they had respectively lived in some

 habits

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habits of intimacy, that the Athenians had determined to give them up indiſcriminately to the fury of the populace. Pretending much regret that perſons in whom they once had ſo tender a concern, ſhould ſhare the common calamity, they exhorted them, by all poſſible means, to contrive their eſcape, and offered to provide them with a bark for that purpoſe. The known cruelty of Eurymedon made the artifice ſucceed. The bark was already launched from the iſland; the terms of the capitulation were thus infringed; the deluded victims were apprehended in the very act of departure, ſeized, bound, and delivered into the hands of their inexorable enemies.

and of the Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles.

The Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, favoured the deceit, becauſe, as they were themſelves obliged to proceed towards Sicily, they envied the honour that would accrue to their ſucceſſors in conducting the captives to Athens. To gratify this meanneſs of ſoul without example, they permitted barbarities beyond belief.

Unexampled barbarities committed in Corcyra.

The unhappy priſoners were firſt confined in a dungeon. Dragged ſucceſſively from thence, in parties of twenty at a time, they were compelled to paſs in pairs, their hands tied behind their backs, between two ranks of their enemies, armed with whips, prongs, and every inſtrument of licentious and diſgraceful torture. The wretches left in priſon were long ignorant of the ignominious cruelty inflicted on their companions: but, as ſoon as they learned the abominable ſcenes tranſacted without, they refuſed to quit their confinement,

guarded

guarded the entrance, and invited, with one consent, the Athenians to murder them. But the Athenians wanted either humanity or firmneſs to commit this kind cruelty. The Corcyrean populace ventured not to force a paſſage from deſpair. They mounted the priſon walls, uncovered the roof, and overwhelmed thoſe below with ſtones, darts, and arrows. Theſe weapons were deſtructive to many, and furniſhed others with the means of deſtroying themſelves, or each other. They laid down their heads, opened their breaſts, expoſed their necks, mutually ſoliciting, in plaintive or frantic accents, the fatal ſtroke. The whole night (for the night intervened) was ſpent in this horrid ſcene; and the morning preſented a ſpectacle too ſhocking for deſcription. The obdurate hearts of the Corcyreans were incapable of pity or remorſe; but their relenting eyes could not bear the ſight; and they commanded the bodies of their fellow-citizens, now breathleſs or expiring, to be thrown on carts, and conveyed without the walls.

The conſequences of the ſedition permanent.

Thus ended the ſedition of Corcyra[10]; but its conſequences were not ſoon to end. The contagion of that unhappy iſland engendered a political malady, which ſpread its baneful influence over Greece. The ariſtocratical, and ſtill more, the popular governments of that country, had ever been liable to faction, which occaſionally blazed into ſedition. But this morbid tendency, congenial to the conſtitution of republics, thenceforth aſſumed a more dangerous appearance, and be-

[10] Thucydid. p. 220—285.

trayed

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trayed more alarming ſymptoms. In every republic, and almoſt in every city, the intriguing and ambitious found the ready protection of Athens, or of Sparta, according as their ſelfiſh and guilty deſigns were ſcreened under the pretence of maintaining the prerogatives of the nobles, or aſſerting the privileges of the people. A virtuous and moderate ariſtocracy, an equal impartial freedom, theſe were the colourings which ſerved to juſtify violence and varniſh guilt. Sheltered by the ſpecious coverings of fair names, the prodigal aſſaſſin delivered himſelf from the importunity of his creditor. The father, with unnatural cruelty, puniſhed the licentious extravagance of his ſon: the ſon avenged, by parricide, the ſtern ſeverity of his father. The debates of the public aſſembly were decided by the ſword. Not ſatisfied with victory, men thirſted for blood. This general diſorder overwhelmed laws human and divine. The ordinary courſe of events was reverſed: ſentiments loſt their natural force, and words their uſual meaning[11]. Dulneſs and ſtupidity triumphed over abilities and refinement; for while the crafty and ingenious were laying fine-ſpun ſnares for their enemies, men of blunter minds had immediate recourſe to the ſword and poignard. This ſucceſsful audacity was termed manly enterpriſe; ferocity aſſumed the name of courage; faction and ambition paſſed for patriotiſm and magnanimity; perfidy was called prudence; cunning, wiſdom; every vice was clothed in the garb of every virtue:

[11] Thucydid. p. 227, & ſeqq.

while

while juſtice, moderation, and candour, were branded as weakneſs, cowardice, meanneſs of ſoul, and indifference to the public intereſt. Such was the perverſion of ſentiment, and ſuch the corruption of language, firſt engendered amidſt the turbulence of Grecian factions, and too faithfully imitated, as far as the ſoft effeminacy of modern manners will permit, by the diſcontented and ſeditious of later times—Wretched and deteſtable deluſions, by which wicked men deceive and ruin the public and themſelves.

CHAP. XVII.

Physical Calamities conspire with the Evils of War.—Athenian Expedition into Ætolia.—Victories of Demosthenes.—He fortifies Pybus.—Blocks up the Spartans in Sphacteria.—The Spartans solicit Peace.—Artifices and Imprudence of Cleon.—His unmerited Success.—Ridiculed by Aristophanes.—Athenian Conquests.—Battle of Delium.—Commotions in Thrace.—Expedition of Brasidas.—Truce for a Year.—The War renewed.—Battle of Amphipolis.—Peace of Nicias.—Dissatisfaction of the Spartan Allies.

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Physical calamities conspire with the evils of war. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A.C. 427.

IT would be agreeable to diversify the dark and melancholy scenes of the Peloponnesian war, by introducing occurrences and transactions of a different and more pleasing kind. But such, unfortunately, is the settled gloom of our present subject, that the episodes commonly reflect the same colour with the principal action. The miserable period now under our review, and already distinguished by revolt and sedition, was still farther deformed by a return of the pestilence, and by innumerable earthquakes. The disease carried off five thousand Athenian troops, and a great but uncertain number of other citizens. It raged, during a twelvemonth, with unabating violence; many remedies were employed, but all equally ineffectual. The poison at length spent its force, and

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and the malady disappeared by a slow and insensible progress, similar to that observed in the Levant, and other parts of the world, which are still liable to be visited by this dreadful calamity [1]. The earthquakes alarmed Attica and Bœotia, but proved most destructive in the neighbouring isles. The dreadful concussions of the land were accompanied, or perhaps produced, by a violent agitation of the sea. The reflux of the waves overwhelmed the flourishing city of Orobia, on the western coast of Eubœa. Similar disasters happened in the small islands of Atalanta and Peperathus. Nor did these alarming events terminate the afflictions of the Greeks; for Nature, as if she had delighted to produce at one period every thing most awful, poured forth a torrent of fire from Mount Ætna, which demolished the industrious labours of the Cataneans. A dreadful eruption had happened fifty years before this period; and the present was the third, and most memorable, by which Sicily had been agitated and inflamed, since the coasts of that island were adorned by Grecian colonies [2].

Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A.C. 426.

If the Peloponnesian war had not been carried on with an animosity unknown to the mildness of modern times, the long sufferings of the contending parties would have disposed them eagerly to desire the blessings of tranquillity. But such virulent passions rankled in Athens and Sparta, that while calamities were equally balanced, and the

Expedition of Demosthenes to Ætolia. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A.C. 425.

[1] Voyage de Tournefort, vol. ii. Discourse on the Plague, in the Phil. Trans. vol. lxiv.

[2] Thucydid. p. 250.

capitals

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capitals of both republics were ſecure, no combination of adverſe circumſtances ſeemed ſufficient to determine either ſide to purchaſe peace by the ſmalleſt diminution of honour. Yet to this neceſſity, Sparta in the following year was reduced by a train of events, equally ſudden and ſingular. Demoſthenes, a general of merit and enterpriſe, commanded the Athenian forces at Naupactus. This town, as related above, had been beſtowed on the unfortunate Meſſenians; by whoſe aſſiſtance, together with that of the Athenian allies in Acarnania, Cephallenia, and Zacynthus, Demoſthenes undertook to reduce the hoſtile provinces of Ætolia, Ambracia, and Leucadia. But the operations neceſſary for this purpoſe were obſtructed by the jealouſies and diſſenſions which prevailed among the confederates; each ſtate inſiſting, that the whole force of the war ſhould be immediately directed againſt its particular enemies.

Miſunderſtanding among the Athenian allies.

The allied army, thus diſtracted by contrariety, and weakened by defection, performed nothing deciſive againſt Leucadia or Ambracia. In Ætolia they were extremely unfortunate. The Meſſenians, who were continually haraſſed by the natives of that barbarous province, perſuaded Demoſthenes that it would be eaſy to over-run their country, before the inhabitants, who lived in ſcattered villages, widely ſeparated from each other, could collect their force, or attempt reſiſtance. In purſuance of this advice, Demoſthenes entered Ætolia, took and plundered the towns, and drove the inhabitants before him. During ſeveral days he

marched

marched unresisted; but having proceeded to Ægitium, the principal, or rather only city in the province, he found that his design had by no means escaped the notice of the enemy. Ægitium is situate among lofty mountains, and about ten miles distant from the Corinthian gulf. Among these intricate, and almost inaccessible heights the flower of the Ætolian nation were posted. Even the most distant tribes had come up, before the confederate army entered their borders.

Singular mode of battle.

Ægitium was stormed; but the inhabitants escaped to their countrymen concealed among the mountains. While the Athenians and their allies pursued them, the Ætolians rushed, in separate bodies, from different eminences, and checked the pursuers with their darts and javelins. Having discharged their missile weapons, they retired, being light-armed, and incapable to resist the impression of pikemen. New detachments continually poured forth from the mountains, and in all directions annoyed the confederates. The latter lost no ground, as long as their archers had darts, and were able to use them. But when the greatest part of their light troops were wounded or slain, the heavy-armed men began to give away. They still, however, maintained their order; and the battle long continued, in alternate pursuits and retreats, the Ætolians always flying before the enemy as soon as they had discharged their javelins. But at length the confederates were exhausted by so many repeated charges, and totally defeated by opponents who durst not wait their approach.

Their

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Unfortunate iſſue of the expedition.

Their conductors through this intricate country had all periſhed. They miſtook their road to the ſea. The enemy were light-armed, and in their own territories. The purſuit, therefore, was unuſually deſtructive. Many fell into caverns, or tumbled headlong from precipices. A large party wandered into an impervious wood, which being ſet on fire by the enemy, conſumed them in its flames. A miſerable remnant returned to Naupactus, afflicted by the loſs of their companions, and highly mortified at being defeated by Barbarians, alike ignorant of the rules of war, and of the laws of civil ſociety, who ſpoke an unknown dialect, and fed on raw fleſh [3].

Demoſthenes defends Naupactus, &c.

This diſaſter deterred Demoſthenes from returning to Athens, till fortune gave him an opportunity to retrieve the honour of his arms. The Ætolians and Ambraciots, the moſt formidable enemies of the republic on that weſtern coaſt of Greece, ſolicited and obtained aſſiſtance from Lacedæmon and Corinth, vigorouſly attacked the towns of Naupactus and Amphilochian Argos, and threatened to reduce the whole province of Acarnania, in which the latter was ſituated. The vigilance and activity of Demoſthenes not only ſaved theſe important cities, but obtained the moſt ſignal advantages over the aſſailants. With profound military ſkill he divided the ſtrength of the enemy, and, by a well-conducted ſtratagem, totally defeated the Ambraciots among the heights of Idomené. A ſtrong detachment of that brave nation had ad-

Defeats the Ætolians and Ambraciots.

3 Thucydid. p. 237, & ſeqq.

vanced

vanced the preceding day to Olpæ, a place fortified by the Acarnanians, and the ſeat of their courts of juſtice. Demoſthenes obliged them to retreat with conſiderable loſs, and intercepted their return homeward. Meanwhile the collected force of the Ambraciots marched to ſupport their detachment, with whoſe misfortunes they were totally unacquainted. Appriſed of this deſign, Demoſthenes beſet the paſſes, and ſeized the moſt advantageous poſts on their route. With the remainder of his force he advanced to attack them in front. They had already proceeded to Idomené, and encamped on the loweſt ridge of that mountain [4].

Surpriſes their camp.

Demoſthenes placed his Meſſenians in the van, and commanded them, as they marched along, to diſcourſe in their Doric dialect. This circumſtance, as the morning was yet in its dawn, effectually prevented the advanced guards from ſuſpecting them to be enemies. Demoſthenes then ruſhed forward with the Meſſenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots were yet in their beds. The camp was no ſooner aſſaulted, than the rout began. Many were ſlain on the ſpot; the reſt fled amain; but the paſſes were beſet, and the purſuers light-armed. Some ran to the ſea, and beheld a new object of terror, in ſome Athenian ſhips then cruiſing on the coaſt. In this complication of calamities, they plunged into the water, and ſwam to the hoſtile ſquadron, chooſing rather to be deſtroyed by the Athenians, than by the enemies from whom they had eſcaped.

4 Thucydid. p. 244, & ſeqq.

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Consternation of an Ambracian herald.

On the following day, the victors, who remained at Idomené, stripping the dead, and erecting a trophy, were addressed by a herald sent on the part of the detachment who had so much suffered in its retreat from Olpæ. This herald knew nothing of the fresh disaster that had befallen his countrymen. Observing the arms of the Ambraciots, he was astonished at their number. The victors perceiving his surprise, asked him, before he explained his commission, "What he judged to be the amount of the slain?" "Not more than two hundred," replied the herald. The demander then said, "It should seem otherwise, for there are the arms of more than a thousand men." The herald rejoined, "They cannot then belong to our party." The other replied, "They must, if you fought yesterday at Idomené." "We fought no where yesterday; we suffered the day before, in our retreat from Olpæ." "But *we* fought yesterday against these Ambraciots, who were marching to your relief." When the herald heard this, he burst into a groan, and went abruptly off, without further explaining his commission [5].

Demosthenes sails to the Peloponnesus. Olymp. lxxxviii.4. A.C.425.

These important successes enabled Demosthenes to return with honour to Athens. The term of his military command had expired; but his mind could not brook inactivity. He therefore solicited permission to accompany, as a volunteer, the armament which sailed to Corcyra, the success of which has already been related, with leave to em-

[5] Thucydid. p. 244, & seqq.

ploy the Meſſenians, whom he carried along with him, on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, ſhould any opportunity occur there, for promoting the public ſervice. While the fleet ſlowly coaſted along the ſouthern ſhores of that peninſula, the Meſſenians viewed, with mingled joy and ſorrow, the long loſt, but ſtill beloved, ſeats of their anceſtors. They regretted, in particular, the decay of ancient Pylus, the royal reſidence of their admired Neſtor, whoſe youth had been adorned by valour, and his age renowned for wiſdom. Their immortal reſentment againſt Sparta was inflamed by beholding the ruins of Meſſené. A thouſand ideas and ſentiments, which time had obliterated, revived at the ſight of their native ſhores.

Emotions of the Meſſenians at the ſight of their native ſhores.

When the tumult of their emotions ſubſided, they explained their feelings to Demoſthenes, and to each other. He ſuggeſted, or at leaſt warmly approved, the deſign of landing, and rebuilding Pylus, which had been abandoned by the Spartans, though it enjoyed a convenient harbour, and was ſtrongly fortified by nature. Demoſthenes propoſed this meaſure to Eurymedon and Sophocles, who anſwered him with the inſolence congenial to their character, "That there were many barren capes on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, which thoſe might fortify who wiſhed to entail an uſeleſs expence on their country." He next applied to the ſeveral captains of the fleet, and even to the inferior officers, but without better ſucceſs, although he aſſured them that the place abounded in wood and ſtone, with which a wall, ſufficient for defence, might

The Athenians and Meſſenians fortify Pylus.

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might ſpeedily be completed. He had deſiſted from farther intreaties, when a fortunate ſtorm drove the whole fleet towards the Pylian harbour. This circumſtance enabled him to renew his inſtances with greater force, alleging that the events of fortune confirmed the expediency of the undertaking. At length the ſailors and ſoldiers, weary of idleneſs (for the weather prevented them from putting to ſea), began the work of their own accord, and carried it on with ſuch vigour and activity, that in ſix days the place was ſtrongly fortified on every ſide[6]. The Athenian fleet then proceeded to Corcyra, Demoſthenes retaining only five ſhips to guard this new acquiſition.

The Spartans attempt to diſlodge them.

The Spartans were no ſooner appriſed of this daring meaſure, than they withdrew their army from its annual incurſion into Attica, and recalled their fleet from Corcyra. The citizens, reſiding at home, immediately flew to arms, and marched towards Pylus, which was only fifty miles diſtant from their capital. They found the new fortreſs ſo well prepared for defence, that nothing could be undertaken againſt it with any proſpect of ſucceſs, until their whole forces had aſſembled. This occaſioned but a ſhort delay; after which Pylus was vigorouſly aſſaulted by ſea and land. The walls were weakeſt towards the harbour; the entrance of which, however, was ſo narrow, that only two ſhips could ſail into it abreaſt. Here the attack was moſt furious, and the reſiſtance moſt obſtinate.

[6] Thucydid. p. 256, & ſeqq.

Demoſ-

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Gallantry of Brasidas.

Demosthenes encouraged his troops by his voice and arm. The gallant Brasidas, a man destined to act such an illustrious part in the following scenes of the war, called out to the Lacedæmonian pilots to drive against the beach; and exhorted them, by the destruction of their ships, to save the honour of their country. He farther recommended this boldness by his example, but, in performing it, received a wound which rendered him insensible. His body dropped into the sea, seemingly deprived of life, but was recovered by the affectionate zeal of his attendants. When his senses returned, he perceived the loss of his shield, a matter highly punishable by the Spartan laws, if the shield of Brasidas had not been lost with more glory than ever shield was defended [7].

About four hundred Spartans blocked up in Sphacteria.

During three days, Demosthenes, with very unequal strength, resisted the enemy; when the approach of the Athenian fleet from Corcyra, which he had apprised of his danger, terminated the incredible labours of his exhausted garrison. A naval engagement ensued, in which the Lacedæmonians were defeated. But neither this defeat, nor the loss of five ships, nor the total dispersion of their fleet, nor the unexpected relief of Pylus, gave them so much uneasiness, as an event principally occasioned by their own imprudence. The island of Sphacteria, scarce two miles in circumference, barren, woody, and uninhabited, lies before the harbour of Pylus. In this island the Spartans had

7 Thucydid. p. 258.

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posted four hundred and twenty heavy-armed men, with a much greater proportion of Helots, not reflecting that the Athenians, as soon as they had resumed the command of the neighbouring sea, must have these forces at their devotion. This circumstance occurred not to the Spartans till after their defeat; and then affected them the more deeply, because the troops blocked up in the island belonged to the first families of the republic.

Consternation in Sparta.

Advice of this misfortune was immediately sent to the capital. The annual magistrates, attended by a deputation of the senate, hastened to examine matters on the spot. The evil appeared to be incapable of remedy; and of such importance was this body of Spartans to the community, that all present agreed in the necessity of soliciting a truce, until ambassadors were sent to Athens to treat of a general peace. The Athenians granted a suspension of hostilities, on condition that the Spartans, as a pledge of their sincerity, surrendered their whole fleet (consisting of about sixty vessels) into the harbour of Pylus. Even this mortifying proposal was accepted. Twenty days were consumed in the embassy; during which time the troops intercepted in Sphacteria were supplied with a stated proportion of meal, meat, and wine[8], that of the free-

[8] Thucydides does not ascertain the quantity of meat. He says, two chænixes of meal, and two cotyls of wine; that is, two pints of meal, and one pint of wine English measure, a very small allowance; but the Athenians were afraid lest the besieged might hoard their provisions, if allowed more for daily support; which, if the negociation failed, would enable them to hold out the place longer than they could otherwise have done.

men

men amounting to double the quantity allowed to the ſlaves.

The Spartans ſolicit peace.

When the Spartan ambaſſadors were admitted to an audience at Athens, they artfully apologized for the intended length of their diſcourſes. In all their tranſactions with the Greeks, they had hitherto affected the dignified brevity[9] inſpired by conſcious pre-eminence: "Yet on the preſent occaſion, they allowed that it was neceſſary to explain, at ſome length, the advantages which would reſult to all Greece, and particularly to Athens herſelf, if the latter accepted the treaty and alliance, the free gifts of unfeigned friendſhip, ſpontaneouſly offered by Sparta. They pretended not to conceal or extenuate the greatneſs of their misfortune; but the Athenians ought alſo to remember the viciſſitudes of war. It was full time to embrace a hearty reconcilement, and to terminate the calamities of their common country. The war had as yet been carried on with more emulation than hatred; neither party had been reduced to extremity, nor had any incurable evil been yet inflicted or ſuffered. Terms of agreement, if accepted in the moment of victory, would redound to the glory of Athens; if rejected, would aſcertain, who were the authors of the war, and to whom the public calamities ought thenceforth to be imputed; ſince it was well known, that if Athens and Sparta were unanimous, no power in Greece would venture to diſpute their commands[10]."

9 Imperatoria brevitas. TACITUS.

10 Thucydid. p. 262, & ſeqq.

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Arrogant demands of the Athenians.

The meek ſpirit of this diſcourſe only diſcovered to the Athenians the full extent of their good fortune, of which they determined completely to avail themſelves. Inſtigated by the violence of Cleon, they anſwered the ambaſſadors with great haughtineſs; demanding, as preliminaries to the treaty, that the Spartans in Sphacteria ſhould be ſent to Athens; and that ſeveral places of great importance, belonging to the Spartans or their allies, ſhould be delivered into their hands. Theſe lofty pretenſions, which were by no means juſtified by military ſucceſs, appeared totally inadmiſſible to the ambaſſadors, who returned in diſguſt to the Spartan camp.

The negociation fruitleſs.

Nothing, it was evident, could be expected from the moderation of Athens; but it was expected from her juſtice, that ſhe would reſtore the fleet, which had been ſurrendered as a pledge of the treaty. Even this was, on various pretences, denied [11]. Both parties, therefore, prepared for hoſtilities; the Athenians to maintain their arrogance, the Spartans to avenge it.

Obſtinate defence of Sphacteria.

The former employed the operation of famine, as the readieſt and leaſt dangerous mode of reducing the ſoldiers in Sphacteria. The Athenian fleet, now greatly augmented, carefully guarded the iſland night and day. But notwithſtanding their utmoſt vigilance, ſmall veſſels availed them-

[11] The Athenians objected, "an incurſion towards their fortreſs, during the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, και αλλα ουκ αξιολογα," and other matters of little moment, ſays Thucydides, with his uſual impartiality, p. 266.

ſelves

ſelves of ſtorms and darkneſs to throw proviſions into the place; a ſervice undertaken by ſlaves from the promiſe of liberty; and by freemen, from the proſpect of great pecuniary rewards. The Athenians redoubled their diligence, and often intercepted theſe victuallers; but they found it more difficult to interrupt the expert divers, who, plunging deep under water, dragged after them bottles of leather, filled with honey and flour. The blockade was thus fruitleſsly protracted ſeveral weeks. Demoſthenes was averſe to attack an iſland difficult of acceſs, covered with wood, deſtitute of roads, and defended on the ſide of Pylus by a natural fortification, ſtrengthened by art. Meanwhile the Athenians began to ſuffer inconveniences in their turn. Their garriſon in Pylus was cloſely preſſed by the enemy; there was but one ſource of freſh water, and that ſcanty, in the place; proviſions grew ſcarce: the barrenneſs of the neighbouring coaſt afforded no ſupply: while they beſieged the Spartans, they themſelves experienced the hardſhips of a ſiege.

Artifices and impudence of Cleon.

When their ſituation was reported at Athens, the aſſembly fell into commotion: many clamoured againſt Demoſthenes; ſeveral accuſed Cleon. The artful demagogue, whoſe oppoſition had chiefly prevented an advantageous peace with Sparta, affected to diſbelieve the intelligence, and adviſed ſending men of approved confidence to Pylus, in order to detect the impoſture. The populace called aloud, "that Cleon himſelf ſhould undertake that commiſſion." But the diſſembler dreaded

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to become the dupe of his own artifice. He perceived, that if he went to Pylus, he muſt, at his return, either acknowledge the truth of the report, and thus be ſubjected to immediate ſhame, or fabricate falſe intelligence, and thus be expoſed to future puniſhment. He therefore eluded his own propoſal, by declaring, "that it ill became the dignity of Athens to ſtoop to a formal and tedious examination; and that, whatever were the ſtate of the armament, if the commanders acted like men, they might take Sphacteria in a few days: that if *he* had the honour to be general, he would ſail to the iſland with a ſmall body of light infantry, and take it at the firſt onſet."

Character of Nicias.

Theſe ſarcaſtic obſervations were chiefly directed againſt Nicias, one of the generals actually preſent in the aſſembly; a man of a virtuous, but timid diſpoſition; endowed with much prudence, and little enterpriſe; poſſeſſed of moderate abilities, and immoderate riches; a zealous partizan of ariſtocracy, and an avowed enemy to Cleon, whom he regarded as the worſt enemy of his country.

He cedes the command to Cleon.

A perſon of this character could not be much inclined to engage in the hazardous expedition to Sphacteria. When the Athenians, with the uſual licentiouſneſs that prevailed in their aſſemblies, called out to Cleon, "that if the enterpriſe appeared ſo eaſy, it would better ſuit the extent of his abilities;" Nicias roſe up, and immediately offered to cede to him the command. Cleon at firſt accepted it, thinking Nicias's propoſal merely a feint; but when the latter appeared in earneſt, his adverſary

adverſary drew back, alleging, "that Nicias, not Cleon, was general." The Athenians, with the malicious pleaſantry natural to the multitude, preſſed Cleon the cloſer, the more eagerly he receded. He was at length overcome by their importunity, but not forſaken by his impudence[12]. Advancing to the middle of the aſſembly, he declared, "that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians; and engaged, in twenty days, to bring the Spartans as priſoners to Athens, or to die in the attempt[13]." This heroical language excited laughter among the multitude; the wiſe rejoiced in thinking, that they muſt obtain one of two advantages, either the deſtruction of a turbulent demagogue (which they rather hoped), or the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria.

Boaſtful promiſe of the latter;

The latter event was haſtened by an accident; while ſome ſoldiers were preparing their victuals, the wood was ſet on fire, and long burned unperceived, till a briſk gale ariſing, the conflagration raged with ſuch violence, as threatened to conſume the iſland. This unforeſeen diſaſter diſcloſed the ſtrength and poſition of the Spartans; and Demoſthenes was actually preparing to attack them, when Cleon, with his light-armed troops, arrived in the camp. The iſland was invaded during night; the advanced guards were taken or ſlain. At the dawn, the Athenians made a deſcent from

which is performed by accident. Olymp. lxxxviii.4. A.C.425.

12 Thucydid. p. 271.

13 Η αυτȣ αποκτενειν, or, "kill them on the ſpot." A little alteration in the text will give the meaning which I preferred as moſt agreeable to what follows; but the other tranſlation better ſuits the boaſtful character of Cleon.

ſeventy

ſeventy ſhips. The main body of the enemy retired to the ſtrong poſt oppoſite to Pylus, haraſſed in their march by ſhowers of arrows, ſtones, and darts, involved in the aſhes of the burnt wood, which, mounting widely into the air, on all ſides intercepted their ſight, and increaſed the gloom of battle. The Spartans, cloſely embodied, and preſenting a dreadful front to the aſſailants, made good their retreat. Having occupied the deſtined poſt, they boldly defended it wherever the enemy approached, for the nature of the ground hindered it from being ſurrounded. The Athenians uſed their utmoſt efforts to repel and overcome them; and during the greateſt part of the day, both parties obſtinately perſevered in their purpoſe, under the painful preſſures of battle, thirſt, and a burning ſun. At length the Meſſenians, whoſe ardour had been ſignally diſtinguiſhed in every part of this enterpriſe, diſcovered an unknown path leading to the eminence which defended the Lacedæmonian rear. The Spartans were thus encompaſſed on all ſides, and reduced to a ſimilar ſituation to that of their illuſtrious countrymen who fell at Thermopylæ.

The Spartans in Sphacteria carried priſoners to Athens.

Nor did their commanders diſgrace the country of Leonidas. Their general, Epitades, was ſlain. Hippagretes was dying of his wounds. Styphon, the third in command, ſtill exhorted them to perſevere. But Demoſthenes and Cleon, deſirous rather to carry them priſoners to Athens, than to put them to death, invited them, by the loud proclamation of a herald, to lay down their arms.

The

The greater part dropped their sheilds, and waved their hands, in token of compliance. A conference followed between Demosthenes and Cleon on one side, and Styphon on the other. Styphon desired leave to send over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. Several messages passed between them; in the last of which it was said, "the Lacedæmonians permit you to consult your own utility, provided you submit to nothing base:" in consequence of which determination, they surrendered their arms and their persons. They were conducted to Athens, within the time assigned by Cleon; having held out fifty-two days after the expiration of the truce, during which time they had been so sparing of the provisions conveyed to them by the extraordinary means above mentioned, that, when the place was taken, they had still something in reserve[14]. CHAP. XVII.

Humiliation of Sparta.

The Athenians withdrew their fleet, leaving a strong garrison in Pylus, which was soon reinforced by an enterprising body of Messenians from Naupactus. The Messenians, though possessed of no more than one barren cape on their native and once happy coast, resumed their inveterate hatred against Sparta, whose territories they continually infested by incursions, or harassed by alarms. This species of war, destructive in itself, was rendered still more dangerous by the revolts of the Helots, attracted by every motive of affection towards their ancient kinsmen, and animated by every principle of resentment against their tyrannical masters. Mean-

14 Thucydid. p. 271—279.

while

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while the Athenian fleet renewed and multiplied their ravages on the coaſt of Peloponneſus. Reduced to extremity by ſuch proceedings, the Spartans ſent to Athens repeated overtures of accommodation. But the good fortune of the Athenians had only nouriſhed their ambition. At the inſtigation of Cleon, they diſmiſſed the Spartan ambaſſadors more inſolently than ever[15]. Such was their deference to the opinion of this arrogant demagogue; at the ſame time that, with the moſt inconſiſtent levity, they liſtened with pleaſure to the plays of Ariſtophanes, which laſhed the character and adminiſtration of Cleon with the boldeſt ſeverity of ſatire, ſharpened by the edge of the moſt poignant ridicule.

Authority and inſolence of Cleon.

Expoſed by Ariſtophanes.

The taking of Pylus, the triumphant return of Cleon, a notorious coward transformed by caprice and accident into a brave and ſucceſsful commander, were topics well ſuiting the comic vein of Ariſtophanes. The imperious demagogue had deſerved the perſonal reſentment of the poet, by denying the legitimacy of his birth[16], and thereby conteſting his title to vote in the aſſembly. On former occaſions, Ariſtophanes had ſtigmatiſed the incapacity and inſolence of Cleon, together with his perfidious ſelfiſhneſs in embroiling the affairs of the republic. In the comedy[17] firſt repreſented in the ſeventh year of the war, he attacks him in the moment of victory, when fortune had rendered him

15 Ariſtoph. Equit. v. 794. 16 Vit. anonym. Ariſtoph.

17 The ἱππεις.

the

the idol of a licentious multitude, when no comedian was ſo daring as to play his character, and no painter ſo bold as to deſign his maſk[18].

Account of his comedy, intitled, the Knights.

Ariſtophanes, therefore, appeared for the firſt time on the ſtage, only diſguiſing his own face, the better to repreſent the part of Cleon. In this ludicrous piece, which ſeems to have been celebrated even beyond its merit, the people of Athens are deſcribed under the allegory of a capricious old dotard, whoſe credulity, abuſed by a malicious ſlave lately admitted into his houſe[19], perſecutes and torments his faithful old ſervants. Demoſthenes bitterly complains, that, intending to gratify the palate of the old man, he had brought a delicate morſel from Pylus; but that it had been ſtolen by Cleon, and by him ſerved up to their common maſter. After lamenting, with his companion Nicias, the hardſhips of their condition, they hold counſel together, and contrive various expedients for putting an end to their common calamities. The deſponding Nicias propoſes drinking bull's blood, after the example of Themiſtocles; Demoſthenes, with more courage, adviſes a hearty draught of wine. Finding Cleon aſleep, they ſeize the opportunity not only to purloin this liquor, but to rifle his pockets, in which they diſcover ſome ancient oracles, typically repreſenting the ſucceſſion of Athenian magiſtrates. Towards the end of the prophecy, it was ſaid, that the

18 Ὑπο τȣ δεȣς γαρ αυτον ȣδεις ηθελε
Των σκευοποιων εικασαι. Equites, v. 231.

19 Νεωνητον κακον, "the new-bought miſchief."

dragon

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dragon ſhould overcome the devouring vulture. The rapacious avarice of Cleon correſponded to the type of the vulture; and the dragon darkly ſhadowed out Agoracritus, an eminent maker of puddings and ſauſages, the ſhape and contents of which alluded to the figure and food of that terrible ſerpent. Nicias and Demoſthenes hail this favourite of fortune, as the deſtined maſter of the republic. Agoracritus alleges in vain, that he is totally unacquainted with political affairs, ignorant of every liberal art, and has hardly learned to read. They reply, by announcing to him the oracle, and by proving that his pretended imperfections better qualified him to conduct the government of Athens. This office required none of the talents, the want of which he lamented. He matched Cleon in impudence, and ſurpaſſed him in ſtrength of lungs. His profeſſion had taught him to ſqueeze, to amaſs, to bruiſe, to embroil, and to confound; and long experience had rendered him accompliſhed in all the frauds and chicane of the market[20]. He might therefore boldly enter the liſts with Cleon, being aſſured of aſſiſtance from the whole body of Athenian knights[21]. Agoracritus, thus encouraged, prepares for encountering his adverſary. The conteſt, long doubtful, is maintained in a ſtyle of the loweſt buffoonery, always ludicrous, often indecent. The old dotard, or rather the Athenians whom he repreſents,

[20] The ſame word in Greek denotes the market and the forum. Indeed the ſame place uſually ſerved for both.

[21] The ἱππεῖς, or Equites, the ſecond rank of citizens at Athens, who deteſted Cleon, and from whom the play takes its name.

finally

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finally acknowledge their paſt errors; and regret being ſo long deceived by an upſtart ſlave, through whoſe obſtinacy in continuing the war, they had been cooped up within the walls of an unwholeſome city, and hindered from enjoying their beautiful fields and happy rural amuſements. Agoracritus ſeizes this favourable moment to produce two ancient treaties with the Lacedæmonians, perſonified by two beautiful women, whom he had found cloſely mewed up in the houſe of Cleon. Of theſe females the old Athenian becomes ſuddenly enamoured, and they retire together to the country.

The Athenians take Cythera. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A.C. 424.

The people of Athens permitted, and even approved, the licentious boldneſs of Ariſtophanes; but neither the ſtrength of reaſon, nor the ſharpneſs of ſatire, could reſiſt the impetuoſity of their ambition. The war was rendered popular by ſucceſs; they prepared for carrying it on with redoubled vigour. The firſt operations of the enſuing ſummer gratified their utmoſt hopes. The principal diviſion of the fleet, conducted by the prudence of Nicias, took the fertile and populous iſland of Cythera, ſtretching from the ſouthern promontory of Laconia towards the Cretan ſea, and long enriched by the commerce of Egypt and Libya. The Lacedæmonian garriſon, as well as the Spartan magiſtrates in the iſland, ſurrendered priſoners of war. The more dangerous part of the inhabitants were removed to the Athenian iſles; the remainder were ſubjected to an annual tribute of eight hundred pounds ſterling; an Athenian garriſon took poſſeſſion of the fortreſs.

 Soon

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Reduce Nicæa, and ravage Peloponnesus.

Soon after this important conqueſt, the arms of Demoſthenes and Hippocrates reduced the town of Nicæa, the principal ſea-port of the Megareans; and the Athenian fleet ravaged with impunity ſeveral maritime cities on the eaſtern coaſt of Peloponneſus. Thyrea was condemned to a harder fate. This city, together with the ſurrounding diſtrict, had been granted, by the compaſſion of Sparta, to the miſerable natives of Ægina, who (as above mentioned) had been driven from their once powerful iſland by the cruelty of Athens. This cruelty ſtill continued to purſue them. Their newly-raiſed walls were taken by aſſault; their houſes burned; and the inhabitants, without diſtinction, put to the ſword.

Endeavour to produce a revolution in Bœotia.

Hitherto all the enterpriſes of the Athenians were crowned with ſucceſs. Fortune firſt deſerted them in Bœotia. During ſeveral months their generals, Demoſthenes and Hippocrates, availing themſelves of the political factions of that country, had been carrying on ſecret intrigues with Chæronæa, Siphæ, and Orchomenus, places abounding in declared partizans of democracy, and eternally hoſtile to the ambition of Thebes. The inſurgents had agreed to take arms, in order to betray the weſtern parts of Bœotia to Demoſthenes, who ſailed with forty gallies from Naupactus; while Hippocrates, at the head of ſeven thouſand heavy-armed Athenians, and a much greater proportion of light-armed auxiliaries, invaded the eaſtern frontier of that province. It was expected, that, before the Thebans could bring a ſufficient force into the

the field, the invaders and inſurgents, advancing from oppoſite extremities of the country, might unite in the centre, and perhaps ſubdue Thebes itſelf, the moſt powerful, as well as moſt zealous, ally of Sparta.

Their plan too complicated for execution.

This plan, though concerted with much ability, was found too complicated for execution. Demoſthenes ſteered towards Siphæ, before his coadjutor was ready to take the field; ſome miſtake, it is ſaid, having happened about the time appointed for action; and the whole contrivance was betrayed by Nichomachus, a Phocian, to the Spartans, and by them communicated to the Bœotians. The cities which meditated revolt were thus ſecured, before Demoſthenes appeared at Siphæ, and before Hippocrates had even marched from Attica.

They are defeated in the battle of Delium. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

The latter at length entered the eaſtern frontier of Bœotia; and, as the principal deſign had miſcarried, contented himſelf with taking and fortifying Delium, a place ſacred to Apollo. Having garriſoned this poſt, he prepared for returning home. But while his army ſtill lay in the neighbourhood of Delium, the Thebans, encouraged by Pagondas, a brave and ſkilful leader, marched with great rapidity from Tanagra, in order to intercept his retreat. Their forces amounted to eighteen thouſand; the Athenians were little leſs numerous. An engagement enſued, which national emulation rendered bloody and obſtinate. Before the battle, Pagondas had detached a ſmall ſquadron of horſe, with orders to ride up after the commencement of the action. This ſtratagem

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was decisive. The Athenians, terrified at the sight of a reinforcement, which their fears magnified into a new army, were thrown into disorder, and put to flight. Approaching darkness saved them from total destruction. They escaped disgracefully into Attica, after leaving in the field of battle a thousand pikemen, with their commander Hippocrates.

The Thebans take Delium by means of a machine invented for that purpose.

The victorious army immediately formed the siege of Delium, which was taken by means of a machine first contrived for that purpose. Several parts of the fortification, which had been raised in great haste, consisted chiefly of wood. The besiegers therefore, joining together a number of large beams, formed a huge mast, perforated in the middle; to one of its extremities they appended a prodigious mass of pitch and sulphur; and to the other a bellows, which, when this unusual instrument of destruction was raised above the wooden rampart, immediately threw the whole into flames. The Athenian garrison, diminished by death or desertion to two hundred men, surrendered prisoners of war[22].

Commotions in Thrace.

The Athenians had scarcely time to lament their losses in Bœotia, when they received intelligence of a calamity in another quarter, equally unexpected, and still more alarming. This event is the more remarkable, because it naturally arose out of the preceding prosperity of Athens, and the past misfortunes of Sparta. The uninterrupted

22 Thucydid. p. 304—320.

train

train of ſucceſs which attended the arms of Nicias and Demoſthenes in the eighth year of the war, alarmed the citizens of Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, which having embraced the earlieſt opportunity of revolting from the Athenians, juſtly dreaded the vengeance of an incenſed and victorious people. Every ſoutherly wind threatened them with the approach of an Athenian fleet. Their apprehenſions were not leſs painful on the ſide of Theſſaly. The ſlighteſt movement in that country terrified them with the apprehenſions of an Athenian army, which, victorious in the ſouth, ſhould advance to puniſh its northern enemies. But as none of theſe dreaded dangers were realiſed, the inhabitants of the Chalcidicé gradually reſumed courage, put their towns in a poſture of defence, and craved aſſiſtance from their Peloponneſian allies. At the ſame time Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who regarded the Athenians as his ancient and natural enemies, and the rapacious invaders of his coaſt, ſent money into the ſouth of Greece, for the purpoſe of hiring ſoldiers, whom he intended to employ in reſiſting the encroachments of that ambitious people, as well as in ſubduing the Elymeans, Lynceſtæ, and other barbarous tribes, not yet incorporated in the Macedonian kingdom.

Fomented by the Spartans.

Such were the enemies, whoſe activity the good fortune of Athens had rouſed; while the calamities of Sparta prompted her to ſupply the reinforcement of troops, which both Perdiccas and the Chalcidians demanded. During the ſeventh and

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eighth years of the war, that republic fatally experienced the truth of Pericles's maxim, "that those who command the sea, may also become masters at land." The Athenian fleets domineered over the coast of Peloponnesus. It was impossible to foresee what places would be the next objects of their continual descents. The maritime parts were successively laid waste, and finally abandoned by the inhabitants, who found resistance ineffectual and useless. These misfortunes were increased by the frequent desertion of the Helots to the neighbouring garrisons in Pylus and Cythera, and by the dread of a general insurrection among those numerous and unhappy victims of Spartan tyranny. To prevent this evil, the Spartans had recourse to such expedients as excite astonishment and horror. They commanded the Helots to choose two thousand of their bravest and most meritorious youths, who, by the general consent of their companions, deserved the crown of liberty; and when invested with this perfidious ornament, the unsuspecting freemen had paraded the streets, and sacrificed in the temples, exulting in their late emancipation, these new members of the community gradually disappeared from the sight of men, nor was it ever known by what means they had been destroyed. But the veil of mystery, which concealed that dark and bloody stratagem, prevented neither the resentment of the slaves, nor the just suspicion of their masters. The latter were eager to embrace any measure that might deliver their country from its dangerous domestic foes. With much satisfaction,

tion, therefore, they ſent ſeven hundred Helots to the ſtandard of Braſidas, whoſe merit had recommended him to Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, as the general beſt qualified to manage the Macedonian war. About a thouſand ſoldiers were levied in the neighbouring cities of Peloponneſus. Several Spartans cheerfully accompanied a leader whom they admired. With this inconſiderable force Braſidas, towards the beginning of autumn, undertook an expedition highly important in its conſequences, and conducted with conſummate prudence and bravery [23].

Braſidas's expedition to Thrace. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

Having traverſed the friendly countries of Bœotia and Phocis, he arrived at the foot of Mount Oëta, and penetrated through the narrow defiles confined between that ſteep and woody range of hills, and the boiſterous waves of the Malian gulf. The ſight of Thermopylæ animated the enthuſiaſm of the Spartans, and encouraged them to force their way through the hoſtile plains of Theſſaly; a country actually torn by domeſtic diſcord, but always friendly to the Athenians. The celerity of Braſidas anticipated the ſlow oppoſition of a divided enemy. Having reached the Macedonian town of Dium, he joined forces with Perdiccas, who propoſed directing the firſt operations of the combined army againſt Arribæus, the king or leader of the barbarous Lynceſtæ. But even this Barbarian knew the valour of the Spartans, and the equity of Braſidas. To the deciſion of the

23 Thucydid. p. 304.

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Grecian general he offered to ſubmit the differences between Perdiccas and himſelf, and engaged to abide by the award, however unfavourable to his intereſt. The Spartan liſtened to a propoſal extremely reaſonable in itſelf, though altogether inconſiſtent with the ambitious views of Perdiccas, who diſdained to accept as a judge the man whom he paid as an auxiliary. Braſidas, on the other hand, declined in firm but decent terms, to employ his valour againſt thoſe who implored his juſtice. The generals thus ſeparated in mutual diſguſt; and Perdiccas thenceforth reduced his contribution of ſubſidy from a moiety to a third; but even that was extorted from his fears, not beſtowed by his munificence.

His tranſactions with the Acanthians.

Braſidas haſtened to join the Chalcidians, by whom he was received with a degree of joy ſuitable to the impatience with which he had been expected. Amidſt the general defection of their neighbours, the towns of Acanthus and Stagirus ſtill maintained their allegiance to Athens. Braſidas appeared before the gates of Acanthus, while the peaceful inhabitants were preparing for the labours of the vintage. He ſent a meſſenger, craving leave to enter the place, and to addreſs the aſſembly. The Acanthians were divided in opinion; but the majority, fearing to expoſe their ripe fields and vineyards to the reſentment of his army, agreed to admit the general alone and unattended, and impartially to weigh whatever he propoſed for their deliberation. Braſidas, though a Spartan, was an able ſpeaker. He obſerved to the Acanthians,

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convened in full aſſembly, " That, in compliance with the generous reſolution of Sparta, he had undertaken, and finally accompliſhed, a long and dangerous journey, to deliver them from the tyranny of Athenian magiſtrates and garriſons, and to reſtore them, what the common oppreſſors of Greece had ſo long withheld, the independent government of their own equitable laws. This was the object, which, amidſt all the calamities of war, the Spartans had ever kept in view; this was the purpoſe, which, before his departure from home, the principal magiſtrates had ſworn unanimouſly to maintain. *That* freedom and independence, which formed the domeſtic happineſs of Sparta, his countrymen were ambitious to communicate to all their allies. But if the Acanthians refuſed to ſhare the general benefit, they muſt not complain of experiencing the unhappy effects of their obſtinacy. The arms of Sparta would compel thoſe whom her arguments had failed to perſuade. Nor could this be blamed as injuſtice; firſt, becauſe the reſources with which the Acanthians furniſhed Athens, under the ignominious name of tribute, ſerved to rivet the chains of Greece; and ſecondly, becauſe the example of a people, ſo wealthy and flouriſhing, and long renowned for their penetration and ſagacity, might influence the reſolutions of neighbouring ſtates, and deter them from concurring with the meaſures neceſſary to promote the public welfare and ſecurity."

His merit and ſucceſs.

This judicious diſcourſe, enforced by the terror of the Spartan army, engaged the Acanthians to accept

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accept the friendship of Brasidas. Stagirus, another city on the Strymonic gulf, readily followed the example, and opened its gates to the deliverer. During the ensuing winter, the measures of the Spartan general were conducted with equal ability and enterprise. His successful operations against the inland towns facilitated the surrender of such places, as, by their maritime or insular situation, were most exposed to the vengeance of Athens, and therefore most averse to revolt. His moderate use of victory ensured the good-will of the vanquished. The various parts of a plan, thus artfully combined, mutually assisted each other; the success of one undertaking contributed to that of the next which followed it; and, at length, without any considerable miscarriage, he had rendered himself master of most places in the peninsulas of Acta, Sithonia, and Pallené.

Amphipolis revolts to Brasidas,

The loss of Amphipolis was that which most deeply afflicted the Athenians: a rich and populous city, beautifully situate on a small but well cultivated island, surrounded by the river Strymon, the banks of which supplied excellent timber, and other materials of naval strength. By possessing this town, the Spartans now commanded both branches of the river, and might thus pass, without interruption, to the Athenian colonies, or subjects, on the coast of Thrace; seize, or plunder, the gold mines opposite to the isle of Thasos; and ravage the fertile fields of the Thracian Chersonesus. The conquest of a place so essential to the enemy, had exercised the courage, the eloquence,

and

and the dexterity of Brafidas. He formed a confpiracy with the malcontents in the place, fkilfully difpofed his army before the walls, harangued the affembly of the people. A moft feafonable promptitude diftinguifhed all his meafures; yet the Athenian Eucleus, who commanded the garrifon, found time to fend a veffel to Thafos, requefting immediate and effectual relief.

notwithftanding the activity of Thucydides the hiftorian;

The Athenians had committed the government of that ifland, as well as the direction of the mines on the oppofite continent, to the celebrated hiftorian of a war, in which he was a meritorious, though unfortunate, actor. Without a moment's delay, Thucydides put to fea with feven gallies, and arrived in the mouth of the Strymon the fame day on which his affiftance had been demanded. But it was already too late to fave Amphipolis [24]. The Spartan general, who had exact information of all the meafures of the befieged, well knew the importance of anticipating the arrival of Thucydides, whofe name was highly refpected by the Greek colonies in Thrace, and whofe influence was confiderable among the native Barbarians. Brafidas, therefore, propofed fuch a capitulation to the Amphipolitans as it feemed imprudent to refufe. They were to be releafed from the tribute which they had hitherto paid the Athenians; to enjoy the utmoft degree of political independence, not inconfiftent with the alliance of Sparta; even the Athenian garrifon, if they continued in the place, were to be entitled to all the rights of citizens; and fuch per-

24 Thucydid. p. 322.

fons

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ſons as choſe to leave it, were granted a reaſonable time to remove their families and their property. The laſt condition was embraced by the Athenians, and their more determined partizans. They retired to the neighbouring town of Eion, ſituate near the ſea, on the northern branch of the Strymon; a place ſecured againſt every hoſtile aſſault by the ſkill and activity of Thucydides.

which ſaves Eion

Braſidas's ſucceſs occaſions clamours and impeachments in Athens.

Towards the end of winter, the full extent of Braſidas's ſucceſs was made known at Athens. The aſſembly was in commotion; and the populace were the more enraged at their loſſes, as it now appeared ſo eaſy to have prevented them, either by guarding the narrow defiles which led to their Macedonian poſſeſſions, or by ſending their fleet with a ſeaſonable reinforcement to their feeble garriſons in thoſe parts. Their own neglect had occaſioned the public diſgrace; but with the uſual injuſtice and abſurdity accompanying popular diſcontents, they exculpated themſelves, and baniſhed their generals. Thucydides was involved in this cruel ſentence. An armament was ſent to Macedon; and new commanders were named to oppoſe Braſidas.

The Spartans avail themſelves of it to obtain a truce for a year.

But the deſigns of that commander, who had begun to build veſſels on the Strymon, and aſpired at nothing leſs than ſucceeding to the authority, without exerciſing the oppreſſion, of Athens, over thoſe extenſive ſhores, were more ſucceſsfully oppoſed by the envy of the Spartan magiſtrates. The pride of the nobility was wounded by the glory of an expedition, in which they had no ſhare; and

their

their selfishness, while it obstinately prevented the supplies necessary to complete the plan of Brasidas, was eager to reap the profit of his past success. The restoration of their kinsmen taken at Sphacteria formed the object of their fondest wish; and they expected that the Athenians might listen to a proposal for that purpose, in order to recover the places which they had lost, and to check the fortunate career of a prudent and enterprising general. The Athenians readily entered into these views; it was determined that matters of such importance should be discussed with leisure and impartiality; a truce was therefore agreed on for a year between the contending republics.

Olymp. lxxxix. 2. A.C. 423.

This transaction was concluded in the ninth summer of the war. It was totally unexpected by Brasidas, who received the voluntary submission of Scioné and Menda, two places of considerable importance in the peninsula of Pallené; of the former, indeed, before he was acquainted with the suspension of hostilities; but of the latter, even after he was apprised of that treaty.

The war renewed. Olymp. lxxxix. 3. A.C. 422.

While the active valour of Brasidas prevented the confirmation of peace, the conscious worthlessness of Cleon promoted the renewal, or rather the continuance, of war. The glory of Athens was the perpetual theme of his discourse. He exhorted his countrymen to punish the perfidy of Sparta, in abetting the insolent revolt of Menda and Scioné; and to employ his own skill and bravery, which had been so successfully exerted on the coast of Peloponnesus, to repair their declining fortune in Mace-

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Macedonia. The Athenians liſtened to the ſpecious advice of this turbulent declaimer, who, in the enſuing ſpring, ſailed to the Macedonian coaſt with a fleet of thirty gallies, twelve hundred citizens, heavy-armed, a ſquadron of three hundred horſe, and a powerful body of light-armed auxiliaries. The ſurrender of Menda and Torona, whoſe inhabitants were treated with every exceſs of cruelty, encouraged him to attack Amphipolis. With this deſign, having collected his forces at Eion, he waited the arrival of ſome Macedonian troops, promiſed by Perdiccas, who having quarrelled with the Spartan general, deceitfully flattered the hopes of his antagoniſt.

Battle of Amphipolis.

The army of Cleon contained the flower of the Athenian youth, whoſe ardent valour diſdained a precarious dependence on Barbarian aid. They accuſed the cowardice of their leader, which was only equalled by his incapacity, and lamented their own hard fate in being ſubjected to the authority of a man ſo unworthy to command them. The impatient temper of an arrogant demagogue was ill fitted to endure theſe ſeditious complaints. He haſtily led his troops before the place, without previouſly examining the ſtrength of the walls, the ſituation of the ground, the number or diſpoſition of the enemy. Braſidas, meanwhile, had taken proper meaſures to avail himſelf of the known imprudence of his adverſary. A conſiderable body of men had been concealed in the woody mountain Cerdylium, which overhangs Amphipolis. The greater part of the army were drawn up, ready for action,

action, at the ſeveral gates of the city. Clearidas, who commanded there, had orders to ruſh forth at a given ſignal, while Braſidas in perſon, conducting a ſelect band of intrepid followers, watched the firſt opportunity for attack. The plan, contrived with ſo much ſkill, was executed with equal dexterity and preciſion. Confounded with the rapidity of ſuch an unexpected and complicated charge, the enemy fled amain, abandoning their ſhields, and expoſing their naked backs to the ſwords and ſpears of the purſuers. The forces on either ſide amounted to about three thouſand; ſix hundred Athenians fell victims to the folly of Cleon, who, though foremoſt in the flight, was arreſted by the hand of a Myrcinian targeteer.

Death of Cleon.

Death and honours of Braſidas.

His death might appeaſe the manes of his unfortunate countrymen; but nothing could alleviate the ſorrow of the victors for the loſs of their admired Braſidas, who received a mortal wound while he advanced to the attack. He was conveyed alive to Amphipolis, and enjoyed the conſolation of his laſt victory, in which only ſeven men had periſhed on the Spartan ſide. The ſad magnificence of his funeral was adorned by the ſplendour of military honours; but what was ſtill more honourable to Braſidas, he was ſincerely lamented by the grateful tears of numerous communities, who regarded his virtues and abilities as the ſureſt pledges of their own happineſs and ſecurity. The citizens of Amphipolis paid an extraordinary tribute to his memory. Having demoliſhed every monument of their ancient leaders and patriots,

they

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they erected the ſtatue of Braſidas in the moſt conſpicuous ſquare of the city, appointed annual games to be celebrated at his tomb, and ſacrificed to his revered ſhade, as to the great hero and original founder of their community[25].

Peace of Nicias. Olymp. lxxxix. 4. A.C. 421.

The battle of Amphipolis removed the principal obſtacles to peace. There was not any Spartan general qualified to accompliſh the deſigns of Braſidas. The Athenians, dejected by defeat, and humbled by diſgrace, wanted the bold impoſing eloquence of Cleon, to diſguiſe their weakneſs, and varniſh their misfortunes. With the diſheartened remains of an enfeebled armament, they deſpaired of recovering their Macedonian poſſeſſions; and the greater part returned home, well diſpoſed for an accommodation with the enemy. Theſe diſpoſitions were confirmed by the pacific temper of Nicias, who had ſucceeded to the influence of Cleon, and who fortunately diſcovered in the moderation of Pleiſtoanax, king of Sparta, a coadjutor extremely ſolicitous to promote his views. During winter, ſeveral friendly conferences were held between the commiſſioners of the two republics; and, towards the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, a treaty of peace, and ſoon afterwards a defenſive alliance, for fifty years, was ratified by the kings and ephori of Sparta on the one ſide, and by the archons and generals of Athens on the other. In conſequence of this negociation, which was intended to comprehend the reſpective allies of the contracting powers, all places and priſoners, taken in

25 Thucydid. p. 307.

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the courſe of the war, were to be mutually reſtored; the revolted cities in Macedon were ſpecified by name; but it was regulated that the Athenians ſhould not require from them any higher revenue than that apportioned by the juſtice of Ariſtides [26].

Diſſatiſfaction of the Lacedæmonian allies.

In all their tranſactions, the Greeks were ever prodigal of promiſes, but backward in performance; and, amidſt the continual rotation of authority, magiſtrates eaſily found excuſes for violating the conditions granted by their predeceſſors. The known principles of republican inconſtancy, ever ready to vibrate between exceſſive animoſity and immoderate friendſhip, might likewiſe ſuggeſt a reaſon for converting the treaty of peace into a contract of alliance. But this meaſure, in the preſent caſe, was the effect of neceſſity. Athens and Sparta might make mutual reſtitution, becauſe their reſpective intereſts required it. But no motive of intereſt engaged the former power to reſtore Nicæa to the Megareans, or the towns of Solium and Anactorium to Corinth. The Thebans, ſhortly before the peace, had ſeized the Athenian fortreſs of Panactum, ſituate on the frontier of Bœotia. They were ſtill maſters of Platæa. Elated by their ſignal victory at Delium, they could not be ſuppoſed willing to abandon their conqueſts, or even much inclined to peace. It was ſtill leſs to be expected that the Macedonian cities ſhould, for the conveniency of Sparta, ſubmit to the ſevere yoke

26 Thucydid. p. 354, & ſeqq.

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of Athens, from which they had recently been delivered; nor could it be hoped that even the inferior ſtates of Peloponneſus ſhould tamely lay down their arms, without obtaining any of thoſe advantages with which they had been long flattered by their Spartan allies.

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Discontents fomented by the Corinthians.—The Argive Alliance.—To which Athens accedes.—Birth and Education of Alcibiades.—His Friendship with Socrates.—His Character—And Views—Which are favoured by the State of Greece.—He deceives the Spartan Ambassadors.—Renewal of the Peloponnesian War.—Battle of Mantinæa.—Tumults in Argos.—Massacre of the Scioneans.—Cruel Conquest of Melos.

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Discontents fomented by the Corinthians.

THE voluptuous, yet turbulent citizens of Corinth, enjoy the odious distinction of renewing a war which their intrigues and animosities had first kindled. Under pretence of having taken an oath never to abandon the Macedonian cities, they declined being parties in the general treaty of peace. The alliance between Athens and Sparta, in which it was stipulated, that these contracting powers should be entitled to make such alterations in the treaty as circumstances might require, the Corinthians affected, with some reason, to consider as a conspiracy against the common liberties of Greece[1]. Fired with this idea, they hastened to Argos, in order to animate that republic with the same passions which rankled in their own breasts. Hav-

[1] The clause was worded in such a manner as might naturally excite alarm: Προσθειναι και αφελειν ὅτι αν ΑΜΦΟΙΝ τοιν πολιοιν δοκῃ. Thucydid. l. v. p. 284.

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ing rouſed the ambition of the *magiſtrates*, they artfully reminded the *people* of the glory of Agamemnon, recalled to the Argives their ancient and juſt pre-eminence in the Peloponneſus, and conjured them to maintain the honour of that illuſtrious peninſula, which had been ſo ſhamefully abandoned by the puſillanimity, or betrayed by the ſelfiſhneſs, of Sparta.

The Argive alliance. Olymp. lxxxix. 4. A.C. 421.

The Argives wanted neither power nor inclination to aſſume that important office. During the Peloponneſian war, they had obſerved the principles of a prudent neutrality, equally favourable to their populouſneſs and their wealth. Their protection was courted by Mantinæa, the moſt powerful city in Arcadia, which had recently conquered ſome villages in its neighbourhood, to which Sparta laid claim. The Elians, long hoſtile to Sparta, eagerly promoted the Argive alliance, which was farther ſtrengthened by the ſpeedy acceſſion of the Macedonian allies, whoſe inhabitants were not more flattered by the kind zeal of Corinth, than provoked by the cruel indifference of Sparta. Thebes and Megara were equally offended with their Lacedæmonian allies, and equally inclined to war. But a rigid ariſtocracy prevailed in thoſe ſtates, whoſe ambitious magiſtrates, trembling for their perſonal authority, and that of their families, declined entering into confederacy with free democratical republics[2].

To which Athens accedes.

But this democratical aſſociation ſoon acquired an acceſſion ſtill more important, and received into

[2] Thucydid. l. v. p. 371.

its

its boſom the fountain of liberty itſelf; even the republic of Athens. This extraordinary event happened in the year following the negociation between Athens and Sparta. It was effected by means extremely remote from the experience of modern times; means which it is incumbent on us to explain, leſt the political tranſactions of Greece ſhould appear too fluctuating and capricious to afford a proper ſubject for hiſtory.

CHAP. XVIII. Olymp. xc. 1. A.C. 420.

Amidſt the factious turbulence of ſenates and aſſemblies, no meaſure could be adopted by one party, without being condemned by another. Many Athenians diſapproved the peace of Nicias [3]; but the general blaze of oppoſition was eclipſed by the ſplendour of one man, who, on this occaſion, firſt diſplayed thoſe ſingular but unhappy talents, which proved fatal to himſelf and to his country. Alcibiades had not yet reached his thirtieth year, the age required by the wiſdom of Solon for being entitled to ſpeak in the aſſembly. But every advantageous circumſtance of birth and fortune, talents natural and acquired, accompliſhments of mind and body, pleaded an exception in favour of this extraordinary character, which, producing at once flowers and fruit, united with the blooming vivacity of youth, the ripened wiſdom of experience [4]. His father, the rich and generous Clinias, derived his extraction from the heroic Ajax,

Birth and education of Alcibiades.

3 The Greeks ſometimes diſtinguiſhed treaties by the names of thoſe who made them: the peace of Cimon; the peace of Nicias; and, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, the peace of Antalcidas.

4 Plut. & Nepos in Alcibiad.

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Ajax, and had diſtinguiſhed his own valour and patriotiſm in the glorious ſcenes of the Perſian war. In the female line, the ſon of Clinias was allied to the eloquence and magnanimity of Pericles, who, as his neareſt ſurviving kinſman, was entruſted with the care of his minority. But the ſtateſman, who governed with undivided ſway the affairs of Athens and of Greece, could not beſtow much attention on this important domeſtic taſk. The tender years of Alcibiades were committed to the illiberal diſcipline of mercenary preceptors; his youth and inexperience were beſet by the deſtructive adulation of ſervile flatterers,—until the young Athenian, having begun to reliſh the poems of Homer, the admiration of which is congenial to every great mind, learned from thence to deſpiſe the pedantry of the one, and to deteſt the meanneſs of the other[5].

His early attachment to Socrates.

From Homer Alcibiades early imbibed that ambition for excellence which is the great leſſon of the immortal bard. Having attained the verge of manhood, he readily diſtinguiſhed, among the crowd of rhetoricians and ſophiſts, the ſuperior merit of Socrates, who, rejecting all factitious and abſtruſe ſtudies, confined his ſpeculations to matters of real importance and utility; who, having never travelled to Egypt and the Eaſt in ſearch of *myſterious* knowledge, reaſoned with an Attic perſpicuity and freedom; and who, being unbiaſſed by the ſyſtem of any maſter, and always maſter of himſelf, thought,

5 Plut. in Alcibiad.

ſpoke,

ſpoke, and acted with equal independence and dignity. An amiable and moſt inſtructive writer, the diſciple and friend of Socrates, has left an admirable panegyric of the uniform temperance, the unſhaken probity, the diffuſive benevolence invariably diſplayed in his virtuous life of ſeventy years[6]. His diſtinguiſhing excellencies are juſtly appreciated by Xenophon, a ſcholar worthy of his maſter[7]; but the youthful levity of Alcibiades (for youth is ſeldom capable of eſtimating the higheſt of all merits, the undeviating tenor of an innocent and uſeful life) was chiefly delighted with the ſplendour of particular actions. The eloquence, rather than the innocence of Socrates, excited his admiration. He was charmed with that inimitable raillery, that clear comprehenſive logic, which baffled the moſt acute diſputants of the Athenian ſchools[8]; that erect independence of mind, which diſdained the inſolence of power, the pride of wealth, and the vanity of popular fame, was well fitted to attract the congenial eſteem of Alcibiades, who aſpired beyond the beaten paths of vulgar greatneſs; nor could the gallant youth be leſs affected by the invincible intrepidity of Socrates, when, quitting the ſhade of ſpeculation, and covered with the helm and cuiraſs, he graſped the maſſy ſpear, and juſtified, by his ſtrenuous exertion in the field of battle, the uſeful leſſons of his philoſophy[9].

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Their mutual obligations and friendſhip.

Socrates in his turn (ſince it is eaſier for a wiſe man to correct the errors of reaſon than to con-

6 Xenoph. Memorabil. Socrat.

7 See particularly Xenoph. Apolog. Socrat.

8 Plato, paſſim.

9 Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. pp. 449. 804. 818.

CHAP. XVIII. quer the delufions of fentiment) was deeply affected with the beauty of Alcibiades [10]; a beauty depending, not on the tranfient flower of youth, and the feductive delicacy of effeminate graces, but on the ineffable harmony of a form which realifed the fublime conceptions of Homer and Phidias concerning their fabulous divinities, and which fhone in the autumn of life with undiminifhed effulgence[11]. The affection of Socrates, though infinitely removed from impurity, refembled rather the ardour of love than the calm moderation of friendfhip. The fage, whofe company was courted by his other difciples, himfelf courted the company of Alcibiades; and when the ungrateful youth fometimes efcaped to his licentious companions, the philofopher purfued him with the eagernefs of a father or mafter, anxious to recover a fugitive fon or flave[12]. At the battle of Potidæa he faved the life of his pupil, and in order to gratify the love of military glory, which already animated his youthful bofom, the fage obtained for Alcibiades the prize of valour, which the univerfal confent of the Athenians thought due to himfelf. At the fatal engagement of Delium, Alcibiades, it is faid, had an opportunity of returning the more fubftantial favour, by faving the precious life of Socrates [13]; and it may

10 Vid. Xenoph. and Plato, paffim. Socrates often acknowledges the danger of beauty, and its power over himfelf; but lofes no opportunity to caution his difciples againft the fhameful paffions, and abominable vices, which flow from this fair fource. Vid. Memorab. Socrat. l. ii. paffim, & l. v. c. iii. Sympof. c. iv. p. 246.

11 Plut. in Alcibiad.

12 Plut. ibid.

13 Strabo, p. 330. & Plut. in Alcibiad.

well

well be fuppofed that an interchange of fuch important favours would ftraiten the bands of their mutual friendfhip, during which the powers of reafon and fancy were directed, with unabating diligence, to improve the underftanding, and excite the virtue of Alcibiades.

Deceitful character of Alcibiades.

But this favourite youth laboured under a defect, which could not be compenfated by the higheft birth, the moft fplendid fortune, the nobleft endowments of mind and body, and even the ineftimable friendfhip of Socrates. He wanted an honeft [14] heart. This we are warranted to affirm on the authority of contemporary writers, who acknowledge, that firft admiration, and then intereft, was the foundation of his attachment to the illuftrious fage, by whofe inftruction he expected to become, not a good, but an able, man. Some inclination to virtue he might, in fuch company, perhaps feel, but more probably feign; and the niceft difcernment might miftake the real character of a man, who could adopt, at pleafure, the moft oppofite manners; and who, as will appear from the fubfequent events of his various life, could furpafs the fplendid magnificence of Athens, or the rigid frugality of Sparta; could conform, as intereft required, to the laborious exercifes of the Thebans, or to the voluptuous indolence of Ionia; affume the foft effeminacy of an Eaftern prince, or rival the fturdy vices of the drunken Thracians [15].

14 Lyfias cont. Alcibiad. & Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. l. i. p. 715.

15 Nepos in Alcibiad.

The

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His views

The first specimen of his political conduct discovered the extraordinary resources of his versatile mind. He opposed the peace of Nicias, as the work of a rival, whom he wished to disgrace. His ambition longed for war, and the Spartans deserved his resentment, having, in all their transactions with Athens, testified the utmost respect for Nicias, while they were at no pains to conceal their want of regard for himself, though his family had been long connected with their republic by an intercourse of hospitality, and he had endeavoured to strengthen that connection by his personal good offices to the Lacedæmonians taken in Sphacteria. To gratify at once his resentment, his ambition, and his jealousy, he determined to renew the war with Sparta; a design by no means difficult at the present juncture.

favoured by the state of Greece. Olymp. xc. 1. A.C. 420.

In compliance with the peace of Nicias, the Spartans withdrew their troops from Amphipolis; but they could restore neither that city, nor the neighbouring places in Macedon, to the dominion of Athens. The Athenians, agreeably to the treaty, allowed the captives taken in Sphacteria to meet the longing embraces of their kinsmen and friends; but good policy forbade their surrendering Pylus, until the enemy had performed some of the conditions stipulated in return. Mutual unwillingness, or inability, to comply with the articles of peace, sowed the seeds of animosity, which found a favourable soil in both republics. The authority of those magistrates, who supported the pacific measures of Nicias and Pleistoanax, had expired. The

Spartan

Spartan youth wiſhed, by new hoſtilities, to cancel the memory of a war, which had been carried on without profit, and terminated with diſhonour. But the wiſer part perceived that better ſucceſs could not be expected while the Athenians poſſeſſed Pylus. In their eagerneſs to recover that fortreſs, they renewed their alliance with the Thebans, from whom they received Panactum, which they hoped to exchange for Pylus; forgetting, in this tranſaction, an important clauſe in their treaty with Athens, "that neither of the contracting powers ſhould, without mutual communication and conſent, conclude any new alliance." The Thebans rejoiced in the proſpect of embroiling the affairs of Athens and Sparta; and the Corinthians, guided by the ſame hoſtile views, readily concurred with the Thebans, and openly re-entered into the Lacedæmonian confederacy[16].

He outwits the Spartan ambaſſadors. Olymp. xc. 1. A.C. 420.

Having concluded this negociation, the Spartans, who yielded to none in the art of diſſembling, diſpatched ambaſſadors to Athens, excuſing what they termed an apparent infringement of the treaty, and requeſting that ſtate to accept Panactum (which had been carefully diſmantled) in exchange for Pylus. The ſenate of Athens heard their propoſal without ſuſpicion, eſpecially as they declared themſelves inveſted with full powers to embrace every reaſonable plan of preſent accommodation and permanent friendſhip. It now remained for the ambaſſadors to propoſe their demand in the po-

[16] Thucydid, l. v. paſſim.

pular

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pular aſſembly, which, they had reaſon to hope, might be deceived ſtill more eaſily than the ſenate. But in this expectation they were diſappointed by a contrivance of Alcibiades, no leſs ſingular than audacious. Having invited the ambaſſadors to an entertainment, during which he talked of their republic with more than his wonted reſpect, and teſtified the utmoſt ſolicitude for the ſucceſs of their negociation, he obſerved to them, that one circumſtance gave him much concern, their having mentioned full powers. They muſt beware of repeating that error in the aſſembly, becauſe the natural rapacity of the populace, appriſed of that circumſtance, would not fail to inſiſt on ſuch conditions as the honour of Sparta could not poſſibly comply with. If they concealed the extent of their commiſſion, the declaring of which could only ſerve to indicate timidity on the one ſide, and to provoke inſolence on the other, he pledged himſelf to obtain the recovery of Pylus, and the gratification of their utmoſt hopes. On this occaſion the Spartans injudiciouſly confided in a man, who had been irritated by the former neglect and ingratitude of their country. When they appeared next day in the aſſembly, Alcibiades demanded, with a loud voice, the object and extent of their commiſſion. According to the concerted plan, they denied their having full powers. The artful Athenian, affecting a tranſport of indignation, arraigned the audacity and baſeneſs of a people by whom his own unſuſpecting temper had been egregiouſly abuſed. "But yeſterday they declared their full powers in the ſenate;

they

they denied to-day what yefterday they difplayed with oftentation. Such (I now perceive it) is the ufual duplicity of their republic. It is thus they have reftored Amphipolis. It is thus, Athenians! they have reftored the neighbouring towns in Macedon: it is thus they have, indeed, put you in poffeffion of Panactum, but with demolifhed walls; and after concluding an alliance with Athens, ratified by folemn oath, moft treacheroufly and daringly infringed it, by entering into a league with Thebes, your determined and inveterate enemy. Can you ftill, men of Athens! tamely fubmit to fuch indignities? Do you not expel fuch traitors (pointing to the ambaffadors) from your prefence, and from your city?" This extraordinary harangue totally difconcerted the Spartans. Had their confufion allowed them to extenuate their fault by declaring the truth, the leaft reflection muft have fuggefted, that Alcibiades would reprefent their fimple ftory as a new turn of ingenious artifice. They retired abruptly from the affembly[17]; Nicias, and the other partizans of Sparta, fhared their difgrace; and the Athenians were foon afterwards perfuaded by Alcibiades to embrace the Argive alliance[18].

The Peloponnefian war renewed.

It might be expected, that the weight of fuch a powerful confederacy fhould have fpeedily crufhed the debility of Sparta, already exhaufted by the

17 Thucyd. mentions the fhock of an earthquake, which occafioned the diffolution of that affembly, before coming to any conclufion.

18 Thucydid. l. v. p. 374, & feqq. Plut. in Alcibiad.

former

CHAP. XVIII. Olymp. XC. 2. A.C. 419.

former war. But the military operations of Greece depended lefs on the relative ftrength of contending powers, than on the alternate preponderance of domeftic factions. In the year following the treaty, the Athenians fent a fmall body of troops to affift their Peloponnefian allies in the reduction of Epidaurus, Tegea, and other hoftile cities in Argolis and Arcadia. Yet in the enfuing year, when the Spartans, dreading the lofs of fome cities, and the defection of others, made a vigorous effort to retrieve their authority in Peloponnefus, the Athenians alone difcovered little inclination, and exerted no activity, to obftruct their meafures for that purpofe. Pleiftoanax being a partizan of the peace of Nicias, the Spartans entrufted the command to Agis, his more warlike colleague. All Lacedæmonians of the military age were fummoned to the field. The dangerous expedient of arming the Helots was adopted on this important emergence. The Spartan allies fhewed unufual ardour in their caufe. The Thebans fent ten thoufand foot, and one thoufand horfemen[19]; the Corinthians two thoufand heavy-armed men; the Megarians almoft an equal number; the ancient cities of Pallené and Sicyon in Achaia gave a powerful and ready affiftance; while the fmall, but generous republic of Phlius, whofe territory, bordering on Argolis, was appointed for the rendez-

19 They had, however, but five hundred horfes; ἱππης πεντακοσιοι και αμιπποι ισοι. Perhaps the αμιπποι, thofe not provided with horfes, ferved as attendants on the horfemen. The mixing of light infantry with the cavalry was frequent in later times; but of this hereafter.

vous

vous of the confederates, took the field with the whole body of citizens and ſlaves capable of bearing arms[20].

The Spartan and Argive armies face each other, but part without engaging. Olymp. xc. 3. A. C. 418.

The Argives obſerved the approaching ſtorm, and prepared to reſiſt it. The Eleans and Mantineans joined them; and although the Athenians were long expected in vain, the Argives did not loſe courage, but boldly took the field to oppoſe the invaders. The ſkilful movements of king Agis intercepted their return to Argos; the high grounds above them were occupied by the Corinthians and Phliaſians; their retreat towards Nemea was cut off by the Bœotians and Megarians. A battle ſeemed inevitable in the winding vale of Argos; but it is eaſier to admire, than explain, the ſubſequent conduct of either army. Whether the Argive commanders[21] were diſconcerted by the judicious poſition of the enemy, or that compaſſion touched their minds on perceiving ſuch numerous bodies of men, chiefly natives of the ſame peninſula, ſprung from the ſame blood, and ſpeaking the ſame Doric tongue, prepared to embrue their parricidal hands in kindred blood; or that, being ſecretly partizans of ariſtocracy[22], they were unwilling to come to extremities with Sparta; it is certain, that inſtead of joining battle, they entered

[20] Thucydid. l. v. p. 384, & ſeqq.

[21] Or rather Thraſyllus, who was one of five generals, but who ſeems to have enjoyed ſome pre-eminence over his colleagues. Perhaps it was his turn to command.

[22] Alciphron, who, with Thraſyllus, was the principal agent in this affair, was the "προξενος Λακεδαιμονιων," the public hoſt of the Lacedæmonians. Thucydid. p. 386.

into

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into conference, with the Lacedæmonian king. In consequence of this unexpected measure, a truce was concluded between the chiefs, without the concurrence or knowledge of the officers or troops in either army. The Argives, Thrasyllus and Alciphron, engaged that their countrymen should give complete satisfaction for the injuries of which they were accused; and king Agis, whose authority, by the Spartan laws, was absolute in the field, led off his obsequious army.

Discontents hereby occasioned in both states.

Whatever might be the cause of this measure, it occasioned (after the first pause of silent astonishment) universal discontent, followed by loud and licentious clamours. The Spartans complained, "That, after assembling such a body of men as had scarcely ever been collected in Peloponnesus, whose attachment to their cause was ardent, whose numbers and courage were invincible, and after surrounding their enemies on every side, and depriving them of every resource, the glorious hope, or rather certainty, of the most complete and important victory, should have been sacrificed, in one moment, by the caprice, the cowardice, or the corruption of their general." The Argives lamented, "That their numerous enemies, whom they had a fair opportunity of engaging in their own country, should have been allowed to escape from their hands by a hasty and ill-judged composition." Nor did they confine their resentment to vain complaints. The most daring or most seditious attacked the houses of Thrasyllus and Alciphron. The rest soon joined in the tumult. The effects

effects of the generals were plundered or confiscated; and their lives were saved, with difficulty, by the respected sanctuary of Argive Juno. CHAP. XVIII.

Alcibiades persuades the Argives to break the truce. Olymp. xc. 3. A. C. 418.

Though the Greeks, and indeed the ancients in general, seldom employed resident ambassadors in foreign states, Alcibiades was then invested with that character at Argos. His activity would not fail to promote the popular tumult, in which his own and the Athenian interest was concerned. On a future occasion he boasted, that, chiefly at his instigation, the Argives and their allies were persuaded to break the truce; a measure greatly facilitated by the long-expected arrival of the Athenian transports, conveying a reinforcement of twelve hundred soldiers, and a body of three hundred cavalry. Encouraged by this event, the Argives, regardless of the truce, attacked the ancient and wealthy city of Orchomenus in Arcadia, which, after a feeble resistance, submitted to their arms. They next proceeded to lay siege to the neighbouring town of Tegea, a design extremely contrary to the inclination of the Eleans, who were eager to chastise the inhabitants of Lepreum, a district on their own frontier. The Argives, however, paid no regard to their demands; and the Eleans, offended by this instance of contempt, returned home in disgust.

The Spartans take the field.

The Lacedæmonians learned with indignation the submission of Orchomenus, the siege of Tegea, and the open infraction of the treaty. They had formerly murmured against the imprudent or perfidious measures of king Agis; but when they felt

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the effects of his misconduct, their resentment became outrageous. In the first emotions of their animosity, they determined to destroy his house, and to subject him to a fine of several thousand pounds sterling, which, in all probability, he would have been unable to pay. But his eloquence and address appeased the general clamour; and, as the anger of popular assemblies is easily converted into pity, he was again taken into favour. His known talents for war recommended him to the command of the army; and he assured his countrymen, that his future services should speedily wipe off the stain from his character. The Spartans, however, first elected on this occasion ten counsellors to attend their kings in the field, to restrain their too precipitate resolves, and control their too absolute authority.

Battle of Mantinæa.

Having taken this precaution, the necessity of which seemed justified by recent experience, they summoned the assistance of their allies, whose ardour to renew hostilities was equal to their own. They proceeded with a numerous army (though inferior to that formerly collected, as their confederates beyond the Isthmus had not yet time to join them), and marched directly to the town of Mantinæa, expecting either to take that place, or to oblige the enemy to defend it, by withdrawing their troops from the siege of Tegea. The approach of the Argives prevented the surprise of Mantinæa; and both armies, whose ambition or resentment had been so lately disappointed of an opportunity to display

play their valour or their fury, eagerly prepared for an engagement. CHAP. XVIII.

Military orations.

According to ancient cuſtom, the leaders of the ſeveral nations addreſſed their reſpective troops. The Mantinæans were animated " by the ſight of their city, for the defence of which, as well as for the ſafety of their wives and children, they were exhorted valiantly to contend. The event of the battle muſt determine the important alternative of dominion and ſervitude; dominion which they had lately aſſumed over various cities in Arcadia, and ſervitude, which they had already ſuffered under the cruel tyranny of Sparta." The Argives were reminded " of their ancient pre-eminence in Peloponneſus, which they had recently recovered, and which their honour was now called to maintain. They were reminded of the long and bloody wars which they had formerly carried on, in order to repel the uſurpation of a powerful and ambitious neighbour. This was the ſame enemy who actually provoked their arms, and gave them an opportunity of revenging, in one day, the accumulated injuſtice of many centuries." The Athenians heard, and repeated, " That it was glorious to march at the head of gallant and faithful allies, and to ſhew themſelves deſerving of their hereditary renown. They yielded to none in bravery; their power was unrivalled; and when they had overcome the Lacedæmonians, even in the Peloponneſus, their dominion would be more extenſive and ſecure."

 The

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The Spartans victorious.

The Spartans briefly exhorted their followers, and each other, "to exert that innate valour which had ever animated their breafts, and which could receive no additional force from a tedious difplay of ufelefs words." Thus faying, they marched with a flow and firm ftep, regulated by the found of the flute, to meet the impetuous onfet[23] of the Argives and Athenians. Above a thoufand of the former, chofen from the flower of the nobleft youth of Argos, had been employed, fince the firft diffenfions occafioned by the peace of Nicias, in the conftant exercife of arms, in order to maintain the honourable pretenfions of their country. They behaved with fignal bravery. The Athenians were not wanting to their ancient fame. The Mantinæans ftrenuoufly defended every thing moft dear to them. But the allied army had been confiderably weakened by the defertion of the Eleans; and the martial enthufiafm of king Agis, feconded by the perfevering valour of the Spartans[24], decided the fortune

[23] The admirable verfes of Milton, who was a diligent reader of Thucydides, are the beft commentary on this battle.

Anon they move
In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and foft recorders, fuch as rais'd
To height of nobleft temper heroes old,
Arming to battle; and inftead of rage,
Deliberate valour breath'd firm and unmov'd, &c.

Par. Loft, b. i.

[24] If the text is not corrupt, the words of Thucydides are very remarkable: Αλλα μαλιϛα δη κατα παντα τη εμπειρια Λακεδαιμονιοι ελασσωθεντες, τη ανδρεια εδειξαν ȣχ ἡσσον περιγενομενοι. p. 394. "That the Lacedæmonians, exceedingly inferior as they appeared on this occafion to the enemy in military fkill, fhewed themfelves as much fuperior to them in true manly courage." It appears from the defcription

fortune of the battle. The allies were repulſed, broken, thrown into diſorder, and put to flight. The Spartans, unwilling to irritate their deſpair, or ſuperſtitiouſly obſerving an ancient maxim, which enjoined them "to make a bridge for a flying enemy," did not continue the purſuit, but ſpeedily returned home to celebrate the Carnean feſtival, rejoicing in having reſtored the luſtre of their arms, and recovered their authority in the Peloponneſus.

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Tumults in Argos.

This, in fact, proved the immediate conſequence of a battle, which was not ſo bloody as might have been expected, the vanquiſhed having loſt *eleven*, and the victors only *three*, hundred. But the revolutions of Greece chiefly depended on the fluctuating politics of domeſtic factions. The Spartans had a numerous party in Argos itſelf, who, emboldened by the recent victory of their friends, immediately took arms, aboliſhed the popular government, deſtroyed the partiſans of Athens, abjured the league with that ſtate, and entered into a new confederacy with Sparta. This event hap-

tion of the battle, that the Lacedæmonians were defective, not in ſkill, but in diſcipline. In approaching the enemy, their right wing extended too far, which frequently happened from the deſire of every ſoldier to cover his unarmed ſide by the ſhield of the next perſon on his right. In conſequence of this tendency, the Lacedæmonian left wing was over-reached by the enemy's right. Agis ordered the Skiritæ and Braſidians to wheel from their places on the right, and lengthen the front of the left wing: commanding the battalions of Hipponoidas and Ariſtocles to fill up the vacuity occaſioned by this movement. But theſe generals abſolutely refuſed to obey orders, and were afterwards baniſhed Sparta on that account. Thucydid. p. 393, & ſeqq.

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pened a few weeks after the engagement, and towards the close of the fourteenth winter of the Peloponnesian war. During the two following years, Argos paid dearly for a moment of transient splendour, having undergone three bloody revolutions, which renewed the atrocities of Corcyrean sedition. The contest ended, as in Corcyra, in favour of the Athenians and democracy.

Massacre of the Scioneans.

The affairs of the Peloponnesus had long occupied, without engrossing, the attention of Athens. The year preceding her alliance with Argos, the Athenians reduced the rebellious city of Scioné, in the peninsula of Pallené, against which their resentment had been provoked to the utmost fury, because the Scioneans, though inhabiting a country almost surrounded by the sea, had defied the naval power of Athens, and, amidst the misfortunes of that state, revolted to her enemies. The citizens of Scioné became the victims of a revenge equally cruel and imprudent. The males, above the age of puberty, were put to the sword; the women and children dragged into servitude; the name and honours of the city extinguished for ever; and the territory planted with a new colony, consisting chiefly of Platæan exiles. These atrocious cruelties alarmed the terror, exasperated the resentment, and invigorated the resistance, of the neighbouring republics. Their defence was undertaken by Perdiccas, king of Macedon, whom the Athenians therefore interdicted the use of the Grecian seas. But that ambitious people made so little progress in reducing the Macedonian coast,

that they finally desisted from this design, contenting themselves with guarding those places which still preserved their allegiance, with re-establishing domestic order, and with collecting the customary tribute from their numerous colonies and dependencies.

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The Athenians attack Melos. Olymp. xci. 1. A.C. 416.

The productive industry diffused through all branches of the community, the equality of private fortune, the absence of habitual luxury, together with the natural advantages of their soil and climate, enabled the Greeks to flourish amidst furious and bloody wars. After a short period of tranquillity, their exuberant population overflowed, and was obliged to discharge itself in foreign colonies or conquests. Such a period Athens enjoyed for five years after the peace of Nicias, as the Macedonian and Argive wars only employed her activity, without exhausting her strength. The necessity of exerting her superfluous vigour in some useful and honourable design, was fatally experienced, in the year following, by the unfortunate island of Melos, one of the largest of the Cyclades, lying directly opposite to the Cape of Malea, the southern promontory of Laconia.

Description of that island.

This beautiful island, sixty miles in circumference, of a circular form, of anagreeable temperature, and affording, in peculiar perfection [25], the usual productions of a fine climate, had early in-

[25] The island of Melos is every where impregnated with iron, bitumen, sulphur, and other minerals. It is described by Tournefort as a great laboratory. Its subterranean fires are supposed to give peculiar force and flavour to its wines and fruits.

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vited the colonization of the Spartans; and the happy ſettlement had enjoyed political independence for ſeven hundred years. The ſtrength and importance of the capital, which had the ſame name with the iſland, may be underſtood by the armament, of thirty ſhips, and near three thouſand ſoldiers, which the Athenians brought againſt it. Before they commenced hoſtilities, either by attacking the city, or by ravaging the country, they ſent ambaſſadors to the Melians, in order to perſuade them to ſurrender, without incurring the danger or the puniſhment of an unequal, and probably a fruitleſs, reſiſtance. The cautious iſlanders, well acquainted with the eloquence and addreſs of the enemy with whom they had to contend, denied them the permiſſion to ſpeak before the public aſſembly, but appointed a deputation of the magiſtrates, to hear and examine their demands. The Athenian ambaſſadors were received in the ſenate-houſe, where a moſt important and intereſting conference was held [26], which, while it engages our compaſſion for the unhappy victims of ambition, explains the prevailing ſentiments and opinions of the Greeks in matters of war and government, and illuſtrates the daring injuſtice of the Athenian republic. The ambaſſadors began the dialogue, by obſerving, "That ſince the diſtruſt of the Melians, probably ariſing from the conſcious weakneſs of their cauſe, had refuſed them the liberty of ſpeaking, in a continued oration, to the aſſembly of the people, they ſhould uſe that mode of conference which ſeemed

Conference between the commiſſioners of Athens and Melos.

[26] Thucydid. l. v. p. 400, & ſeqq.

moſt

most agreeable to the inclinations of their adversaries, and patiently listen to the objections which might occur to any part of their discourse." *Melians.* "The proposal is just and reasonable; but you have come hither with an armed force, which renders you judges in your own cause. Though vanquished in debate, you may still conquer by arms; but if *we* yield in argument, we must submit to slavery." *Athenians.* "If you intend to talk of matters foreign to the subject, we have done." *M.* "It is surely excusable for those, whose all is at stake, to turn themselves on every side, and to suggest their suspicions and their doubts. But let the conference be carried on in the manner which you have proposed." *A.* "And, on both sides, let all superfluous arguments be omitted; either that *we*, having repelled and conquered the Persians, are entitled to govern the Greeks; or that *you*, being a colony of Lacedæmon, are entitled to independence. Let us speak like men of sense and experience, who know that the equal rules of justice are observed only by men of an equal condition; but that it belongs to the strong to command, and to the weak to obey; because such is the interest of both." *M.* "How can our interest and yours coincide?" *A.* "By submission, you will save your lives; and by preserving you, we will increase our own power." *M.* "Consider (for this also must be mentioned, since disregarding *justice*, you are governed only by *utility*) that your unprovoked invasion of the Melians will rouse the resentment of all Greece; will render all neutral

CHAP. XVIII. neutral ſtates your enemies; and, if ever your empire ſhould decline, (as what human grandeur is not ſubject to decay?) will expoſe you to a dreadful and juſt puniſhment." *A.* "The continuance of our empire is the care of fortune and the gods; the little that man can do to preſerve it, *we* will not neglect. The liberty of Melos offends the pride of the neighbouring iſles, and ſtirs them to rebellion. The intereſt of our preſent power muſt prevail over the apprehenſion of future danger." *M.* "While the Athenians are thus prepared to incur danger for the preſervation of empire, and their ſubject iſlands to defy death for the hopes of freedom, would it not be the baſeſt and moſt infamous cowardice in us, who have long enjoyed liberty, to decline any toil or danger for maintaining the moſt valuable and the moſt glorious of all human poſſeſſions?" *A.* "We are not come hither to diſpute the prize of valour, but to offer terms of ſafety." *M.* "The event of war is uncertain; there is ſome hope in reſiſtance, none in ſubmiſſion." *A.* "Flattering hope often deceives the proſperous and the powerful, but always deſtroys the weak and unfortunate, who, diſregarding natural means of preſervation, have recourſe to idle dreams of the fancy, to omens, oracles, divination, and all the fallacious illuſions of a vain ſuperſtition." *M.* "We know that it will be difficult for the Melians to contend with the ſtrength and fortune of Athens: yet we truſt that the gods will ſupport the juſtice of our cauſe; and that the Lacedæmonians, from whom we are deſcended,

moved

moved by a ſenſe of honour, will defend their own blood." *A.* "Believe not that Athens will be forſaken by the gods. Ambition is implanted in man. The wiſdom of providence, not an Athenian decree, has eſtabliſhed the inevitable law, that the ſtrong ſhould govern the weak. As to the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonians, we ſincerely congratulate your happy ignorance of their principles. Whatever equity prevails in their domeſtic inſtitutions, they have but one rule reſpecting their neighbours, which is, to regulate all their tranſactions with them by their own conveniency." *M.* "It is chiefly that conſideration which affords us hope, that they will not forſake an iſland which they have planted, leſt they ſhould be regarded as traitors, than which nothing could be more unfavourable to their intereſt, eſpecially ſince Melos, lying in the neighbourhood of their own territories, would be a dangerous poſſeſſion in the hands of an enemy." *A.* "The timid caution of the Lacedæmonians ſeldom takes the field, even againſt their inveterate enemies in the Peloponneſus, unleſs when their ſtandard is attended by numerous allies. It is not to be imagined that, for the ſafety of a colony, they will alone croſs the Cretan ſea, to contend with the ſuperior navy of Athens." *M.* "Should the Lacedæmonians be averſe to ſail, they can tranſport others in their ſtead; and the extent of the Cretan ſea may elude the vigilance of your ſhips; or ſhould that probability fail, the Lacedæmonians may attack your ſubjects on the continent, and accompliſh the deſigns of the warlike

Bra-

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Brafidas." *A.* " You are determined, it feems, to learn, by fatal experience, that fear never compelled the Athenians to defift from their defigns; efpecially never to raife the fiege of any place which they had once invefted. For during the whole of this long conference, you have not mentioned a fingle particular capable of affording any juft ground of confidence. Deceived by the fplendour of words, you talk of honour and independence, rejecting the offers of a powerful ftate, whofe arms you are unable to refift, and whofe protection you might obtain at the expence of a moderate tribute. Left fhame fhould have any fhare in this dangerous behaviour, we fhall leave you to confult privately, only reminding you once more, that your prefent deliberations involve the fate of your country."

Magnanimity of the Melians.

The Athenian ambaffadors retired; and fhortly afterwards, the Melians recalled them, and " declared their unanimous refolution not to betray, in one unlucky hour, the liberty which they had maintained for feven hundred years; depending on the vigorous affiftance of their Lacedæmonian kinfmen, and trufting efpecially in that divine providence which had hitherto moft wonderfully preferved them amidft the general convulfions of Greece. But they entreated the Athenians to accept their offers of neutrality, and to abftain from unprovoked violence." The ambaffadors prepared for returning to the camp, leaving the commiffioners with a farcaftic threat, " That of all men, in fuch a delicate fituation, the Melians alone

Conqueft of Melos, and cruel treatment of the inhabitants.

thought

thought the future more certain than the paſt, and would grievouſly ſuffer for their folly, in preferring to the propoſals of certain and immediate ſafety, the deceitfulneſs of hope, the inſtability of fortune, and the vain proſpect of Lacedæmonian aid." The Athenians, irritated by oppoſition, inveſted, without delay, the capital of Melos, which was blocked up for ſeveral months by ſea and land. The beſieged, after ſuffering cruelly by famine, made ſeveral deſperate ſallies, ſeized the Athenian magazines, and deſtroyed part of their works. But towards the end of winter, their reſiſtance was defeated by the vigorous efforts of the enemy, combined with domeſtic treaſon. The males above the age of fourteen ſhared the unhappy fate of the Scioneans. The women and children were ſubjected to perpetual ſervitude, and five hundred new inhabitants, drawn from the neighbouring colonies of Athens, were ſent to occupy the vacant lands, which had been cultivated and adorned for ſeven centuries by the labour of the exterminated Melians[27].

27 Thucydid. l. v. p. 410. ad fin.

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Alcibiades promotes the Sicilian Expedition.—Revolutions in that Island.—Embassy to Athens.—Extravagant Views of Alcibiades.—Opposed by Nicias.—The Athenians prepare to invade Sicily.—Their Armament beheld with Suspicion by the Italian States.—Deliberations concerning the Mode of carrying on the War.—Alcibiades takes Catana by Stratagem.—His Intrigues in Messené.—He is unseasonably recalled to Athens.—Charged with Treason and Impiety.—Escapes to Sparta.—Nicias determines to attack Syracuse.—Description of that City.—The Athenians prevail in a Battle.—Return to Catana and Naxos.

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Alcibiades promotes the expedition into Sicily.

THE inhuman massacre of the Melians has been ascribed by an instructive, though often inaccurate biographer[1], to the unfeeling pride of Alcibiades. But more ancient and authentic writers[2], whose silence seems to exculpate the son of Clinias from this atrocious accusation, represent him as the principal author of the expedition against Sicily; an expedition not more unjust in its principle than fatal in its consequences.

Revolutions in that island. A. C. 479—468.

The salutary union between the princes of Syracuse and Agrigentum triumphed, as we had occa-

[1] Plut. in Alcib.

[2] Thucyd. l. v. Lysias Orat. cont. Alcib.

sion

ſion to relate, over the ambition and reſources of Carthage. Sicily flouriſhed under the virtuous adminiſtration of Gelon [3] and Theron; but its tranquillity was diſturbed by the diſſenſions of their immediate ſucceſſors. Hieron king of Syracuſe proved victorious in a long and bloody war, during which the incapacity and misfortunes of his rival Thraſideus emboldened the reſentment of his ſubjects, already provoked by his injuſtice and cruelty [4]. He eſcaped the popular fury, but fell a victim to his own deſpair; and the Agrigentines, having expelled the family of an odious tyrant, inſtituted a republican form of policy.

Reign of Hieron in Syracuſe.

The falſe, cruel, and avaricious Hieron (for ſuch at leaſt he is deſcribed [5] in the firſt years of his reign) probably received little benefit from the dangerous influence of proſperity. But his mind was not incapable of reflection; and, in the courſe of a long ſickneſs and confinement, he diſcovered the emptineſs of ſuch objects as kings are taught to admire, and had recourſe to the ſolid pleaſures of the mind. By converſing with Grecian philoſophers, he learned the moſt important of all leſſons, that of converſing with himſelf; a converſation which none but the moſt virtuous or the moſt vicious of men can long and frequently maintain, without deriving from it eſſential profit. With the improvement of his underſtanding, the ſentiments of Hieron improved; his character and manners underwent a total change; and the latter

3 See above, p. 36.

4 Diodor. l. xi. c. lx. & ſeqq.

5 Diodor. Sic. l. xi. c. lxvi.

years

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years of his reign adorn the hiſtory of Sicily, and the age in which he lived[6]. The poets Simonides, Æſchylus, and Bacchilides, frequented his court, and admired the greatneſs of his mind, rather than of his fortune. The ſublime genius of Pindar has celebrated the magnificent generoſity of his illuſtrious patron. And in an age when writing was the picture of converſation, becauſe men talked as they needed not have been aſhamed to write, the impartial diſciple of Socrates, who had nothing to hope or to fear from the aſhes of a king of Sicily, has repreſented Hieron, in the Dialogue entitled from his name[7], as a model of wiſdom and virtue.

The tyranny of Thraſybulus, and eſtabliſhment of democracy. Olymp. lxxviii. 3. A.C. 466.

It is a mortifying reflection that the inimitable qualities of a virtuous prince ſhould naturally encourage the ſloth, or irritate the vices, of a degenerate ſucceſſor. The glorious reign of Hieron was followed by the bloody tyranny of Thraſybulus; a wretch who, diſgracing the throne and human nature, was expelled from Sicily by the juſt indignation of his ſubjects. Reſentment is more permanent than gratitude. The Syracuſans forgot the fame of Gelon; they forgot the recent merit of Hieron; and, that they might never be again ſubjected to a tyrant like Thraſybulus, exchanged the odious power of kings for the dangerous fury of democracy[8].

Effects of that revolution.

The inferior cities having ſucceſſively imitated the example of Agrigentum and Syracuſe, the

6 Ælian. l. ix. c. vii. 7 Xenophont. Hieron.
8 Ariſtot. de Repub. l. v. c. xii.

Grecian

Grecian colonies in Sicily experienced the diſorders of that tumultuous liberty which had ſo long prevailed in the mother-country. Diſtracted by internal diſcord, and haraſſed by external hoſtility, they had neither leiſure nor inclination to attend to the politics of Greece. The republic of Syracuſe, which was alone capable of interpoſing, with effect, in the quarrels of that country, imitated, inſtead of oppoſing, the ambition of Athens. Moſt of the Dorian ſettlements had become confederates, or rather tributaries, to the Syracuſans; and towards the commencement of the Peloponneſian war, that aſpiring people, though torn by domeſtic factions, ſtrenuouſly exerted their valour againſt the Ionic ſettlements of Leontium, Catana, and Naxos.

Diſſenſions in Sicily, in which the Athenians interfere. Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 426.

While theſe unhappy iſlanders ſtruggled with the turbulence of a government more ſtormy than the whirlpools of Scylla and Charybdis, they likewiſe enjoyed, however, the peculiar advantages of democracy; which, of all political conſtitutions, preſents the wideſt ſcope to the exerciſe of ſuperior talents, and has always been the moſt productive in great men. The active fermentation of popular aſſemblies had given the eloquence of a Gorgias to Leontium, and the abilities of a Hermocrates to Syracuſe. In the ſixth year of the Peloponneſian war, the former came to Athens to ſolicit the protection of that republic againſt the unjuſt uſurpation of the Sicilian capital. His arguments convinced the judgment, and the brilliant harmony of his ſtyle tranſported the ſenſibility, of the Athenians.

 They

CHAP. XIX. They immediately dispatched twenty ships of war to the assistance of their Ionic brethren. Two years afterwards a similar request was made, and as readily complied with; and the Athenians seemed disposed to engage with vigour in the war, when the foresight of Hermocrates, alarmed by the intrusion of these ambitious strangers, promoted a general congress of the states of Sicily.

Appeased by Hermocrates. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424. This convention was held at the central town of Gela; it was attended by the plenipotentiaries of all the Doric and Ionic cities. Hermocrates represented Syracuse; and illustrious as that republic was, his conduct proved him worthy its highest honours. While the representatives of other states dwelt on their particular grievances, and urged their separate interests, Hermocrates regarded and enforced only the general interest of Sicily. His arguments finally prevailed, and all parties were engaged to terminate their domestic contests, lest the whole island should fall a prey to a foreign power[9].

New dissensions. Olymp. xci. 1. A. C. 416. But a plan of union, so seasonable and salutary, depended on the transient influence of a single man, while the principles of discord were innumerable and permanent. Within a few years after this event, Leontium was taken and destroyed, its inhabitants reduced to the wretched condition of exiles, and its confederates, the Egestæans, closely besieged by the conjunct arms of Selinus and Syracuse. The unfortunate communities again sent an embassy to Athens, pleading the rights of

Demands of the Egesteans;

9 Thucydid. p. 290.

con-

consanguinity, and addressing not only the passions but the interest of their powerful allies. "The Athenians," they insisted, "were bound by every principle of sound policy to repress the growing greatness of Syracuse, which must otherwise become a formidable accession to the Peloponnesian league; and now was the time for undertaking that enterprise, while their Ionian kinsmen in Sicily were still capable of exerting some vigour in their own defence." In order to enforce these arguments, the ambassadors of Egesta or Segesta gave an ostentatious, and even a very false, description of the wealth of their republic; which, according to their account, was capable of furnishing the whole expence of the war. Their fellow-citizens at home carried on the deception by a most unjustifiable artifice, displaying to the Athenian commissioners sent to confer with them, the borrowed riches of their neighbours, and raising, by extraordinary expedients, the sum of sixty talents of silver, to maintain, for a month, an Athenian fleet of sixty sail, as if they had purposed monthly to repeat this large subsidy, which at once exhausted their faculties[10].

The arguments of their Sicilian allies were doubtless entitled to considerable weight with the Athenians; yet various reasons might have dissuaded that ambitious people from undertaking, at the present juncture, an expedition against the powerful republic of Syracuse. The cloud of war, which Pericles saw advancing with rapid motion from the Pelo-

with which the Athenians imprudently comply.

10 Thucydid. p. 444.

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Peloponnefus, had been at length difpelled by the valour and fortune of the Athenians; not, however, before the arms of Brafidas had fhaken their empire to the foundation. The fame ftorm might be again collected, if the Athenians removed their armies from home, efpecially if they were unfortunate abroad, fince the wounded pride of Sparta would eagerly feize the firft opportunity of revenge. The rebellion of the Macedonian cities was ftill unfubdued, and it would be highly imprudent and dangerous, before recovering the allegiance of thefe ancient poffeffions, to attempt the acquifition of new territories. Should the Athenian expedition againft Sicily be crowned with the moft flattering fuccefs, it would ftill be difficult, nay, impoffible, to preferve fuch a diftant and extenfive conqueft; but fhould this ambitious defign fail in the execution, as there was too good reafon to apprehend, the misfortunes of the Athenians, whofe greatnefs was the object both of terror and of envy, would encourage the rebellious fpirit of their fubjects and allies, excite the latent animofity of the Peloponnefians, and reinforce their ancient enemies by the refentment and hoftility of Syracufe and her confederates, juftly provoked by the daring invafion of their ifland.

Extravagant views of Alcibiades.

These prudential confiderations were unable to cool the ardour of the Athenian affembly, inflamed by the breath of their favourite Alcibiades. It is a juft and profound obfervation of Machiavel, that the real powers of government are often contracted to a narrower point in republics than in monarchies;

narchies; an obſervation which that ſagacious ſtateſman had learned from the experience of his native city, and which he might have confirmed by the hiſtory of the Greeks, whoſe political meaſures, and even whoſe national character, depended on the tranſient influence of a few individuals. Under the direction of Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, the Athenians diſplayed the ſoundeſt policy, adorned by unſhaken probity, and by heroic valour. Cimon inſpired the generous ambition which animated his own breaſt: a dignified grandeur and magnanimous firmneſs diſtinguiſhed the long adminiſtration, I had almoſt ſaid reign, of Pericles. The ſon of Clinias ſucceeded to the power and authority, without ſucceeding to the virtues of thoſe great men, whom his pride diſdained to imitate. Regardleſs of order and decency, with a licentious magnificence moſt offenſive to the ſpirit of republican equality, he blended a certain elegance of manners, which not only repelled cenſure, but attracted applauſe. Thus diſpenſed from obſerving the eſtabliſhed formalities of private life, he expected that the glory of his adminiſtration might ſoar above the ordinary dictates of political prudence[11]. Though he preferred what was uſeful to what was virtuous, he preferred what was brilliant to what was uſeful, and, diſdaining the common gifts of valour and fortune, aſpired at objects extraordinary and unattainable. The recovery of the Athenian poſſeſſions, and the re-eſtabliſhment of an empire, al-

[11] See Plut. in Alcibiad. Iſocrat. de Pace; above all, the animated picture in Plato's Republic (l. viii. cap. cc. & ſeqq.), of which Alcibiades, doubtleſs, was the original.

CHAP. XIX. ready too extenſive, might have ſatisfied the ambition of a bold and active ſtateſman. But the extravagant hopes of Alcibiades expatiated in a wider field. The acquiſition of Sicily itſelf he regarded only as a neceſſary introduction to farther and more important conqueſts. The intermediate ſituation of that beautiful and fertile iſland opened, on the one hand, an eaſy communication with the eaſtern front of Italy, which, from Brunduſium to the Sicilian frith, was adorned by populous and flouriſhing cities; and on the other, afforded a ſhort and ſafe paſſage to the northern ſhores of Africa, which, for many ages, had been cultivated and enriched by the united labours of the Greeks and Carthaginians. In his waking or ſleeping dreams, Alcibiades graſped the wide extent of thoſe diſtant poſſeſſions, by the reſources of which he expected finally to ſubdue the pertinacious ſpirit, and obſtinate reſiſtance, of the Peloponneſians. Thus ſecure at home, and ſovereign of the ſea, Athens might incorporate with her own the troops of the conquered provinces, and maintain an unſhaken dominion over the moſt delightful portion of the earth, while her fortunate citizens, delivered from all laborious and mercenary cares, would be ſupported by the contributions of ſubject nations, and enabled to diſplay, in their full extent, that taſte for ſplendour and magnificence, that greatneſs of ſoul and ſuperiority of genius, which juſtly entitled them to the empire of the world[12].

[12] Iſocrat. de Pace. Andocid. Orat. iii. p. 269. & Ariſtoph. Veſp. ver. 656.

Allured

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The Sicilian expedition opposed by Nicias. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 415.

Allured by these extravagant, but flattering prospects of grandeur, the Athenians, in two successive assemblies, held at the short interval of five days, agreed to the resolution of making war against Sicily, and of raising such naval and military force as seemed necessary for carrying it on with vigour and success. While they still deliberated on the latter object, the virtuous Nicias, who had been named with Alcibiades and Lamachus to the command of the projected armament, omitted nothing that prudence could suggest, and patriotism enforce, to deter his countrymen from such a dangerous and fatal design. On this memorable occasion, he threw aside his usual timidity, and divested himself of that rigid regard for established forms, which was natural to his age and character. Though the assembly was convened to determine the proportion of supplies and troops, and the means of collecting them with the greatest expedition and facility, he ventured, contrary to ancient custom, to propose a different subject of debate; affirming, "That the interest of Athens was concerned, not in providing the preparations for the Sicilian invasion, but in re-examining the expediency of the war. The assembly ought not to be moved by the arguments and intreaties of the persecuted Egistæans, and fugitive Leontines, whom resentment had taught to exaggerate, and misery to deceive. Nor ought the vain phantom of glory and ambition to engage Athens in a design perhaps altogether impracticable, and, in the present juncture, peculiarly unseasonable; since it would be madness

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madneſs to excite the flames of a new war, before the aſhes of the old were extinguiſhed. The pleas of danger and ſelf-defence were in the higheſt degree frivolous; for, ſhould the dreaded power of Syracuſe be extended over the whole of Sicily, the Athenians would have nothing to apprehend: this event would rather increaſe their ſecurity. In the actual ſtate of the iſland, particular cities might be perſuaded by fear, or intereſt, to court the protection of the Peloponneſian confederacy; but the victorious Syracuſe would diſdain to follow the ſtandard of Sparta. Should the former republic, by an effort of uncommon generoſity, ſubject the partial dictates of her pride to the general ſafety and honour of the Dorian name, ſound policy, however, would ſtill prevent her from endangering the precarious empire which ſhe had obtained over her neighbours, by ſtrengthening the confederacy of Peloponneſus, of which the avowed deſign was to give liberty and independence to the Grecian cities. Should all remote views of policy be diſregarded, yet immediate fear would deter the Syracuſans from provoking the reſentment of Athens, the effects of which they had not as yet experienced, but which, being unknown, muſt appear the more formidable. It was evident, therefore, that the Sicilian expedition might be omitted without danger; but if this enterpriſe, which had been haſtily reſolved on, were injudiciouſly executed, or if any of thoſe misfortunes ſhould happen, which are but too frequent in war, the Athenians would be expoſed not only to danger, but to diſgrace and ruin.

ruin. The refult of fuch an important deliberation ought not to be committed to the rafh decifion of youthful levity; which viewed the Sicilian war as it did every other object, through the delufive medium of hope, vanity, and ambition; and, totally difregarding the expence and danger to be incurred by the republic, confidered only the profits of military command, which might repair the wreck of exhaufted fortunes, and fupply a new fund for the indulgence of extravagant and licentious pleafures. He had in his eye a youth of that defcription, the principal author of the expedition, who was furrounded by a numerous band of adherents, determined to applaud his difcourfe and to promote his meafures. It became the wifdom and dignity of the affembly to refift with firmnefs that juvenile confpiracy. In fuch a dangerous crifis, it was the duty of the prefident to difpenfe with ordinary forms, and to act, not merely as the inftrument, but as the phyfician of a difeafed republic. The queftion ought to be debated a fecond time; and the Athenians ought to refcind the decree againft Sicily, which had paffed without fufficient examination, in the abfence of feveral aged and refpectable counfellors[13]."

His difcourfe anfwered by Alcibiades.

This difcourfe immediately called up Alcibiades, who, prefuming on his credit with the affembly, acknowledged, "That he had afpired to the com-

13 Thucydid. l. vi. p. 417, & feqq. The Sicilian expedition is uninterruptedly related through the remainder of the fixth and feventh books of Thucydides. The collateral authority of Diodorus, Plutarch, and the orators, is of little importance.

mand

CHAP. XIX. mand in Sicily, and that he thought himſelf juſtly intitled to that honour. The extravagance of which he was accuſed, had redounded to the profit of his country; ſince his magnificence at the Olympic games, however it might be traduced by an abuſive epithet, had extended the glory of Athens, and deſerved the admiration of Greece. His youth and inexperience had effected what the policy of the wiſeſt ſtateſmen had often attempted in vain. A powerful confederacy had been formed againſt Sparta, even in the boſom of the Peloponneſus; and the terror of a domeſtic foe would long prevent the enmity of that rival ſtate from interrupting the progreſs of Athenian grandeur. In an expedition, evidently directed to this glorious end, expence and danger ought not to be regarded, ſince wealth was uſefully ſacrificed to purchaſe victory and renown; and power was only to be preſerved by ſeizing every favourable opportunity to increaſe it. To the undertaking which he adviſed, no reaſonable objection could be made; its expence would be furniſhed by the Egiſtæans, and other confederates; and the danger could not be great, as Sicily, however extenſive and populous, was inhabited by a promiſcuous crowd of various nations, without arms or diſcipline, devoid of patriotiſm, and incapable of union[14]."

Nicias explains the difficulties of the war. The aſſembly murmured applauſe, confirmed their former decree, and teſtified for the war greater alacrity than before. Nicias perceived the violence

[14] Thucydid. p. 422—426.

of

of the popular current; ſtill, however, he made one ineffectual effort to reſiſt its force. "The ſucceſs of an invader," he obſerved, "commonly depended on the weight and rapidity of his firſt unexpected impreſſion, which confirmed the confidence of his friends, and excited diſmay and terror in his enemies. If the expedition into Sicily muſt be undertaken in defiance of every difficulty and danger, it ought therefore to be carried into execution with the utmoſt vigour. The Athenians might thus ſecure the aſſiſtance of Naxos and Catana, which were connected by affinity with the Egiſtæans and Leontines. But there remained ſeven cities, and thoſe far more powerful, with which they muſt prepare to contend; particularly Selinus and Syracuſe, places well provided with ſhips, magazines, cavalry, archers, heavy-armed troops, and every object and reſource moſt uſeful in defenſive war. An armament ſimply naval would not be ſufficient to cope with ſuch a ſtrength. Five thouſand pikemen, with a proportional number of archers and cavalry, could not render the invaſion ſucceſsful. After arriving in Sicily, the towns muſt be beſieged or ſtormed; workmen, with all ſorts of machines and implements, muſt be collected for thoſe purpoſes, and tranſported to an iſland from which, in the four winter months, a meſſenger could ſcarcely return to Athens. This neceſſary train, which would greatly encumber the fleet and army, muſt be ſubſiſted in a hoſtile country. Beſides an hundred gallies, a great number of tenders and victuallers would be required for the

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the expedition. To collect ſuch an immenſe maſs of war, demanded, doubtleſs, aſtoniſhing ardour and perſeverance; but if the Athenians intended to employ a ſmaller force, he muſt, in juſtice to his country and himſelf, decline accepting the command, ſince nothing leſs than what he had deſcribed could promiſe a hope of victory, or prevent the certainty of defeat[15]."

The Athenians prepare for invading Sicily. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 415.

The laſt attempt of Nicias to diſſuade his countrymen from this fatal enterpriſe, by magnifying the difficulty of its execution, produced an oppoſite effect. The obſtacles, which were unable to conquer, only animated the courage of the aſſembly; and it was determined, that the generals ſhould be inveſted with full authority to raiſe ſuch ſums of money, and to levy ſuch a body of troops, as might enſure ſucceſs to their arms. The domeſtic ſtrength of the Athenians was unequal to the greatneſs of the undertaking: proper agents were diſpatched to demand an extraordinary contribution from their dependent ſtates, as well as to ſummon the reluctant aſſiſtance of their more warlike allies. Theſe auxiliary ſquadrons were ordered to ſail to Corcyra, in which rendezvous the Athenians, towards the middle of ſummer, were ready to join their confederates.

The magnitude of their preparations.

The magnitude of the preparations increaſed the hopes and the ardour of all ranks of men in the republic. The old expected that nothing could reſiſt ſuch a numerous and well-equipped armament.

[15] Thucydid. p. 427—429.

The

The young eagerly ſeized an occaſion to gratify their curioſity and love of knowledge in a diſtant navigation, and to ſhare the honours of ſuch a glorious enterpriſe. The rich exulted in diſplaying their magnificence; the poor rejoiced in the immediate aſſurance of pay ſufficient to relieve their preſent wants[16], and in the proſpect of obtaining by their arms the materials of future eaſe and happineſs. Inſtead of finding any difficulty to complete the levies, the great difficulty conſiſted in deciding the preference of valour and merit among thoſe who ſolicited to ſerve; and the whole complement of forces, to be employed by ſea and land, conſiſted of choſen men[17].

The general alacrity to embark.

Amidſt the general alacrity felt, or at leaſt expreſſed, by people of all deſcriptions (for the dread of incurring public cenſure made ſeveral expreſs what they did not feel), Socrates[18] alone ventured openly and boldly to condemn the expedition, and to predict the future calamities of his country. But the authority of a ſage was incapable to check the courſe of that enthuſiaſm, which had not been interrupted by the anniverſary

16 The moſt expert and able ſeamen received a drachma (ſeven pence three farthings) as daily pay, beſides donatives from their reſpective captains. Thucydid. & Plut.

17 Thucydid. p. 430—433.

18 Plutarch joins Meton the aſtrologer with Socrates. But the ſtory of Meton, who pretended madneſs, burned his houſe, and entreated the Athenians, that, amidſt his domeſtic misfortunes, he might not be deprived of the comfort of his only ſon, is inconſiſtent with the narrative of Thucydides, which proves, that inſtead of compelling reluctance, there was occaſion to repreſs forwardneſs, to embark.

feſtival

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feſtival of Adonis, an ancient and melancholy rite, which inauſpiciouſly returned a few days preceding the embarkation. During this dreary ceremony, the ſtreets of Athens were crowded with ſpectres clothed in funereal robes; the ſpacious domes and temples reſounded with lugubrious cries; while the Grecian matrons, marching in ſlow proceſſion, tore their diſhevelled hair, beat their naked boſoms, and lamented in mournful ſtrains the untimely death of the lover, and beloved favourite, of Venus[19].

The armament ſails from Athens;

When the appointed day arrived, the whole inhabitants of Athens, whether citizens or ſtrangers, aſſembled early in the Piræus, to admire the greateſt ſpectacle ever beheld in a Grecian harbour. An hundred gallies were adorned with all the ſplendour of naval pomp: the troops deſtined to embark, vied with each other in the elegance of their dreſs and the brightneſs of their arms: the alacrity painted in every face, and the magnificence diſplayed with profuſion in every part of the equipage, repreſented a triumphal ſhow, rather than the ſtern image of war. But the ſolidity and greatneſs of the armament proved that it was intended for uſe, not for oſtentation. Amidſt this glare of external pageantry which accompanied the adventurous youth, their friends and kinſmen could not ſuppreſs a few parting tears, when they conſidered the length of the voyage, the dangers of the ſea, and the uncertainty of beholding again the

19 Plut. in Nic. & Alcibiad.

deareſt

dearest pledges of their affections. But these partial expressions of grief were speedily interrupted by the animating sounds of the trumpet, which issued at once from an hundred ships, and provoked sympathetic acclamations from the shore. The captains then offered solemn prayers to the gods, which were answered by corresponding vows from the spectators: the customary libations were poured out in goblets of gold and silver; and, after the triumphant Pæan had been sung in full chorus, the whole fleet at once set sail, and contended for the prize of naval skill and celerity, until they reached the lofty shores of Ægina, from whence they enjoyed a prosperous navigation to the rendezvous of their confederates at Corcyra[20].

is reviewed at Corcyra.

At Corcyra the commanders reviewed the strength of the armament, which consisted of an hundred and thirty-four ships of war, with a proportional number of transports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops, exceeding five thousand, were attended with a sufficient body of slingers and archers. The army, abundantly provided in every other article, was extremely deficient in horses, which amounted to no more than thirty. But, at a moderate computation, we may estimate the whole military and naval strength, including slaves and servants, at twenty thousand men.

The Athenians sail along the coast of Italy.

With this powerful host, had the Athenians at once surprised and assailed the unprepared security of Syracuse, the expedition, however adventurous

20 Thucydid. l. vi. p. 432, & seqq. Plut. in Nicia. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 332.

and

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and imprudent, might, perhaps, have been crowned with succefs. But the timid mariners of Greece would have trembled at the propofal of trufting fuch a numerous fleet on the broad expanfe of the Ionian fea. They determined to crofs the narroweft paffage between Italy and Sicily, after coafting along the eaftern fhores of the former, until they reached the Strait of Meffina. That this defign might be executed with the greater fafety, they difpatched three light veffels to examine the difpofition of the Italian cities, and to folicit admiffion into their harbours. The greateft part of Magna Græcia had, indeed, been peopled by Dorians, naturally hoftile to Athens. But from one Italian city the Athenians had reafon to expect a very favourable reception. The effeminate Sybaris had been demolifhed, as related above[21], by the warlike inhabitants of Crotona, about the time that the Athenians, growing more powerful than their neighbours, began to feize every opportunity to extend their colonies and their dominion. Governed by fuch principles, they could not long overlook the happy fituation of Sybaris, near to which they early formed an eftablifhment that affumed the name of Thurium, from a falubrious fountain of frefh water[22]; and the colony was increafed by a numerous fupply of emigrants, who, under Athenian leaders, failed from Greece thirteen years before the Peloponnefian war[23].

[21] P. 53.

[22] Ωνομασαν απο της κρηνης θεριον. Diodor. l. xii. p. 295.

[23] Suid. ad voc. Lyfias.

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The armament at Corcyra, whatever jealousy its power might create in other cities, was entitled to the gratitude of Thurium; presuming on which, the commanders, without waiting the return of the advice-boats, ordered the fleet to proceed, in three divisions, to the Italian coast. But neither the ties of consanguinity, nor the duties acknowledged by colonies towards their parent state, could prevail on the suspicious Thurians to open their gates, or even to furnish a market, to their Athenian ancestors. The towns of Tarentum and Locris prohibited them the use of their harbours, and refused to supply them with water; and they coasted the whole extent of the shore, from the promontory of Iapygium to that of Rhegium, before any one city would allow them to purchase the commodities for which they had immediate use. The magistrates of Rhegium granted this favour, but they granted nothing more; notwithstanding the earnest solicitations of Alcibiades and his colleagues, who exhorted them, as a colony of Eubœa, to assist their brethren of Leontium, whose republic the Athenians had determined to re-establish and to defend[24].

Are regarded with suspicion by the Italian cities.

Rhegium alone supplies them with a market.

While the armament continued at Rhegium, they were informed by vessels which had been purposely dispatched from Corcyra, that the Egistæans, notwithstanding the boasted accounts lately given of their riches, possessed only thirty talents in their treasury. This disagreeable intelligence, together

They are informed of the artifice of the Egistæans.

24 Thucydid. p. 443.

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They deliberate on the mode of carrying on the war.

with the disappointment of assistance from any Italian city, occasioned a council of war, to consider what measures ought to be pursued in the Sicilian expedition. It was the opinion of Nicias, "that the Egistæans ought to be furnished with that proportion of ships only, the charges of which they were able to defray; and that the Athenian fleet having settled, either by arms or by persuasion, the quarrels between them and their neighbours, should return to their own harbours, after sailing along the coast of Sicily, and displaying to the inhabitants of that island both their inclination and their power to protect the weakness of their allies."

Alcibiades declared, "That it would be shameful and ignominious to dissolve such a powerful armament, without performing some exploit worthy the renown of the republic; that, by the prospect of immediate and effectual support, the inferior cities might easily be alienated from their reluctant confederacy with Selinus and Syracuse; after which, the war ought to be carried on with the utmost vigour against those republics, unless they re-established the Leontines in their territory, and gave complete satisfaction to the injured Egistæans."

Judicious advice of Lamachus;

Lamachus not only approved the active counsels of Alcibiades, but proposed a measure still more enterprising. "The Athenians ought not to waste time in unimportant objects. Instead of striking at the extremities, they ought to assault at once the heart and strength of the enemy. If they immediately attacked Syracuse, it would not only be the

the firft, but the laft city, which they would have occafion to befiege. Nor could the attempt fail, if undertaken without delay, before the Syracufans had time to recollect themfelves, and to provide for their own defence; and while the Athenian troops, as yet undaunted by any check, enjoyed unbroken courage and blooming hopes."

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This advice, which does equal honour to the fpirit and good fenfe of Lamachus, was rejected by the timidity of Nicias, and probably by the vanity of Alcibiades. The latter perceived a flattering opportunity of exhaufting all the refources of his eloquence and intrigue to get poffeffion of the dependent cities, before he illuftrated the glory of his arms in the fiege of Syracufe. The fleet failed from Rhegium to execute *his* plan, which was adopted by his colleagues, as forming the middle between the extremes of their refpective opinions. A confiderable detachment was fent to examine the preparations and the ftrength of Syracufe, and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to all the captives and ftrangers confined within its walls.

is rejected.

With another detachment Alcibiades failed to Naxos, and perfuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. The remainder of the armament proceeded to Catana, which refufed to admit the fhips into the harbour, or the troops into the city. But on the arrival of Alcibiades, the Cataneans allowed him to addrefs the affembly, and propofe his demands. The artful Athenian tranfported the populace, and even the magiftrates them-

Alcibiades takes Catana by ftratagem.

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themſelves, by the charms of his eloquence; the citizens flocked from every quarter, to hear a diſcourſe which was purpoſely protracted for ſeveral hours; the ſoldiers forſook their poſts; and the enemy, who had prepared to avail themſelves of this negligence, burſt through the unguarded gates, and became maſters of the city. Thoſe of the Cataneans who were moſt attached to the intereſts of Syracuſe, fortunately eſcaped death by the celerity of their flight. The reſt accepted the proffered friendſhip of the Athenians. This ſucceſs would probably have been followed by the

His intrigues in Meſſené.

ſurrender of Meſſené, which Alcibiades had filled with diſtruſt and ſedition. But when the plot was ripe for execution[25], the man who had contrived, and who alone could conduct it, was diſqualified from ſerving his country. The arrival of the Salaminian galley recalled Alcibiades to Athens, that he might ſtand trial for his life.

He is unſeaſonably recalled to Athens.

It would be improper to ſuſpend the courſe of an intereſting narrative, by deſcribing the cauſes and circumſtances of this unexpected event, if they were not immediately connected with the ſubſequent hiſtory of the Sicilian expedition, and with the future fortune of the Athenians, who, after engaging, by the advice of one man, in the moſt

25 Thucydides ſays, “When Alcibiades knew he ſhould be baniſhed, he betrayed his accomplices to the party favourable to Syracuſe, who immediately put their adverſaries to death.” Thucydid. p. 462. We ſhall ſee hereafter ſtill more fatal conſequences of his reſentment againſt his country. But nothing can more ſtrongly atteſt the turpitude of his character.

romantic

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romantic ſchemes of conqueſt which the madneſs of ambition had ever dared to entertain, injudiciouſly arreſted the activity of that man in the execution of ſuch extraordinary deſigns, as could only be accompliſhed by the wonderful reſources of his ſingular and eccentric genius. It happened, that on the night preceding the intended navigation to Sicily, all the ſtatues of Mercury, which had been erected in the Athenian ſtreets as the boundaries of different edifices and tenements, were thrown down, broken, and defaced. One only image of the god, of uncommon ſize and beauty, was ſaved from the general wreck; it was afterwards called the ſtatue of Andocides, as it ſtood before the houſe of the Athenian orator of that name. This daring inſult was firſt aſcribed to the wicked artifices of the Corinthians, who, it was ſuppoſed, might employ ſuch an abominable and ſacrilegious contrivance, to deter the Athenian armament from ſailing againſt their colony and kinſmen of Syracuſe. But the enemies of Alcibiades availed themſelves of the impious levity[26] of his character, to direct the popular ſtorm againſt the head of their deteſted foe. On the evidence of ſlaves, he was

The cauſe of his recal.

26 Democritus, the chief promoter of the Atomic philoſophy, was younger than Anaxagoras, and elder than Socrates. His ſcholars, Diagoras and Protagoras, propagated his wild ſyſtem at Athens towards the commencement of the Peloponneſian war. Whether Alcibiades embraced the barren doctrines of that miſerable ſect, or adhered to the divine philoſophy of his maſter Socrates, or, more probably, fluctuated between them, he muſt, in all caſes alike, have been obnoxious to the ſuſpicion of impiety. Comp. Strabo, l. lxv. p. 703. Sext. Empiric. l. lix. 11. Laert. l. ii. in Democrit. Socrat. & Protag.

 accuſed

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accuſed of having treated, with rude familiarity, other adored images of the gods; and Theſſalus, the degenerate ſon of the magnanimous Cimon, impeached him of impiety towards the goddeſſes Ceres and Proſerpine, whoſe awful ceremonies he had polluted and profaned; aſſuming, though uninitiated, the name and robes of the high-prieſt, calling Polytion (in whoſe houſe this dreadful ſcene had been repreſented), the torch-bearer, Theodorus the herald, and his other licentious companions the ſacred brethren and holy miniſters of thoſe myſterious rites[27].

He is charged with impiety and treaſon. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 415.

Such an atrocious accuſation alarmed the terrors of the Athenians; one aſſembly was ſummoned after another; and the panic became the more general, when it was underſtood that, during the ſame night in which the ſtatues had been mutilated, a body of Peloponneſian troops had marched towards the Iſthmus of Corinth. In the confuſed imagination of the vulgar, it was poſſible to unite the incompatible intereſts of ſuperſtition and of freedom; and they were perſuaded by Androcles, and other artful demagogues, that the profanation of the myſteries, the defacing of the ſtatues of Mercury, the movement of the Peloponneſian troops, all announced a conſpiracy to demoliſh the eſtabliſhed form of popular government, the ſafety of which had, ever ſince the expulſion of the Piſiſtratidæ, formed an object of univerſal and moſt anxious ſolicitude.

[27] Plutarch. in Alcibiad.

Alcibi-

The artifices of his accuſers.

Alcibiades defended himſelf, with his uſual eloquence and addreſs, againſt the malignity of a charge, unſupported by any adequate evidence. The ſoldiers and ſailors, whoſe eagerneſs already graſped the conqueſt of Sicily, interceded for the deliverance of their commander, whom they regarded as the ſoul of that glorious enterpriſe. A thouſand Argives and Mantineans, who had enliſted, on this occaſion, under the Athenian banners, declared their unwillingneſs to ſail, unleſs they were accompanied by Alcibiades, whoſe valour and abilities alone had determined them to engage in ſuch an important, but dangerous ſervice. This powerful combination in his favour diſappointed the preſent hopes, without diſconcerting the future meaſures, of his enemies. They perceived that, were he brought to an immediate trial, it would be impoſſible to obtain ſentence againſt him; but that were his perſon and influence removed to a diſtance from Athens, every thing might be hoped from the weakneſs, inconſtancy, and credulity of the populace. It was therefore determined by this perfidious cabal, that ſuch orators as had hitherto diſguiſed, under the maſk of friendſhip or admiration, their envy and hatred of Alcibiades, ſhould declare in full aſſembly, "that it would be inconſiſtent with the cleareſt dictates of prudence and propriety, to involve in the tedious formalities of a judicial procedure, a citizen who had been elected general by the unanimous ſuffrage of his country, and whoſe preſence was eagerly demanded by the affectionate ardour of

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of his troops. The charges againſt him deſerved, doubtleſs, to be ſeriouſly examined; but the preſent was not a proper time for ſuch an inveſtigation which muſt blunt the courage of his followers, and interrupt the ſervice of the republic. Let him ſail, therefore, for Sicily, and at his return home he will either vindicate his innocence, or ſuffer the puniſhment of his guilt." Alcibiades perceived the poiſon concealed under this affected lenity, and teſtified his reluctance to leave behind him ſuch abundant materials for the malice of informers. But his petition for an immediate trial was rejected by the aſſembly. He therefore ſet ſail, probably flattering himſelf, that by the glory and ſucceſs of his arms, he would ſilence the clamours, and defeat the machinations, of his accuſers.

Favoured by popular deluſion.

But this expectation was unfortunately diſappointed. In a republican government, it is not more eaſy to excite, than it is difficult to appeaſe, the fermentation of public diſcontents, eſpecially if occaſioned by any real or pretended diminution of freedom. The removal of Alcibiades gave full ſcope to the ebullitions of popular frenzy. The Athenians were continually aſſembled to enquire into the violation of the ſtatues. Many reſpectable citizens were ſeized on ſuſpicion, becauſe they had, on former occaſions, diſcovered principles hoſtile to the wild extravagance of democracy. Others were impriſoned on the evidence of Teucer, an obſcure ſtranger, and Diopeithes, a calumnious demagogue. The violence of the public diſorder opened a door to private vengeance. Every individual

vidual was deſirous to ſee his perſonal enemies among the number of ſtate criminals; and his reſentment was invited falſely to accuſe them, by an injudicious decree of the aſſembly, offering high rewards to thoſe who ſhould denounce the guilty, and even to the guilty themſelves, who ſhould denounce their aſſociates.

Alcibiades eſcapes to Sparta. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 415.

Among the perſons who had been ſeized on ſuſpicion, was the crafty and intriguing Timæus, and the profligate and impious Andocides, the ſame whoſe ſtatue of Mercury had eſcaped the general mutilation. The known character of theſe men naturally marked them out as peculiar victims of popular fury. As they were confined in the ſame priſon, they had an opportunity of communicating their apprehenſions, and of contriving means of ſafety. Timæus perſuaded his friend (for the ties of common danger create between knaves a temporary friendſhip), that it would be weakneſs to die by a falſe accuſation, when he might ſave himſelf by a lie. Andocides turned informer. The priſoners whom he named were baniſhed or put to death; the reſt were ſet at liberty. The abſent, among whom was Alcibiades, were recalled to ſtand trial. But they did not obey the ſummons ſent them by the Salaminian galley. The wanderings and miſfortunes of more obſcure names are unknown. Alcibiades eſcaped to Thurium, and afterwards to Argos; and when he underſtood that the Athenians had ſet a price on his head, he finally took refuge in Sparta; where his active genius ſeized the

the first opportunity to advise and to promote those fatal measures, which, while they gratified his private resentment, occasioned the ruin of his country.[28]

Languid operations in Sicily.

The removal of Alcibiades soon appeared in the languid operations of the Athenian armament. The cautious timidity of Nicias, supported by wealth, eloquence, and authority, gained an absolute ascendant over the more warlike and enterprising character of Lamachus, whose poverty exposed him to contempt. Instead of making a bold impression on Selinus or Syracuse, Nicias contented himself with taking possession of the inconsiderable colony of Hyccara. He ravaged, or laid under contribution, some places of smaller note, and obtained thirty talents from the Egistæans, which, added to the sale of the booty, furnished about thirty thousand pounds sterling[29], a sum that might be usefully employed in the prosecution of an expensive war. But this advantage did not compensate for the courage inspired into the Syracusans by delay, and for the dishonour sustained by the Athenian troops, in their unsuccessful attempts against Hybla and Himera, as well as for their dejection at being confined, during the greatest part

[28] Plut. in Alcibiad. & Isocrates, and Lysias, in the Orations for and against the son of Alcibiades. Several facts and circumstances are differently represented in the orations of Andocides; but that orator was a party concerned.

[29]

Thirty talents from the Egistæans, amount to	£ 5,812
The sale of slaves, &c. - - -	23,259
Sum	£ 29,062

of

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of the ſummer, in the inactive quarters of Naxos and Catana.

Nicias determines to attack Syracuſe.

The impatience of the Athenians murmured againſt theſe dilatory and ignoble proceedings, which appeared altogether unworthy the greatneſs of their armament, the generous ſpirit with which they felt themſelves animated, and the ancient glory of the republic. Nicias, reſiſting the wary dictates of his own fear or foreſight, determined to gratify the inclination of his troops by the vigour of his winter campaign. The conqueſt of Syracuſe, againſt which he intended to lead them, might well excite the emulation of the combatants, ſince that powerful city formed the main obſtacle to their ambition, and the principal bulwark not only of Sicily, but of the Italian and African ſhores.

Deſcription of that city.

Ancient Syracuſe, of which the ruined grandeur ſtill forms an object of admiration, was ſituate on a ſpacious promontory, waſhed on three ſides by the ſea, and defended on the weſt by abrupt and almoſt inacceſſible mountains. The town was built in a triangular form, whoſe ſummit may be conceived at the lofty mountains Epipolé. Adjacent to theſe natural fortifications, the weſtern or inland diviſion of the city was diſtinguiſhed by the name of Tycha, or Fortune, being adorned by a magnificent temple of that flattering divinity. The triangle gradually widening towards the baſe, comprehended the vaſt extent of Achradina, reaching from the northern ſhore of the promontory to the ſouthern iſland Ortygia. This ſmall iſland, compoſing the whole of modern Syracuſe, formed but the third

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third and leaſt extenſive diviſion of the ancient; which was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circuit, enriched by a triple harbour, and peopled by above two hundred thouſand warlike citizens or induſtrious ſlaves[30].

Temper of the Syracuſans.

When the Syracuſans heard the firſt rumours of the Athenian invaſion, they deſpiſed, or affected to deſpiſe them, as idle lies invented to amuſe the ignorance of the populace. The hoſtile armament had arrived at Rhegium before they could be perſuaded, by the wiſdom of Hermocrates, to provide againſt a danger which their preſumption painted as imaginary. But when they received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had reached the Italian coaſt; when they beheld their numerous fleet commanding the ſea of Sicily, and ready to make a deſcent on their defenceleſs iſland, they were ſeized with a degree of juſt terror and alarm proportional to their falſe ſecurity. They condemned their former incredulity and indifference, which had been nouriſhed by the intereſted adulation of the demagogue Athenagoras, who vainly aſſured them that the ſtrength of Syracuſe was ſufficient not only to defy the aſſaults, but to deter the attempts, of any Grecian foe. From the heights of preſumption they plunged into the depths of deſpair, and their ſpirits were, with difficulty, reſtored by the animating voice of Hermocrates, who was not more prudent in proſperity than intrepid in danger[31].

30 Strabo, p. 266, & ſeqq. & Thucydid. paſſim. l. vi.

31 Thucydid. p. 436, & ſeqq.

By

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They insult the Athenians.

By his exhortations they were encouraged to make ready their arms, to equip their fleet, to strengthen their garrisons, and to summon the assistance of their allies. These measures were undertaken with ardour, and carried on with unremitting activity; and the dilatory operations of the enemy not only removed the recent terror and trepidation of the Syracusans, but inspired them with unusual firmness. They requested the generals, whom they had appointed to the number of fifteen, to lead them to Catana, that they might attack the hostile camp. Their cavalry harassed the Athenians by frequent incursions, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, destroyed their advanced posts, and even proceeded so near to the main body, that they were distinctly heard demanding, with loud insults, Whether those boasted lords of Greece had left their native country, that they might form a precarious settlement at the foot of Mount Ætna[32].

Stratagem of Nicias for getting possession of Syracuse.

Provoked by these indignities, and excited by the impatient resentment of his own troops, Nicias was still restrained from an open attempt against Syracuse by the difficulties attending that enterprise. The distance between Catana and the Sicilian capital was more than thirty miles; but, after the most prosperous voyage, the Athenians could not expect, without extreme danger, to make a

[32] Plutarch. The sneer is differently expressed in Thucydides: "Whether they had not come to gain a settlement for themselves in a *foreign* country, rather than to replace the Leontines in *their own*." Thucydid. p. 455.

descent

CHAP. XIX. descent on the fortified coast of a powerful and vigilant enemy. If they determined to march by land, they must be harassed by the numerous cavalry of Syracuse, which actually watched their motions, and with whose activity, in a broken and intricate country, the strength of heavy-armed troops was exceedingly ill qualified to contend. To avoid both inconveniencies, Nicias employed a stratagem. A citizen of Catana, whose subtile and daring genius, prepared alike to die or to deceive, ought to have preserved his name from oblivion, appeared in Syracuse as a deserter from his native city; the unhappy fate of which, in being subjected to the imperious commands, or licentious disorder of the Athenians, he lamented with perfidious tears, and with the plaintive accents of well-dissembled sorrow. "*He* was not the only man who bewailed, with filial compassion, the misfortunes and ignominy of his country. A numerous band of Cataneans, whose resentment was repressed by fear, longed to take up arms, that they might deliver themselves from a disgraceful yoke, and repel the tyranny of the invaders. Nor could the design fail of success, if Syracuse should second their generous ardour. The Athenians, so liberally endowed with courage and ambition, were destitute of wisdom and of discipline. They spurned the confinement of the military life; their posts were forsaken, their ships unguarded; they disdained the duties of the camp, and indulged in the pleasures of the city. On an appointed day it would be easy for the Syracusans, assisted by the conspi-

conspirators of Catana, to attack them unprepared, to mount their undefended ramparts, to demolish their encampment, and to burn their fleet." This daring proposal well corresponded with the keen sentiments of revenge which animated the inhabitants of Syracuse. The day was named; the plan of the enterprise was concerted, and the treacherous Catanean returned home to revive the hopes, and to confirm the resolution, of his pretended associates.

Fails through the activity of the Syracusans.

The success of this intrigue gave the utmost satisfaction to Nicias, whose armament prepared to sail for Syracuse on the day appointed by the inhabitants of that city for assaulting, with their whole force, the Athenian camp. Already had they marched, with this view, to the fertile plain of Leontium, when, after twelve hours sail, the Athenian fleet arrived in the great harbour, disembarked their troops, and fortified a camp without the western wall, near to a celebrated temple of Olympian Jupiter; a situation which had been pointed out by some Syracusan exiles, and which was well adapted to every purpose of accommodation and defence. Meanwhile the cavalry of Syracuse, having proceeded to the walls of Catana, had discovered, to their infinite regret, the departure of the Athenians. The unwelcome intelligence was conveyed, with the utmost expedition, to the infantry, who immediately marched back to protect Syracuse. The rapid return of the warlike youth restored the courage of the aged Syracusans. They were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus,

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Nicias defeats the Syracusans in a battle. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 415.

Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined, without loſs of time, to attack the hoſtile encampment[33].

Only a few days elapſed before the Athenians gave them a fairer opportunity of revenge. The two armies prepared to engage, reſpectively inflamed by reſentment and ambition; the one formidable in courage and numbers, the other elated by ſuperior diſcipline and habitual victory. The Syracuſan generals drew up their troops, ſixteen, and the Athenians only eight, deep: but the latter had, in their camp, a body of reſerve, which was kept ready for action on the firſt ſignal. Nicias went round the ranks, exhorting his ſoldiers by a ſhort diſcourſe, in which he obſerved, "that the ſtrength of their preſent preparations was better fitted to inſpire confidence, than the moſt eloquent ſpeech with a weak army, eſpecially as they contended againſt the Syracuſans, a promiſcuous crowd, whoſe preſumption was founded on inexperience, and whoſe deſultorious ardour, however ſucceſsful in predatory incurſions, would yield to the firſt ſhock of regular war. They fought, indeed, in defence of their city; ſo did the Athenians and their allies, whom nothing but military valour and ſucceſs would reſtore in ſafety to their reſpective countries[34]." Having thus ſpoken, he led his troops to the enemy, who did not decline the engagement. The light-armed archers[35] ſkirmiſhed

33 Thucydid. p. 445—457.

34 Thucydid. p. 458 & 459.

35 Thucydides mentions, beſides the archers (τοξοται), the λιθοβολοι and σφενδονηται, "the throwers of ſtones and ſlingers." P. 449. They were all ψιλοι, as he ſays immediately below.

in the war: the prieſts brought forth the accuſtomed ſacrifices: the trumpets ſummoned for a general charge.

Cauſe of their defeat.

The attack was begun with fury, and continued with perſeverance for ſeveral hours. Both ſides were animated by every principle that can inſpire and urge the utmoſt vigour of exertion, and victory was ſtill doubtful, when a tempeſt ſuddenly aroſe, accompanied with unuſual peals of thunder. This event, which little affected the Athenians, confounded the unexperienced credulity of the enemy, who were broken and put to flight. Nicias reſtrained the eagerneſs of his men in the purſuit, leſt they ſhould be expoſed to danger from a body of twelve hundred Syracuſan cavalry, who had not engaged in the battle, but who impatiently watched an opportunity to aſſault the diſordered phalanx. The Syracuſans eſcaped to their city, and the Athenians returned to their camp. In ſuch an obſtinate conflict the vanquiſhed loſt two hundred and ſixty, the victors only fifty men; numbers that might occaſion much ſurpriſe, if we reflected not that, to oppoſe the offenſive weapons uſed by antiquity, the warriors of Greece (in every circumſtance ſo unlike the miſerable and naked peaſants of modern Europe, whoſe lives are ſacrificed without defence, as without remorſe, to the ambition of men whom the Greeks would have ſtyled tyrants) being armed with the helmet and cuiraſs, the ample buckler, the firm corſelet, and the manly greaves, they often diſplayed their ſkill, their courage, and their love of liberty, at a very ſmall expence of human blood.

The Athenians return to Catana and Naxos.

The voyage, the encampment, and the battle, employed the dangerous activity, and gratified the impetuous ardour of the Athenians, but did not facilitate the conqueſt of Syracuſe. Without more powerful preparations, Nicias deſpaired of taking the place, either by aſſault, or by a regular ſiege. Soon after his victory he returned with the whole armament to Naxos and Catana; a meaſure which ſufficiently proves that the late enterpriſe had been undertaken, not in conſequence of any permanent ſyſtem of operations formed by the general, but in compliance with the ungovernable[36] temper of his troops, whoſe ideas of military ſubordination were confined to the field of battle.

36 Without attending to this circumſtance, the conduct of Grecian generals muſt, on many occaſions, appear altogether unaccountable. The ſame obſervation applies to modern hiſtory preceding the peace of Munſter. The famous war of thirty years, which ended in that peace, laid the foundation for the exact military ſubordination which diſtinguiſhes the preſent century. See Pere Bougeant, Hiſtoire de la Guerre de 30 Ans.

CHAP. XX.

Preparations for the ensuing Campaign.—The Athenians begin the Siege with Vigour.—Distress and Sedition in Syracuse.—Arrival of Gylippus—Who defeats the Athenians.—Transactions in Greece.—A second Armament arrives at Syracuse—Its first Operations successful.—The Athenians defeated.—Prepare to raise the Siege.—Naval Engagement in the Great Harbour.—Despondency of the Athenians.—Stratagem of Hermocrates.—The Athenians raise their camp.—Melancholy Firmness of Nicias.—Demosthenes capitulates.—Nicias surrenders.—Cruel Treatment of the Athenian Captives.—Singular Exception.

CHAP. XX.

Nicias prepares for the ensuing campaign. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 41[?]

NICIAS had reason to expect that his victory over the Syracusans would procure him respect and assistance from the inferior states of Sicily. His emissaries were diffused over that island and the neighbouring coast of Italy. Messengers were sent to Tuscany, where Pisa and other cities had been founded by Greek colonies[1]. An embassy was dispatched to Carthage, the rival and enemy of Syracuse. Nicias gave orders to collect materials for circumvallation, iron, bricks, and all necessary stores. He demanded horses

[1] Strabo, p. 243, & p. 283, & seqq.

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from the Egestæans; and required from Athens reinforcements and a large pecuniary supply; and neglected nothing that might enable him to open the ensuing campaign with vigour and effect[2].

The Syracusans prepare for defence.

While the Athenians thus prepared for the attack of Syracuse, the citizens of that capital displayed equal activity in providing for their own defence. By the advice of Hermocrates, they appointed *himself*, Heraclides, and Sicanus; three, instead of fifteen generals. The commanders newly elected, both in civil and military affairs, were invested with unlimited power, which was usefully employed to purchase or prepare arms, daily to exercise the troops, and to strengthen and extend the fortifications of Syracuse. They likewise dispatched ambassadors to the numerous cities and republics with which they had been connected in peace, or allied in war, to solicit the continuance of their friendship, and to counteract the dangerous designs of the Athenians.

Both parties court the friendship of the Camerineans. Olymp. XCI. 2. A.C. 415.

The importance of the city Camerina, situate on the southern coast of Sicily, demanded the presence of Hermocrates himself. The Camerineans had given a very feeble and reluctant assistance to their allies of Syracuse; and the orator Euphemus employed all the resources of his genius to unite them

2 It is remarkable that though Nicias, after the removal of Alcibiades, enjoyed the principal, or rather sole, command of the army, he acted quite contrary to the opinion which he had declared at the commencement of the expedition. The plan which he pursued was that of Alcibiades, not his own: the views of the banished general still actuated the army; but the ardent spirit was withdrawn, that could alone ensure their success.

Arguments of the Syracuſans.

them to the Athenian confederacy. An aſſembly being ſummoned, Hermocrates informed them, "That his deſire to prevent the deception of the Camerineans, not the dread of the Athenian power, had occaſioned his preſent journey. That reſtleſs and ambitious nation, which had ſo often kindled the flames of war on the continent of Greece, had lately ſailed to Sicily, under pretence of re-eſtabliſhing the affairs of the Leontines and Egeſtæans, but from a motive more ſelfiſh, which it was eaſy to conjecture, and impoſſible to miſtake. Their real and only deſign was to ſow diſſenſion and diſagreement among the Sicilian ſtates, which, fighting ſingly, might be ſucceſſively ſubdued. How could effrontery affirm, or ſimplicity believe, that the Athenians ſhould undertake a voyage to vindicate the freedom of Egeſta; they who oppreſſed, with all the rigours of ſlavery, the unhappy iſlanders of Eubœa, by whom Egeſta had been built, and from whom its inhabitants were deſcended! Under pretence of delivering from the tyranny of the great king, the Greeks of Aſia, of the Helleſpont, of Thrace, and of the Ægean, they had conquered and enſlaved thoſe various countries. They actually employed the ſame perfidious contrivance againſt the ſafety of the Sicilians; but he truſted that their preſent undertaking, though carried on with equal artifice, would be attended with very different ſucceſs; and that they would learn, by experience, to diſtinguiſh between the effeminate Ionians and Helleſpontines, whoſe minds had been enfeebled and debaſed by the Perſian yoke, and the magna-

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nimous Dorians of Sicily, the genuine offspring of Peloponnesus, the source of valour and of liberty[3]."

Of the Athenians.

Euphemus, the Athenian, repelled, with force and spirit, these reproachful accusations. "The colonies of Athens were kept in a dependence, not less advantageous to themselves than honourable to the parent state. The general interest of Greece required that the same republic which at first had so bravely established, should still continue to maintain, the national independence. They who yield protection, must assume authority; but this authority the Athenians had exerted in a manner essential to their own and to the public safety. If they had subjected the neighbouring coasts and islands, their *interest* might justify that odious but necessary measure; and the same dictates of sound policy which induced them to conquer and to enslave the Hellespontine and Asiatic Greeks, would engage them to emancipate and to deliver the oppressed Sicilians. To this office they were invited by the Leontines and Egestæans; to this duty they were prompted by the ties of friendship and consanguinity; to this enterprise they were determined by the strongest of all motives, a well-grounded fear lest the inhabitants of Sicily (whose number and distance rendered it impossible for Athens to subdue, far less to retain them in subjection) should fall a prey to the watchful encroachments of Syracuse, and thus become an accession to the Peloponnesian confederacy." The Camerineans dreaded

[3] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 463, & seqq.

the

the distant ambition of Athens, but dreaded still more the neighbouring hostility of Syracuse. Their fears dictated a reply in friendly and respectful terms; but they craved leave to preserve a neutrality between the contending powers, hoping, by this expedient, to irritate the resentment of neither, yet to defeat the designs of both.

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The Camerineans determine to observe neutrality.

Meanwhile the expected reinforcements arrived from Athens. In addition to his original force, Nicias had likewise collected a body of six hundred cavalry, and the sum of four hundred talents; and, in the eighteenth summer of the war, the activity of the troops and workmen had completed all necessary preparations for undertaking the siege of Syracuse. The Athenian armament enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the northern harbour of Trogilé, and the troops were no sooner disembarked than they seized an opportunity of signalising their valour against a body of seven hundred men, who marched to reinforce the garrison of Labdalus; an important fortress, situate on the highest of the mountains which overlook and command the city. Three hundred Syracusans were killed in the pursuit; the rest took refuge behind their walls; and the castle of Labdalus was taken, and strongly guarded by the victors. The plan which Nicias adopted for conquering the city, was to draw a wall on either side from the neighbourhood of Labdalus, towards the port of Trogilé on the north, and towards the gulph, extending two leagues in circumference, and justly called the Great Harbour, on the south. When these circumvallations had

The Athenians are reinforced, and begin the siege with vigour. Olymp. xci. 3. A.C. 414.

 sur-

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ſurrounded the place by land, he expected, by his numerous fleet, to block up the wide extent of the Syracuſan harbours. The whole ſtrength of the Athenian armament was employed in the former operations; and, as all neceſſary materials had been provided with due attention, the works roſe with a rapidity which ſurpriſed and terrified the beſieged. Their former, as well as their recent defeat, deterred them from oppoſing the enemy in a general engagement; but the advice of Hermocrates perſuaded them to raiſe walls, which might traverſe and interrupt thoſe of the Athenians[4]. The imminent danger urged the activity of the workmen; the hoſtile bulwarks approached each other; frequent ſkirmiſhes took place, in one of which the brave Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his raſh valour[5]; but the Athenian troops maintained their uſual ſuperiority.

Diſtreſs and ſedition in Syracuſe.

Encouraged by ſucceſs, Nicias puſhed the enemy with vigour. The Syracuſans loſt hopes of defending their new works, or of preventing the complete circumvallation of their city; and this deſpair was increaſed by the abundant ſupplies which arrived from all quarters to the beſiegers, while the intereſt of Syracuſe ſeemed to be univerſally abandoned by the indifference or cowardice of her allies. In the turbulent democracies of Greece, the moment of public danger commonly gave the ſignal for domeſtic ſedition. The populace clamoured, with their uſual licentiouſneſs, againſt the incapacity or perfidy of their leaders, to whom

[4] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 482, & ſeqq. [5] Plutarch. in Nicia.

alone

alone they ascribed their misfortunes. New generals were named in the room of Hermocrates and his colleagues; and this injudicious alteration increafed the calamities of Syracufe, which at length prepared to capitulate [6].

The Syracufans unexpectedly relieved by their Peloponnefian allies. Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414.

While the affembly deliberated concerning the execution of a meafure, which, however difgraceful, was declared to be neceffary, a Corinthian galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the central harbour of Ortygia, which being ftrongly fortified, and penetrating into the heart of the city, ferved as the principal and moft fecure ftation for the Syracufan fleet. The news immediately reached the affembly, and all ranks of men eagerly crowded around Gongylus the Corinthian, that they might learn the defign of his voyage, and the intentions of their Peloponnefian allies. Gongylus announced a fpeedy and effectual relief to the befieged city [7]. He acquainted the Syracufans, that the embaffy, fent the preceding year, to crave the affiftance of Peloponnefus, had been crowned with fuccefs. His own countrymen had warmly embraced the caufe of their kinfmen, and moft refpectable colony. They had fitted out a confiderable fleet, the arrival of which might be expected every hour. The Lacedæmonians alfo had fent a fmall fquadron, and the whole armament was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of tried valour and ability.

Arrival of the Spartan Gylippus;

While the defponding citizens of Syracufe liftened to this intelligence with pleafing aftonifh-ment,

6 Thucydid. p. 487.

7 Id. p. 490.

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ment, a meſſenger arrived by land from Gylippus himſelf. That experienced commander, inſtead of purſuing a direct courſe to Sicily, which might have been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed with four gallies on the weſtern coaſt of the iſland. The name of a Spartan general determined the wavering irreſolution of the Sicilians. The troops of Himera, Selinus, and Gela, flocked to his ſtandard; and he approached Syracuſe on the ſide of Epipolé, where the line of contravallation was ſtill unfiniſhed, with a body of ſeveral thouſand men.

who defeats the Athenians.

The moſt courageous of the citizens ſallied forth to meet this generous and powerful protector. The junction was happily effected; the ardour of the troops kindled into enthuſiaſm; and they diſtinguiſhed that memorable day by ſurpriſing ſeveral important Athenian poſts. This firſt ſucceſs re-animated the activity of the ſoldiers and workmen. The traverſe wall was extended with the utmoſt diligence, and a vigorous ſally deprived the enemy of the ſtrong caſtle of Labdalus. Nicias perceiving that the intereſt of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually weakened by delay, wiſhed to bring the fortune of the war to the deciſion of a battle. Nor did Gylippus decline the engagement. The firſt action was unfavourable to the Syracuſans, who had been imprudently poſted in the defiles between their own and the enemy's walls, which rendered of no avail their ſuperiority in cavalry and archers. The magnanimity of Gylippus acknowledged this error, for which he com-

completely atoned by his judicious conduct in the ſucceeding engagements. His forces were drawn up in a more ſpacious ground. The pikemen received the ſhock of the enemy's front. The horſes and light-armed troops aſſailed and haraſſed their undefended flanks. The Athenians were thrown into diſorder, repulſed, and purſued to their camp with conſiderable loſs, and with irreparable diſgrace.

Conſequences of the victory.

The important conſequences of this victory appeared in the ſubſequent events of the ſiege. The Syracuſans ſoon extended their works beyond the line of circumvallation, ſo that it was impoſſible to block up their city, without forcing their ramparts. The beſiegers, while they maintained the ſuperiority of their arms, had been abundantly ſupplied with neceſſaries from the neighbouring territory; but every place was alike hoſtile to them after their defeat. The ſoldiers who went out in queſt of wood and water, were unexpectedly attacked and cut off by the enemy's cavalry, or by the reinforcements which arrived from every quarter to the aſſiſtance of Syracuſe; and they were at length reduced to depend, for every neceſſary ſupply, on the precarious bounty of the Italian ſhore.

Nicias demands a reinforcement from Athens.

Nicias, whoſe ſenſibility deeply felt the public diſtreſs, wrote a moſt deſponding letter to the Athenians. He honeſtly deſcribed, and lamented, the misfortunes and diſorders of his army. The ſlaves deſerted in great numbers; the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and ſubſiſtence, preferred the

CHAP. XX. the more ſecure and lucrative ſervice of Syracuſe; even the Athenian citizens, diſguſted with the unexpected length and intolerable hardſhips of the war, abandoned the care of the gallies to unexperienced hands; an abuſe too eaſily permitted by the captains, whoſe weakneſs and partiality had corrupted the diſcipline, and ruined the ſtrength, of the fleet. Nicias frankly acknowledged his inability to check the diſorder; obſerving, that he wrote to thoſe who knew the difficulty of governing the licentious ſpirit of their domeſtic troops. He therefore exhorted the aſſembly, either to call them home without delay, or to ſend immediately a ſecond armament, not leſs powerful than the firſt.

Naval operations. Olymp. xci. 4. A.C. 413.

Gylippus and Hermocrates (for the latter had again aſſumed the authority due to his abilities) were acquainted with the actual diſtreſs, as well as the future hopes of the beſiegers, who might derive, in conſequence of Nicias's letter, more effectual ſuccours from Attica than the beſieged city could expect from Peloponneſus. They were prompted by intereſt therefore, as well as by inclination, to preſs the enemy on every ſide, and at once to aſſail them by ſea and land. Beſides the bad condition of the Athenian fleet, the abſence of a conſiderable number of gallies employed in conducting the convoys of proviſions, encouraged this reſolution. The Corinthian ſquadron of twelve ſail, long expected with anxiety, had eſcaped the dangers of a winter's voyage; and at the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, the harbours of Syracuſe

Syracuſe were crowded with the whole naval ſtrength of Sicily. Hermocrates perſuaded his countrymen, "That the advantages of ſkill and experience, which he honeſtly aſcribed to the Athenians, could not compenſate their terror and confuſion at being ſuddenly attacked by a ſuperior force, on an element which they affected to command. Athens had aſſumed this boaſted empire of the ſea in repelling the invaſion of Perſia. Syracuſe had a ſimilar, yet ſtronger motive; and as ſhe poſſeſſed greater power, was entitled to expect more diſtinguiſhed ſucceſs."

Alternate ſucceſs.

The principal ſquadrons of Syracuſe lay in the harbour of Ortygia, ſeparated, by an iſland of the ſame name, from the ſtation of the Athenian fleet. While Hermocrates ſailed forth with eighty gallies, to venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked the hoſtile fortifications at Plemmyrium, a promontory oppoſite to Ortygia, which confined the entrance of the Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syracuſans at ſea, whereby they loſt fourteen veſſels, was balanced by their victory at land, in which they took three fortreſſes, containing a large quantity of military and naval ſtores, and a conſiderable ſum of money. In ſome ſubſequent actions, which ſcarcely deſerve the name of battles, their fleet was ſtill unſucceſsful; but as they engaged with great caution, and found every where a ſecure retreat on a friendly ſhore, their loſs was extremely inconſiderable. The want of ſucceſs, in their firſt attempt, did not abate their reſolution to gain the command at ſea. The hopes of defending their country

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country ſharpened their invention, and animated their activity. They could not, indeed, contend with the Athenians in the rapidity of naval evolution, or in the ſkill of ſeamanſhip; but in the deſtined ſcene of action, there was little opportunity for diſplaying thoſe advantages; and by ſtrengthening, with unremitting labour, the prows of their ſhips, they compenſated, by ſuperior weight, the defect of velocity. They provided alſo a great number of ſmall veſſels, which might approach ſo near the hoſtile fleet, that the light-armed troops with which they were filled could aim their darts againſt the Athenian mariners.

The Athenians defeated at ſea.

By unexampled aſſiduity in completing theſe preparations, the Syracuſans at length prevailed in a general engagement, which was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian ſhips were ſunk, many more were diſabled, and Nicias ſaved the remains of his ſhattered and diſhonoured armament, by retiring behind a line of merchantmen and tranſports, from the maſts of which had been ſuſpended huge maſſes of lead, named dolphins from their form, ſufficient to cruſh, by their falling weight, the ſtouteſt gallies of antiquity. This unexpected obſtacle arreſted the progreſs of the victors; but the advantages already obtained elevated them with the higheſt hopes, and reduced the enemy to deſpair.

Tranſactions in Greece. Olymp. xci. 3. A.C. 414.

The Athenian misfortunes in Sicily were attended by misfortunes at home, ſtill more dreadful. In the eighteenth year of the war, Alcibiades accompanied to Sparta the ambaſſadors of Corinth and Syracuſe,

Syracuse, who had solicited and obtained assistance to the besieged city. On that occasion, the Athenian exile first acquired the confidence of the Spartans, by condemning, in the strongest terms, the injustice and ambition of his ungrateful countrymen, "whose cruelty towards himself equalled their inveterate hostility to the Lacedæmonian republic; but that republic might, by following his advice, disarm their resentment. The town of Decelia was situated on the Attic frontier, at an equal distance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This place, which commanded an extensive and fertile plain, might be surprised and fortified by the Spartans[8], who, instead of harassing their foes by annual incursions, might thus infest them by a continual war. The wisdom of Sparta had too long neglected such a salutary and decisive measure, especially as the existence of a similar design had often been suggested by the fears of the enemy, who trembled even at the apprehension of seeing a foreign garrison in their territory."

The Peloponnesians raise a fortress in Attica. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

This advice, first proposed, and often urged, by Alcibiades, was adopted in the commencement of the ensuing spring, when the warlike Agis led a powerful army into Attica. The defenceless inhabitants of the frontier fled before his irresistible arms; but instead of pursuing them, as usual, into the heart of the country, he stopped short at Decelia. As all ne-

[8] The Athenians, with their usual imprudence, facilitated the success of Alcibiades's intrigues. At the time they ought, if possible, to have soothed, they exasperated the Spartans to the utmost, by frequent incursions from Pylus, and by openly assisting the Argives. Thucydid. l. vi. sub fine.

cessary

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ceſſary materials had been provided in great abundance, the place was ſpeedily fortified on every ſide, and the walls of Decelia, which might be diſtinctly ſeen acroſs the intermediate plain, bid defiance to thoſe of Athens [9].

The miſerable ſtate of that country.

The latter city was kept in continual alarm by the watchful hoſtility of a neighbouring garriſon. The open country was entirely laid waſte, and the uſual communication was interrupted with the valuable iſland of Eubœa, from which, in ſeaſons of ſcarcity, or during the ravages of war, the Athenians commonly derived their ſupplies of corn, wine, and oil, and whatever is moſt neceſſary to life. Haraſſed by the fatigues of unremitting ſervice, and deprived of daily bread, the ſlaves murmured, complained, and revolted to the enemy; and their defection robbed the ſtate of twenty thouſand uſeful artiſans. Since the latter years of Pericles, the Athenians had not been involved in ſuch diſtreſs. But their preſent were far more grievous than their paſt ſufferings. Theſe had been chiefly occaſioned by the temporary rage of the peſtilence, the abatement of which there was always reaſon to expect; but thoſe were inflicted by the unextinguiſhable hatred of a cruel and unrelenting foe [10].

The Athenians exert great vigour in the midſt of their calamities.

The domeſtic calamities of the republic did not, however, prevent the moſt vigorous exertions abroad. Twenty gallies, ſtationed at Naupactus, watched the motions of the Peloponneſian fleet deſtined to the aſſiſtance of Syracuſe: thirty carried on the war in Macedonia, to reduce the rebellion

9 Thucydid. p. 500, & ſeqq.

10 Id. ibid.

of

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of Amphipolis; a considerable squadron collected tribute, and levied soldiers, in the colonies of Asia; another, still more powerful, ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. Never did any kingdom or republic equal the magnanimity of Athens; never, in ancient or modern times, did the courage of any state entertain an ambition so far superior to its power, or exert efforts so disproportionate to its strength. Amidst the difficulties and dangers which encompassed them on every side, the Athenians persisted in the siege of Syracuse, a city little inferior to their own; and, undaunted by the actual devastation of their country, unterrified by the menaced assault of their walls, they sent, without delay, such a reinforcement into Sicily, as afforded the most promising hopes of success in their expedition against that island[11].

The Athenian armament, commanded by Demosthenes, arrives at Syracuse. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

The Syracusans had scarcely time to rejoice at their victory, or Nicias to bewail his defeat, when a numerous and formidable armament appeared on the Sicilian coast. The foremost gallies, their prows adorned with gaudy streamers, pursued a secure course towards the harbours of Syracuse. The emulation of the rowers was animated by the mingled sounds of the trumpet and clarion; and the regular decoration, the elegant splendour, which distinguished every part of the equipment, exhibited a pompous spectacle of naval triumph. Their appearance, even at a distance, announced the country to which they belonged; and both the joy

[11] Thucydid. p. 501, & seqq.

CHAP. XX. of the besiegers, and the terror of the besieged, acknowledged that Athens was the only city in the world capable of sending to the sea such a beautiful and magnificent contribution. The Syracusans employed not unavailing efforts to check the progress, or to hinder the approach, of the hostile armament; which, besides innumerable foreign vessels and transports, consisted of seventy-three Athenian gallies, commanded by the experienced valour of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The pikemen on board exceeded five thousand; the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and, including the rowers, workmen, and attendants, the whole strength may be reckoned equal to that originally sent with Nicias[12], which amounted to above twenty thousand men.

The combined forces assault Syracuse.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the operations in Sicily had lowered the character of the general; and this circumstance, as well as the superior abilities of Demosthenes, entitled him to assume the tone of authority in their conjunct deliberations. His advice, which Eurymedon highly approved, and in which the dilatory caution of Nicias finally acquiesced, was clear and simple. "They ought to avail themselves of the alarm which the unexpected arrival of such a powerful reinforcement had spread among the enemy; and instead of submitting to the tedious formalities of a siege, at once assault the walls of Syracuse. He trusted, by the valour of his troops, to obtain, in one day,

[12] Comp. Thucydid. supra citat. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 336. Plut. in Nicia.

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the valuable reward of long and ſevere labours. But if the gods had otherwiſe determined, it would be time to deſiſt from an enterpriſe, in which delay was equal to defeat, and to employ the bravery of the Athenian youth in repelling the invaders of their country [13]."

Their firſt operations ſucceſsful.

After ravaging the banks of the Anapus, and making ſome ineffectual attempts againſt the fortifications on that ſide, probably with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, Demoſthenes choſe the firſt hour of a moonſhine night, to proceed with the flower of the army to ſeize the fortreſſes in Epipolé. The march was performed with ſucceſsful celerity; the out-poſts were ſurpriſed; the guards put to the ſword; and three ſeparate encampments, of the Syracuſans, the Sicilians, and allies, formed a feeble oppoſition to the Athenian ardour. As if their victory had already been complete, the aſſailants began to pull down the wooden battlements, or to urge the purſuit with a rapidity which diſordered their ranks.

A general engagement, in which the Athenians are defeated.

Meanwhile, the vigilant activity of Gylippus had aſſembled the whole force of Syracuſe. At the approach of the enemy his vanguard retired. The Athenians were decoyed within the intricate windings of the walls, and their irregular fury was firſt checked by the firmneſs of a Theban phalanx. A reſiſtance ſo ſudden and unexpected might alone have been deciſive; but other circumſtances were adverſe to the Athenians: their ignorance of the

[13] Thucydid. l. vii. p. 519.

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ground, the alternate obſcurity of night, and the deceitful glare of the moon, which, ſhining in the front of the Thebans, illumined the ſplendour of their arms, and multiplied the terror of their numbers. The foremoſt ranks of the purſuers were repelled; and, as they retreated to the main body, encountered the advancing Argives and Corcyreans, who, ſinging the Pœan in their Doric dialect and accent, were unfortunately taken for enemies. Fear, and then rage, ſeized the Athenians, who thinking themſelves encompaſſed on all ſides, determined to force their way, and committed much bloodſhed among their allies, before the miſtake could be diſcovered. To prevent the repetition of this dreadful error, their ſcattered bands were obliged at every moment to demand the watch-word, which was at length betrayed to their adverſaries. The conſequence of this was doubly fatal. At every rencounter the ſilent Athenians were ſlaughtered without mercy, while the enemy, who knew their watch-word, might at pleaſure join, or decline, the battle, and eaſily oppreſs their weakneſs, or elude their ſtrength. The terror and confuſion increaſed; the rout became general; Gylippus purſued in good order with his victorious troops. The vanquiſhed could not deſcend in a body with the celerity of fear, by the narrow paſſages through which they had mounted. Many abandoned their arms, and explored the unknown paths of the rocky Epipolé. Others threw themſelves from precipices, rather than await the purſuers. Several thouſands were left dead or wounded on the ſcene

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of action; and in the morning the greater part of the stragglers were intercepted and cut off by the Syracusan cavalry [14].

The salutary measures proposed by Demosthenes prevented by Nicias.

This dreadful and unexpected disaster suspended the operations of the siege. The Athenian generals spent the time in fruitless deliberations concerning their future measures, while the army lay encamped on the marshy and unhealthy banks of the Anapus. The vicissitudes of an autumnal atmosphere, corrupted by the foul vapours of an unwholesome soil, made a severe impression on the irritable fibres of men, exhausted by fatigue, dejected by disgrace, and deprived of hope. A general sickness broke out in the camp. Demosthenes urged this calamity as a new reason for hastening their departure, while it was yet possible to cross the Ionian sea, without risking the danger of a winter's tempest. But Nicias dissuaded the design of leaving Sicily until they should be warranted to take this important step by the positive authority of the republic. "Those who were actually the most bent on ignominious flight, would, after their return, be the foremost to accuse the weakness or the treachery of their commanders; and for his own part, he would rather die honourably in the field of battle, than perish by the unjust sentence of his country." Demosthenes and Eurymedon knew, by fatal experience, the irascible temper of an Athenian assembly; they only insisted, that the armament should at least remove to

14 Thucydid. p. 520, & seqq.

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a more convenient ſtation, from whence, after the troops had recovered their uſual health and ſpirits, they might haraſs the enemy by continual deſcents, until they obtained an opportunity of fighting the Syracuſan fleet on the open ſea.

His motives.

But even this reſolution was ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by Nicias, who knew by the ſecret correſpondence which he maintained with certain traitors in Syracuſe, that the treaſury of that city had been exhauſted by the enormous expence of two thouſand talents already incurred in the war, and that the magiſtrates had ſtretched their credit to its utmoſt limits, in borrowing from their allies; and who therefore naturally flattered himſelf, that the vigour of their reſiſtance would abate with the decay of their faculties. The colleagues of Nicias were confounded with the firmneſs of an oppoſition ſo unlike the flexible timidity of his ordinary character, and ſo inconſiſtent with the ſentiments which he had often expreſſed concerning the Sicilian expedition. They imagined that he might rely on ſome more important ground of confidence, which his caution was unwilling to explain; they ſubmitted therefore to his opinion, an opinion equally fatal to himſelf and to them, and to the armament which they commanded[15].

The Syracuſans receive a reinforcement.

Meanwhile the prudence of Gylippus profited of the fame of his victory, to draw a powerful reinforcement from the Sicilian cities; and the tranſports, ſo long expected from Peloponneſus, finally

[15] Comp. Thucydid. p. 524. & Plut. in Nicia.

arrived

arrived in the harbour of Ortygia. The Peloponnesian forces had failed from Greece early in the fpring; and it is not explained for what reafon they touched on the coaft of Cyrenaica. There they continued for fome months, that they might defend their Grecian brethren, actually threatened by the barbarous affaults of the Lybians; and having conquered that dangerous enemy, they augmented their fleet with a few Cyrenian gallies[16], and fafely reached Syracufe, the place of their firft deftination. This fquadron formed the laft affiftance fent to either of the contending parties, and nothing farther was required to complete the actors in the following dreadful fcene; for by the acceffion of the Cyrenians, Syracufe was either attacked or defended by all the various divifions of the Grecian name, which formed, in that age, the moft civilized portion of the inhabitants of Afia, Africa, and Europe.

The Athenians prepare to raife the fiege.

The arrival of fuch powerful auxiliaries to the befieged, and the increafing force of the malady, totally difconcerted the Athenians. Even Nicias agreed to fet fail. Every neceffary preparation was made for this purpofe, and the cover of night was chofen, as moft proper for concealing their own difgrace, and for eluding the vengeance of the enemy. But the night appointed for their departure was diftinguifhed by an inaufpicious eclipfe of the moon, for fo at leaft it was judged by the fuperftitious fears of Nicias, and by the ignorance

16 Thucydid. p. 527.

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of his diviners[17], even in the vain art which they professed. The voyage was deferred till the mystical number of thrice nine days. But before the expiration of that time it was no longer practicable; for the design was soon discovered to the Syracusans, and this discovery, added to the encouragement derived from the circumstances of which we have already taken notice, increased their eagerness to attack the enemy by sea and land. Their attempts failed to destroy, by fire-ships, the Athenian fleet. They were more successful in employing superior numbers to divide the strength, and to weaken the resistance, of an enfeebled and dejected foe. During three days there was a perpetual succession of military and naval exploits. On the first day fortune hung in suspense; the second deprived the Athenians of a considerable squadron commanded by Eurymedon; and this misfortune was embittered, on the third, by the loss of eighteen gallies, with their crews[18].

Their purpose opposed by the enemy;

The Syracusans celebrated their victory with triumphant enthusiasm; while their orators "extolled and magnified the glory of a city, which, by its native prowess and single danger, had not only maintained the independence of Sicily, but avenged the injuries of the whole Grecian name, too long dishonoured and afflicted by the oppressive tyranny of Athens. That tyranny had been acquired and confirmed by the usurped sovereignty of

17 The rules of divination, we are told, should have taught them, that the obscurity of an eclipse betokened a successful retreat. Plutarch. in Nicia.

18 Thucydid. p. 528, & seqq.

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the ſea; but even on that element, the courage of Syracuſe had defeated the experience of the enemy. Their renown would be immortal, if they accompliſhed the uſeful and meritorious work; and if, by intercepting the retreat, and deſtroying the armament of the Athenians, they cruſhed at once the power, and for ever humbled the pride, of that aſpiring people."

who throw a chain acroſs the Great Harbour.

This deſign, ſuggeſted by the wiſdom of Hermocrates, was eagerly adopted by the active zeal of his fellow-citizens, who ſtrove, with unremitting ardour, to throw a chain of veſſels acroſs the mouth of the Great Harbour, about a mile in breadth. The labour was complete before Nicias, totally occupied by other objects, attempted to interrupt it. After repeated defeats, and although he was ſo miſerably tormented by the ſtone, that he had frequently ſolicited his recal, that virtuous commander, whoſe courage roſe in adverſity, uſed the utmoſt diligence to retrieve the affairs of his country. The ſhattered gallies were ſpeedily refitted, and again prepared, to the number of an hundred and ten, to riſk the event of a battle. As they had ſuffered greatly, on former occaſions, by the hardneſs and maſſive ſolidity of the Syracuſan prows, Nicias provided them with grappling-irons, fitted to prevent the recoil of their opponents, and the repetition of the hoſtile ſtroke. The decks were crowded with armed men, and the contrivance to which the enemy had hitherto chiefly owed their ſucceſs, of introducing the firmneſs and ſtability of a military, into a naval engagement, was adopted

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in its full extent by the Athenians. When the fleet was ready for sea, Nicias recalled the troops from the various posts and fortresses still occupied by their arms, and formed them into one camp on the shore, where, on the day of battle, their ranks might be extended as widely as the vicinity of the Syracusan ramparts could safely permit; that a spacious retreat might be secured to the Athenian ships, if persecuted by their usual bad fortune; in which fatal alternative nothing remained, but to retire by land with the miserable remnant of the army. But Nicias did not yet despair, that the last efforts of his countrymen would break the enemy's chain at the mouth of the Great Harbour; and that they would return victorious, to transport their encamped companions to the friendly ports of Naxos and Catana.

Both sides prepare for battle.

Elevated by this hope, he forgot his bodily infirmities, and suppressed the anguish of his soul. With a cheerful and magnanimous firmness, he removed the dejection of the Athenians, exhorting them, before they embarked, by an affecting and manly speech, " to remember the vicissitudes of war, and the instability of fortune[19]. Though hitherto unsuccessful, they had every thing to expect from the strength of their actual preparations; nor ought men, who had tried and surmounted so many dangers, to yield to the weak prejudices of unexperienced folly, and cloud the prospect of future victory, by the gloomy remembrance of past

[19] Thucydid. p. 535, & seqq.

defeat.

defeat. They yet enjoyed an opportunity to defend their lives, their liberty, their friends, their country, and the mighty name of Athens; an opportunity which never could return, ſince the whole fortune of the republic was embarked in the preſent fleet." When Gylippus and the Syracuſan commanders were appriſed of the deſigns of the enemy, they haſtened to the defence of the bar which had been thrown acroſs the entrance of the harbour. It is uncertain for what reaſon they had left open one narrow paſſage[20], on either ſide of which they ſtationed a powerful ſquadron. Gylippus animated the ſailors with ſuch topics as the occaſion naturally furniſhed, and returned to take the conduct of the land forces, leaving Sicanus, Agatharchus, and Pythen, the two firſt to command the wings, and the laſt, a citizen of Corinth, to command the centre, of the Syracuſan fleet, which fell ſhort of the Athenian by the number of twenty gallies. But the former was admirably provided with whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for attack or for defence; even the Athenian grappling-irons had not been overlooked; to elude the dangerous graſp of theſe inſtruments, the prows of the Syracuſan veſſels were covered with wet and ſlippery hides.

Naval engagement in the Great Habour.

Before the Athenians ſet ſail, Nicias, that nothing might be neglected to obtain ſucceſs, went round the whole armament, addreſſing, in the moſt pathetic terms, the ſeveral commanders by name,

20 Και τον καταλειφθεντα διεκπλουν. Thucydid. p. 451.

recalling

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recalling to them the objects most dear and most respectable, which they were engaged by every tie of honour and affection to defend, and conjuring them by their families, their friends, and their paternal gods, to exert whatever skill or courage they collectively, or as individuals, possessed, on this ever memorable and most important occasion. He then returned to the camp with an enfeebled body and an anxious mind, committing the last hope of the republic to the active valour of Demosthenes, Eudemus, and Menander. The first impression of the Athenians was irresistible; they burst through the passage of the bar, and repelled the squadrons on either side. As the entrance widened, the Syracusans, in their turn, rushed into the harbour, which was more favourable than the open sea to their mode of fighting. Thither the foremost of the Athenians returned, either compelled by superior force, or that they might assist their companions. The engagement became general in the mouth of the harbour; and in this narrow space two hundred gallies fought, during the greatest part of the day, with an obstinate and persevering valour. It would require the expressive energy of Thucydides, and the imitative, though inimitable, sounds and expressions of the Grecian tongue, to describe the noise, the tumult, and the ardour of the contending squadrons. The battle was not long confined to the shock of adverse prows, and to the distant hostility of darts and arrows. The nearest vessels grappled, and closed with each other, and their decks were soon converted

verted into a field of blood. While the heavy-armed troops boarded the enemy's ſhips, they left their own expoſed to a ſimilar misfortune; the fleets were divided into maſſive cluſters of adhering gallies; and the confuſion of their mingled ſhouts overpowered the voice of authority; the Athenians exhorting, not to abandon an element on which their republic had ever acquired victory and glory, for the dangerous protection of an hoſtile ſhore; and the Syracuſans encouraging each other not to fly from an enemy, whoſe weakneſs or cowardice had long meditated flight[21].

The Athenians defeated.

The ſingular and tremendous ſpectacle of an engagement more fierce and obſtinate than any that had ever been beheld in the Grecian ſeas, reſtrained the activity, and totally ſuſpended the powers, of the numerous and adverſe battalions which encircled the coaſt. The ſpectators and the actors were equally intereſted in the important ſcene; but the former, the current of whoſe ſenſibility was undiverted by any exertion of mind or body, felt more deeply, and expreſſed more forcibly, the various emotions by which they were agitated[22]. Hope, fear, the ſhouts of victory, the ſhrieks of deſpair, the anxious ſolicitude of doubtful ſucceſs, animated the countenances, the voice, and the geſture of the Athenians, whoſe whole reliance centered in their fleet. When at length their gallies evidently gave way on every ſide, the contraſt of alternate, and the rapid tumult of ſucceſſive

[21] Thucydid. p. 543, & ſeqq. [22] Id. p. 544.

paſſions,

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passions, subsided in a melancholy calm. This dreadful pause of astonishment and terror was followed by the disordered trepidation of flight and fear: many escaped to the camp: others ran, uncertain whither to direct their steps; while Nicias, with a small, but undismayed band, remained on the shore, to protect the landing of their unfortunate gallies. But the retreat of the Athenians could not probably have been effected, had it not been favoured by the actual circumstances of the enemy, as well as by the peculiar prejudices of ancient superstition. In this well-fought battle, the vanquished had lost fifty, and the victors forty vessels. It was incumbent on the latter to employ their immediate and most strenuous efforts to recover the dead bodies of their friends, that they might be honoured with the sacred and indispensable rites of funeral. The day was far spent; the strength of the sailors had been exhausted by a long continuance of unremitting labour; and both they and their companions on shore were more desirous to return to Syracuse to enjoy the fruits of victory, than to irritate the dangerous despair of the vanquished Athenians[23].

Their extreme despondency.

It is observed by the Roman orator[24], with no less truth than elegance, that not only the navy of Athens, but the glory and the empire of that republic, suffered shipwreck in the fatal harbour of Syracuse. The despondent degeneracy which immediately followed this ever memorable engagement was testi-

[23] Thucydid. p. 545. [24] Cic. in Verr. v. 37.

fied in the neglect of a duty which the Athenians had never neglected before, and in denying a part of their national character, which it had hitherto been their greatest glory to maintain. They abandoned to insult and indignity the bodies of the slain; and when it was proposed to them by their commanders to prepare next day for a second engagement, since their vessels were still more numerous than those of the enemy, they, who had seldom avoided a superior, and who had never declined the encounter of an equal force, declared, that no motive could induce them to withstand the weaker armament of Syracuse. Their only desire was to escape by land, under cover of the night, from a foe whom they had not courage to oppose, and from a place where every object was offensive to their sight, and most painful to their reflection[25].

The Syracusans celebrate the festival of Hercules with licentious joy.

The behaviour of the Syracusans might have proved extremely favourable to this design. The evening after the battle was the vigil of the feast of Hercules; and the still agitated combatants awakened, after a short and feverish repose, to celebrate the memory of their favourite hero, to whose propitious influence they probably ascribed the merit of the most splendid trophy that ever adorned the fame of Syracuse. From the triumph of victory, and grateful emotions of religious enthusiasm, there was an easy transition, in the creed and in the practice of the Greeks, to the extravagance of licentious joy, and the excesses of sensual indulgence.

[25] Thucydid. p. 545.

Sports,

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Sports, proceſſions, muſic, dancing, the pleaſures of the table, of the elegant arts, and of unguarded converſation, were incorporated in the texture of their religious worſhip. But the coincidence of a feſtival and a victory demanded an accumulated profuſion of ſuch objects as ſooth the ſenſes and pleaſe the fancy. Amidſt theſe giddy tranſports, the Syracuſans loſt all remembrance of an enemy whom they deſpiſed; even the ſoldiers on guard joined the diſſolute or frivolous amuſements of their companions; and, during the greateſt part of the night, Syracuſe preſented a mixed ſcene of ſecure gaiety, of thoughtleſs jollity, and of mad and dangerous diſorder[26].

Stratagem of Hermocrates to prevent the Athenian retreat.

The firm and vigilant mind of Hermocrates alone withſtood, but was unable to divert, the general current. It was impoſſible to rouſe to the fatigues of war men buried in wine and pleaſure, and intoxicated with victory; and, as he could not intercept by force, he determined to retard by ſtratagem, the intended retreat of the Athenians, whoſe numbers and reſentment would ſtill render them formidable to whatever part of Sicily they might remove their camp. A ſelect band of horſemen, aſſuming the character of traitors, fearleſsly approached the hoſtile ramparts, and warned the Athenians of the danger of departing that night, as many ambuſcades lurked in the way, and all the moſt important paſſes were occupied by the enemy. The frequency of treaſon gained credit to the per-

[26] Thucydid. p. 546.

fidious

fidious advice; and the Athenians, having changed their first resolution, were persuaded by Nicias to wait two days longer, that such measures might be taken as seemed best adapted to promote the safety and celerity of their march [27].

The Athenians raise their camp.

The camp was raised on the third morning after the battle. Forty thousand men, of whom many were afflicted with wounds and disease, and all exhausted by fatigue, and dejected by calamity, exhibited the appearance, not of a flying army, but of a great and populous community, driven from their ancient habitations by the cruel vengeance of a conqueror. They had miserably fallen from the lofty expectations with which they sailed in triumph to the harbour of Syracuse. They had abandoned their fleet, their transports, the hopes of victory, and the glory of the Athenian name; and these collective sufferings were enhanced and exasperated by the painful images which struck the eyes and the fancy of each unfortunate individual. The mangled bodies of their companions and friends, deprived of the sacred rites of funeral, affected them with a sentiment of religious horror, on which the weakness of human nature is happily unable to dwell. They removed their attention from this dreadful sight; but they could not divert their compassion from a spectacle still more melancholy, the numerous crowds of sick and wounded, who followed them with enfeebled and unequal steps, intreating, in the accent and attitude of unutterable

Their dreadful afflictions.

[27] Thucydid. p. 547.

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anguifh, to be delivered from the horrors of famine, or the rage of an exafperated foe. Amidft fuch affecting fcenes, the heart of a ftranger would have melted with tender fympathy; but how much more muft it have afflicted the Athenians, to fee their parents, brothers, children, and friends, involved in unexampled mifery! to hear, without the poffibility of relieving, their lamentable complaints! and reluctantly to throw the clinging victims from their wearied necks and arms! Yet the care of perfonal fafety prevailed over every other care; for the foldiers, either deftitute of flaves, or diftrufting their fidelity, were not only encumbered by their armour, but oppreffed by the weight of their provifions [28].

Melancholy firmnefs of Nicias.

The fuperior rank of Nicias entitled him to a pre-eminence of toil and of woe; and he deferves the regard of pofterity by his character and fufferings, and ftill more by the melancholy firmnefs of his conduct. The load of accumulated difafters did not fink him into inactive defpondency. He moved with a rapid pace around every part of the army, and the ardour of his mind re-animating the languor of his debilitated frame, he exclaimed, with a loud and diftinct voice, "Athenians and allies! there is yet room for hope. Many have efcaped from ftill greater evils; nor ought you rafhly to accufe either fortune or yourfelves. As to me, who, in bodily ftrength, excel not the weakeft among you (for you fee to what a miferable condition my difeafe has reduced me), and

[28] Thucydid. p. 548.

who,

who, in the happineſs of private life, and the deceitful gifts of proſperity, had long been diſtinguiſhed above the moſt illuſtrious of my contemporaries, I am now confounded in affliction with the meaneſt and moſt worthleſs. Yet am I unconſcious of deſerving ſuch a fatal reverſe of fortune. My conduct towards men has been irreproachable; my piety towards the gods conſpicuous and ſincere. For this reaſon I am ſtill animated with confidence; calamities, unmerited by guilt, are diſarmed of their terrors. If we have incurred the indignation of the gods by our ambitious deſigns againſt Sicily, our offence, ſurely, is ſufficiently expiated by paſt ſufferings, which now render us the objects of compaſſion. Other nations have attacked their neighbours with leſs provocation, and have yet eſcaped with a gentler puniſhment; nor will experience warrant the belief, that for the frailties and errors of paſſion, providence ſhould impoſe penalties too heavy to be borne. We have the leſs reaſon to adopt an impious prejudice, ſo diſhonourable to the gods, when we conſider the means which their goodneſs has ſtill left us to provide for our defence. Our numbers, our reſolution, and even our misfortunes, ſtill render us formidable. There is not any army in Sicily capable to intercept our courſe; much leſs to expel us from the firſt friendly territory in which we may fix our camp. If we can ſecure, therefore, our preſent ſafety, by a prudent, ſpeedy, and courageous retreat, we may afterwards retrieve our loſt honour, and reſtore the fallen glory of Athens;

 ſince

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ſince the chief ornament of a ſtate conſiſts in brave and virtuous men, not in empty ſhips and undefended walls [29]."

The retreat of the Athenians.

The actions of Nicias fully correſponded with his words. He neglected none of the duties of a great general. Inſtead of leading the army towards Naxos and Catana, in which direction there was reaſon to apprehend many ſecret ambuſhes of the enemy, he conducted them by the weſtern route towards Gela and Camerina; expecting, by this meaſure, to find proviſions in greater plenty, as well as to elude the latent ſnares of the Syracuſans. That nothing might be omitted which promiſed the hope of relief, meſſengers were immediately diſpatched to the neighbouring cities, which might poſſibly be tempted by their natural jealouſy of the growing proſperity of Syracuſe, to favour the retreat of the vanquiſhed. The troops were then divided into two ſquares, as the moſt ſecure and capacious arrangement. Nicias led the van; Demoſthenes conducted the rear; the baggage, and unarmed multitude, occupied the centre. In this order of march they paſſed the river Anapus, the ford of which was feebly diſputed by an inconſiderable guard; and having proceeded the firſt day only five miles, they encamped in the evening on a riſing ground, after being much haraſſed during the latter part of their journey by the Syracuſan cavalry and archers, who galled them at a diſtance, intercepted the ſtragglers, and avoided, by a ſeaſonable retreat, to commit the ſecurity of their own

[29] Thucydid. p. 550.

fortune

fortune with the dangerous deſpair of the Athenians. Next day, having marched only twenty furlongs, they reached a ſpacious plain, the convenience of which invited them to repoſe; eſpecially as they needed a ſupply of water and proviſions, which might be eaſily obtained from the ſurrounding country [30].

Interrupted by the enemy.

Before this time, the enemy were appriſed of their line of march; and, in order to interrupt it, they ſent a numerous detachment to fortify the mountain of Acræum. This mountain, which probably gave name to the ſmall town ſituate in its neighbourhood, interſected the direct road to Gela and Camerina. It was diſtant a few miles from the Athenian encampment, and a ſmall degree of art might render it impregnable, ſince it was of a ſteep and rapid aſcent, and encompaſſed on every ſide by the rocky channel of a loud and foaming torrent. In vain the Athenians attempted, on three ſucceſſive days, to force the paſſage. They were repelled with loſs in every new attack, which became more feeble than the preceding. In the firſt and moſt deſperate, an accidental ſtorm of thunder encreaſed the courage of the Syracuſans and the terror of the Athenians. A ſimilar event had, in the firſt engagement after the invaſion of Sicily, produced an oppoſite effect on the contending nations. But the hopes and the fears of men change with their fortune.

Change their line of march.

In the evening after the laſt unſucceſsful conteſt, the condition of the Athenians was peculiarly de-

30 Thucydid. p. 552, & ſeqq.

 plorable.

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plorable. The numbers of the wounded had been increaſed by the fruitleſs attempts to paſs the mountain; the enemy had continually galled and inſulted them as they retreated to their camp; the adjacent territory could no longer ſupply them with the neceſſaries of life; and they muſt be compelled, after all their hardſhips and fatigues, to make a long circuit by the ſea-ſhore, if they expected to reach, in ſafety, the places of their reſpective deſtination. Even this reſolution (for there was no alternative), however dreadful to men in their comfortleſs and exhauſted ſtate, was recommended by Nicias, who, to conceal his deſign from the enemy, cauſed innumerable fires to be lighted in every part of the camp[31]. The troops then marched out under cover of the night, and in the ſame order which they had hitherto obſerved. But they had not proceeded far in this nocturnal expedition, when the obſcurity of the ſkies, the deceitful tracks of an unknown and hoſtile country, filled the moſt timid or unfortunate with imaginary terrors. Their panic, as is uſual in great bodies of men, was ſpeedily communicated to thoſe around them; and Demoſthenes, with above one half of his diviſion, fatally miſtook the road, and quitted, never more to rejoin, the reſt of the army.

The diviſion commanded by Demoſthenes ſurrenders to Gylippus.

The ſcouts of Gylippus and the Syracuſans immediately brought intelligence of this important event, which furniſhed an opportunity to attack the divided ſtrength of the Athenians. His ſuperior knowledge of the country enabled Gylippus,

[31] Thucydid. p. 552, & ſeqq.

by

by the celerity of his march, to intercept the ſmaller diviſion, and to ſurround them on every ſide, in the difficult and intricate defiles which led to the ford of the river Erinios. There he aſſaulted them with impunity, during a whole day, with darts, arrows, and javelins. When the meaſure of their ſufferings was complete, he proclaimed towards the evening, by the ſound of the trumpet, and with the loud voice of the herald, freedom, forgiveneſs, and protection to all who ſhould deſert and abandon the bad fortune of their leaders; an offer which was accepted by the troops of ſeveral Aſiatic iſlands, and other dependent and tributary countries. At length he entered into treaty with Demoſthenes himſelf, whoſe ſoldiers laid down their arms, and delivered their money (which filled the capacious hollow of four broad bucklers), on condition that they ſhould not ſuffer death, impriſonment, or famine[32]. Notwithſtanding the number of the deſerters and of the ſlain, the remainder ſtill amounted to ſix thouſand, who were ſent to Syracuſe with their captive general, under a powerful and vigilant eſcort, while the activity of Gylippus followed the flying battalions of the enemy, which had been conducted by Nicias to the diſtance of twenty miles, towards the fatal banks of the river Aſſinaros.

The diviſion under Nicias overtaken by the enemy.

The Syracuſans overtook the rear before the van could arrive at the lofty and abrupt margin of this rapid ſtream; and an herald was ſent to Nicias,

[32] Thucydid. p. 553.

 exhorting

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exhorting him to imitate the example of his colleague, and to ſurrender, without farther bloodſhed, to the irreſiſtible valour of his victorious purſuers. Nicias diſbelieved, or affected to diſbelieve, the report; but when a confidential meſſenger, whom he was allowed to diſpatch for information, brought certain intelligence of the ſurrender and diſgrace of Demoſthenes, he alſo condeſcended to propoſe terms, in the name of the Athenians, engaging, on the immediate ceſſation of hoſtilities, to reimburſe the magiſtrates of Syracuſe for the expence of the war, and to deliver Athenian hoſtages (a citizen for a talent) until the debt ſhould be liquidated [33].

Their melancholy defence.

Theſe terms were rejected by the Syracuſans with diſdain; and Gylippus having occupied the moſt advantageous poſts on every ſide, attacked the army of Nicias with the ſame mode of warfare which had, two days before, proved ſo deſtructive to their unfortunate companions. During the whole day they bore, with extraordinary patience, the hoſtile aſſault, ſtill expecting, under cover of the night, to eſcape the cruel vigilance of the enemy. But that hope was vain: Gylippus perceived their departure; and although three hundred men of determined courage gallantly broke through the guards, and effected their eſcape, the reſt were no ſooner diſcovered than they returned to their former ſtation, and laid down their arms in ſilent deſpair. Yet the return of the morning brought back their courage. They again took up their arms, and marched towards

[33] Thucydid. p. 554.

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the river, miserably galled and afflicted by the hostile archers and cavalry. Their distress was most lamentable and incurable: yet hope did not totally forsake them; for like men in the oppression and languor of a consuming disease, they still entertained a confused idea, that their sufferings would end, could they but reach the opposite banks of the neighbouring river[34].

Horrid scene on the banks of the Assinaros.

The desire of assuaging their thirst encouraged this daring design. They rushed with frantic disorder into the rapidity of the stream; the pursuing Syracusans, who had occupied the rocky banks, destroying them with innumerable volleys of missile weapons. In the Assinaros they had a new enemy to contend with. The depth and force of the waters triumphed over their single, and shook their implicated strength. Many were borne down the stream. At length the weight of their numbers resisted the violence of the torrent; but a new form of danger and of horror presented itself to the eyes of Nicias. His soldiers turned their fury against each other, disputing, with the point of the sword, the unwholesome draughts of the agitated and turbid current. This spectacle melted the firmness of his manly soul. He surrendered to Gylippus, and asked quarter for the miserable remnant of his troops, who had not perished in the Assinaros, or been destroyed by the Syracusan archers and cavalry[35]. Before the commands of the Lacedæmonian general could pervade the army, many of the soldiers had, according to the barba-

34 Thucydid. p. 554. 35 Ibid. p. 555.

rous

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rous practice of the age, ſeized their priſoners and ſlaves; ſo that the Athenian captives were afterwards diſtributed among ſeveral communities of Sicily, which had ſent aſſiſtance to Syracuſe. The reſt, upon laying down their arms, were entitled to the pity and protection of Gylippus; who, after ſending proper detachments to intercept and collect the ſtragglers, returned in triumph to the city with the ineſtimable trophies of his valour and conduct.

Death of the Athenian generals.

Nicias had little to expect from the *humanity* of a proud and victorious Spartan; but Demoſthenes might naturally flatter himſelf with the hope of *juſtice*. He urged with energy, but urged in vain, the obſervance of the capitulation which had been ratified with due forms, on the faith of which he had ſurrendered himſelf and the troops entruſted to his command. The public priſoners, conducted ſucceſſively to Syracuſe, and exceeding together the number of ſeven thouſand, were treated with the ſame inhuman cruelty. They were univerſally condemned to labour in the mines and quarries of Sicily[36]: their whole ſuſtenance was bread and water: they ſuffered alternately the ardours of a ſcorching ſun, and the chilling damps of autumn. For ſeventy days and nights they languiſhed in this dreadful captivity, during which, the diſeaſes incident to their manner of life were rendered infectious by the ſtench of the dead bodies, which corrupted the purity of the ſurrounding air. At length an eternal ſeparation was made between

Cruel treatment of the captives.

36 Thucydid. p. 556.

3 thoſe

thoſe who ſhould enjoy the happier lot of being ſold as ſlaves into diſtant lands, and thoſe who ſhould for ever be confined to their terrible dungeons. The Athenians, with ſuch Italians and Sicilians as had unnaturally embraced their cauſe, were reſerved for the latter doom. Their generals, Nicias and Demoſthenes, had not lived to behold this melancholy hour. Gylippus would have ſpared their lives, not from any motives of humanity and eſteem, but that his joyous return to Sparta might have been graced by their preſence. But the reſentment of the Syracuſans, the fears of the Corinthians; above all, the ſuſpicious jealouſy of thoſe perfidious traitors who had maintained a ſecret correſpondence with Nicias, which they dreaded leſt the accidents of his future life might diſcover, loudly demanded the immediate execution of the captive generals [37]. The Athenians of thoſe times juſtly regretted the loſs of Demoſthenes, a gallant and enterpriſing commander; but poſterity will for ever lament the fate of Nicias, the moſt pious, the moſt virtuous, and the moſt unfortunate man of the age in which he lived.

A ſingular exception to this general cruelty.

Amidſt this dark and dreadful ſcene of cruelty and revenge, we muſt not omit to mention one ſingular example of humanity, which broke forth like a meteor in the gloom of a nocturnal tempeſt. The Syracuſans, who could puniſh their helpleſs captives with ſuch unrelenting ſeverity, had often melted into tears at the affecting ſtrains of Euripides [38], an Athenian poet, who had learned in the Socratic

37 Thucydid. l. vii. ad fin.

38 See above, p. 140.

ſchool

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ſchool to adorn the leſſons of philoſophy with the charms of fancy, and who was regarded by the taſte of his contemporaries, as he ſtill is by many enlightened judges, as the moſt tender and pathetic, the moſt philoſophical and inſtructive, of all tragic writers. The pleaſure which the Syracuſans had derived from his inimitable poetry, made them long to hear it rehearſed by the flexible voices and harmonious pronunciation of the Athenians, ſo unlike, and ſo ſuperior, to the rudeneſs and aſperity of their own Doric dialect. They deſired their captives to repeat the plaintive ſcenes of their favourite bard. The captives obeyed; and affecting to repreſent the woes of ancient kings and heroes, they too faithfully expreſſed their own. Their taſte and ſenſibility endeared them to the Syracuſans, who releaſed their bonds, received them with kindneſs into their families [39], and, after treating them with all the honourable diſtinctions of ancient hoſpitality, reſtored them to their longing and afflicted country, as a ſmall but precious wreck of the moſt formidable armament that had ever ſailed from a Grecian harbour. At their return to Athens, the grateful captives walked in ſolemn proceſſion to the houſe of Euripides, whom they hailed as their deliverer from ſlavery and death [40]. This acknowledgment, infinitely more honourable than

39 Ητοι τεθνηκεν η διδασκει γραμματα, "he is either dead or teaching verſes;" an expreſſion firſt introduced at this time, was afterterwards applied proverbially, in ſpeaking of travellers in foreign countries, whoſe fate was uncertain.

40 Plutarch. in Nicia.

all

all the crowns and ſplendour that ever ſurrounded the perſon, and even than all the altars and temples that ever adorned the memory of a poet[41], muſt have tranſported Euripides with the *ſecond* triumph which the heart of man can feel. He would have enjoyed the *firſt*, if his countrymen had owed to his virtues the tribute which they paid to his talents; and if, inſtead of the beauty and elegance of his verſes, they had been ſaved by his probity, his courage, or his patriotiſm; qualities which, ſtill more than genius and fancy, conſtitute the real excellence and dignity of human nature.

[41] See above, Chapter VI.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.